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ENCYCLOPÆDIA OF THEOLOGY.

BY

DR. J. F. RÄBIGER,

ORDINARY PROFESSOR OF EVANGELICAL THEOLOGY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF BRESLAU.

Translated,

With Additions to the History and Literature,

BY THE

REV. JOHN MACPHERSON, M.A.,

FINDHORN.

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a.c

VOL. I.

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TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

FOR the scientific equipment of the student of theology the theological encyclopædia in some form or other is absolutely indispensable. Not only in beginning his professional course does the theological student require to know what generally is included in that course upon which he is entering, but the advanced student, who has been face to face with the main problems of the various branches of theological science, finds it desirable, and even necessary, that he should be reminded of the inter-relations of those theological departments, and of the attitude which theology bears to the other sciences. It is the special function of theological encyclopædia to afford to the beginner an outline and a bird's-eye view of the whole course of theological study, and, at the same time, to indicate to the professional theologian the scope and limits of the different departments of theology, the questions to be solved, and the points of view to be occupied, in accordance with the demands of science.

There are two different methods of treatment, either of which may be followed by the encyclopædist. Räbiger has adopted the *material* method, and he argues vigorously against the merely *formal* method. Those who adopt the formal method maintain that theological encyclopædia has simply to indicate the arrangement and distribution of the various theological branches, showing their relations to one another, and determining exactly their range and scope. They insist that encyclopædia has nothing to do with the detailed contents of the theological sciences, or the methods of treatment to be

followed in these several departments. It is further argued that any adequate treatment of the materials included under each division would require so many distinct treatises by specialists, and that any attempt to sketch the contents of, and indicate scientific methods for, the several divisions of theology, within the limits of a single treatise, must result in a superficial and unserviceable outline. The best answer to this last-mentioned objection lies in the presentation of the works that have been actually produced in accordance with the material method. The Encyclopædias of Hagenbach, Hofmann, and Rabiger, to mention only the most recent, all of which give a material treatment of theology and its several divisions, prove beyond all dispute how possible it is, by the exercise of a wise system of proportion, to treat suggestively and instructively all the departments embraced under the theological encyclopædia. The most telling argument in favour of the material treatment of encyclopædia seems to be this, that it is impossible according to the formal method accurately to exhibit the relations subsisting between the main divisions of theology, and those subsisting between the several sub-divisions under those leading heads. An encyclopædia constructed in accordance with the formal method may, from its conspectus-like brevity, form a convenient introduction to the study of theology, but the material method alone gives scope for a scientific treatment of the subject, inasmuch as here only the idea, scope, and limits of the theological branches can receive adequate expression.

When this view of the theological encyclopædia, as a representation of theology according to its scientific contents, is admitted, it becomes evident that there is great need for watchful attention to the relative importance of the several branches of theological science. The encyclopædist must not be an enthusiastic specialist. Such a one would almost certainly give undue prominence to the branch with which he is deeply acquainted, and overlook or under-estimate those

branches in which he had taken less interest. The correctness of the impression produced will largely depend upon the sense of proportion which has been present to the mind of him who undertakes to sketch the whole. Hence the encyclopædist must be a ripe theologian, who has carefully traversed the various theological departments and made himself familiar with the technical details of all the leading divisions of theology. All the successful encyclopædists of modern times have been men who had attained distinction in several departments of theological study. Hagenbach, for example, though chiefly known for his contributions to historical theology, in the departments of Church history and the history of doctrines, had also written a short hermeneutical treatise, and, under the department of practical theology, had published a handbook on homiletics and liturgics. Then Hofmann, again, as is well known, was equally distinguished as a systematic theologian and as an exegete, and had early won for himself a reputation as a historian. And this is true also of Räbiger, although his name is not widely known among English readers. The manner in which the several divisions of theology are treated in this encyclopædia is the best proof that the author is no novice in any of these departments. Besides his class lectures on various branches of theological science, Räbiger has published approved treatises in more than one department. We have an early treatise from his hand on the ethics of the Old Testament Apocrypha (*Ethice librorum apocryph. Vet. Test.* Vratislaviæ 1836, 1838), which is a contribution at once to systematic, exegetical, and historical theology. Then we have a work, which is referred to with approval by Pfleiderer in his Paulinism, on the Christology of Paul (*De christologia Paulina contra Baurium commentatio.* Vratislaviæ 1852), which shows a similar comprehensiveness of theological study. In the purely exegetical department we have a volume of valuable critical discussions on Paul's

Epistles to the Corinthians (*Kritische Untersuchungen ueber den Inhalt der beiden Briefe an die Korinther*). Ripe scholarship, to the acquirement of which those earlier works testify, and mature thoughtful reflection upon the fundamental problems and characteristic points of all the departments of theology, are the main features of Räbiger's contribution to theological encyclopædia.

Räbiger's Theological Encyclopædia has been very favourably noticed in the leading theological reviews of Germany. Hilgenfeld says that no one can rise from the reading of any section of the book without having received both suggestion and instruction. A similar verdict may be fairly expected from the English reader who is prepared to devote to its study the attention which it demands.

In the present edition an endeavour has been made to render the work more directly serviceable to the English reader than a mere rendering of the original treatise would have been. Considerable additions have been made to the history of encyclopædia as given in the Introduction. In common with most German theologians, Räbiger confined his review for the most part to the works of his fellow-countrymen. I have inserted a few notices of works that had been thus overlooked by the author. Then, such treatises on encyclopædia as had appeared since the original publication of Räbiger's work, those of Doedes, Hofmann, and Rothe, have been sketched and criticized at the close of the historical review. In the notes many additional references to English theological literature have been given, and special care has been taken to refer the reader to English translations of German books referred to, wherever any such were known to exist. All additions have been carefully marked "Ed." or enclosed within square brackets.

The first volume embraces all the introductory and general matter, and the second volume will be wholly devoted to the treatment of the several divisions of theology. In order to

make the first volume as complete as possible, I have added three appendices. The first, and by far the largest of these, is simply a translation of Rabiger's treatise, *Zur theologischen Encyclopædie*, published two years after the appearance of the present work. As an important criticism of the theological positions of such theologians as Hofmann and Rothe, it has been given entire. The second appendix is also a translation from this little treatise, and, as an answer to an able critic, it serves to illustrate many of Rabiger's principles and methods of treatment. The third appendix I have written in answer to a possible objection against a distribution of the theological sciences which allows no separate place for apologetics.

Rabiger gave his treatise the alternative title "Theologik;" but as this name has not commended itself to any of his theological critics, it has not been inserted in the title-page of the present edition.

THE TRANSLATOR.

FINDHORN, *October* 1884.

AUTHOR'S PREFACE.

THE addition of another to the many theological encyclopædias is justified by the circumstances in which theology and Church are at the present time. It is an undeniable fact that theology no longer possesses its earlier scientific reputation, and that for this decadence it is itself not without blame. If theology subordinates itself to a traditional ecclesiasticism, or sets as its highest task the rendering of service to an ecclesiastical professionalism, or loses itself in an excessively minute investigation of historical details, it need not surprise us that from many sides its scientific claims are gainsaid, and a place in the circle of the sciences denied it, or that it is even branded as the enemy of culture, of which the sooner an end is made the better. And if such be really the case with theology, why should not our studious youths avoid a study which seems to demand of them the sacrifice of intellect, or, at least, affords no food for their youthful aspirations? Owing to the importance which in Protestant circles theology has for Church, its decadence must react most injuriously on Church life. The immediate consequence of the degradation, undervaluing, and rejection of theology is that the Protestant consciousness dies out, and the reformation spirit is no longer operative in its original living power, that to many, a dogmatically stable ecclesiasticism seems the highest end, while by others, on the contrary, the Church is regarded as a historical anachronism, which should be completely eliminated from modern culture, and that between these two extremes an indifference

to forms, yea, a complete aversion to Church, has in wide circles firmly rooted itself.

Now theological encyclopædia should not only render an account of the condition of the theology of its time, but should above all work for the up-building of theology. We have therefore, at the present time, incentives of the most varied kind for engaging anew upon the treatment of encyclopædia, and in those very incentives themselves we find the chief points of view which are of importance for such a treatment. Over against the modern view of theology, what must be done is to vindicate for theology its scientific independence and authority among the other sciences. But over against a Catholicism, which conducts itself with an ever increasing recklessness, as though Protestantism no longer existed, there must be the awakening of the Protestant spirit and the Protestant consciousness, the winning again of the German people's love for their Reformed Church, and the leading of the German youth, by a deep impulse of the heart, undeterred by any outward critical considerations, to the study of theology and the service of the Church. To furnish a contribution to this work is the purpose which has led me to publish my treatise on theological encyclopædia. With peculiar pleasure I have repeatedly delivered lectures on this branch of study. The brief outlines, however, which were sufficient in academic treatment were not sufficient for publication, and have been expanded by me in the present work. As in the lectures, so also in the ampler treatise, I have been guided by the conviction, that for the end assigned to theological encyclopædia it did not suffice to lay down a mere formal scheme of the departments of theological study, but that it was necessary rather to include in the scheme the essential contents of theology, and so to furnish not merely a formal but a material outline of theological science. This mode of treatment certainly brings with it no small difficulties to the encyclopædist, inasmuch as it presupposes a uniform

mastering of all the departments of theology. Nevertheless, as this is undoubtedly the right method, I have not felt at liberty to refrain from myself undertaking those difficulties, trusting to the indulgence of the specialists. The space required for this essential development I have endeavoured to gain by treating the literature of the several branches of study within the narrowest possible limits. From the method adopted, the name *Theologic* has suggested itself to me as corresponding to the old *studium theologicum*, and seems preferable to the name Theological Encyclopædia commonly given since first applied to the science by Mursinna. The standpoint from which I view theology and have sought to represent it, may be generally described as the historical. As in all scientific departments the historical method has in our time won general acceptance, it can least of all be departed from in theology. It ought not therefore to be said that, because of a temporarily prevailing current, Theology has to take the historical standpoint, and to apply itself to a one-sided historical investigation. Much rather I am of opinion that theology must on principle, in consequence of its own essential character, place itself on historical ground, and from that solve its ideal problems. No science is so much exposed as theology to the danger of falling under the sway of subjectivity. The various theological systems have yielded more or less to subjective influences. Only when led by the inexorable declarations of history is theology able to avoid the cliffs of subjectivity and reach those of objectivity, after which every science has striven. From this point of view have I proceeded. May God render the work which I have executed in single-hearted love for theology and Church, fruitful for both, and accompany it with His blessing.

THE AUTHOR.

BRESLAU, *October* 1879.

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THEOLOGICAL ENCYCLOPÆDIA.

INTRODUCTION.

§ 1. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE HISTORY OF THE THEOLOGICAL ENCYCLOPÆDIA.

THE beginnings of Christian theology carry us back to the earliest period of the Church. As soon as the Christian Church life had been in some measure consolidated, Christian theology also began to shape itself, and this theology, just as the development of the Church became wider and more varied, has kept equal pace with the Church development through the course of the centuries down to the present time. Advancing from a religious interest, at once deep and uninterruptedly maintained, theology is the most important creation of the Christian spirit, a witness of the living force dwelling in it, such as no other religious communion possesses. A comprehensive history of Christian theology would require to take note of the far-reaching influences of theology, not only upon life within the Church, but also upon all circles of life outside of the Church, in so far as the Church has been in any measure in contact with them.

An encyclopædia of theology could make its appearance for the first time only after theology had itself been so far perfected as to be capable of presentation as a subject for

reflective study. But, having once made its appearance, it has, through all centuries, continued the faithful companion of theology, partly determined by the course of theological development, partly determining that development. A history of theological encyclopædia must, indeed, set for itself a much humbler task than that which is set for the history of theology: nevertheless, within its limited range, it still bestows a glance upon the development of theology as a whole, and just thereby secures a significance for every new exposition of theological encyclopædia. The theological encyclopædia of the present must attach itself to the history of the present,[1] and from the course of that history it must seek to win the right points of view, both for the general conception and for the systematic arrangement of theology. An endeavour must also be made, by means of such an attachment to the history, to attain unto that objectivity, so pre-eminently desirable in encyclopædia, which has to estimate fairly not only that general position which it assumes as its own, but also that which may possibly be regarded as erroneous, if a proper representation is to be given of the theological conditions of the present. Most of the encyclopædists of recent times have, indeed, admitted into their treatises the history of theological encyclopædia, yet the inner connection of this history with the encyclopædia itself has never been made sufficiently clear. In these treatises, therefore, the significance of the history falls into the background —indeed its very admission seems unauthorized. The significance of the history of theological encyclopædia, as well as its right to a place in the encyclopædia itself, can be vindicated and made good only when the history has been accurately conceived as the foundation upon which the theological encyclopædia is to be reared.

[1] That is to say, must describe the origin and growth of all those elements which constitute the complex phenomenon known as theology in the present day.—Ed.

§ 2. THE HISTORY OF THEOLOGICAL ENCYCLOPÆDIA.

(*a*) *In the Primitive Period.*

The germs of Christian theology are already discernible in the apostolic writings. Their doctrine of Christ, the history of His life, and of the first fortunes of His Church, the decisions regarding the formation of the Christian society, demonstrations from the Old Testament, especially by Paul and by the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, furnish the foundation for further theological development. As the bearer of a new religious life, the Christian Church entered into history, and found a world already become old, which confronted it with its religions, and with a rich culture grown up from them. In its struggle with Judaism, and heathenism, and various tendencies manifesting themselves in the Church itself, all of which leant more or less upon the old, it had to make the new truth, which it professed, the subject of observation and research, of investigation and comparison, in order to prove it to be the power which was entitled to stand in place of the old. This was the scientific, that is, the theological task of the Christian Church. Theology, like every science, has proceeded immediately from the life, from the most pressing needs, which were present to individuals as well as to the Christian community collectively, and, during the first four centuries, under the freest development, it possessed decisive authority in the Church. From the fifth century, however, the independence and power of theology were gradually lost in the ecclesiasticism that had meanwhile grown strong, which from this time forth, in accordance with the complete severance of the ecclesiastical orders into laymen on the one hand, and clergy, priests, and monks on the other, dominated everything as a hierarchical authority.

Looking stedfastly into the Person of Christ, moved by the Spirit which they received from Him, leaning on ecclesiastical tradition, and not carried away by the Greek wisdom, that old theology devoted its strength with rare zeal to the investigation of Holy Scripture, the history of the Church, and the development of Christian doctrine, and, in a rich literature, bequeathed to posterity the treasures of its Christian knowledge. As the result and pith of its scientific controversies and labours, it has also given expression to the ecclesiastically sanctioned doctrine of the Trinity and Person of Christ in the most summary form, and has won substantial credit to itself by separating the apostolic writings from the writings of the primitive Christian period, and joining the former with the Old Testament so as to form the biblical canonical Scriptures. From this time forth, under the authority of the Church, all theological argumentation is grounded upon oral and written tradition (the latter growing up, through the decisions of Councils and the teachings of the Church Fathers, into an ever-expanding material), and upon the Holy Scripture of the Old and New Testaments, the sacred dignity of which was firmly established by means of the doctrine of inspiration.

Owing to its extraordinarily rich productivity, which had been called forth by the immediate needs of the Church life, theology in the first centuries did not reach such a calm condition and systematic form as to be able to set on foot reflections upon itself, to determine theoretically its own peculiar task, to fix and bring into a systematic connection with one another the principles on which it has to build itself up, and the constituent parts which it has to embrace—that is, in short, theology was not yet able to conceive and represent itself as a special and independent science. Only after the end of the fourth century did any writings appear in which the beginnings of theological encyclopædia are discernible; and even then, these were of the most elementary kind, inasmuch as even these writings followed, not a theological, but merely a

practical tendency, in seeking to utilize for the service of the Church such theological attainments as had then been reached.

According to Chrysostom in his work on the priesthood,[1] the Church is the City of God, and its government is entrusted to the priests. Priests are distinguished from laymen as men are from beasts. As dispensers of the sacraments and as wielding the power of the keys, they preside over the entrance into heaven and hell, and are to be honoured more highly than kings and princes, to be revered more than earthly parents. The higher the rank, the greater are the difficulties and dangers of the priestly calling. Therefore, priests ought to distinguish themselves from the laity not only by moral and practical qualities (the priesthood is a *πρᾶγμα ἀγγελικῆς ἀρετῆς δεόμενον*), but also by *ἀκρίβεια δογμάτων* and *γνῶσις*, that is, by exact acquaintance with Church doctrine and by the understanding of Holy Scripture, so that, in accordance with the demands made upon the priestly office, they may defend the Church and its doctrines against heathens and heretics, against Jews and curious questioners within the Church itself, and engage successfully in the edification of the congregation. Chrysostom accordingly does not allow himself even to name the separate theological studies, but contents himself with making a general demand that the priest should seek to gain theological culture for practical use in his official calling, that is, knowledge of Church doctrine and of Holy Scripture. In this very treatise of his, however, when divested of its exaggerated estimate of priestly rank, he furnishes a noticeable contribution to pastoral theology.

In this connection we may place side by side with the writing of Chrysostom that of Ambrose, *de officiis ministrorum*,[2] in the Western Church. After the example of Cicero, *de officiis*,

[1] Joannis Chrysostomi de sacerdotio libri sex. Gr. et lat. op. Jo. A. Bengelii. Stutt. 1725.

[2] Ambrosii Mediolanensis episcopi de officiis ministrorum libri tres. Opera, ed. Maur. t. iii. Venet. 1751.

Ambrose, with great knowledge of Scripture, developes the Christian ethics in contrast to that of heathenism, and holds this before his clergy as a pattern according to which they have to fashion their lives. The learned culture which, according to Chrysostom, is appropriate in the clergy, is not made prominent by Ambrose.

Augustine, on the contrary, lays great stress upon this in his four books, *de doctrina Christiana*,[1] which were intended specially for ordained preachers. The *vera religio*, which the Church possesses, and which the ordained preacher should proclaim, is to be known from Holy Scripture. The preacher, therefore, should not only believe on the authority of the Church, but he should seek to gain from Holy Scripture the understanding of the doctrine acknowledged by the Church, and preach it accordingly. For the right understanding of Holy Scripture, a *munus divinum*—a divine endowment, to which some are so ready to appeal, is not at all sufficient; but rather for that end special scholarly acquirements, and a special scholarly dexterity, are requisite. Augustine, therefore, in the first three books of the work just quoted, which treat of the *modus inveniendi quæ intelligenda sunt*, indicates the means and methods by which the understanding of Scripture is attained, especially acquaintance with the Hebrew and Greek languages, as also natural science, astronomy, history, and dialectic; and then in the fourth book, which treats of the *modus proferendi quæ intellecta sunt*, he shows how the preacher has to give forth what he has learnt from Scripture. With reference, therefore, to the study of Scripture recommended to the ordained preacher, Augustine simply frames the outlines of a system of biblical hermeneutics, and a sacred rhetoric or system of homiletics.

While Chrysostom and Ambrose write for priests, and Augustine writes for preachers, Cassiodorus, in the sixth

[1] Augustini de doctrina christiana libri quatuor. Opera, ed. Migne, t. iii. Paris 1861. [Translation—Messrs. Clark's series of St. Augustine's Works.]

century, gives, in his *Institutiō divinarum Scripturarum*,[1] to his monks in the monastery of Viviers in Southern Italy, an instruction in theological science. In this work he makes prominent the reference to the religious and moral life of the Christian. It is the spiritual wellbeing of his monks that lies upon his heart. With a view to this, and to the higher perfection of the Christian life which they ought to exemplify, he sets before them what they should appropriate in the way of clerical acquirements, in order that they may become confirmed in the faith sanctioned by the Church, and advanced in holiness of conversation. Above all, therefore, he recommends to them the study of Holy Scripture. From it is to be derived that heavenly truth which secures for those who live according to it, eternal salvation. But for this very study he gives them such comprehensive directions, by means of references to the most important exegetical works, and by critical and hermeneutical remarks, that to a certain extent he has furnished them with an outline of a complete course of exegetical theology. But for further establishment in the faith, and confirmation against heretical snares, he demands of the monks the study of the decisions of Councils, as well as those writings of the Fathers which treat of the doctrines of the Church, especially the fundamental doctrine of the Trinity, or such as are useful for the Christian moral life. Among the dogmatical and ethical studies, however, must also be included the study of Church history, which indeed, by means of *res cælestes*, is fitted to educate the minds of those who study it. Secular sciences also are promotive of Christian studies, the *disciplinæ sæculares*, cosmography, grammar, rhetoric, dialectic, arithmetic, music, geometry, and astronomy: only he gives a warning against the undue exaltation of these, as also generally against the over-estimation of learning. (*Sciamus tamen non in solis literis positam esse prudentiam, sed perfectum sapientiam dare Deum unicuique prout vult. Nam si tantum in*

[1] Opera, ed. Garet. Venet. 1729. Vol. ii. p. 508 sqq.

literis esset scientia rerum bonarum, qui literas nesciunt, utique rectam sapientiam non haberent, c. 28.) Finally, in what may be regarded as a contribution to practical theology, he further recommends to the monks attention to gardening and agriculture, horticulture, fishing, and the study of medicine, that they may be able in their cloister to exercise hospitality, and tend the sick, but special care is to be given to the copying of the Holy Scriptures.

In the seventh century, Isidorus, Archbishop of Seville, in his twenty books of Etymologies,[1] which form a general encyclopædia of the sciences, included theology. Accordingly, in the first three books he has treated of the seven *artes liberales* as the philosophical groundwork; in the fourth book, of medicine; in the fifth, of jurisprudence; while in the sixth, seventh, and eighth books, he indicates the principal parts of theological study. In the sixth book he treats of ecclesiastical writings and offices, and, after the example of Augustine and Cassiodorus, he gathers together here everything which in that time was regarded as Scripture science, and closely joins to this what belongs to practical theology. Then in the seventh book, "On God, Angels, and Believers," he treats of matters belonging to dogmatics and ethics. And finally, in the eighth book, "On the Church and the various Sects," he communicates the materials of Church history, and that, indeed, from a high point of view, so that he draws into his description the Jewish sects, heathen philosophers, poets, and mythologies, and indicates the influence which Judaism, heathen philosophy, poetry, and religion exercised upon the historical development of Christianity.

A reference to the contents of the writings quoted show that none of them, not even that of Isidorus, though it claims to have a scientific arrangement, meets the demands which ought to be answered in a system of theological science.

[1] Isidori Hispalensis episcopi opera omnia, rec. Faustino Arevalo. Romæ 1798. T. iii. iv. Etymologiarum libri xx.

Nevertheless, it is worthy of note that they seek to turn to account for the Church life the theological attainments then reached, with limitation indeed to the higher orders in the Church, to priests, preachers, and monks, while the subordinate order of the laity remains unheeded, so that, led by this practical consideration, and leaning on the authority of the Church, and ecclesiastical tradition, and Holy Scripture, they made prominent those fundamental articles which are indispensable to the upbuilding of theological science. Thus these writers assign to the study of Scripture a privileged place, and also maintain firmly the connection of theology with the secular sciences, although at most they allow these only as helps to the study of Scripture. Were the *disjecta membra*, as they here lie, gathered together, there would rise up straightway a structure of theology, inwardly indeed wanting in systematic articulation, but yet outwardly stately, having as its principal parts the study of Scripture, dogmatical and ethical study, Church history, and practical theology.

§ 3. THE HISTORY OF THEOLOGICAL ENCYCLOPÆDIA—*Continued.*

(*b*) *During the Middle Ages.*

The same practical tendency, which from the writings referred to above is seen to characterize the first period, is found still prevailing in the *Institutio clericorum* of Rabanus Maurus,[1] the learned Abbot of Fulda, in the beginning of the ninth century. Rabanus, too, brings theology into the closest connection with the idea of the Church and its three orders, the order of the laity, of the monks, and of the priests. Theology is only for the priests, and consists in their ecclesiastical instruction, by means of which they may obtain those acquirements and that moral excellence which are necessary for guiding the helm of the Church. (*Institutio ecclesiastica qualiter ad divinum officium instrui oporteat sanctissimum ordinem clericorum, multimoda narratione declarat, quia et scientiæ plenitudinem et vitæ rectitudinem et eruditionis perfectionem maxime eos habere decet, qui in quodam culmine constituti gubernaculum regiminis in ecclesia tenent.* Lib. 3, init.) In the first two books of the work referred to, Rabanus treats of the various ranks of the priests, and of the various spiritual offices, with their respective functions, which are to be administered on the basis of the traditional faith of the Church. Consequently he gathers together in this part of

[1] Rabani Mauri opera omnia, ed. Migne. Paris 1851. T. i. p. 293 sqq. De clericorum institutione ad Heistulphum archiepiscopum libri tres. [Besides this work Rabanus wrote a treatise, *de universo*, in twenty-two books, which is closely modelled on that of Isidorus of Seville on Etymologies, and is, like it, an encyclopædia; of interest now only as indicating the range of studies prescribed to theological students of the ninth century. In his later years, as Archbishop of Mainz, he enlarged and recast the first book of his Institutio. See further particulars well stated in a concise article by Hauck in Herzog's Encyclopædie, Bd. xii. p. 459–465.]

his treatise all that belongs to Church government and to the Church service, and generally whatever would fall under the head of practical theology. And this he does, in order that he may point out, in the third book, that the priest must qualify himself for the discharge of his official duties in the Church pre-eminently by means of the study of Holy Scripture, which is the foundation and source of all wisdom. Finally, with the priest as preacher still in view, he produces a sketch of homiletics, which is rich in good and pointed remarks.

While Rabanus from his clerical standpoint failed to reach any systematic construction of theology, and, indeed, leaves unnoticed altogether certain of its essential articles, which had been previously recognised, in the twelfth century a more ambitious, more thoroughly systematizing spirit meets us in the mystic Hugo St. Victor. In the seven books of his *Eruditio Didascalica*,[1] he has drawn up a universal system of the sciences. Man, who alone of all creatures is endowed with reason, in order to secure the restoration of the integrity of his nature, upon the possession of which his likeness to God depends, and in order to secure victory over the varied necessities and wants of life, has to strive after wisdom as the highest good. The study of wisdom is philosophy. In the fourfold partition of this study (*theorica*, *practica* or *ethica*, *mechanica*, and *logica*) theology occupies in the *scientia theorica*, the properly speculative science, the highest place. But although Hugo was indeed able to assign its place to theology in the collective system, he did not succeed in distinguishing it as a special branch of study from the study of philosophy generally, and in systematically arranging it, like the general system of philosophy, according to its principal constituent parts. The leading divisions of theology, however, do come into view in this work of Hugo's, though indeed somewhat inconsequently. Thus, for example, he presupposes the faith of the

[1] Hugonis de Sancto Victore opera omnia, ed. Migne, t. ii. p. 741 sqq. Eruditionis didascalicæ libri vii.

Church, and then, for the establishment thereof, he urgently recommends the study of Holy Scripture; to this, again, he gives a very thorough treatment, co-ordinating therewith the study of the Church Fathers, and then he brings to the front what we would now reckon Church history and the history of dogmas. And then finally, in the seventh book, he draws up an outline of dogmatics, which to a certain extent, as the first part of the *scientia theorica*, may be called his *theologia* in the highest sense.

Next to Hugo St. Victor, as still belonging to the thirteenth century, may be placed the Dominican, Vincent of Beauvais, *vir immensæ lectionis*. According to a fundamental view essentially Christian, he expounds in his *Bibliotheca Mundi*,[1] which is divided into *speculum naturale, doctrinale, morale*, and *historiale*, the whole range of contemporary knowledge. After having treated in the *speculum naturale* of natural science, and, towards its close, of human nature according to its original condition, and according to its corruption through sin, he goes on in the second treatise to doctrine, that is, to science in its special sense, to which everything belongs which pertains to the preservation or restoration of the temporal and spiritual wellbeing of mankind: so that he treats here of philosophy in general, and of that science which is the grand end of all the sciences, that is, of theology. But the true divine theology is to be distinguished from the false, heathenish theology, which moves only in the sphere of nature, whereas the true becomes first possible by means of the Word become flesh, from whom Holy Scripture is derived. Divine authority therefore enters in, and every believing and pious mind must submit himself to it. In *divina scriptura* there is contained *divina sapientia*, and all the *artes* must be placed at the service of *divina sapientia*, which, in the form of dogmatics and ethics, leads back fallen man to his original innocence and dignity, and enables him to attain unto the enjoyment of eternal

[1] Vincentii Bellovacensis bibliotheca mundi. Duaci 1624.

blessedness. This last point is specially elaborated in the *speculum morale*,[1] which embraces a system of Christian ethics, into which, at the same time, rich dogmatic material is admitted. Thus has Vincent assigned a place to theology among the other sciences; but for the systematic arrangement of the parts of theology itself, he has indeed contributed nothing. Viewing theology as a whole, he does not regard it from the theoretical point of view of knowledge, but rather from an ethical point of view. According to Vincent, it is essentially the task of theology to restore again man hurled by the fall into destruction and misery, and to make him a partaker of that eternal salvation ordained for him.

Theology, then, as it has been represented in the writings hitherto referred to, judged of according to its scientific character, not only leaves out—what for every science is indispensable—the organic arrangement, according to a strict inward connection, of particulars under the sections to which they belong; but also, what is of principal importance, it is wanting altogether in that independent spiritual energy which penetrates the given material, and makes it a unity by imparting to it its own character. This theology is throughout bound to the authority of the traditional faith sanctioned by the Church, and to the divine authority of Holy Scripture, so that it has to maintain in reference to this authority an attitude that is essentially passive and receptive. The study of Scripture, invariably recommended, is again subordinated to the authority of the faith of the Church, and is indeed only demanded in order to reach the right understanding of that faith. But in order that the letter of Scripture may prove itself pliable to the various purposes which it is to serve, a fourfold sense of Scripture is laid down in the hermeneutical axioms which occur in those treatises before referred to, *sensus literalis, allegoricus, moralis,* or *tropologicus,* and *anagogicus,* so that the

[1] Neudecker in Herzog's Real-Encyclopædie, under the word Vincentius, proves that the *speculum morale* is not genuine.

theologian need never get into any embarrassment over a passage of Scripture in regard to its signification, or in regard to the purpose that should be served by its application.[1] The *scientia* or *doctrina theologica*, as it here presents itself, is therefore not so much an actual scientific branch of study, but rather a mere acquirement resting upon authority, which is useful for practical purposes of the most varied kinds,—it may be for vindication of the faith of the Church, or for the refuting of heretics, or for the edification of individuals and of the community, or for the guidance of the Church, or generally, for spiritual furtherance or advancement, to which also the other sciences, outside of theology, ought to contribute. Theology appears here as a mere scholarly exercise, which nevertheless continues to be constantly applied to the life of the Church and to its real needs.

If you look away from the theoretical representations of theological study, and consider theology as it shows itself in its practical results during this mediæval period, then this so-called scholastic theology, which from the eleventh to the fourteenth century was essentially dominant, does not in general succeed in meeting that demand which, we saw, has hitherto been always made of theology,—the demand, that is to say, for study of the Scriptures, in such a way that by

[1] In the earliest Christian times the allegorical method of interpretation was universally favoured, and as it had been already largely employed by Greeks and Jews in the study of the Old Testament, it awakened no opposition. Then Origen, early in the third century, advocated a threefold sense, and was followed by Ambrose, Augustine, and all the great teachers of these centuries. Even this, however, did not afford sufficient scope for spiritualizing, and so, by the fifth century, we find the fourfold sense, as referred to above, advocated by leading divines, and securing a firm place in theology. Bonaventura (1221–74), who ultimately recommended a sevenfold sense, as supported by the seven seals of the Revelation, vindicated the fourfold sense by reference to the Trinity,—three and one,—one *literal*, then the *anagogical* referring to the Father, the *allegorical* to the Son, and the *tropological* to the Holy Spirit. *Deus est trinus et unus. In essentia unus, in personis trinus. Ideo Scriptura, quæ est de ipso, habet in unitate literæ triformitatem intelligentiæ.* See Doedes, Manual of Hermeneutics, Edin. 1867, p. 19–22. Reuss, Geschichte der Heilig. Schr. N. T. § 525. —Ed.

means of it a religious quickening and elevation should be continuously communicated to theology, its ethical contents preserved, and also its connection with the practical life of the Church maintained. That type of doctrine, too, which had been elaborated by the primitive Christian theology, remained firm in the scholastic theology, as an unimpeachable holy thing under the sanction of the Church. It sought, however, to arrive at the understanding of this doctrine, not by means of Scripture investigation, but by means of dialectic elaboration. The spiritual interest which was excited by acquaintance with Platonic, and especially Aristotelian philosophy, showed its influence upon the scholastic theology, in the treatment which this latter gave to the traditional dogma, which was an endeavour by means of philosophizing methods to get near spiritually to the dogma, and then to make it accessible to the understanding through dialectic elaboration. The Christian spirit, urged on by an indwelling impulse, has, in the scholastic theology, accomplished a wonderful work, and by means of this has impressed its signature upon the mediæval period; but because of its bondage to traditional dogma on the one hand, and because of the philosophical restraint thereby laid upon it on the other hand, it could not produce out of this unclear mixture of philosophy and doctrinal propositions any clear scientific result which would survive its own time. Scholasticism is, speaking generally, a onesided theological intellectualism, which being altogether self-contained, ever more and more lost itself in a logical formalism; and being in this way divorced from religious interests, it not only failed to satisfy the demands of the Church life upon theology, but upon this Church life, as well as upon the general guidance of the Church and the Church service, it exerted a most baneful influence.

From a directly ethical point of view, a reaction soon set in against the onesidedness of scholastic theology. Already, in the second half of the thirteenth century, the Franciscan

Roger Bacon discovered its weak points, and the injuries done by it to the interests of the Church. His *Compendium studii philosophiæ*[1] comes here specially under consideration. In spite of the many *doctores maxime in theologia*, the period is one in which the grossest errors and profoundest ignorance prevailed. Especially the Romish Curia, and, after its example, the religious orders and the clergy, were corrupted. The days of Antichrist had come. But the corruption of morals is evidence of the corruption of science. *Et ideo cum tantam corruptionem vitæ videmus ubique et maxime in clericis, necesse et quod eorum studium sit corruptum*, p. 398 sqq. Original sin, individual sin, the domination of an unworthy authority, the low taste of the inexperienced multitude, the power of custom, and *obstinatio animi humani, qua in solatium suæ ignorantiæ reprobat omnia quæ ignorat*, are the chief causes of ignorance. Many have expressed themselves contemptuously about *magistri* and *doctores* of theology and philosophy, while they themselves have learnt nothing, and are still unable to learn anything, *occupati appetitu deliciarum, devitiarum et honorum, et corrupti causis ignorantiæ prædictis*, p. 428. The study of theology must enter upon a quite different course, *et tanto nequius latet error, quanto maior fit apparentia sapientiæ. . . . Nunc nunquam fuerunt tot studentes nec tot doctores, . . . et tamen infinitus est error in studio theologiæ et per consequens philosophiæ propter malos theologos.* While Bacon demands the removal of existing evils by a *summus pontifex aliquis optimus* and a *concilium generale*, p. 429, he exerts all the powers of his mind and his comprehensive scholarship in order to turn science about again into right paths, or by this means to work a reformation upon his times. Led on by a profoundly Christian intuition, Bacon places himself at a thoroughly universal standpoint. All

[1] Fr. Rogeri Bacon, Opera quædum hactenus inedita, vol. i. Edited by J. S. Brewer, London 1859. Contents:—1. Opus tertium. 2. Opus minus. 3. Compendium studii philosophiæ.

wisdom, according to him, is derived from God. God has revealed it to the unbelieving philosophers as well as to the believing. First to His saints, to whom also He gave the law, has He communicated philosophy, and this is handed down in the Hebrew tongue; it was renewed through Aristotle in the Greek tongue; and after him through Avicenna in the Arabic tongue, *Opus Tertium*, p. 32.

The study of philosophy is identical with the study of wisdom, and falls into two parts—the one speculative, the other practical. The branches of study belonging to practical philosophy are practical, *quia considerant opera utilia in ecclesia et republica et toto mundo. Opera principalia quæ valent homini, sunt ista, quæ ipsum ordinant in vitam æternam et retrahunt ab inferno.* Comp. *Studii phil.* p. 393 sqq. The *scientia practica sive moralis* is the *domina partium omnium philosophiæ et utitur eis et imperat propter utilitates civitatum et regnorum.* Of its six leading divisions, of which jurisprudence has to be set forth last, the first five belong to the department of theology, as dogmatics, the doctrine of Church and State, ethics, apologetics, and homiletics, *Opus Tertium*, p. 47 sqq. But scientific knowledge is to be attained by three different methods, by the method of authority, of reason, and of experience. Mere *auctoritas* leads only to *credulitas*, for which *intellectus* must give the *ratio*, but even the *ratio* itself again must approve itself to experience. Comp. *Studii phil.* p. 396. The sciences necessary for all study, but despised by modern theologians, are *scientia linguarum sapientialium, mathematica, perspectiva, alkimia, scientia experimentalis*, p. 433. The *linguæ sapientales*, that is, the languages in which all wisdom has been handed down, are the Hebrew, Greek, Arabic, and Chaldean languages. As the knowledge of these is indispensable for general study, it is specially so for the *studium principale*, theological study. The seven defects from which, according to Bacon, that study suffered during his time (*Opus Minus*, p. 322 sqq.), can be removed only by means of a thorough-

going study of Scripture. In Holy Scripture the sum-total of wisdom is contained. Theology, which ought to secure for itself the possession of that wisdom, must extract it from the vessels in which it was originally deposited, that is, from the original tongues, p. 465 sq. Bacon proves by thirteen reasons the necessity of the study of languages, and is against all translations being accepted, so that he would rather like to see all the vile Latin translations of Aristotle burnt,[1] if thereby the old philosophy would be studied in the original language, p. 469. While in all departments of science Bacon strives after the highest acquirements, still no kind of scientific knowledge has value for him, except in so far as it shows itself fruitful for practice. This is pre-eminently true in regard to theology. Hence, without express reference to it, he contends against the scholastic theology, because, separating itself from life, it went on with its abstract speculations; but he places theology, as such, at the head of the other sciences, just because it is called, by means of that divine wisdom with which it is invested, to exercise a moral influence upon Church and State.

Towards the end of the fourteenth and the beginning of the fifteenth century, Petrus de Alliaco and John Gerson prove worthy successors of Bacon, both of them celebrated chancellors of the University of Paris, which was itself a chief stronghold of the scholastic theology. They fought strenuously, not indeed against scholasticism generally, but against the unreality which characterized its discussions. Gerson, especially in his Epistles *De Reformatione theologiæ*, and in his Epistles to the students at the College of Navarre at Paris (*epistolæ duæ ad studentes collegii Navarræ Parisiensis: quid et qualiter studere debeat novus theologiæ auditor, et contra curiositatem studentium*),[2] with respect to the *generalis ecclesiæ*

[1] This statement does not apply to the writings of Aristotle generally, as Frommüller wrongly expresses it in Herzog's Encyclopædia, i. p. 656. [The passage objected to has been struck out of the article in the new edition of Herzog, where it appears in vol. ii. p. 54–56.]

[2] Joannis Gersonii opera ed. Ellies du Pin, t. i. p. 120 sqq.

clades, which has gone so far, *ut desit remedii locus, quia quæ fuerunt vitia, mores fiunt*, as he says with Seneca, laments the general decay of theology under bishops and clergy, and dissuades them from the subtle and superficial scholastic doctrines, on account of which the students of theology only make themselves ridiculous to those of the other faculties, and which, for the Church and its faith, are not only unfruitful but injurious. In opposition to all this, he demands of theology that, in order to reach again a *solida veritas*, it should turn its attention to ethical studies, and fall back again on the old Church teachers, but especially on Holy Scripture. And this is altogether in harmony with Petrus de Alliaco, who, in his *Recommendatio Scripturæ sacræ*,[1] by way of explanation of Matt. xvi. 18, maintains that Holy Scripture is the everlasting rock on which the Church rests.

Alongside of those already named, the scholar of Alliacus, Nicolaus de Clemangis, takes his place with his work *De studio theologico*.[2] He gives an extraordinarily high place to theology. As the *spiritualis et sacrosancta sapientia* it is for him the *nobilissima scientia;* but it must not be, as in the ordinary scholasticism, a mere theology of intellect; it must also be a theology of feeling. It is not only *scientia*, but also *charitas*, and has for its purpose the personal edification of the theologian, and through him the edification of others. In accordance with this view Nicolaus comprehends the whole study of theology in the study of Holy Scripture, and especially recommends the study of the Fathers of the early Church, whose works were written under the enlightening influence of the Holy Spirit.

The chief representative of this anti-scholastic tendency was Erasmus. He, too, paints with glaring colours the serious defects from which the Church of his time suffered, and represents them as brought in principally by its pastors, the

[1] In Gersonii operâ, t. i. p. 603 sqq.

[2] In D'Achery Spicilegium, ed. de la Barre, t. i. p. 473 sqq.

bishops, theologians, and priests; and then, in his *Ratio compendio perveniendi ad veram theologiam*, and in his *Adhortatio ad christianæ philosophiæ studium*,[1] he sets forth the *vera theologia* and *christiana philosophia* by way of contrast with the scholastic philosophy. This true theology, however, he views strictly from the standpoint of the practical Church purpose. It should promote the *vera religio* in all circles and among all orders in the Church, whatever their occupations and tendencies. But true religion can only be drawn from the Holy Scripture, therefore its study before all else is incumbent upon the theologian. Instead of learning by rote sophistical doctrinal propositions, commentaries on Aristotle, and formal scholastic inferences, it rather befits theologians *operam dare libris divinis, ex quorum fontibus universa scatet theologia, quæ modo vere sit theologia.* Among the sacred writings, those of the New Testament take the first rank; and among the Old Testament writings those take the first place which are most in harmony with them. (Sit igitur apud nos primus honos novo testamento, per quod christiani sumus, et ubi Christus nobis multo expressius quàm in vetere depingitur, proximus veteri et in hoc his libris, qui cum novo maxime consentiunt, quales sunt Esaiæ libri.) For the study of Scripture Erasmus demands the acquiring of the Latin, Greek, and Hebrew languages, as well as the study of the seven *artes liberales*, especially of cosmography, history, and poetics, and recommends for advancement in the study of Scripture the use of the old interpreters, especially of Origen and Jerome. Erasmus will not altogether discard the study of scholasticism, only he warns against the overvaluing of the scholastic system of doctrine, and refers rather to the old theologians, Augustine, Chrysostom, who kept themselves to Holy Scripture, and have nothing of scholastic subtlety.

[1] Ratio seu methodus compendio perveniendi ad veram theologiam per Erasmum Roterod. postremum ab ipso autore castigata et locupletata. Coloniæ 1523.

Under the influence of the reawakened interest in classical humanist studies, he developed a hermeneutical system, not free indeed from the customary method of Scripture treatment, but still even to this day worthy of attention; and, entering upon the contents of Holy Scripture itself, he makes an advance toward the science more recently called biblical theology, and the history of the life of Jesus. He also furnishes particularly valuable contributions to practical theology, especially to homiletics, although, because of the immediately practical Church interest, which from the circumstances of the time had a preponderating influence upon him, he could not rise to the setting forth of the full significance of Church history for theology.

The anti-scholastic theologians referred to have contributed but little to the encyclopædic development of theology. Their merit lies rather in this, that they emphasized the ethical significance of theology, in accordance with a view truly religious, and animated by a desire for the elevation of the whole Christian life, in opposition to a theoretical scholasticism, onesided and divorced from life, while they too still acknowledged the authority of Church and tradition. This merit remains with them undiminished, even although it cannot be denied that they themselves, because in general they laid the blame of the decay of the Church upon scholasticism, placed in the foreground the practical tasks of theology, and so fell into a onesided practicalism, on account of which the theoretical tasks of theology did not get their proper place.

§ 4. THE HISTORY OF THEOLOGICAL ENCYCLOPÆDIA—*Continued.*

(c) *From the Reformation up to the period of Pietism.*

The Reformation, by means of those principles which it had enunciated, brought about a complete rupture with the Romish Church. For, inasmuch as it grounded the Reformed idea of the Church on the principles of Scripture and faith, it repudiated the foundation of the Romish idea of the Church, the divine authority of the hierarchy and tradition. But, in order to build up the new idea of the Church on its inner side, and to render it secure on its outer side, there was need of very energetic labour, which, in the exercise of that freedom of the Christian spirit which was characteristic of the theology of the earliest age of the Church, the leaders of the Reformation in Germany and Switzerland undertook with rare talent and unwearied zeal. Owing to the importance which was always attached to theology in the Reformed Churches, an attempt was very soon made at its systematic instruction, in order to rear upon the new foundations a new theological structure answering to the Reformed idea of the Church. A beginning thereof was already made by Melanchthon, while Luther, engaged in uninterrupted theological activity and labour, expressed himself on theology only occasionally.

In his *Brevis Discendæ Theologiæ Ratio*,[1] Melanchthon, altogether in the spirit of Luther, sketched the outlines of the Reformed theology, which was soon more thoroughly developed by his immediate successors. The foundation of theological study is the study of Scripture. The method for this is gained by adopting a purely religious point of view. The fundamental doctrine of faith, which alone leads to justification before God, is the middle point, from which the Scripture

[1] Melanchthonis Opera. Witteb. 1562. T. ii. p. 35–37.

investigator has to proceed and expound Scripture. He must therefore begin with the New Testament, and in that, with the Pauline Epistles, especially with Romans, Galatians, and Colossians; and then he must advance to the Old Testament, in which that *summa doctrinæ christianæ*, that essence of Christian doctrine, is also contained. The Old and the New Testaments are the one divine revelation, and contain essentially one and the same divine doctrine of salvation. But in order to comprehend this exegetically, the theologian has to keep to the one ruling sense as the meaning of the words. With great decision Melanchthon protests against the fourfold sense of Scripture assumed in the earlier theology, and demands, in opposition to such arbitrary interpretation of the word of Scripture, the simple grammatical exposition. The study of Scripture thus with Melanchthon corresponds essentially to dogmatic study. But, with the study of Scripture, the theologian has to join the study of the Church Fathers and the ecclesiastical canons, so that he may become acquainted with the Church doctrines and decrees. And further, the theologian, who must be expert in the understanding of Scripture and in the niceties of apologetics and polemics, has to familiarize himself with the *literæ humanæ*, the necessary knowledge of the languages, grammar, rhetoric, and dialectics, and also to make himself acquainted with philosophy, guarding himself, however, against any confusion of philosophy and Christian doctrine. The theology thus framed upon Scripture study is then only suitable to clerical preachers, whose task it is, by means of preaching and catechizing, to introduce the Christian doctrine to the people. Practical theology, therefore, with Melanchthon, consists principally in homiletics and catechetics, of which, in his writing *De Officiis Concionatoris*,[1]

[1] Opera, t. ii. p. 30–34. A supplement to this work takes more of the form of an abstract of homiletics adapted to the schools under the title: Ratio brevis sacrarum concionum tractandarum, a quodam docto et pio rhapsodo, Philippi Mel. familiari, congesta. T. ii. p. 7 sqq.

he gives an outline, with full instruction about the study of Scripture.

Theology is represented in the same way as by Melanchthon, by his own and Luther's scholars—Thamer,[1] Weller,[2] Chytræus,[3] and Selneccer[4]—in their writings on theological study. All of them show a very high regard for theology. It is *arcana et divina sapientia, longe supra humanæ et angelicæ rationis conspectum posita, quam nemo principium seculi huius sine spiritu sancto intelligit* (Chytræus). *Fons, ex quo omnes reliquæ scientiæ profluunt et in quem rursum defluunt et ad eundem tanquam ad initium et finem referuntur* (Selneccer). But it is particularly worthy of notice, that they have already expressly declared Holy Scripture to be the first and only principle of dogmatic theology, and maintained that it is to be immediately identified with the word of God; that they further specially recommend dogmatic study on the basis of Melanchthon's *Loci Theologici*, and in the study of Scripture, follow his direction for the establishment of the several doctrinal articles. Also, it deserves to be made prominent, that they view theology, not as a mere scholarly acquirement, but rather in the light of Luther's proverb: *Oratio, meditatio, et tentatio theologum facit* (compare especially Chytræus). Consequently they set very earnestly before theologians the ethical claims made by theology, and emphasize particularly the ethical influence which the study of theology must exercise upon the edification of the theologian himself, if he is to be qualified to edify others. The *theologia Christiana* consists,

[1] Adhortatio ad theologiæ studium in academia, Marburgensi 1543. Compare Herzog's Real-Encyclopædie under "Thamer."

[2] Ratio formandi studii theologici. Item de modo et ratione concionandi. Autore D. Hieronymo Wellero. Noribergæ 1563.

[3] De studio theologiæ recte inchoando et aliis aliquot utilibus materiis commonefactiones. David Chytræus. Rostochii 1572.

[4] Notatio Nicolai Selnecceri de studio sacræ theologiæ et de ratione discendi doctrinam cœlestem. Lipsiæ 1579. In this same book is contained: De ratione methodica discendi doctrinam ecclesiæ propriam. Isagoge in usum studiosorum scripta a Nic. Selneccero.

not in *sola cognitione et scientia et curiosarum ac inanium disputationum subtilitate, sed in vêræ pietatis usu et praxi potissimum* (Chytræus). And just because they make piety the point of departure and the end of theology, and set the practical task thereof above the theoretical, it not seldom happens with them, that Christianity and theology are interchanged, and that that is demanded as a special acquirement of theologians, which really concerns Christians generally.

Side by side with those Lutheran theologians, the Reformed theologian Andreas Hyperius, in the sixteenth century, may be compared with Melanchthon in comprehensive learning and ecclesiastical zeal. We have from his pen a *ratio studii theologici*,[1] in four books, in which he takes a comprehensive survey of theological study. To him also it is the *sacrosancta theologia disciplinarum omnium princeps. Quantum divina præstant humanis, cœlestia terrenis, tantum theologia reliquis disciplinis est anteponenda.* According to him, too, agreeably to the inner relationship of piety and culture, theology ought to subserve the personal edification of the theologian and the edification of others; but its higher aim has reference to the Church catholic, to contribute to the guidance and advancement of the Church, the *ecclesia catholica et orthodoxa, quæ nititur fundamento apostolorum et prophetarum, præter quod poni aliud nullum potest, atque secundum spiritum sanctum ac verbum Dei incorrupte judicat.* And so, after having in his first book enumerated the characteristics and preliminary culture which are to be required of one beginning the study of theology, he points out to the student, in the following books, the course which has to be pursued in theological study. Theology, according to Hyperius, falls into two divisions, theory and

[1] De theologo seu de ratione studii theologici libri iv., Andrea Hyperio autore. Basileæ 1582. (Ed. 1, ib. 1556.) [Hyperius was not strictly a Reformed, but a conciliatory Lutheran theologian. He had a hearty appreciation of the Reformed doctrine, and was inclined to advance a good way in securing a mutual understanding between the two parties. Comp. Dorner, History of Protestant Theology, vol. ii. p. 15, note. Engl. translation pub. by T. & T. Clark, Edin.]

practice. The former embraces the study of Scripture and the study of dogmatics. This last stands in close connection with the former; for the several passages of Scripture are to be reduced under their proper doctrinal heads, and have to afford to dogmatics its foundation. The *literæ humaniæ* are to be adopted by theology in so far as they may contribute to the study of Scripture. Philosophy, too, should be admitted in theological study only as a handmaid, as *famula*, as *pedissequa*, like Hagar in relation to Sarah, who was alone in full authority. The second division of theology, the practical, embraces Church history, which is specially serviceable as affording an insight and giving hints concerning the guidance of the Church, together with ecclesiastical archæology and patristics, and besides, what belongs to pastoral theology, in the wide sense of the word.

After this, up to the end of the sixteenth century, the theology of the Reformed Churches assumed a very extreme dogmatic activity, and the new dogmas which it produced on the basis of the principles of Scripture and faith, as well as the dogmas descending from the primitive Church and enshrined in special confessional writings, secured general acceptance. From the beginning of the seventeenth century, this doctrinal tendency, to which already Chytræus, Selneccer, and Hyperius themselves inclined, won decided preponderance in the Reformed theology. That which theology had accomplished, and for which it had secured the acceptance of the Church, must also be preserved, more firmly established, and developed by the Church. In the Lutheran Church, its two greatest dogmatists of the century may be considered the chief representatives of this theology—John Gerhard and Abraham Calov, from both of whom we have still in our possession special expositions of the course of theological study.[1] In one

[1] Methodus studii theologici publicis prælectionibus in academia Jenansi, anno 1617, exposita a Johanne Gerhardo, Jenæ 1622. Abraham Calovi institutionum theologicarum τὰ προλεγόμενα. Dantisci 1649.

particular point this theology gives expression to a clear judgment concerning itself, inasmuch as in general it holds fast to the earlier practical tendency. According to Gerhard, *Studium theologiæ ignorantiæ in rebus spiritualibus nobis connatæ atque ἀταξίας in affectibus hærentis remedium, ad sanctitatis et pietatis culturam ὄρμητήριον, quotidie Deum in verbo audiendi et cum Deo per preces colloquendi medium adeoque sanctissimæ et beatissimæ illius societatis, quam in cœlo expectamus quoddam præludium*, a definition which would equally apply to Christianity. Yet more decided is the definition of Calov: *Theologia est habitus practicus cognitionis e revelatione divina haustæ, de vera religione, qua homo post lapsum per fidem ad salutem æternam perducendus.* Theology is the knowledge of the true religion, directed to the furthering of the life of the Church, derived from divine revelation, by means of which, since his fall, man may, through the exercise of faith, be led to eternal salvation. The one and characteristic principle of this theology, therefore, is the divine revelation which is deposited in the Holy Scripture, and everything else is brought in simply for the purpose of dogmatically establishing this principle as such. For this end the theory of inspiration is now thoroughly elaborated. Divine revelation and Holy Scripture precisely correspond. Holy Scripture is the revealed word of God, and the word of God is that which has been committed to writing by virtue of the operation of the Holy Spirit upon prophets, evangelists, and apostles, as the amanuenses of the Holy Spirit (compare Calov). Holy Scripture, therefore, according to its contents and verbal expression, is the actual word of God. Inasmuch then as theology is derived from those pure divine sources, it receives for its whole contents a certainty and infallibility, by means of which it is not only distinguished from all other sciences, but is elevated over them, so that these are all subordinated to theology, while it is itself subordinated to none. Then also those secular sciences, with which theology has

associated itself, have yet for it an importance only as sciences contributing their aid. This is specially true regarding philosophy, of which indeed theology can make a manifold use; which, however, can always be properly only a *ministerium*, but in no case a *magisterium*, for in that case a *μιξοφιλοσοφοθεολογία*, as in scholasticism, might be again introduced. On the contrary, philosophy is, as Gerhard, following Luther's example, phrases it, the serving ass, whereas theology, on the other hand, is the Christ who rides upon the ass.

Such an assertion of the authority of Holy Scripture, determining and deciding everything with its word, made it necessary that the most thorough and exact acquaintance with its contents should be required of the theologian. Hence, exegetical theology receives a prominent place in this theology, so that Gerhard demands an uninterrupted study of Scripture during the five years which he claims for theological study. Dogmatics attaches itself immediately to exegetical theology. If Melanchthon placed the study of Scripture under the religious point of view, it is here placed completely at the service of dogma; for true religion, the knowledge of which is to be derived from Holy Scripture, is the *religio lutherana*, that is, the doctrine of the Lutheran Church as laid down in the confessional writings. All investigation of Scripture must be directed to the more perfectly developing, in accordance with the word of Scripture, of doctrine already formulated, and to the more thorough establishing of this by means of Scripture. And thus dogmatic theology is essentially the middle point of theological study, and for this Gerhard assigns a course of unremitting study during five years. Dogmatic theology is followed by polemics, which, on the basis of dogmatical efficiency already acquired, is to qualify for controversy with those who oppose the doctrines of the Church. This again is followed by Church history, which may now first be prosecuted without danger, and with the proper insight

into the true doctrine as already here and there it comes forward in history. Practical theology, again, is substantially comprised in homiletics, which ought to qualify the theologian for preaching the true doctrine.

This Lutheran theology, treated encyclopædically as a system of orthodox theology, according to Gerhard *totum doctrinæ christianæ systema*, in accordance with which it must develope itself under the conditions of the ecclesiastical position of the present day, has in no small measure promoted the systematic construction of theology. Inasmuch as it proceeds from a definite notion of theology which embraces all the essential elements of the system, the principle is dogmatically established which forms the only foundation thereof: the principal divisions will then be clearly distinguished from one another, and these parts themselves, with reference to the doctrine, which theology should acknowledge and preach, will be brought into inner relation with each other. Nevertheless this acknowledgment can yet have reference only to the formal distribution of the parts of theology. According to its scientific character, this orthodox theology stands altogether under the dominion of the positive. It assumes a simply receptive attitude toward the doctrine conveyed to it in the Confessions of the Church, and toward the word of Scripture, by means of which its dogmas are accredited; and if now, indeed, it treats the material so received with that extraordinary learning which we meet with in the great dogmatic works of Gerhard and Calov, it nevertheless does not reach to a scientific knowledge of that material, but only, as it freely confesses regarding itself, to a *cognitio de vera religione*, that is, in fact, only to a taking cognizance of the true religion. By its striving after this *cognitio*, and by its identifying of the *vera religio* with the Lutheran doctrine, which it has laid down as the one and only condition of salvation, during the seventeenth century it fell into that dogmatism, which resembles the pre-Reformation scholasticism, inasmuch

as it too lays all stress on dogmatic theory, only with the difference, that while the latter wrought upon a philosophical basis, the former wrought on the divine basis of Holy Scripture, and hence all the more recklessly presses its dogmatic theory into the practical Church life. If the presuppositions on which the whole system rests, that the Holy Scripture of the Old and New Testaments is the absolute divine revelation, and that the Lutheran Church doctrine is confirmed and proved true by this same Scripture, were in reality objectively established, then this orthodox theology would in fact, as in its own estimation it does, surpass in certainty all other sciences, and would rightly make these subordinate. It is, however, just these presuppositions which challenge criticism, and the farther they extend themselves, so much the more deeply must the orthodox system be shaken, and the longing after theological progress be stimulated.

Already in the seventeenth century itself Calixtus[1] broke in upon the neatly closed joints of the orthodox system and disordered it. According to the definitions of theology which he lays down in the *Apparatus theologicus* and in the *Epitome theologiæ*, Calixtus evinced complete sympathy with the orthodox theologians in their general conception of theology, with their practical tendency, and with their inclination to place doctrine in the foreground. He also firmly adheres to the orthodox theology in regard to the principle of Scripture, and vindicates this with great ingenuity in the treatise annexed to the *Epitome* against the Roman Catholic doctrine which makes the Pope, *principium fidei*, where he exposes the vicious reasoning in a circle, when it is argued that the infallibility of the Scripture is established by the Pope, and then, that the Pope's own infallibility is

[1] Georgii Calixti apparatus theologici et fragmenti historiæ ecclesiæ occidentalis editio altera, e.b. autoris MS. aucta a Fridr. Ulr. Calixto. Helmst. 1661. (Ed. 1, 1628.) G. Calixti Epitome theologiæ. Adjecta est ejusdem disputatio peculiaris de principio theologico contra Pontificios. Brunsv. 1647.

established by means of that Scripture. Calixtus also, in common with the orthodox theologians, has the same *partitio theologiæ* into dogmatics, exegesis, Church history, polemics, and practical theology, distinguishing, however, a *theologia scholastica*, or rather *academica*, which essentially consists in a complete dogmatic, and a *theologia ecclesiastica*, or *didactica*, or *positiva*, which should embrace what it is necessary that the clergy as such should know. But, notwithstanding all this agreement, Calixtus steps beyond the bounds of the orthodox system, when he demands for dogmatic proof, not only Scripture, but also the *perpetuus et unanimis apostolicæ et catholicæ ecclesiæ consensus*, and so, to a certain extent, in addition to the principle of Scripture, introduces tradition as a secondary principle. He further even distinguishes between the different value of the Old and New Testaments for dogmatic proof, and besides, is willing to demonstrate the evidence for the doctrine by means of the *lumen naturale*, by means of the *ratio*. How dangerous these doctrines seemed to the orthodox theologians is shown by the great excitement which the Calixtine theology occasioned among them, by the charge of syncretism and crypto-Catholicism which they raised against Calixtus and his followers, and by the vehemence and bitterness with which they persecuted them.

More lasting, and richer in its consequences, was the opposition which, like that of the fifteenth century against scholasticism, now in a similar way arose against the dogmatism of the orthodox theology. Pietism, originated by Spener, raised the question as to the worth of that very object unto which all their toil had been directed. Quite in the spirit of the Reformation, he protested in the name of Christian piety against the orthodox Scripture dogmatism, and assailed it with its own weapons. If the orthodox theology establishes itself with its whole doctrinal system upon Holy Scripture, and directs its *habitus practicus* principally to the

conserving of, and gaining currency for, the orthodox doctrine derived from Holy Scripture in the interest of eternal salvation theoretically and practically, then over against this there was full justification for the demand to fall back upon the word of Scripture itself, and to seek salvation in it, but not in a dogmatic wisdom of the schools. Pietism, therefore, leaves the principle of dogmatism, the Holy Scripture, untouched, but raises against dogmatism itself the charge that it has set aside Scripture, and with its scholastic learning has entered on a course fraught with peril to the Christian life of holiness. Spener had himself already given utterance to these fundamental thoughts in his *Piis desideriis* in the year 1675, and yet more definitely in his preface *De Impedimentis studii theologici* to the tables prepared by him from Dannhauer's Hodosophy in the year 1690. His followers, too, have manifested a great zeal in endeavouring to give a new construction to theological study. Besides J. J. Breithaupt,[1] and Joachim Lange,[2] especially A. H. Francke has, in numerous writings, expounded theology in the sense of pietism. Not scholarship, *erudition*, but piety, *pietas*, is the principal thing. For the promotion of piety, before everything else must be prosecuted that study of Scripture, which by the orthodox theology was placed altogether at the service of doctrine, so that the interests of piety were more and more neglected. The right method of study is that procedure by means of which the end of theology is attained.[3] Now the end is Christ; as He is the end of Scripture, and so also the end of theology. Him must the theologian appropriate, in order to break the tyranny of Satan in himself as well as in others, if he is to advance the glory of God and attain unto eternal life.[4] The

[1] Exercitationes de studio theologico. Hal. 1702.

[2] De Genuina studii theologici præcipue thetici indole ac methodo. Hal. 1712; and Institutiones studii theologici literariæ. Hal. 1723.

[3] Definitio methodi studii theologici proposita ab Aug. Herm. Franckio. Halæ 1708.

[4] Institutio brevis de fine studii theologici. Halæ 1708.

study of Scripture is followed in order by dogmatics, polemics, and homiletics, while Church history remains unheeded.[1]

This pietistic theology enters wholly into the service of practical Christianity, and classes, as requirements of the theologian, qualifications that should rather be expected generally of the Christian, and therefore, of course, of the theologian too, but not of him as such. In its practical tendency, it has its historical justification as contrasted with the orthodox theology: but as, in the case of the orthodox theology, the theological scientific interest was absorbed in the dogmatic, so in the case of pietism it was absorbed in the interest of edification.[2]

In the Reformed Church, theological development had a similar course to that which it had in the Lutheran Church. The works on Encyclopædia by John Henry Alsted afford evidence that already a scholastic spirit had penetrated even into the Reformed Church. Although Alsted indeed emphasizes the ethical purpose of theological study, and, after the example of Hyperius, maintains the connection of theology with the Church, yet his discussions on theology and on Holy Scripture bear likewise the mark of that dogmatic scholasticism which at the same time gained the ascendency in the Lutheran Church. Study of Scripture, dogmatics, polemics, ethics, and practical theology, are, according to Alsted, the chief subjects in theological study, while Church history is absolutely ignored. But just here a reaction set in, which, in opposition to a one-sided dogmatism, fell back upon Holy Scripture, and would make known its contents instead of a complex of dogmas as the ground of salvation. Stephen Gaussen,[3] a theologian of the semi-

[1] Summa prælectionum aliquot de studiis recte et ordinate tractandis.

[2] Methodus sacrosanctæ theologiæ, Hanoviæ 1623; and Encyclopædia omnium scientiarum, Herborn 1330. 4 voll. F.

[3] Steph. Gausseni, S.S. theol. in Acad. Salmur. Prof., Dissertationes—1. de studii theol. ratione; 2. de natura theologiæ; 3. de ratione concionandi. Ed. 7. Traj. ad Rh. et Hardowici 1790. (Ed. 1, 1670.)

nary of Saumur, and J. L. Frei[1] and Samuel Werenfels,[2] the Basel theologians, were representatives of this tendency at the end of the seventeenth and beginning of the eighteenth century. While the last-named theologian claims the right of investigation of Scripture for the laity against every kind of ecclesiastical authority, and denounces all compulsion in matters of faith as impiety, he claims the right of reading Holy Scripture, not for the purpose of maintaining the interests of dogmatics, but for the purpose of learning from it the true religion, for preserving this in its simplicity, and keeping it free *a scoriis humanarum traditionum omnisque philosophiæ et sophisticæ*. But the truth of this religion, which the *Deistæ* and *Rationales* view as a product of human reason, is guaranteed by means of an *immediata* and *extraordinaria revelatio divina*, which Werenfels, in some separate treatises, seeks to prove. That the word of God is contained in Holy Scripture is what all Christians believe. This, however, is not to be established by means of the infallibility of the Romish, that is, the clerical-hierarchical Church, but by means of the testimony of the whole Christian Church collectively. Still even this is only an *argumentum summæ probabilitatis*, and has to be itself established on the witness of the Holy Spirit, by means of which the hearts of believers

[1] J. L. Frei, Meletemata de officio doctoris christiani. Basil 1711–15.

[2] Sam. Werenfelsii opuscula theologica, philosophica et philologica. Ed. nova, t. 1–3. Basil. 1782. 8vo. (Ed. 1, Basil. 1728. 2 voll. 4to.) [Werenfels is widely known as the author of the sarcastic lines in which the manner of using the Bible prevalent in his times is characterized:

Hic liber est, in quo sua quærit dogmata quisque,
Invenit et pariter dogmata quisque sua.

It was in the interest of Scripture study that he protested against dogmatic prepossessions on the part of the exegete, whether these were entertained by sceptical or believing students of the Word. "The so-called 'believing exegesis' is not always the most faithful and unprejudiced exegesis." (Doedes.) Those who most strongly express their reverence for Scripture are often conspicuous for their attachment to a special type of doctrine, and are strongly tempted to seek and find that to which they are attached set forth in the Scriptures which they revere. Extreme men, in the broad and in the orthodox schools, are alike exposed to this danger.—ED.]

are made certain of the truth contained in Scripture. *Ne igitur,*—says Werenfels, in his dissertation, *De triplici teste de verbo Dei testante,—quæramus ecclesiam, ut in ea reperiamus veritatem; præposterum hoc est: nomen ingens, splendor externus oculos fascinare potest. Sed quæramus veritatem, ut inveniamus cui associemur ecclesiam.*—In Polemics the question is as to the *sincerus consensus circa fundamentalia fidei christianæ dogmata,* and as to toleration in regard to opinions which do not affect the very essence of Christianity. Werenfels treats of the significance of the theology for the Church, in his dissertation, *De scopo doctoris in academia sive literas docentis. Commune ecclesiæ bonum est theologus.* The *salus æterna* of the members of the Church is dependent upon the pastoral office. The chief end, therefore, is *bonum ovium Christi pastorem instituere,* that is, to make sure that young theologians are qualified for the office of pastor. The task of theology is thus reduced to a practical training for the pastoral office. Guided by his practical purposes, and in proportion to his dogmatically unfettered fundamental view, Werenfels gives the most excellent exhortations in favour of the union of the Lutheran and Reformed Churches in his *cogitationes generales de ratione uniendi ecclesias protestantes, quæ vulgo lutheranarum et reformatorum nominibus distingui solent,* and in his dissertation *De ratione uniendi ecclesias protestantes.* Both Lutherans and Reformed are reciprocally to recognise one another and ecclesiastically to unite, because they hold the same *vera, viva et salvifica fides,* which constitutes the essence of true Christianity. Whether the *oralis manducatio,* and the *æterna Dei prædestinatio* are included therein, does not come into consideration. With reference to its predominantly practical ecclesiastical tendency, with reference to its depreciation of dogma and its bringing into prominence of Christian piety, with reference, further, to the conflict against the sterile orthodoxy, and against the injury sustained by the moral life and true piety as occasioned by that orthodoxy,—the theological

tendencies represented by Werenfels may be classed along with those of Pietism in the Lutheran Church. Here, as there, we have the most decided struggle against dogmatism, but, at the same time, an equally decided adherence to the divine authority of Holy Scripture.

The Roman Catholic Church, at least after the commencement of the Reformation, could tolerate a theological tendency like that of Erasmus, which, in the interests of Christian piety, grounded theological study upon Holy Scripture, but, in accordance with its real character, very soon again sought to return to the paths of scholastic theology. Already Latomus,[1] in his writing directed against Erasmus, makes the assertion that Christian piety is not bound to the letter of Scripture, and that therefore Scripture itself, and also the knowledge of the three languages demanded by Erasmus for the study of Scripture, Hebrew, Greek, and Latin, may be dispensed with. *Scripturæ impiis quidem inutiles, piis vero non necessariæ.* The pious have to keep to the doctrine of the Church, and its understanding of Scripture. Latomus distinguishes between a *theologia corporalis* and *spiritualis.* The former is the popular theology, which is intended for preachers who have to teach the laity about virtue and vice: the latter is the speculative theology, which has for its task pre-eminently the study of the schoolmen, and the study of Scripture with the help of ancient commentaries.

Erasmus, in his Apology,[2] ridiculed the idea of making a twofold distinction in theology, *qua Deum sapimus* and *qua docemus Deum.* Theology as a whole must be bound up with piety, and the Church doctrine must be received not only with the intellect, but also with the heart, and for this end the Scripture must be studied thoroughly, that is, in the

[1] De trium linguarum et studii theologici ratione dialogus. Per Jacobum Latomum, theol. licentiatum. 1519.

[2] Erasmi Rot. Apologia, rejiciens quorundam suspiciones ac rumores, natos ex dialogo, qui eximio viro Jacobo Latomo, S. theol. licent. inscribitur. Lovanii 1519.

original languages. The *Institutio* which Latomus demands for his *Theologus spiritualis*, is treated by Erasmus in his ironical manner, for he will not scruple to allow even to the schoolmen their value, if only they will not put themselves above the fathers and above Holy Scripture.

On the other hand, Laurentius à Villavicentio[1] not unskilfully endeavours to link on those demands of Erasmus to the interests of the Church. Thoroughly possessed by the conviction that, for the wellbeing of the Church, a sound theological culture of its teachers was of supreme importance, he introduces the students of theology to its study, after a vigorous attempt to prove for the Church, that Christ from the *Cathedra Petri* points out by means of His vicar, not only *quod sit verum et legitimum Dei verbum*, but also *quæ sit sana certaque ejus intelligentia*. Among the preliminary studies regarded by him as necessary along with philosophy, mathematics, and history, he would also include a knowledge of languages, especially of Hebrew and Greek. A beginning has to be made with the study of Scripture, but the writings of such interpreters as have departed from the apostolic doctrine of the Romish Church ought not to be used. For the right method of the explanation of Scripture complete hermeneutical rules are given. But the chief thing for the student is the dogmatic study, by means of which he must appropriate to himself the knowledge of all *dogmata ecclesiæ, verbo Dei aut divina traditione vel conciliorum autoritate aperte confirmata*. For the attainment of this end Laurentius, after giving a special warning against Martin Luther, the *bestia infernalis*, the *hæreticæ pravitatis auctor*, recommends the most important representatives of the scholastic theology, and adds to Augustine, John of Damascus, and Peter the Lombard, and his own compendium of Scholastic Dogmatics. In the fourth book, Laurentius treats of practical theology as directed to the life

[1] De recte formando theologiæ studio libri quatuor, restituti per Laurentium à Villavicentio, Xerezanum. Antverpiæ 1565.

of the Church, under which he includes Church history and the doctrine of the Church service; and he concludes with a treatise on the purpose of theological study which is twofold, for the theologian himself,—advancement in piety, for others,—edification.

Here already, in opposition to the Reformed doctrines, the authority of the Pope in matters of doctrine, and the scholastic theology, as the bulwark of this dogma, are placed in the foreground. When, however, Jesuitism had afterwards grown up to maturity as the *defensor ecclesiæ contra omnem hæreticam pravitatem*, and for the realization of its plans had gained possession of the common schools and of the higher educational seminaries, it was its influence especially that carried matters further in this direction, and, with the help of scholasticism, rendered even theology wholly subservient to its purposes. The works of the Jesuit Possevinus are a proof of this.[1] In his *Bibliotheca selecta* he has sketched a comprehensive plan of studies, the purpose of which is to set the true *cultura ingeniorum* over against the heresy that had begun to prevail. Theological study is placed at the head. This has to begin with the study of Scripture, but that, again, has to rear itself chiefly on the scholastic theology and casuistry. This is followed by practical theology, and by polemics which is directed against schismatics and heretics. In immediate succession come philosophy, jurisprudence, medicine, mathematical studies, among which music, architecture, and geography are to be included, history, the art of poetry, painting, and finally,

[1] Antonii Possevini Mantuani Societ. Jesu, bibliotheca selecta de ratione studiorum. Romæ 1593, F. Also, Apparatus sacer, in duos tomos distributus. Colon. 1608, F. [Professor Schmidt of Strasburg, writing in Herzog's *Encyclopædie*, vol. xii. p. 143, characterizes both of the works here referred to: "The Bibliotheca is overloaded with much that is useless and irrelevant, and is generally of little importance. Very much superior is the Apparatus sacer ad scriptores veteris et novi Testamenti, eorum interpretes, synodos et patres, etc.,—a book even yet most useful, in spite of its defects and errors, published at Venice, in three folio volumes, 1603-1606,—a connected presentation of the sources of all the different departments of theology, made with great industry, but without the exercise of the necessary criticism."—Ed.]

eloquence, with which sacred eloquence is joined, as the *ratio concionandi*,—these all are destined to bear the train of theology. The *Apparatus sacer*, which is set forth with an equipment of great learning, embraces an alphabetical list of all sacred ecclesiastical writers, from whose works *illibatum fidei ac doctrinæ catholicæ depositum* is to be derived.

Here there is not in any case the very slightest contribution made to systematics, either in reference to the general sciences, or in reference to theological science. Nevertheless, by means of the intellectual activity of the Jesuits, that again became dominant in the theology of the Roman Catholic Church, which at the same time appeared in Protestant theology as the result of its historical development. The same scholastic dogmatism now gained prominence in Protestantism, as had before, on very different grounds, been favoured by Catholicism. The doctrines ecclesiastically sanctioned by the Tridentine and Reformation symbols appear now as theological systems opposed to each other. This fact explains the inexhaustible abundance of theological controversies, by which those theologies are distinguished, as well as the importance which must always belong to polemics, as occupied with the preservation of the treasured possessions of the Church. The *theologica polemica*, which, on the Catholic side, was cultivated especially by the Jesuits, now forms a principal constituent part of theological study. In it expression is given, with all possible emphasis, to the contrast between the Catholic and the Protestant principles. Jesuitism finds the guarantee of the truth of the Church doctrine in the infallibility of the Pope; Protestant confessionalism finds this in the infallibility of Holy Scripture. Meanwhile, however, a theological tendency made itself felt, and that first of all in the French Church, which affirmed its independence of that Jesuitical spirit which was now dominant in theology. Mabillon, with his *Traité des études monastiques*,[1] is in this connection worthy of notice.

[1] Traité des études monastiques, divisé en trois parties, par Jean Mabillon, religeuse Bénédictin de la congrégation de St. Maur. Bruxelles 1692.

He writes for his young brethren at St. Maur a guide for their studies. According to the prescribed rule of Benedict, the monks have to prosecute theological studies, and that for their own edification. Scripture study forms the ground upon which the study of the Church fathers, which is of the greatest importance for the understanding of Scripture and for the knowledge of the Church doctrine, and the study of the councils, and of canon and civil law, have to be arranged. To this, the study of positive and scholastic theology succeeds. Positive theology is essentially dogmatics, which leans upon Scripture and tradition; while scholastic theology seeks to reach the knowledge of the Church doctrine by the help of the reason. With these studies, then, the monks might occupy themselves, if the *questions chimériques et inutiles*, with which, in the course of the centuries, they might get mixed up, should be banished from them. In conclusion, the study of profane and ecclesiastical history is recommended to the monks, as well as, under certain restrictions, that of philosophy and the Belles Lettres.

Of yet greater importance is Ellies du Pin.[1] Without the sacrifice in any measure of Catholic principles, Du Pin, inspired by a true Christian spirit, is the most decided opponent of the Romish curial system, which had found a champion in the Jesuits, and of its scholastic formalism. In his *Methodus studii theologici* he bases Christian theology on divine revelation alone, as it is contained in Holy Scripture, in tradition, and in the Church doctrine formulated, in accordance with

[1] Ludovici Ellies du Pin, methodus studii theologici recte instituendi. Ex gallico in lat. sermonem vertit J. M. Christell. Aug. Vind. 1722. The work appeared first anonymously under the title: Methode pour Etudier la théologie. Paris 1716. The importance of the work itself, and the attitude which Du Pin assumed toward Protestantism, caused the Protestant theologians Christell and Frickius, the former to translate the writing into Latin, the latter to prefix to this translation a *Prefatio de vita, scriptis et fatis Du Pinii.* [Scheurl, in Herzog's *Encyclopædie*, says of Du Pin, that he wrote with extraordinary facility, showing much cleverness and taste, but by no means great profundity.]

tradition, by the Councils. Divine revelation, as thus given expression to, is the *sanctum depositum* of the Church, and constitutes the essential object of Christian theology, as well of the positive as of the scholastic. In the view of Du Pin the scholastic theology is especially the systematic exposition of Christian truths, and reaches back to the earliest age of the Church; while the positive theology treats the separate doctrinal propositions as need and occasion require. Mediæval scholasticism made a wrong use of philosophy, introduced many things into theology which did not belong to it, and lost itself in empty and fruitless discussions. The theologian has to make only a formal use of philosophy. In presence of the mysteries which are contained in Holy Scripture and in traditional doctrine, the reason (*ratio*) of the theologian must be silent. In accordance with these fundamental principles the study of theology takes shape. Its foundation is the study of Scripture, and, as indispensable to this, the knowledge of the Hebrew, Greek, and Latin tongues. But Scripture has a double sense, *sensus literalis*, and *sensus mysticus*. The former, which was originally intended by the author, is alone to be employed in dogmatic proof. On the other hand, the *sensus allegoricus, tropologicus*, and *anagogicus*, into which the *sensus mysticus* is partitioned, are merely *sensus arbitrarii*, which are only suitable for edification. In exposition of Scripture, however, the theologian must be led by the *sensus ecclesiæ atque unanimis patrum interpretatio*. The study of Scripture is followed by the study of tradition, under which the entire history of the Church is embraced, and alongside of this the history of the doctrines of the Church is placed. Dogmatics, moral and practical theology, form the conclusion; the latter, however, with reference only to preachers and such as have the cure of souls.

The spirit of Erasmus has unquestionably had an influence on the treatment of theology. We cannot certainly refuse to Du Pin a hasty acknowledgment of the way in which, with

that unmistakeable decidedness which is characteristic of Protestantism, he makes Holy Scripture the foundation of theology; we recognise also his anti-Jesuitical tendencies, and the pains which he took to free theology from all scholastic accessories. Nevertheless, even with Du Pin, regard for the Church doctrine exerts a determined influence upon his whole theology, and prejudicially affects its systematic and scientific construction.

§ 5. HISTORY OF THEOLOGICAL ENCYCLOPÆDIA—*Continued.*

(*d*) *From the Period of Pietism to that of Schleiermacher.*

Pietism, with its preponderating practical tendency and its individualistic character, though indeed it has attained no scientific independence, has nevertheless exercised a wholesome influence on the wider development of the prevailing theology. Inasmuch as it did not on principle diverge from the orthodox theology, and did not contest the doctrine maintained by this theology as such, but only the over-estimation of that doctrine, orthodox theology was stimulated in the direction of Christian piety, under the influence of which pietism had been moving, and thereby the force of the pietistic opposition was weakened. The writings of Pfaff,[1] Buddæus,[2] and J. G. Walch,[3] relating to this subject, which appeared in the first half of the eighteenth century, are evidence of this. All three, quite in the sense of the orthodox theology, firmly maintain the Church doctrine, as it is laid down in the confessions, and the principles of Scripture, by means of which theology holds a position of scientific certainty such as is held by no other science; but not only do they very urgently recommend the writings of pietist theologians, such as Joachim Lange, and August Herm. Francke, for theological study, they also themselves point out in the most forcible way that the *Christianismus practicus* must always be kept in view by the student; that, for the theologian and Church teacher, not only are the *cognitio* and *eruditio*

[1] Chr. M. Pfaffii introductio in historiam theologiæ literariam, pp. 1–3. Tubingæ 1724-26.

[2] Jo. Fr. Buddæi Isagoge historico-theologica ad theologiam universam singulasque ejus partes, t. 1, 2. Lipsiæ 1727. 4to.

[3] Johann Georg Walch's Einleitung in die theologischen Wissenschaften (Introduction to the Theological Sciences), 2nd edition. Jena 1753.

of consequence, but also the *sapientia prudentiaque divina* and *vitæ integritas;* that theology must be prosecuted with *oratio, meditatio,* and *tentatio,* and for the advancement of God's glory and the eternal wellbeing of the Christian. *Fieri solet, ut homines eruditi sint pessimi ecclesiarum ministri.* (Pfaff.) The scholarliness into which, during its contest on behalf of pure doctrine, orthodox theology had been developed, associates itself here with the Christian practical tendency of pietism, and is itself thereby led over, in its judgment on orthodoxy, from dogmatic severity to mildness and toleration. Orthodox theology passes over into the theological system that is distinguished by the name of Supernaturalism. The three theologians just referred to have contributed little to the construction of a theological system. The task which they set before them was rather a literary one. They attached themselves, therefore, to the theological scheme which had already come into use, in order to provide the separate branches of study with that literary apparatus proper to them, without troubling themselves much about their inner relations to one another. The importance which they attach to Church history, only shows that they are not unaffected by the theology of Calixtus, who, by means of the position which he assigned to ecclesiastical tradition after Scripture, must have also stimulated the orthodox to a study of Church history. The tendency referred to prevailed especially with Pfaff and Buddæus. The former, in a literary historical style, treats of the *theologia exegetica,* of the *theologia dogmatica, tam theoretica quam morali,* of the *theologia polemica, ecclesiastica,* and *pastoralis,* under which are to be included the *jurisprudentia ecclesiastica, theologia casualis, catechetica, homiletica,* and *mystica.* In exegetical theology and Church history the material is distributed under fifteen rubrics, in order to enter the literature in its proper place, but no attempt, indeed, is made to divide this material according to the different branches of study, and to bring these into a systematic connection. Buddæus in the general part of his work expresses himself in a very complete manner regarding

the method and the end of theological study, regarding the talents and special qualities desirable in one studying theology, regarding helps and preliminary acquirements; and then in the special part he places the *theologia thetica, symbolica, patristica et moralis*, under which the *theologia mystica, jurisprudentia divina et prudentia tum humana tum pastoralis*, are to be included, and thereafter *jurisprudentia ecclesiastica, historia ecclesiastica, theologia polemica*, and *exegetica* are allowed to follow in a group. Walch, again, after he has, with reference to natural and revealed religion, distinguished revealed theology from natural theology, and pointed out as the subject of the former the divine truths which are established as such by the witness of the Holy Scripture, makes an attempt at systematic arrangement, which, however, cannot be regarded as successful. In reference to its subject, theology, according to him, falls into two main divisions, theoretical and practical, of which the former embraces thetic or dogmatic theology, the latter moral theology; while the rest of the theological branches are distinguished, partly with reference to form and method, partly with reference to order of treatment, and are placed under the two main divisions as merely subsidiary sciences. According to the scheme sketched out in his *Introduction*, Walch gives in detail in his *Bibliotheca*,[1] in nine chapters, the literature belonging to the several branches.

The theologians named are succeeded by Mosheim. In his *Brief Method for the Rational Acquiring of Sacred Learning*,[2] he places theology altogether under the point of view of practical use. In the first main division, he treats of the purpose of theological study and the necessary preparatory acquirements. Theology should communicate dexterity in doing that which is incumbent upon one who is to be a minister of

[1] Jo. Georgii Walchii bibliotheca theologica selecta literariis adnotationibus instructa, t. 1–4. Jenæ 1757–65.

[2] Johann Lorenz von Mosheim, Kurze Anweisung die Gottesgelahrtheit vernünftig zu erlernen. Nach dessen Tode zum Druck befördert durch Chr. E. von Windheim. Helmstädt 1756.

the gospel. Among the numerous preliminary acquirements philosophy receives a prominent place, but in theology itself it ought to be only sparingly employed. In the second main division, dogmatics and morals are placed at the head of the theological sciences. The study of Scripture follows, since the doctrines are to be proved from Scripture. A system of polemics is particularly serviceable to the clergy against free-thinkers, atheists, and deists, as well as against papists. In the department of Church history, the cleric needs only to familiarize himself with a few leading points. More important for him are the practical sciences, pastoral theology, Church law, homiletics, and catechetics. In the third main division, the distinction is laid down between the theologian and the pastor. The theologian, who has to educate and train the pastors, must have a comprehensive acquaintance with all the sciences which are necessary for the pastor, and in this he must be far more thorough and exact than the pastor himself need be.

The Reformed theologian too, Mursinna,[1] who introduced the name "Encyclopædia" for our branch of study in theology, follows the interest rather of a literary historical, than of a scientific, method. He ranks the study of theology extraordinarily high, and would have theologians equipped with all possible accomplishments; but, in the first eleven chapters of his *Encyclopædia* he puts these general requirements together in quite an external manner, without bringing them into inner connection with theology. Toward philosophy, after the manner of the reformed theologians, he assumes a more generous attitude than the Lutheran theologians do. *Philosophia*, says he, *non est ancilla, sed potuis soror theologiæ*. For the most part, what Mursinna treats of in these first eleven chapters does not belong to a theological encyclopædia. In chapter twelfth he distinguishes between true and false religion. Holy Scripture is the book which contains the divine

[1] Primæ lineæ encyclopædiæ theologicæ in usum prælectionum ductæ a Sam. Mursinna, ed. 2. Halæ 1784 (1 ed. 1764).

revelation concerning the true religion. Revealed religion must be in harmony with natural religion, and must supplement it. Exegetical theology, therefore, is made prominent. Then the other branches are enumerated according to the ordinary distribution; for, in a purely formal manner, the task of each separate branch, and the literature belonging to it, are laid down.

While pietism does not come into opposition with orthodox theology on any matter of principle, yet, on the other hand, since the middle of the eighteenth century, the foundations upon which the orthodox system rests, the identity of Holy Scripture with divine revelation, and the identity of the Church doctrine with Holy Scripture, have been questioned. Rationalism, which now as rationalistic theology makes its advance into the Protestant Church, began its comprehensive criticism of those orthodox presuppositions. Protestant theology had in general decidedly refused to have any connection with philosophy. Notwithstanding the many points of contact which exist between philosophy and theology, from their having in part a common object, since the Reformation both went on their own ways, and developed their systems independently of one another, and without any reciprocal regard. The more independently, however, that philosophy was able to make her movements, after she had been freed, by means of the Reformation, from all external ecclesiastical bonds, the more regardlessly did she, and that very soon too, drag into her department the subjects of Christian theology, and assume in many ways a hostile attitude, not only towards the ecclesiastical dogmas, but toward Christianity, yea, even toward religion itself. (Deists. Naturalists.) And notwithstanding the temporary unanimity that prevailed between orthodox theology and the Wolffian philosophy, the opposition was always significantly coming into consciousness, which exists between the philosophical and theological provinces, the contradiction between the light of nature and the light of grace,

between reason and revelation, between knowledge and faith, between the wisdom of the world and that which is learnt of God. At length it became impossible for theology to avoid consideration of this contradiction. And this is the merit of rationalism, that it received into theology itself the contradiction which must lead, if unaccommodated, to a thoroughgoing estrangement, and by this means contributed to a reconciliation, in that it sought to represent, on the one hand, the interests of Christianity over against philosophical negation, and, on the other hand, the interests of reason over against those of revelation. On the part of rationalism, it was before all else enjoined that the orthodox theory of Scripture, and the dogmatic argumentation founded thereupon, should submit to criticism. Over against this, the orthodox and supernaturalistic theory had now to do its utmost, in order to affirm the principle of its own supernatural revelation, and to save as much as possible of the ecclesiastically sanctioned doctrines. The beginning was thus made of a spiritual conflict, through which theology has experienced a complete revolution, and has, at least, advanced on the way to scientific freedom.

The numerous writings of Semler,[1] all of them prosecuting the same end, have proved of far-reaching consequence in regard to the system of traditional theology. While already Ernesti,[2] in opposition to the subjective method of expounding Scripture, which prevailed in the orthodox and pietistic theology, had brought into prominence the objective treatment, by means of which an exposition was offered of the literal sense originally intended by the authors, Semler, in essential agreement with

[1] The following works at this place are deserving of special consideration :— Joannis Salomonis Semleri Institutio brevior ad liberalem eruditionem theologicam, lib. 1 et 2, Halæ 1765–66 , and the German reproduction of this work : Johann Salomo Semler's Versuch einer freiern theologischen Lehrart, zur Bestätigung und Erläuterung seines lateinischen Buches. Halle 1777.

[2] Institutio interpretis Novi Testamenti. Lips. 1761. [This work has been translated into English by the late Bishop Terrot of Edinburgh, forming vols. i. and iv. of the Biblical Cabinet, published by T. & T. Clark,—Ernesti's Principles of Biblical Interpretation.]

Ernesti, made a beginning of the historical treatment of Scripture. In his long preface to the *Versuch einer freiern theologischen Lehrart* (Attempt at a freer method of theological teaching), Semler brought out the two principal points which constituted the issue between him and his orthodox opponents, his attitude toward Holy Scripture, and toward the Lutheran Church doctrine. The Old and New Testament, so he puts it in the third and fourth books of the treatise referred to, is a collection of writings which have been composed at different times and with reference to different requirements; the Old Testament writings answering to the religious requirements of the Jews, the New Testament writings answering to the requirements of different Christian individuals and Churches. Hence a distinction has to be made between its historical and its divine contents, between the canon and the word of God. Not all the Old and New Testament writings, but only those writings, and those constituent parts of them, which contain divine truths, that is to say, truths belonging to religion, are to be regarded as canonical. Religion, moreover, consists essentially in moral worship of God, and in the inward blessedness of man which is thereby secured. Only in reference to these subjects is inspiration to be ascribed to the sacred authors of Scripture, not according to a dogmatic theory brought out in an external way, which gives the title "inspired" to the entire Old and New Testament writings, with their whole contents, down to the very sound of the words. The Holy Scriptures do not contain a system of doctrine valid and binding for all time, nor can they, according to their constitution, serve for the establishment of doctrinal propositions maintained by the Church. A distinction is to be made between dogma and religion. The salvation of Christians is not dependent on the unanimous profession of the Church dogmas; but the principal thing is, that they receive from Holy Scripture the truths necessary for their moral advancement according to their individual requirement, and that they

regulate their lives in accordance with these truths. *Non præcipuam rem esse,* says Semler in the preface to the *Institutio, in decretorum numero et sententiis perpetuum consensum, sed vitam Deo et Christo, quem servatorem omnes fatentur, dignam.* It is necessary that all Christians should know and believe the universal truths belonging to religion; but the dogmas, which, in the course of centuries, have been set forth for Church purposes in varying forms, belong to the domain of the theologian. It is necessary to distinguish between religion and theology. The acknowledgment, however, of the universal truths of religion must be left quite free, according to the capacity and requirement of the Christian, and is not to be put under the constraint of the Church doctrine. A distinction is to be made between private religion or private theology, in regard to which each Christian has his own indisputable right, and public religion or the theology of the Church. (Compare the second book of the *Versuch.*)

Theology, which is suitable, not for all members of the Church communion, but only for a few individuals, is, according to its conception, "a dexterity proper to the teachers of the Christian religion, in order that they may recommend the Christian religion to their contemporaries in the best style, as well as in order that they may rightly estimate the different representations and connections thereof, by means of which the various sects and parties in the Christian religion have originated." Every teacher of the Christian religion has the task, *liberalem Dei cognitionem promovere,* and must therefore himself know *universam Christi doctrinam et disciplinam,* and imitate the example of Christ (*Institutio,* § 4). To *eruditio theologica* belongs *scientia theologia exegeticæ, dogmaticæ, polemicæ, moralis, symbolicæ, patristicæ, historiæ ecclesiasticæ, antiquitatum et juris ecclesiastici vetustioris.* But inasmuch as in the *Institutio,* as well as in the *Versuch,* Semler speaks only about exegetical and dogmatic study, it is evident that these two were regarded by him as of the greatest

importance. For the study of Scripture he claims, in accordance with his fundamental principle, a position in relation to Holy Scripture quite independent of the formulated doctrine of the Church. (Compare the third book of the *Versuch.*) For dogmatic study he claims that a distinction be made between Christian articles of faith and the varying articles of the Church, to which (s. 204 ff.) he adds some excellent thoughts in reference to union. For criticism of the Church doctrine, not only Holy Scripture, but also reason, is to be used. Religion and reason are not contrary to one another (s. 206 ff.). "There may be difference of opinion among theologians *de mysteriis doctrinalibus*, without any injury being thereby done to any fundamental article of the faith to be found in Holy Scripture, or to the circle of doctrine which is bound up with our own true wellbeing" (s. 26). The right, too, of private religion or private theology is to be admitted; only, on its part, it must not interfere with the publicly valid Church doctrine, for by means of this latter the unity of the Church communion is constituted (*Institutio*, § 28).

With a stedfast piety, not untouched by *pietism*, with clear decision on behalf of Christian freedom of faith and conscience, with unwearied diligence and many-sided scholarship, Semler fought a long theological battle against the dominion of orthodoxy. It must always be admitted that his conception of religion and Christianity was superficial, one-sided, and individualistic in an undue degree, that the position which he assigned to religion in respect of dogma and in respect of theology, rested upon an abstraction to which there was no corresponding reality, and that the relation assumed by him between private religion and the publicly valid Church doctrine is not reconcilable with the practice of the evangelical Church; yet, just as little can it be denied, that Semler, by means of his investigation of Holy Scripture on historical grounds, and by means of that separation of religion and theology, of Christianity and dogmatic Church doctrine,

not only shook violently the foundations of orthodox theology,[1] but also, in spite of the faultiness of his own definition of theology, contributed the building stones which theology, in its wider development, had to adopt and to employ in its new scientific structure.

The men of the illumination (*aufklärung*) who had modelled their logic on the Wolffian philosophy, lightly disregarded the pious awe which Semler cherished toward the existing institutions of the Church, and which caused him to avoid an open breach with these. To them it seemed that there was value only in the results which Semler had reached by means of his learned investigations. In accordance with the indications given by Semler, they assumed a relation toward the Church dogmas and Christianity; and just as Christianity has only an essentially ethical significance, so must theology concern itself no further with the orthodox institutions of the Church, but must cast off all unfruitful learned researches, and so adjust itself as to be in a position to promote the general welfare by means of moral influence, and to turn it to the greatest possible practical advantage. Bahrdt,[2] in his treatise on theological study, demands a thorough remodelling of the course of theological study. The importance of the clerical order for the State lies in this, that the clergy are the

[1] H. Schmid, *Die Theologie Semler's*, Nördlingen 1858, was unable from his standpoint to estimate the significance of this distinction. [Oosterzee gives a less favourable view of Semler's theological position: "A theologian of conscientious mind and of astounding reading, but at the same time of a restless spirit, seizing with a revolutionary hand on almost every field of thought, and with an eye rather for ever varying forms, than a heart for the spirit and essence of Christianity" (Dogmatics, § xiv. 9). Dorner has estimated very fairly both sides of Semler's character, recognising his personal piety, and indicating also the strong rationalistic taint in his theology. (Comp. Hist. of Prot. Theology, vol. ii. pp. 287–289.) He thus sums up and gives his verdict: "Semler opened the way for a historical view of all these questions by again agitating them; and thus one important element of the Reformation again took the place of that absence of all criticism which had since set in. Upon the whole, however, the chief result of Semler's labours was rather to destroy than to build up."—ED.]

[2] C. F. Bahrdt, Ueber das theologische Studium auf Universitäten. Berlin 1785.

teachers of the people. The clerical order, however, has destroyed its own respectability and influence: for just among the clergy does "the least illumination in religion" prevail; their sermons are in contents and in style poor, and, for a cultured auditory, unpalatable: for the arts and sciences the clergy have no taste, are wanting in good manners, and, what is particularly injurious, are negligent in the management of children. The foundation of the evil lies in the altogether perverted system of education which theologians receive at the universities. The problem is to educate the young theologians at the university into generally useful teachers of the people. What does not contribute to this end, does not belong to the theological sciences. The learned stuff, which they are taught at the university, is not only of no use, but is actually hurtful, inasmuch as it obstructs in them the insight into the essence of religion. Above all, the distinction between religion and theology is to be made clear to them, and according to this should their study be arranged. The truly "useful branches" are philosophy, religion, the New Testament, natural history, with anatomy and physics, arithmetic and geometry, Greek and Roman classics, history, literature, and therapeutics. All these sciences serve for the illumination of the spirit, improve the gifts which advance the interests of religion, and are useful for their future calling. But religion, as "the system of the general religious sciences, in so far as the blessedness of all cultured nations rests thereupon," has the essentially moral task of confirming the blessedness, that is to say, the constant condition of rest and cheerfulness of disposition. The Old Testament may be dispensed with by the theologian; only with the New Testament has he to occupy himself. Christianity has a great moral value, but still the sayings of Jesus and the apostles are to be believed and obeyed, only in so far as they are in agreement with the teaching of reason. After the young theologian has been confirmed by means of these studies in the illumination, then there may be given to him in the last session of his three years' course, without

danger, a general sketch of technical theology, dogmatics, history of dogmas, Church history, symbolics, introduction to the New Testament. But by far the chief thing is to develop his capacity for teaching. He is not only to gain acquirements, he must also learn to communicate them: hence, pædagogic exercise in the Socratic method of teaching, rhetoric, exercise in the elaboration of discourses in German, examinations, declamations. So equipped, the clergy should, in the absence of public school teachers, act as preachers and schoolmasters, and also as physicians in practical life; and the candidates, instead of becoming family tutors, should enter into practical preparatory training under the clergy as their assistants.

It cannot be denied that Bahrdt says much that is forcible against the old academical style, which in his time was adhered to in the theological course, and against an unfruitful kind of theological learning divorced from practical life, and that he sought in his contest against this, by means of his practical strokes, to elevate the pastorate which in his opinion had been degraded, and to realize his conception in some profitable way. But inasmuch as he laid down practical usefulness as the *standard* measure of theological study, and degraded even this into a mere training for the practical calling, he simply shows that he has no idea of theological science as such, and its significance for life, and just as little of the Church, and the service which the clergyman has to give in it. With him all conduct (Praxis) pertains to the State; and the clergyman, as a teacher of the people, has no other problem to solve than the training of sound citizens for the State, in order that, in the department of the State, the enjoyment of blessedness and the comforts of life may be always increasing.

In this theology of the illumination there is no trace of the Christian spirit of the Reformation. Nevertheless, under the surface upon which it moves, that spirit was still alive, and called attention to its presence by significant utterances. In the

general culture of the times, religious and theological questions were pressed forward, and men like Klopstock, Hamann, Lavater, Jung Stilling, Claudius, conveyed to that spiritual impoverishment, into which the opposition to the theology of the Church had fallen, a wealth of religious and philosophical ideas, which, freed by a Lessing and Herder from its partially chaotic form, and its pietistic and mystical admixtures, and with clear consciousness, was now turned to account on behalf of theological science.[1] These two, Lessing and Herder, the former more as a philosopher, with critical acuteness, the latter more as a theologian, with poetic sensibility and insight, have contested the illumination's standpoint of reason and utility, as well as the life and spirit of the restrictive dogmatism of the Church theology. Religion is regarded by both of them as an original life in the spirit of man; not as a product of human reason, but a divine revelation; not a matter of moralizing reflection, but of the heart and feeling, and as being intended, besides, to penetrate all the spiritual powers of mankind, and the whole course of human culture, and the humanistic studies, by means of which its indwelling divine light is to be manifested. In many points, indeed, the systematic establishment and reconciliation may have been missed by them, yet incontestably they have the merit of having brought into theological development germs which have given evidence of their productive powers, under various degrees of heat and cold, up to the present. Herder, in his letters in reference to the study of theology,[2] as indeed the

[1] Compare Dorner, Geschichte der Protestantischen Theologie. München 1867. s. 714 ff. [In English translation, published by T. & T. Clark, History of Protestant Theology, 1871. We have here an important criticism on the thinkers named above, and the summary reference here made to the school may be amplified from Dorner's careful study of each individual. Comp. vol. ii. pp. 293-320.]—Carl Schwarz, G. E. Lessing als Theologe. Halle 1854.—A. Werner, Herder als Theologe. Berlin 1871.—[Life and Writings of Lessing, by James Sime, 2 vols. London 1877.]

[2] J. G. von Herder's Sämmtliche Werke. Zur Religion und Theologie. Th. 13, 14. Stuttg. und Tüb. 1829.

epistolary form shows, has not set forth a systematically arranged encyclopædia, but still he lays down his fundamental theological opinions with the design of winning over to these the young race of theologians. "The best study of divine learning is the study of the Bible, and the best reading of this divine book is human." He begins with these words, and dedicates the first two divisions of his letters to the study of Scripture. All religion has its roots in history. The Old and the New Testaments are the original sources of the Christian religion. The Old Testament, which had been set aside by Semler and the theologians of the illumination, is brought back again by Herder to a place of honour. In the spirit of the olden time, it is conceived with poetic sensibility in accordance with its religious contents. What has principally to be distinguished in the Bible is between the eternal and the temporal, between the divine and the human; and the end of Scripture exposition, in regard to which Herder now also lays down hermeneutical rules which are of the highest value still, must therefore lead us to understand the eternal, divine, religious contents of Scripture. Hence Herder, in the third division of his letters, joins dogmatics immediately with Bible study. "Dogmatics is a philosophy drawn from the Bible, and this must always remain its source" (s. 48). No contradiction exists between reason and Scripture, between nature and grace, between nature and revelation: they are the gifts of the one God, and the question only is, how to use them both well (s. 16). As with him theology is the most liberal of all sciences (s. 8), so with him is dogmatics "a system of the noblest truths for the human race, relating to man's spiritual and eternal happiness," by means of which "it reaches to manifest truth, pure exposition of Scripture, and sound simplicity" (s. 106). These truths the theologian as well as the preacher has to proclaim, and in this connection too Herder gives excellent instructions of enduring worth. After he has, in the forty-

eighth letter, set forth in brief outline the importance of Church history, he goes on in the forty-ninth letter to treat of pastoral theology in verses "On the good life of an upright servant of God, by Johann Val. Andreä," and then, in the fiftieth letter, he treats of the value of theology for the Church. A supplement to the letters consists of "A sketch of the employment of the three academical years by our young theologians;" and specially in reference to practical theology, which is treated in a very cursory manner in the letters, there is an appendix of six letters to Theophron, intended for those looking forward to the clerical office, and besides these, twelve provincial papers for preachers.[1] The ends contemplated by the Church are superior to those of the State; and the Church must resist every attempt on the part of the State at intermeddling with her tasks. The clergy are not to place themselves at the service of mere civil purposes, but in the prophetical and apostolical spirit to declare divine truth, and thereby to serve the universal purposes of humanity.

In Kant, there came forward an exclusive philosophical system, as an important opponent of the Church theology, which at the same time contributed to the firmer establishment of the rationalistic theology. While Kant, by means of his *Critique of the Pure Reason*, destroyed the metaphysics of philosophical and theological dogmatism, he raised the theology of the illumination above the low sphere of utility, and in place of a frivolous eudæmonism, set up an ideal moralism. The moral law is an imperative demand of the practical reason, and morality alone is an independent autonomic life of the human spirit. But for its realization it demands belief in God, freedom (virtue), and immortality. Religion is, according to Kant, the conviction that the moral laws set up by the reason are divine commands. The result is an ethical commonwealth, in which the moral ideas reach to universal dominion. Christianity coincides with moral religion, the

[1] Werke, zur Religion und Theologie. Th. 15.

Christian Church with the idea of the ethical commonwealth. The formulated faith of the Church is a means for furthering the true, that is, the moral religion. The highest interpreter thereof is pure religious faith. Revelation is to be expounded according to the universal practical rules of the religion of pure reason. Reason, with its natural religion, must be acknowledged and esteemed in the Christian system of belief as the supreme principle; and, on the other hand, the doctrine of revelation must be acknowledged and esteemed by the reason as the means for furthering natural religion. This is the true service which the Church has to yield. It becomes a dis-service when the relation is inverted, when the means is mistaken for the end. The Church faith must gradually pass over into the pure religious faith: in this the coming of the kingdom of God consists. The Church militant must rise into the all-comprehending and the all-dominating Church triumphant, into the ideal ethical commonwealth.

Religion was regarded by Kant as a vehicle for morals,—Christianity, the faith of the Church, and the Church itself, as a transitory means for the furthering of morals. As Kant robbed religion of its independence, so he deprived theology of its scientific character. In his writing entitled *Der Streit der Facultäten*[1] (*The Contest of the Faculties*), he assigns to the theological faculty, in accordance with the position assigned it by the governing body, the highest but, scientifically considered, a very subordinate place. The three superior faculties, the theological, the juristic, and the medical, have no

[1] Kant's Werke. Herausgegeben von Rosenkranz. Th. 10, § 251 ff. [On the Kantian view of religion, especially as set forth in his work, *Religion within the Limits of the Pure Reason*, Kuno Fischer has expressed himself in agreement with what is said above: "Moral belief is the only perfectly certain one. . . . This moral belief forms the basis and ground of religious belief. Now, if it is the problem of theology to explain religious belief, according to the canon of the *Pure Reason* there can be only a *moral theology;* that is, not a morality based on theology (theological morality), but a theology based on morals. And this is the only theology which the critic of the *Reason* had still left as a possible alternative." Comm. on Kant, transl. by Mahaffy, p. 299. See also Prof. Edward Caird's Kant.]

other task but to teach, in the interest of the State, their doctrines as sanctioned and appointed by it; while philosophy, in the interest of truth, has to exercise criticism upon the positive. Hence theology has only to record the faith of the Church acknowledged by the State, without concerning itself about the religious faith established in every man's own reason. What is required of it is, that by its doctrines it should meet the requirements of the State, but not that it should place itself at the service of truth. In this way, Kant sought to come to terms with the State, and with the dominant ecclesiasticism, in order as a philosopher, with so much the less trouble, to deal with Christianity and the faith of the Church; nevertheless he must have gained the experience that the absolutism of the State can allow no freedom to any science, not even to philosophy.[1] All this, however, was transitory, and even theology refused to take the academical place assigned to it by Kant, but rather maintained its position in accordance with the spirit of his philosophical system. With his deep grounding of morals, with his moral estimation of Christianity, with his high ethical ideals, he could not fail to exercise an important attractive influence upon the theology of his times. When, therefore, Kant, in his *Religion within the Limits of the Pure Reason*, expresses himself so decidedly,—"a religion which unhesitatingly declares war against the reason will not permanently hold out against it,"—theology felt itself called upon all the more vigorously to turn this religion of reason to the account of Christianity and the faith of the Church, and to restore the greatest possible harmony between theology and philosophy. Rationalistic theology took up its position at the standpoint of the religion of reason. The three postulates of the practical reason, God, freedom, and immortality, are in force as irrefutable dogmas, which indicate their importance by means of their ethical effect, and are confirmed in the Christian revelation. The orthodox theology

[1] Compare the preface to the "Streit der Facultäten."

gradually withdrew altogether from the circle of scientific activity, but sought to conserve the supernatural in opposition to rationalism, and still, while sending forth manifestoes more or less explicit of the old faith of the Church, endeavoured, above all, to preserve as far as possible biblical Christianity. The commotion which was occasioned by Kant in theological circles, and the vacillation in theological schools between the supernatural and the rationalistic principle which now appeared, are witnessed to by the numerous theological encyclopædias which were issued toward the close of the eighteenth century.

The encyclopædias of Nösselt,[1] Planck,[2] Thym,[3] Tittmann,[4] represent the standpoint of rational supernaturalism. Nosselt and Planck begin their writings with complaints about the dulness of their times, about the want of interest and zeal in theological study, about the pietistic disregard of theology as carnal learning, and the defamation of theology proceeding from men of the illumination, who treated it as unnecessary and purposeless. In order anew to fan the zeal, and to place in a true light the worth and importance of theological science, they wrote their encyclopædias for students of theology and for those who were to be teachers of religion. Hence they treat with great completeness of the philological, philoso-

[1] Anweisung zur Bildung angehender Theologen von Johann Aug. Nösselt. Herausgegeben von Aug. Herm. Niemeyer. Bd. 1–3. 3 Aufl. Halle 1818, 1819. (1 Ausgabe, Halle 1786; 2 Ausgabe, 1791.) [Hagenbach refers to this treatise as "the excellent, solid work," "a handbook which may be used in the present time always with advantage." Comp. p. 106.]

[2] G. J. Planck, Einleitung in die theologischen Wissenschaften. Th. 1, 2. Leipzig 1794,1795.—Grundriss der theologischen Encyclopædie zum Gebrauche bei seinen Vorlesungen. Von G. J. Planck. Göttingen 1813. [Of the latter work Hagenbach says that, though now obsolete, it is useful as a short treatise for beginners: of the former work, he remarks that it is still valued on account of its historical matter and its criticism, while for methodology it is of little worth (p. 107).]

[3] Johann Fr. W. Thym, Theologische Encyclopædie und Methodologie. Halle 1797.

[4] Encyclopædie des theologischen Wissenschaften von Johann Aug. Heinrich Tittmann. Leipzig 1798.

phical, and historical preliminary studies, sciences preparatory to, and helpful for, the study of theology,—treatises which, when given in this detailed fashion, do not belong to theological encyclopædia. That the orthodox theology has outlived itself, of this they have a clear conviction. Planck, in the introduction to his treatise, frankly admits that there is a difference between the old theology and the new. It would not be his task "to introduce the theological student to the system of orthodoxy according to the old theology, but to set him in a position from which he might, by means of his study, acquire a capacity for coming to free and unfettered judgments, for engaging impartially in investigations, and for attaining unto a decided personal conviction." "The question is not how to produce theological scholarship, but how to educate in independent thinking—how to form independent thinking theologians." And hence both of these writers take a freer position in reference to Holy Scripture, as well as in reference to the Church doctrine. Inasmuch as they distinguish between natural and revealed religion, between natural and revealed theology, Christian theology is with them the scholarly knowledge of revealed religion. Christian doctrine then, for as such they conceive of Christianity, can only be known from the Holy Scriptures. And if it be admitted that Holy Scripture contains in part purely popular and temporary representations, then the Christian doctrine, as the eternal, must raise itself above this, and, as revelation, receive its divine verification by means of the authority of Scripture. From this point of view exegetical theology is set down as the first part of theology, and, as its first branch, Planck names apologetics, which has as its task to vindicate, upon new grounds, the divine view of Scripture and the divine origin of Christian doctrine, against objectors, who have destroyed faith in the divinity of Holy Scripture in regard to its principal and fundamental contents. For the old theory of inspiration by an immediate supernatural influence of the

Holy Spirit has been deprived of its earlier prestige, and therefore, as Planck says (s. 458), a crisis has come about, "upon the issue of which not only the fate of science, but perhaps the fate of our whole theology may depend, and which will at least introduce an altogether new epoch in theology." Historical theology, as the second part, is of importance principally in furthering an insight into the truths of faith by means of the history of these. Systematic theology, as the third part, in which Planck includes besides dogmatics and ethics also symbolics, has pre-eminently to establish by Scripture proof the Christian truths of religion, but also, besides, has to prove their inner conformity to reason, and to expound their moral significance in accordance with the Kantian philosophy (Planck, s. 487). "Really indisputable propositions of reason, and actually revealed propositions, cannot really contradict one another" (Nösselt, § 199). While Nösselt sets down symbolical theology as the fourth part of theological science, and in this way distinguishes himself from Planck, the one, as well as the other, has relegated practical or applied theology, *theologia applicata*, to a place outside of the organic theological system, which is to be explained in this way, that they limit theology to the knowledge of religious truths, without giving it a comprehensive application to Christianity and the Church.

Thym intended by his encyclopædia only to afford a guide for his academical lectures. Inasmuch, too, as he distinguishes between mere scholarly acquirement and scientific knowledge, he gives, after the example of Nösselt and Planck, a complete synoptical schematism of theology according to its four principal divisions,—exegetical, historical, systematic, and practical theology,—yet without referring to their inner connection or their particular subordinate branches.

Tittmann acts more independently and more scientifically. In accordance with the usual encyclopædic point of view, he thus indicates the task of the encyclopædia of a particular

science,—"to determine exactly, and to represent, the connection and relation of all the parts of a science with one another, as well as the relation of that science to all the other sciences." Theology is a scholarly acquaintance with the Christian religion, and therefore is a historical science. The Christian revealed religion stands distinguished from natural religion. It has as such its own principles, and upon these, but not upon the principles of a philosophy, is the theological system to be reared. This system consists only of two parts, theoretical and practical, a doctrine of faith or a doctrine of morals. All the other acquirements concern the study, but not the system. All these acquirements, which were once included in exegetical and historical theology, Tittmann embraces under the subsidiary theological acquirements, among which he gives an altogether special attention to the philosophical, in order to make clear the proper relation between theology and philosophy. "Freedom for philosophizing on religion is given in and with reason itself, and is not taken away unless one misuses it; but even this freedom is adequately determined by means of the reason's limitation of knowledge" (s. 228). Philosophy and revelation have to mutually acknowledge one another, and can stand, each in its own department, independent the one of the other. In a special section Tittmann lays down a theological doctrine of method, which embraces theological discipline, that is, the arrangement of study according to a determined plan; theological architectonic, that is, the scientific treatment of theology; and theological pædantic, that is, practical theology. Tittmann exhibits great acuteness in representing theology as science, and in demonstrating the harmony of revealed religion with the religion of reason. Nevertheless, although his endeavours to vindicate for theology its characteristic principles are to be acknowledged, yet his conception of revelation is of so external and historical a kind, that the theology founded thereon cannot maintain its independence as a science over against philo-

sophy. His definition, too, of the subject of theology is such a narrow one, that the significance of exegetical, historical, and practical theology for the theological system does not come into view, and this system itself is identified with systematic theology, while theological architectonic, which is treated theoretically in the last section, would much more suitably find its practical application in the encyclopædia itself.

From a decided supernaturalistic standpoint, Kleuker[1] has expounded the theological encyclopædia. He divides his outlines into two parts. In the first part he places, in a purely formal manner, a science of theological knowledge, in order that he may, according to the plan here laid down, communicate in the second part the material of theology, "the encyclopædia of theological science, or a brief summary of all the principal and fundamental exercises of the whole of theology or the science of religion." Christianity is a divine revelation, and Holy Scripture is the original source of revelation. Hence it comes to this, that divine truths are to be derived from Holy Scripture: in so far as they are contained in Holy Scripture, they are divine truths, and bear in themselves the evidence of their truth. Hence Kleuker puts in the first principal division the theology which concerns itself with Scripture, under the title of fundamental theology, and connects with it apologetics, which has to produce proof for the divinity and truth of the Christianity contained in Holy Scripture. The second principal division embraces: (1) the Christian doctrine of salvation, as dogmatics and morals; (2) Elenchtic, or the justification of the Christian doctrine of salvation. The third principal division gives the theory of practical or applied theology, and contains: (1) the theory of the art of teaching or didactic, (*a*) systematics, (*b*) homiletics, and (*c*) catechetics; (2) the theory (*a*) of Church science or

[1] Grundriss einer Encyclopædie der Theologie oder der Christlichen Religionswissenschaft. Von Johann Friedr. Kleuker, ord. Lehrer der Theologie auf der Universität zu Kiel. Bd. 1, 2. Hamburg 1800, 1801.

ecclesiastics, (*b*) of pastoral science and liturgics. The fourth principal division consists of "the so-called historical theology or the history of Christianity, and of the science of the Christian religion as put in practice, and also of the manner in which it is practised." The superiority which marks out Kleuker's encyclopædia from many previous ones lies in the objectivity with which it represents theology in its scientific distribution. But the distribution itself suffers from very evident imperfections, which are to be explained in part from the standpoint occupied by Kleuker, such as the connecting of apologetics with exegetical theology, and the introduction of a special elenchtic after dogmatics and morals. But the placing of historical theology after practical theology is altogether unjustifiable; for thereby, not only is the latter withdrawn from its historical ground and sphere, but also, the value which historical theology pre-eminently has for the theological system is not brought into prominence.

On account of their connection in respect of theological standpoint, in respect of conception and exposition of theology, Bertholdt,[1] Stäudlin,[2] and Clarisse[3] may be classed along with the last-named encyclopædist. With reference to the general

[1] Theologische Wissenschaftskunde oder Einleitung in die theologischen Wissenschaften, nämlich Vorbereitungs-, Hülfs- und angewandte Wissenschaften des theologischen Studiums. Ein encyclopædisch-litterarisches Handbuch für Theologen. Herausgegeben von L. Bertholdt. Bd. 1, 2. Erlangen 1821, 1822.

[2] C. Fr. Stäudlin, Lehrbuch der Encyclopædie, Methodologie und Geschichte der theologischen Wissenschaften. Hannover, 1821. [What is said above refers to the later period of Stäudlin's theological activity. Earlier, as an extreme Kantian, he occupied a position unfavourable to religion, but later, he exerted himself in the endeavour to harmonize Kant's moralism and those Christian moral precepts which he regarded as constituting Christianity. He does not seem to have ever regarded the Christian revelation as of any consequence except in morality. Compare Dorner, Hist. of Protestant Theology, vol. ii. pp. 323–325.]

[3] Encyclopædiæ theologicæ Epitome, perpetua annotatione, literaria potissimum, illustrata. Futuris theologis scr. Jo. Clarisse, theologiæ in Acad. Lugduno-Batava professor. Ed. alt. Lugd. Bat. 1835 (1 ed. 1832).

survey of the sciences, Bertholdt represents theological encyclopædia as a survey of the theological sciences. It has to develop not only the formal distribution of the theological branches, but also the essential contents of these. Theological encyclopædia has a fourfold division: (1) Sciences preparatory to theological study (theological propædeutic), (2) sciences contributing to theological study (theological boëthetic), (3) sciences fundamental to theology (theological pædeutic), (4) practical sciences (theological pragmatic). Although Bertholdt rightly requires an architectonic for the representation of every separate science, yet he himself does not succeed in representing theology according to a rule of architectonic. The theory of theological science must, in its distribution, be itself a systematic classification of theology: and hence the first division, the propædeutic, is to be excluded from the theological system, whereas the second division, the boëthetic, which embraces the whole of exegetical theology, is to be admitted into it. After the example of Tittmann, Bertholdt regards only the doctrine of faith and of morals as constituting the essential core of theology, and is led on this account to represent the exegetical branches as mere subsidiary sciences. In the third division, Church history presents itself, next to dogmatics and morals, among the fundamental sciences, and can be connected with the former only by means of the history of dogmas. The fourth division again, pragmatic, so named by Bertholdt with a reference to the theologian in his official activity as πραγματικός, is, in accordance with this reference, brought into no demonstratively necessary connection with the theological system.

Stäudlin quite systematically divides his encyclopædia into a general part, which occupies itself with theology as a whole, and a special part, which occupies itself with the several theological sciences. Christian theology belongs to the mixed sciences, inasmuch as it is derived partly from reason and nature, and partly from history and revelations. It is thus partly

rational, partly empirical; partly natural, partly positive. Christianity is rationalism and supernaturalism combined. Those of its doctrines which are natural and are already grounded in the reason, and its revealed, positive, historical doctrines, that is to say, rationalism and supernaturalism, are not contradictory the one to the other. A rationalism which denies all supernatural revelation is to be rejected. As religious philosophy is by itself incapable of an exact scientific treatment, so also Christian theology cannot be an exact science. It has before it the purely practical aim of helping to render one qualified for a spiritual office. "By the theological course of study we understand all spiritual efforts and strivings for developing a capacity for a clerical office" (p. 15 ff.). Stäudlin declares himself decidedly opposed to that reference of exegetical and historical theology to the order of mere subsidiary sciences which was favoured by Tittmann, but considered that exegetical theology should rather be ranked as the first part of theology, inasmuch as all the doctrines essential to Christian theology are already contained in Holy Scripture. The second division treats of the doctrine of faith and morals; the third, of the Christian religion, theology, and Church; the fourth, of the practical application of Holy Scripture and its contents, of Christianity, and of theology in the whole range of its activity, which embraces also the clerical office. The encyclopædia of Stäudlin is kept throughout purely formal. He is satisfied with determining the problems of the separate theological branches, and with giving, as the title of his book promises, an exposition of its history. He does not set down methodology as a special division, but to each branch he attaches the methodological remarks proper to it.

The carefully elaborated encyclopædia of the reformed Dutch theologian Clarisse, in close connection with Mursinna, moves along the path marked out by those who preceded him without any independence or peculiarity. Clarisse only in-

tended to set forth the acquirements necessary for the theological student in the most systematic connection possible. After having, in a general division, treated of the gifts requisite on the part of theologians, and such-like themes, and after having very completely sketched, in a special division, the philological, historical, and philosophical preliminary studies, there follows (1) *theologia philologica* (*exegetica*), (2) *theologia historica*, (3) *theologia systematica* or *philosophica*, with which is also joined *theologia naturalis*, and (4) *theologia pastoralis*. Under all the separate divisions, the literature is very fully given, and likewise the method is indicated which should be followed in the study of each.

The supernaturalistic theologians who have been referred to, by means of their encyclopædias, which throughout manifest a living religious sensibility, and an earnest endeavour to exhibit divine revelation in its harmony with reason, have, over against the depreciation of theology and hostility toward it issuing from various sides, made a contribution worthy of acknowledgment to the solution of the problem set by Nösselt and Planck, which has helped to bring theological science again into a position of honour and consideration. On the other hand, by reason of their attitude toward Holy Scripture, by their *à priori* acknowledgment of the doctrine of Scripture as a divine revelation, and their consequently limited appreciation of the rational element in theology, they have failed, as encyclopædists, to acquire any special merit in the construction of theology according to principle and system. The importance which is to be assigned to them, and which ought not to be underestimated, lies in this, that by maintaining connection with the older theological schemes of arrangement, they have conserved the traditional material to the theological encyclopædia.

§ 6. HISTORY OF THEOLOGICAL ENCYCLOPÆDIA—*Continued.*

(*c*) *From Schleiermacher down to the present time.*

While rationalism made its moral theology the strict measure of what is positive, and remorselessly dismissed everything in the doctrine of the Scripture and of the Church which did not answer to this measure, and while, on the other hand, the supernaturalistic theology swung uncertainly hither and thither between revelation and reason, Schleiermacher led theology back to the immediate believing consciousness, and found in Christian piety itself the standard, in accordance with which all that is positive may be estimated. In this way Schleiermacher was led to a conception of theology quite peculiar, widely differing from any that had previously prevailed. The systematics of this theology he has developed, with a sharp, clear insight into the consequences, in his treatise:—*Kurze Darstellung des theologischen Studiums zum Behuf Einleitender Vorlesungen entworfen.* Berlin 1811. 2 Ausgabe, 1830.[1] [Translated into English by Farrar, under the title, *Brief Outline of the Study of Theology*, drawn up to serve as the basis of introductory lectures. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1850.] Christian theology is, according to Schleiermacher, a positive science, the parts of which are bound into one whole by

[1] "It is," says Hagenbach, "a sketch rapidly drawn with a firm hand, which wants only the pencil of a Herder to make it, by a finishing stroke, a rich, fair picture. Thankfully, however, are the hints to be received scattered, yet sparingly, over the second edition of 1830, which help to a clearer understanding of the little book. This significance, at least, belongs to the treatise, that it furnishes a key to the general system of Schleiermacher's theology" (p. 108). Lange, however, seems to be of opinion that the extreme conciseness of the outlines, and the special characteristics of the work admired by Hagenbach, have restricted the influence of the treatise upon the construction of the theological system. Compare Lange's Encyclopædie, p. 13.—ED.

means of their relation to Christianity, and which as such a whole has a practical problem to solve. § 1. The study of theology is incumbent only upon those in the Church who take part in the guiding of the Church. § 3. "Consequently Christian theology is to be defined as the sum total of those scientific acquirements and technical rules, without the possession and exercise of which a harmonious guiding of the Christian Church, that is, a Christian church government, would be impossible." The Christian faith in and for itself is not in need of such an apparatus. § 5. (Compare *Schleiermacher's Dogmatics*, 2nd edition, vol. 1, p. 84.) Christian piety, which carries its certainty in itself, does not require a theology. The distribution of theology under its principal divisions is determined in accordance with its practical tendency in the matter of Church guidance. The interests of this Church guidance require an assurance that "the existence of the religious community, the guiding of which is incumbent upon the Church, can be proved to be a necessary element in the development of the human spirit." § 22. The proof of this in respect of Christianity is the business of the philosophy of religion and ethics. It is from them that theology has to borrow the idea of Christianity and of the Christian community; and therefore, in the first division, it has to work out the idea of philosophical theology. § 24. Inasmuch then as the purpose of Church guidance is at once conservative and progressive, a special technology, relating exclusively to matters connected with this activity, makes its appearance as practical theology. § 25. Finally, Church guidance demands a knowledge of that whole, which constitutes the subject of this guidance, in respect of its actual condition. But its actual present condition can be understood only when regarded as a product of the past. To present this, therefore, is the task of historical theology which thus constitutes, not only the foundation of practical theology, but also the test of philosophical theology. § 27.

"Consequently historical theology may be said to form the sum total of theological study; and, by means of philosophical theology, it is related to science strictly so called, and, by means of practical theology, it is related to the active Christian life." If perfected, philosophical theology might form the beginning of the theological course of study. In reality, however, its positions are only gained by degrees during the progress of historical studies, and are based upon the principles of ethics, the study of which is presupposed. Further, too, the technology which concerns itself directly with matters of Church guidance cannot formally appear but as the result of historical theology perfected by means of philosophical theology. "In this trilogy—philosophical, historical, and practical theology—the whole course of theological study is embraced; and unquestionably, the most natural order for the treatment of it is to begin with philosophical theology and end with practical theology." § 31. The position of the separate branches of these three principal divisions in the system is also determined by means of their relation to Church guidance. Since ethics, as a science of the principles of history, has to represent the essence of Christianity, and to ascertain what in the development thereof is an expression of its idea, and what, on the other hand, is a deviation from that idea, philosophical theology has upon this basis to draw up a statement in regard to what is essentially Christian, and thus Christianity is put under the category of the positive. Besides this, philosophical theology has to bring into form the material borrowed from ethics. In this way the twofold purpose of Church guidance is accomplished: on the one hand, an acknowledgment of the truths of the faith communicated to the Church is secured, and on the other hand, the morbid deviations from it are brought into prominence as such. Hence apologetics and polemics, general and special, Christian and Protestant, are the two branches of philosophical theology. "These two branches, apologetics and polemics, as regarded from one

point of view, mutually exclude one another; but as regarded from another point of view, the one is conditioned by and dependent upon the other." By the contrasted character of their contents (the one dealing with the Christian idea, the other with deviations from it, see § 39 and § 40), and by the diversity of their tendency (the one being directed outwards, the other inwards, see § 41), they exclude one another. They are mutually dependent, inasmuch as morbid deviations are discoverable only by reference to that which is true and essential to Christianity, and again, the consideration of morbid deviations from the idea illustrates that which is essential to it. "These two branches, therefore, reach their perfect development only by means of, and in connection with, each other" (§§ 32–68). In reference to historical theology, Church guidance demands, first of all, an acquaintance with the present, from which an acquaintance with the future is to be developed. But the present can be understood only from the historical course of the past, and from the earliest conditions of the Christian life, from primitive Christianity. ["Historical theology is wholly embraced in these three divisions: the knowledge of primitive Christianity, the knowledge of the entire course of Christianity, and the knowledge of the actual condition of Christianity at the present time." The order in which these branches were deduced was from the present through the past, back to the period of origination: the order of study begins with the primitive period and ends with the present.] And so, in an order the inverse of their actual derivation, we have to enumerate as subdivisions of historical theology — exegetical theology, Church history, and dogmatics and statistics; these two last constituting together the historical knowledge of the present condition of Christianity. The task, too, of these special parts of historical theology, as well as their derivations, is determined by the relation which they bear to Church guidance. Practical theology receives its task from the emotions

which arise out of the feelings of desire and aversion called forth by philosophical theology in respect of the actual circumstances of the Church at any particular time. It is required of it that, with clear consciousness, it should regulate and lead on to its end that wise activity, in which the emotions corresponding to those feelings take practical shape; and its study is incumbent only upon those "in whom an interest in the affairs of the Church and a scientific spirit are united." § 258. Practical theology does not attempt to teach us what the tasks of Church guidance are, but only the proper method of proceeding in accomplishing them. The tasks of Church guidance, however, have to do with the *Church service*, in so far as these refer to the local congregation, and they have to do with *Church government*, in so far as they refer to the Church, or to the Christian community as a whole. It is in connection with this that prescriptions regarding proper procedure are to be set down. These are to be regarded as technical rules, but yet they serve only for the guidance of him who means to be a practical theologian, and who is capable of becoming such by reason of his own personal qualifications and his special preliminary training. Hence various sets of procedure rules must be recognised according to the variety of the several Church communities; so that Schleiermacher can only lay down a theory of Church guidance for the German Evangelical Church. Practical theology, therefore, as thus limited, falls into two divisions: the principles of the Church service, and the principles of Church polity or government (§§ 257–276).

Although, meanwhile, we put a restraint upon ourselves, intending in a later portion of our work to come back to the subject, in order to give a more detailed consideration to the significance of the principles of Schleiermacher's theology, and mean here only to give a sketch of his theological system as such, yet we must not pass on without expressing our decided opposition to Schleiermacher's whole con-

ception of theology, as well as to his systematic distribution of it. Schleiermacher makes theology not so much a science as a technology or art-theory.[1] For not only the technical rules which practical theology produces, but also the scientific acquirements which philosophical and historical theology yield, are, according to this definition of theology, placed at the service of the Church, so that the whole of theology is made to wear the appearance of a technical affair for supplying the Church with an equipment of acquirements and rules. The foundations of the whole system are given in the first section of the treatise. Were we to set aside the leading positions of that first paragraph, we could scarcely go through any of the other paragraphs without objection. In this first section of his treatise, Schleiermacher identifies *positive* science with pure *practical* science. According to him, every positive science is "a summary of scientific elements which have their coherence with one another, not as though by virtue of the very idea of science they formed a necessary constituent part of scientific organization, but only because they are requisite for the solution of a practical problem." § 1. note.—In so far now as theology is a positive science, it has only a practical problem to solve, so that the relation of its parts to Christianity, by means of which relation it is, according to section first, a scientific whole, transforms itself immediately, according to the statement of section fifth, into the relation of these parts to Church guidance, and the definition of theology results from this purely practical task, —yea, the theological acquirements, without this relation to Church guidance, would cease to be theological. § 6. Never-

[1] The German word here employed—*Kunsttheorie*—means the exhibition of the general principles which underlie a certain activity. An art for which a theory has been provided is brought into a certain relation to science. In so far as the theory, in a thorough manner, takes cognisance of, and tabulates the various principles involved, the art passes into a practical science. The fault found with Schleiermacher is that he regards theology as a summary or collection of practical rules, rather than as a scientific display of principles.—ED.

theless, every positive science (therefore theology, as being a positive science, must be included) has, according to its idea, to adjust itself to the object, that is, to the positive something which has been given it. At first, too, it may remain undecided what significance this object has in reference to the idea of science, and also what the relation of the positive science in question is to the general circle of the sciences, but it must always pre-eminently be the aim of a positive science to solve the definite and circumscribed problem that has reference to its own given object, that is, to reach a scientific knowledge of its object. Schleiermacher has, indeed, earned great merit in this, that he brings theology with all its parts into the closest connection with the Church; but, because he sets for theology a purely practical problem, he subordinates it to a purpose lying outside of its object, while as a science, even as positive, its purpose must be immanent. The practical problem with reference to the Church ought not, indeed, by any means to be excluded, only it must, in opposition to Schleiermacher's mode of treatment, be subordinated to the scientific purpose. The flash of genius is not to be denied which was shown by Schleiermacher when he acknowledged the necessity, on account of that living intercourse and connection into which theology had already entered with philosophy, of giving his practically conditioned theology a scientific foundation, and bringing it thereby into direct relationship with the whole circle of the sciences. Schleiermacher brought this about by means of his philosophical theology, the first division of his theology. But since he made his philosophical theology borrow its materials from the philosophy of religion and from ethics, he renders theology completely dependent upon philosophy. What theology has pre-eminently to produce, the determining of the idea of Christianity and of the Church, that also, in its own place, ought philosophy to produce. As Schleiermacher

by means of his definition alters the scientific character of theology, so by his philosophical theology he robs it of its scientific independence. But just precisely this is a moment of very important range. For when now Schleiermacher demands that every theologian must produce, altogether for himself, his own philosophical theology (§ 67), and that, further, according to § 89, on the basis of his philosophical theology, he must frame his exposition of Scripture, and must also, by the dogmatic treatment of the system of doctrine, make good his own conviction, which still can only rest upon the philosophical theology (§ 196), there is, in consequence of this, an appearance of subjectivity impressed upon the whole of his theological system.[1] The systematic distribution of theology results with Schleiermacher only as a consequence from its practical purpose, and indeed all the more readily because Schleiermacher wished to produce only a formal encyclopædia, that is, only what was requisite for the exact representation of the connection of the different parts of theology as related the one to the other. § 20. It cannot be denied that Schleiermacher, in so far as the practical aspect of theology is concerned, has succeeded in a remark-

[1] For the convenience of the student who may not have easy access to the treatise here criticised, we give here in full the three paragraphs referred to in the above sentence. "Seeing that the philosophical theology of each individual theologian embraces in itself the essential principles of his whole cast of thought in reference to theology, it follows of necessity that every theologian must produce this part of his system wholly for himself." (§ 67.) Schleiermacher then in a note very properly limits and explains this statement, by showing that every individual theologian is not required to develop independently a system of philosophical theology, any more than he is called to develop independently a historical or a practical theology. In §§ 14–17 he had shown that the individual theologian must confine his special activity to one department, but must also have a general acquaintance with the essential features of all the departments of theology. What he means in § 67 is that each theologian must for himself, by firm conviction, lay hold upon the principles on which the philosophical theology which he professes is reared. Then § 89 is as follows: "Seeing that each individual theologian must of necessity form for himself his own exposition of Scripture, because of the close connection between Scripture exposition and philosophical theology, from which all the principles of theology must be taken, we cannot allow him to borrow much from the productions of exegetical

able way. But just for this very reason, that the distribution is not derived from the object, but is determined by something outside of that object, his theology is not objectively established, and is not in any case suited, as Schleiermacher was inclined to think (§ 20), to stand in the place of a methodology, that is, to determine the practical order to be followed in the theological course of study. Regarded from the standpoint of Church guidance, it may fairly be admitted, as a point that has been established, that apologetics and polemics are to occupy the first place. Nevertheless, when Schleiermacher himself says (§ 65) that philosophical theology presupposes the material of historical theology, as something already attained and fully admitted, and that, at least, it cannot do without a chronological knowledge of the course of history (§ 252), in doing so, he expressly admits that he has made a wrong beginning. Besides this, he lays himself open to the objection that the problem of philosophical theology cannot be solved by a mere art of chronicling, but only by means of the most exact knowledge of history. Under the three divisions of historical theology, there already appears the necessity, under which Schleiermacher feels himself laid, to invert the order of derivation when pro-

experts." This borrowing, he explains, must mainly be limited to historical and geographical matter, which may be auxiliary to exposition. Not only the exegetical, but also the dogmatic part of the system is grounded upon philosophical theology; and the same demand of personal conviction is made of the dogmatist as is made of the expositor. "A dogmatic treatment of the system of doctrine is impossible, except as proceeding from personal conviction, yet, on the other hand, it is not necessary that there should be perfect agreement between all the statements of doctrine issued from the same Church community during any one period." (§ 196.) Without personal conviction one may give a report concerning the doctrine current at any particular time, but his representation will not help to establish the inward connection of its truths. From another standpoint than that of Schleiermacher, yet in this one particular making the same demand, Martensen says: "Dogmatics is not a mere historical exhibition of what has been, or now is, true for others, without being true for the author, nor is it a mere philosophical knowledge of Christian truth, obtained from a standpoint outside of faith and the Church." Different views, says Schleiermacher, are current in the Church,—their currency depending on their being officially asserted and not officially contradicted.—Ed.

ceeding to the actual study of the several parts. But apart altogether from this, the real insufficiency of Schleiermacher's schematism appears in the failure on the part of dogmatics to affirm its historical character, inasmuch as, strictly taken, the dogmatist is just as little required to assert and vindicate his personal convictions in regard to doctrine, as the theological statistician is in regard to the facts with which he operates. According to the place thus assigned it by Schleiermacher, dogmatics must be a history of doctrine current at the present time. Practical theology has been emancipated by Schleiermacher from the position of being a mere pendant to practical clerical training, and has been expounded by him with reference to Church guidance,—under the heads of Church government and Church service. But because he traces its origin from arbitrary emotions, which through inclination or disinclination are called forth under existing ecclesiastical circumstances, and still makes it essentially only a theory of technical rules, which are suitable for practical theologians, who alone will and can make use of them, even he has failed to bring practical theology into a strict and necessary connection with the system. When, finally, Schleiermacher describes the succession, so much favoured by him, of the three principal divisions—philosophical, historical, and practical theology—as the natural order, we cannot consider his statement as at all grounded in the nature of the thing, but, on the contrary, it would rather appear natural from Schleiermacher's own peculiar standpoint, to begin with practical theology, or at least to set it before historical theology, as it is admitted in § 25 to be in its derivation prior to historical theology.[1] Schleiermacher, indeed, has

[1] In accordance with Schleiermacher's definition of theology, which recognises only a practical problem, the arrangement of the encyclopædia should certainly be even as Raebiger suggests. That which is essential to theology, as thus defined, would find expression in practical theology, and the other divisions would be subordinate and subsidiary to this. The inversion which is actually

himself taken notice of this uncertainity in his treatment of the systematic order, when he says (§ 31): "With whatever division we might prefer to begin, we should always be obliged, on account of the mutual relations which the several divisions bear to one another, to assume in the one many things that belong to the other two."

The encyclopædia of Danz[1] has been composed evidently under the influence of Schleiermacher, although the differences between it and Schleiermacher's treatise are very marked. According to Danz, theology has Christianity for its subject. As the subject of scientific treatment, Christianity presents, to one so dealing with it, two great elements,—its faith or its religious doctrine, and its associational organism, the Christian Church. Then, from these, there follow the two principal divisions of Christian theology,—the Christian science of religion, and the Christian science of the Church. The first principal division has a theoretical and a practical part. The theoretical embraces exegetical, systematic, and historical theology. The practical part embraces catechetics, homiletics, pastoral wisdom, the science of Christian missions, and apologetics. The second principal division, the Christian science of the Church, embraces THEORETICAL SCIENCES—in-

resorted to, and which is fairly taken to be a confession of the inadequacy of the definition, would be strictly allowable, not in the encyclopædia, but in a separate methodology. On Raebiger's principles, again, which refuse to recognise a methodology distinct from the encyclopædia, this necessity of an inversion in the order of study for those theological departments is sufficient to condemn Schleiermacher's scheme.—ED.

[1] Encyclopædie und Methodologie der theologischen Wissenschaften. Von J. T. L. Danz. Weimar 1832. [Hagenbach notices Danz's work very unfavourably. It is simply a redistribution of Stäudlin's material with a new nomenclature, and indicates no clear consciousness on the part of the writer as to the ground and end of science. Doedes' condemnation of the book is equally emphatic. Speaking specially of Danz's arrangement, he says: "This division has not probably commended itself to any one for naturalness, and we have only to contemplate the work of Danz for a little near at hand in order to be able to understand how Pelt came to speak of it as 'that literary labyrinth of his confused encyclopædia and methodology,' and to declare that it is admirably calculated to bring him who seeks a guide into confusion." See Doedes, Encyclopedie, § 8, Anm. 2.]

cluding (1) general ecclesiastics, (2) symbolics, comparative dogmatics, and history of heresies, (3) ecclesiastical archæology, with the statistics of Christian culture, (4) Church history, in its narrower sense, that is, the history of the outward life of the Church, and (5) Church law; and PRACTICAL SCIENCES, including those whose aim is directed to the maintaining, furthering, upbuilding, and realizing of what is essential to the being of the Christian Church,—Church polity, liturgics, polemics, irenics, henotics. Beyond all those preceding him who were not influenced by Schleiermacher, Danz distinguishes himself in this respect, that he represents Christianity as the subject of theology, and, after the example of Schleiermacher, makes prominent in a proper manner the relation of theology to the Church. He is, however, in advance even of Schleiermacher himself in emphasizing the theoretical problem of theology. His distribution of theology, however, under two principal divisions—the Christian science of religion and the Christian science of the Church—does not prove suitable for a systematic arrangement. At least Danz has not been able to accomplish the distribution of theology under this schematism. He is not even able to bring the two principal divisions into a scientifically determined connection; and since he sets, in the first principal division, a historical and a practical theology, and then, in the second principal division, again sets down a Church history and a practical theology, he not only tears in pieces both of these theological sciences, but also leaves it undetermined whether the particular subdivisions of these should be inserted in the first, or in the second, principal division. Instead of a systematic order, a systematic confusion here presents itself.

Hagenbach and Pelt, in their encyclopædias, stand completely under the influence of Schleiermacher, without, however, giving evidence of that genius for organization by which

Schleiermacher was distinguished. Hagenbach [1] begins with an introduction (pp. 1–50), and even in it the want of systematic configuration comes into view. One should certainly expect that in the introduction the matter under discussion would be the theological encyclopædia. Hagenbach, however, on the contrary, after having simply stated the idea of encyclopædia, occupies this whole division of his treatise with a somewhat detailed consideration of religion, Christianity, Church and theology, the order of teachers in the Church, and a variety of such-like matters, the treatment of which properly belongs to an exposition of theology itself. These topics, therefore, should have been assigned, partly to the general part of the encyclopædia, and partly to systematic and practical theology. Thus Hagenbach's conception of the introduction leads to an unclear mixing of the scientific and practical problems of theology. While quite properly it is emphasized that theology has a practical problem, yet this is so very conspicuously put in the front, that the scientific problem is thereby unduly curtailed. Regard for the order of teachers in the Church is largely influential with Hagenbach. Theology is conceived by him as expressly intended for members of this order, and its task is to teach them what it is necessary for them to know. The scientific point of view, according to which the knowledge that is valuable and the knowledge that is necessary for the theologian must be determined from the nature of theology itself, is not thereby allowed to occupy its proper place. But to speak, as Hagenbach does in § 17, of a partition of theological work between theologians, in the narrowest sense of the word, and the order of teachers in the Church, is altogether improper. The latter, indeed, can and should participate in theological work as such, but it must still be one and the same with that of the profes-

[1] Encyclopædie und Methodologie der theologischen Wissenschaften. Von K. R. Hagenbach. Leipzig 1883. 9 Auflage, 1874. [10th edition, 1880, edited by Professor Kautsch.]

sional theologian, and will then contribute to the qualifying of the teaching orders or the clergy, for their practical activity, which as such is not theological. At page 50 a false title is given to the general part of the treatise when it is styled, The General Part of Theological Encyclopædia, whereas that of which Hagenbach treats in it is not encyclopædia, but theology itself.[1] In his definition of theology he closely connects himself with Schleiermacher. "Theology is a positive science (Schleiermacher, § 1), and consequently has not its defining ground in itself, like pure science, but outside in a department of life determined by empirical circumstances, that is, in the Christian Church, and its temporal manifestation." § 22. Theology is, therefore, "a practical branch of science or a technology,—the theory of an art." § 23. Like Schleiermacher, Hagenbach identifies theology as a positive science with a purely practical science, and seeks to justify this employment of the term "positive" by comparing theology to jurisprudence and medicine, as though these, because they find their application in connection with practical conditions, become on this account mere practical branches of science or technologies! But when Schleiermacher proceeds to give a scientific foundation to his theology, thus conceived of from the practical side, and, with great precision in accordance with his definition, gives organic form to theology, Hagenbach either fails to understand these refinements of Schleiermacher, or on purpose declines to reproduce them. Hagenbach abandons Schleiermacher's distribution, and declares himself, on the ground of utility, in favour of a fourfold arrangement,—exegetical, historical, systematic, and practical theology. In carrying out this

[1] The objection that is here brought against Hagenbach is not that he treats of theology in the general part of his encyclopædia, for this is recognised by Raebiger as the proper subject-of that division. It should, however, have been entitled with distinct reference to theology. The topics wrongly introduced into the introduction would be proper to this division; and the history of encyclopædia, which is tacked on as an appendix to the general part, should form part of the introduction.—Ed.

purpose, the positive theology of § 22 is now converted into another positive theology—into a positive theology, that is to say, which "rests upon the facts given in the founding of the Christian religion (Revelation)." § 34. When the term "positive" is employed in this sense, it is quite properly said that "the study of positive theology, according to its nature, is to be broken up into that of the four principal departments," and the various scientific pursuits comprehended under these are capable of being arranged in a good formal order; but the thought of harmonizing the statements of § 22 and § 34 is not to be entertained. For while, in the former section, it is said that theology does not find its scientific ground of definition in itself, but outside of itself, in the Christian Church, in the latter section, on the contrary, it does find this ground of definition quite within itself, since this positive characteristic, by means of which it is determined in its whole organization, undeniably belongs to its inner being. In consequence of this confusion in regard to such leading ideas, no clear scientific definition can be reached. For if one should ask about the scientific ground of definition for theology, then, according to § 22, theology would be a science by reason of the connection of all the theological branches of study with the Church; but, according to § 34, theology is a science by reason of the connection of the theological departments with the Christian revelation, or even by reason of their connection with both revelation and Church. This connection may, indeed, make these particular branches of study theological, but it certainly cannot make them scientific. It may, indeed, help theology to a logically arranged schematism, but it cannot establish its scientific character. Hagenbach disregards the scientific grounding which Schleiermacher sought to give his theology. No answer is given by him to the question as to the relation which theology must bear toward the Church, or to this positive element, if it is to represent itself as science, and

take its place among the other sciences. For when he employs the phrase, "an ideal treatment of theology," when, too, he insists that philosophy should be a steady companion of theology (§ 28), and, after a criticism of the different tendencies which have prevailed in theology, recommends the mediation theology, which "undertakes to give a spiritual rendering of that which was enjoined from without, to distinguish the eternal contents of religious ideas from their temporal forms of manifestation, to estimate in an unprejudiced manner the historical element and the extant documents, and to reconcile Christianity with the claims of modern culture" (§ 32, p. 87),—a clear exposition of the way upon which theology must go to reach its end,—he does not give any emphatic deliverance, but vacillates undecidedly between assigning to theology a theoretical or a practical purpose. According to the fundamental tendency, however, which finds expression in his definition, Hagenbach's theology still appears only as a conglomeration, without any inner coherence, of acquirements which qualify the Christian Church teacher for his official duties in the Church. Further than this, Hagenbach, with his purely formal representation of the encyclopædia, has not reached,—the marking out and distinguishing from one another the principal departments of theology. Since, therefore, he has satisfied himself with the view that the Bible, and the auxiliary sciences relating to it, form together the subject of exegetical theology, he assigns to the division of historical theology, after the example of the older theologians, the whole Bible history, that is, the history of the Old and New Testaments, to which the history of the people of Israel, the life of Jesus, and the history of the apostolic age belong, and the doctrinal system of the Bible, as biblical dogmatics.[1] In systematic theology, of which the main

[1] In Raebiger's distribution, on the other hand, all those branches of study mentioned above are placed under the principal division of exegetical theology, for this reason, that the materials for them are all contained in Holy Scrip-

divisions are dogmatics and Christian ethics, apologetics is regarded as an introduction to dogmatics, while polemics and irenics are to be considered "not as separate and distinct branches of science, but only as special appendages to theological science." As for practical theology, Hagenbach represents it in all essential respects in the very same way as Schleiermacher. Pelt has recognised the encyclopædia of Hagenbach as "a careful students' book," and its success has justified this recognition. To the student beginning his theological studies, Hagenbach's encyclopædia will always prove rich in instruction regarding special theological guides, and will further him in his study by means of the methodological notes which are interspersed; but it will not be able to advance him in regard to insight into the significance of theological science, and into the systematic connection of its principal divisions and branches.

[The encyclopædia of Hagenbach,[1] which first appeared in the year 1833, celebrated by its tenth edition what may be called a jubilee, having well-nigh reached its fiftieth year. The repeated editions through which it has passed during these fifty years are a clear evidence that it has stood the test as a student's book. This success, but above all, the difficulty that lay in the task itself, has determined the editor of the tenth edition, as he states in his preface, to leave the

ture. It seems quite incorrect on the part of Hagenbach thus to arrange these branches, seeing that he has assigned a separate division to exegetical theology. Their classification under historical theology could be justified only in the case of older theologians, who did not recognise exegetical theology as a distinct division.—ED.

[1] The above paragraph referring to the latest edition of Hagenbach's encyclopædia is translated from the short treatise of Raebiger, supplementary to his Theologic, published in 1882, and entitled, Zur theologischen Encyclopædie. In this little work, Raebiger reviews several treatises on theological encyclopædia which had appeared subsequent to the appearance of his own Theologie in 1880. His extended criticisms of the encyclopædias of Hofmann and Rothe will be given in full, in the form of an appendix, at the close of this volume. —ED.

work essentially unchanged. In this he has acted rightly. For a satisfactory redaction must have been, in fact, so thoroughgoing, that of the original Hagenbach there would have remained very little. The jubilee edition, therefore, in comparison with the ninth, presents itself in a form practically unaltered, and hence I have no occasion for withdrawing anything from the criticism which I have before passed upon this encyclopædia of Hagenbach. I need only intimate my agreement with the judgment pronounced by the editor himself at page viii, that "in the main it reflects the conclusions of a period of theological research which we have now left behind." But with many it will not on that account be regarded as dead, as the editor fears it may, or treated merely "as a help to the understanding of a recently closed period of theological science," for indeed this very *mediation-theology*, which has found in Hagenbach's encyclopædia a very characteristic expression, finds still many favourably inclined toward it. Independently, however, of the theological standpoint which it represents, this encyclopædia commends itself to not a few on account of the abundance of the literary material which it furnishes under the several sections. In its revision, therefore, the editor has directed his special attention to this department, and has gained credit to himself by not only correcting several errors of earlier editions, but also by having supplemented the literature in the most perfect manner possible, bringing it down to the present time. Nevertheless, as he admits on page ix of his preface, he is himself conscious of the difficulty by which the encyclopædist is beset in regard to this matter. He is quite correct in considering it a very doubtful advantage for beginners to have before them a mere accumulation of titles of books, without any estimate of the substance of the books attached, and in regarding it, besides, as scarcely practicable to admit a complete literature into the encyclopædia. I have been myself influenced by considerations like these in

the composition of the present treatise on theologic. The titles of books, piled up page after page, produces upon one beginning the study of theology a feeling of terror, or at least a sense of confusion, while the theological adept will scarcely seek to acquire his knowledge of the literature of an exegetical, historical, or dogmatic subject with which he wishes particularly to occupy himself, from the theological encyclopædia, but rather from a commentary, a handbook of Church history, or a treatise on dogmatics, where the literature must be drawn up in the most complete manner possible. If the range of theological encyclopædia is not to be proportionally expanded, and thereby the specific purpose of the encyclopædia missed, the encyclopædist must renounce the idea of turning the theological encyclopædia into a handbook of theological literature, and must be willing to satisfy himself with indicating under every leading division th principal works, in order to familiarize the beginner w the most eminent representatives of the several branches study, and to set him in a position for applying himself in private studies to those works acknowledged to be the b and for drawing directly from these his knowledge of most important literature for the history of those parti branches of study. What the theological encyclopædia ca yield, and also what it should not be expected to yield, be best relegated to the old so-called *bibliotheca theologica*: it is, indeed, a thing much to be desired, that some would bring out an edition of Winer's Handbook Theological Literature, revised and brought down to t present date.]

[A work has just appeared from the American press, bearing the title: Theological Encyclopædia and Methodology, on the basis of Hagenbach.[1] It forms one of the volumes of a some-

[1] Theological Encyclopædia and Methodology. On the basis of Hagenbach. By George R. Crooks, D.D., and John F. Hurst, D.D., New York and Cincinnati, 1884. Forming volume iii. of Library of Biblical and Theological Literature.

what extensive series of theological treatises, intended, as it would seem, to reflect the views of the Methodist Episcopal Church. This library of biblical and theological literature is under the general editorship of Dr. George R. Crooks and Dr. John F. Hurst, and these gentlemen are the translators and editors of the volume which treats of encyclopædia. The scope and main intention of the work will appear from the following statement of the editors in their preface:—"We have endeavoured, by utilizing the rich material of Hagenbach, to make a handbook for the theological student; a guide to show him the right path of inquiry; a plan or draft of the science, so that by the help here afforded he can see its exterior lines, the boundaries of its subdivisions, and can take the whole into the compass of a complete survey." The editors take credit for considerable additions to the bibliography of the subject, but this is almost wholly confined to enumeration of the titles of English and American works, latter naturally receiving special attention. In all essen- respects the American work may be regarded as simply translation of the German work: the translation being in tain parts somewhat free, but in other sections quite close literal. From the statement on the title-page, that it is ply based upon Hagenbach, we should have expected to some attempt to adapt the work to the use of English dents, and to bring down the history and literature to the est date. We can discover no trace whatever of any rious endeavour in either of these directions. The principal objection brought against Hagenbach by Raebiger is that long lists of books are given under each head and subdivision, treatises being named quite indiscriminately, without reference to their comparative value. This proves confusing to the student, and is scarcely anything more than a publisher's classified index. The American editors, instead of weeding out the useless references in the original lists, retain these entire, and make their own additions upon the same scale and in

accordance with the same principle. Then, in regard to the history and literature of theological encyclopædia, no attempt is made to continue the record beyond the point reached by Hagenbach. Reference, indeed, is made to the barrenness of English and American theological literature in the department of encyclopædia, there being only one comprehensive treatise by an American theologian, Dr. M'Clintock, whose lectures on theological encyclopædia were published at New York in 1873. But it is surely an indication of very culpable carelessness on the part of scholars professing to edit and work up such a treatise as that before us, that, while the editor's preface bears date of 1st March 1884, no reference at all is made to the three important works on theological encyclopædia by Raebiger, Hofmann, and Rothe, all of which appeared in 1880. Besides this, it seems that the last German edition of Hagenbach, also published in 1880, was not used by the American translators. No reference is made to the important treatise of J. P. Lange, Grundriss der theolog. Encyclopædie, which appeared in 1877, of which notice is taken in a footnote on page 109 of Hagenbach's treatise. Notwithstanding these defects, the book is likely to prove highly useful to English theological students, who have not ready access to the German work. It is written in an intelligible and readable style, and is fitted to supply a want that has been keenly felt in English theological literature.—ED.]

Pelt[1] proceeds more independently than Hagenbach. According to the statement which he makes in his preface, he too has written his work for young theologians, to enable

[1] Theologische Encyclopædie als System im Zusammenhange mit der Geschichte der theologischen Wissenschaft, und ihrer einzelnen Zweige entwickelt von A. F. L. Pelt. Hamburg und Gotha, 1845. [Rich but judiciously selected material, set forth with a stroke of genius, a keen sense of the artistic side of the theological calling, a warm enthusiasm for Christianity, a sound and fair judgment, are characteristics of the book worthy of being recognised; but

them to determine their position in the theological domain, but also, at the same time, with the purpose of "making a contribution to the better construction of theology as a system,—a work that has been attempted in many ways since the publication of Schleiermacher's masterpiece." In the Introduction, pp. 1–80, Pelt indicates in a very admirable way the task of the theological encyclopædia, and demands not merely a formal, but rather a material, performance of this task. However, the treating of theology in general in the introduction to the encyclopædia is not favourable to system. For in this case the general outline of theology gets less attention than it deserves. In Pelt's conception of theology the same confusion makes its appearance as is found also in Hagenbach. After the example of Schleiermacher, theology is regarded by Pelt as a positive science, inasmuch as "it relates itself to an outward phænomenon, the Church." "The middle term, to which everything that is to be considered as part of the contents of theology must relate itself, is the kingdom of God, or the organic revelation of God in the world, as the Church" (p. 15). But then, by virtue of its essential connection with a positive religion, it obtains again its positive character (p. 34), and by this means accomplishes its scientific task. Pelt will not consent to regard theology, as Schleiermacher does, as a mere sum-total of acquirements and rules for the guidance of the Church, and consequently as a mere technology or theory of an art. On the contrary, he defines theology as the science of the kingdom of God, which, however, at the same time, as an instruction for the introducing of that kingdom of God into the world, is a practical science or technology. § 5. Pelt has rightly insisted upon the connec-

undoubtedly it might have reached a wider circle had it been compressed within narrower limits.—*Hagenbach.* In his article on Pelt in Herzog, Dorner calls the Encyclopædie "a work not merely of great industry and comprehensive study, but also a truly spiritual conception and an instructive performance." See vol. xi. pp. 435–437.]

tion of theology with the Church, and endeavours to combine the scientific spirit with the practical. As science, however, theology has nothing to do with art, and, taken generally as a technology or theory of an art, it would be brought, in too restricted a sense, into connection with the Church. But now, inasmuch as Pelt emphasizes the scientific character of theology, he is under obligation to prove by what means it obtains this character. Pelt has certainly attempted this, but in a very unsatisfactory manner. As truth in general, so also divine revealed truth, which forms the contents of theology, should have its true form first given it in the system, and hence "theology should assume the form of system, consequently of science, in the essential and strictest sense." The system, however, should, as it seems, be so conceived that all theological elements would find "their point of unity and rest in the perfected kingdom of God" (p. 35). In this way it might, indeed, be possible to establish a purely formal systematic, but certainly it would not still be possible to prove thus the scientific character of theology. In the distribution of his material, Pelt, like Hagenbach, parts company with Schleiermacher, inasmuch as he begins, not with philosophical theology, but with historical theology. In agreement with Schleiermacher he includes in historical theology biblical, that is, exegetical theology, and then, Church history, and ecclesiastical statistics, which last appears as a distinct third part of historical theology, whereas it actually belongs rather to Church history. He differs, moreover, from Schleiermacher in separating dogmatics from statistics, and setting down as a second principal division, systematic theology, which he alternatively denominates — Fundamental theology, thetic theology, and the philosophy of Christianity. With happy insight into Schleiermacher's tendencies, Pelt receives into this division the material treated of by Schleiermacher in his philosophical theology. Nevertheless he is not actually justified in admitting symbolics into fundamental theology,

which is divided into a general doctrine of theological principles, and a doctrine of the special principles of the separate Churches, and, regarding this science of symbolics, as equivalent to the latter subdivision. Neither can his proposal be defended to set down the philosophy of Christianity as a special part of systematic theology, seeing that already fundamental theology and thetic theology have yielded what that would be expected to yield. In reference to practical theology, Pelt differs from Schleiermacher only in so far as he places a system of Church organization or ecclesiastics, as a first subdivision, before the system of Church government and the Church service.

Following Schleiermacher in the closest connection, Reuterdahl[1] divides theology into philosophical, historical, and practical theology, and distinguishes himself from Schleiermacher only by this, that in the first division he prefaces his apologetics and polemics by a psychology of religion and a history of religion.

In the spirit of Schleiermacher, Kienlen,[2] too, has expounded his encyclopædia; but, in the systematic distribution, he agrees mostly with Pelt, and distinguishes himself from both only in this, that he puts down apologetics and polemics as principal divisions of practical theology, and after these, has a further division of a constitutional and technical kind.

We find an unmistakeable trace of Schleiermacher's influence in Harless, too, by whom theology has been represented

[1] Inledning till Theologien, af H. Reuterdahl. Lund 1837.

[2] Encyclopædie der Wissenschaften der Protestantischen Theologie zum Behuf akademischer Vorlesungen dargestellt von H. W. Kienlen. Darmstadt 1845. First published in French at Strassburg, 1842, under the title—Encyclopedie des sciences de la théologie chrétienne. [Among French treatises on encyclopædia may be mentioned,—Edouard Vaucher, Essai de Methodologie des sciences théologiques. Paris 1878. Also interesting papers in the *Bulletin théologique* for 1863; Godet, l'Organisme de la science théologique: Pronier, de l'Encyclopedie des sciences théologiques: and a reply to the latter by Godet. In the same review for 1865 there is an interesting sketch by L. Thomas, entitled,—Esquisse d'une Encyclopedie des sciences théologiques.—Ed.]

from the orthodox Lutheran standpoint.[1] Harless, after he has, in a quite suitable way, defined in the introduction the nature of human knowledge from the idea of the general encyclopædia and methodology, makes the very fair demand that the encyclopædia and methodology of theology, which is a part of the whole range of scientific knowledge, should be represented in the same manner (p. 6). In the first part the plan of such an encyclopædia is sketched according to its fundamental features. Christian theology is the scientific knowledge of the Christian faith. This faith has its manifestation in the Church, and hence "the true theology must proceed from the basis of a common Christian faith, must seek to know this according to its ground and nature, and to lead back to it" (p. 25). Protestant theology is identical with Christian theology, and the common faith, as it is laid down in the symbolical books of the Protestant Church, is the basis of Protestant theology. Christianity as a real phenomenon has a double history, a history of its founding and a history of its spreading. With the former, the exegetical branches are occupied. Exegesis is the basis of all theology. The latter, the historical manifestation of the Church, cannot be comprehended unless there has been a previous systematic statement of doctrine. Dogmatics must therefore precede Church history, as a study bearing a historical, ideal character; while between exegesis and dogmatics comes symbolics, as the historical knowledge of the common faith of to-day, and forms the transition to the Church-historical branches of study—Church history, the history of doctrines, etc. In succession to this comes ethics, as a second branch of study of a historical, ideal character, and forms the transition to practical theology, the contents of which constitute the demands which the Church makes of those to

[1] G. C. A. Harless, Theologische Encyclopædie und Methodologie von Standpunkte der protestantischen Kirche. Grundriss für akademische Vorlesungen. Nürnberg 1837.

whom the guidance of the Church commonwealth is entrusted. After the example of Schleiermacher, Harless seeks to bring theology into the closest possible connection with the Church, only with this difference, that he allows himself to be led not by a practical, but by an essentially theoretical tendency. But although this is fully acknowledged, yet, even from the very beginning, the interests of the true doctrine are brought by Harless into the foreground, so that symbolics and dogmatics get their place immediately after exegesis. The identifying of Protestant theology with Christian theology on this ground of faith is a mere presupposition. But the entire Church history obtains the place after this systematic theology, only in order that it may be there to be judged of by the true doctrine. In particular, this leaves it unexplained wherefore ethics is not immediately connected with dogmatics, seeing that this latter, just as well as the former, must contribute to a proper estimate of the historical Christian life. In the second division, from page 57 to page 258, Harless gives an outline of the history of theology and of the particular branches of theological science;[1] but this neither helps to an insight into the organism thereof, nor could be at all suitable for academical lectures.

While Harless represents the orthodox standpoint, Lobegott Lange, who is not affected by the theology of Schleiermacher, gives, in the spirit of Protestantism and of a supernatural Rationalism, an instruction to young students on theological study.[2] Christian theology, which has for its subject the

[1] [After giving a summary of Harless' work, and referring especially to that historical second part mentioned above, Doedes thus criticises its main positions: "This outline is important as making known the principles by which the scientific theology in its several parts is to be dominated, but of it as an encyclopædia we cannot say this. That elsewhere the placing of dogmatics before historical theology has found no imitation is not to be regretted, for it has generally been agreed that the place between historical and practical theology is the most natural for the so-called systematic theology."—Encyclopedie der Christelijke Theologie, p. 41.]

[2] Anleitung zum Studium der Christlichen Theologie, nach den Grundsätzen des biblischen Rationalismus. Von Lobegott Lange. Jena 1841.

Christian, therefore a positive, historical religion, is bound up neither to confessional writings nor to a philosophical system, but only to Holy Scripture, and has with the help of philosophy to lead to a scientific scholarly knowledge of the Christian religion (p. 28). Hence the principal thing is the understanding of Holy Scripture, of which the systematic study is represented in hermeneutics, and its contents in biblical theology. With these are joined dogmatics and morals. These sciences form the proper domain of Christian theology. As auxiliary sciences, having respect to the history of the fortunes of the Christian Church and the preservation of the Church, Church history and catechetics, homiletics and liturgics are to be added. With a pure scientific spirit, Lange falls back upon the principles on which theology must be built up, if it is to lay any claim to be a science. But because he conceives of the subject of theology in too contracted a manner, and quite overlooks its connection with the Church, he is partly not just to the history of Christianity, partly not able sufficiently to authenticate the systematic connection of the theological branches of study; and this last-mentioned defect specially shows itself in this, that the practical branches are admitted only as an appendix, and are not articulated in the organism of theology.

A contribution to the encyclopædic arrangement of theology, valuable in its formal aspect, has been made by John Peter Lange.[1] He partitions theology according to its historico-didactic character into two principal divisions, a historical and a didactic. The former he divides into three sections—(1) history of the divine revelation constituting the kingdom of God, as fundamental theology, (2) exegetical theology, (3) church-historical theology. The second division

[1] J. P. Lange, De Systemate Encyclopædiæ theologicæ ad religionis Christianæ indolem historico-didacticam accuratius accomodando. Bonnæ 1865. It is published in German in an enlarged form: Grundriss der theologischen Encyclopædie mit Einschluss der Methodologie. Von J. P. Lange. Heidelberg 1877.

likewise parts into three sections—(1) dogmatics, (2) ethics, (3) practical theology. Against this arrangement it may be remarked that fundamental theology, with which it begins, can only first gain the idea of the kingdom of God by means of exegetical theology, and that, by co-ordinating practical theology with dogmatics and ethics, full advantage is not given to its distinctive characteristics.

The tendency of Schleiermacher to enclose theology in the sacred precincts of the Church, as well as the subjective attitude which was peculiar to his theology as a theory of an ecclesiastical art dealing with a positive or given material, must of necessity be overpassed by speculative theology. From the humiliation into which Kant had brought theology, and from its subordination to the practical purpose of the Church, theology could only be raised by this, that a legitimate place in the circle of the sciences should be vindicated for it. And this, indeed, is just the service which Schelling rendered to theology in his lectures on *The Method of Academical Study*.[1] The whole circle of the sciences is here constructed according to the inner type of philosophy. Philosophy is the science of absolute knowledge, and moves in a pure realm of ideas. But the ideas become real in history; hence outside of philosophical knowledge, which, as such, is purely ideal, all other knowledge is the real representation of absolute knowledge (p. 152 ff.). The real sciences, in so far as they reach objectivity through or in relation to the state, are called positive sciences (p. 159). They are the organs or the objectively real side of absolute science, and each one of them has to regard itself as end, because they can only by this means become integral parts of absolute science (pp. 41, 44 ff.). Among them he assigns the first and highest place to theology, as the science of the

[1] Vorlesungen ueber die Methode des akademischen Studiums. Von F. W. J. Schelling. 3 unveränderte Aufgabe. Stuttgart und Tübingen 1830. [1st edition published in 1803.]

absolute and divine essence, in which that which is innermost in philosophy is objectified (p. 160 f.). With all previous methods in theology, Schelling breaks completely, for he begins the ninth lecture "On the Study of Theology" with the words, "If I find it hard to speak of the study of theology, it is because I must consider the form of knowledge, and the whole standpoint from which its truths will be comprehended, as lost and forgotten." For as he opposes the empiricism to which theology had hitherto shown favour, as well as the clearing up (*Aufklärerei*) which should rather be called the clearing out (*Ausklärerei*), and the moralism of the Kantian theology, he points to this, that theology is tenable only as speculatively conceived. "Philosophy is the true organ of theology as science, wherein the highest ideas of the divine essence become objective in nature as the organ, and in history as the revelation, of God" (p. 196). It is not from Holy Scripture that theology has to receive the idea of Christianity. "The first books of the history and doctrine of Christianity are nothing more than a particular manifestation thereof, and so besides an imperfect one. The idea of Christianity is not to be sought in these books, the worth of which must first be estimated according to the measure in which they express that idea and are in agreement with it." "We should not stop at a particular period, which can only be arbitrarily fixed upon, but should have in view that history and world which have called it into being" (p. 198). "One cannot avoid thinking what a hindrance the so-called biblical books have been to Christianity, which for purely religious contents cannot bear comparison, even remotely, with so many other sacred writings of earlier and later times, especially the Indian" (p. 199). The idea of the priesthood to withdraw these books from the people, ought to have been put on the deep ground "that Christianity as a living religion endures, not as a time past, but as an eternal present; and so even miracles in the Church have not ceased, which Protestantism,

and in this matter quite inconsequently, allows only as happening in primitive times" (p. 199). "These books, documents, which require only historical investigation, not faith, have constantly been setting anew empirical Christianity in place of the idea, which can exist independently of them, and will be proclaimed more loudly by means of the whole history of the new world as compared with the old, than by means of those writings in which it still lies in a very undeveloped state" (p. 200). [Compare with this the following from Schwegler in his expositions of Schelling's system: "Christianity as it is in time, exoteric Christianity, corresponds not to its idea, and has only to expect its completion. A main obstacle to this completion was and is the so-called Bible, which besides, as regards true religious substance, is inferior to some other religious writings. A new birth of esoteric Christianity, or a new and higher religion, in which philosophy, religion, and poetry shall be fused into unity, this must be the product of the future" (*History of Philosophy*, p. 303). "The first books of the history and doctrine of Christianity," says Ueberweg in his exposition of the same system, "are but a particular and an imperfect expression of Christianity, and their worth must be measured by the degree of perfection in which they express the idea of Christianity. Since this idea is not dependent on this particular manifestation of it, but is absolute and universal, it cannot be made dependent on the exegesis of these documents, weighty as they are for the earliest history of Christianity" (*History of Philosophy*, London 1874, vol. ii. p. 222).] Protestantism, which is characterized as anti-universal, has, in place of the living authority, set rather that of dead books written in the dead languages, and acknowledges dependence upon symbols which can claim for themselves a mere human authority (p. 201). "What is essential in the study of theology is the connecting together of the speculative and historical construction of Christianity and its most prominent doctrines" (p. 207).

'In consequence of the manifest impossibility of maintaining Christianity according to its exoteric form, the esoteric must be brought forward, and, freed from its integument, shine by its own light" (p. 208). "Philosophy, with the true speculative standpoint, has gained again that of religion, which empiricism and the naturalism like unto it not only partially but universally effaced, and prepares in itself the regeneration of esoteric Christianity as the declaration of the absolute gospel" (p. 210).

From the philosophical standpoint another encyclopædic construction of science than that given by Schelling may perhaps be demanded, but from the theological standpoint it must be acknowledged that he has proved the untenableness of those authorities, as previously used, in which theology gloried, and has elevated theology to the rank of an independent science alongside of the other positive sciences. If, however, theology is not able to follow him to that elevation upon which Schelling would have it placed, then it does indeed relinquish the only ground upon which it can firmly stand. In the most striking way Schelling characterizes the task of Scripture exposition (p. 206), but he has not been able to vindicate the value of Scripture generally and its significance for theology. When he makes the demand that theology should evolve the idea of Christianity from the whole history thereof, then, indeed, theology will certainly accept this general history as a great document, proving the energy of the Christian idea; but as for the point of the Christian history at which it has to seek the idea of Christianity, it will always be able to indicate only the one particular point —the origin of that history, the spirit of its founder. And if Schelling can admit that in Holy Scripture the idea of Christianity is at least present, though undeveloped, the history thereof ought to be able to teach him that in this Scripture there must lie a far greater religious power than in the Indian Vedas.

In the spirit of Schelling, Daub has formed his conception of theology. In his treatise, "Theology and its Encyclopædia in relation to the academical study of both: a fragment for an introduction to the latter,"[1] he purposes, indeed, only to make prominent the claims which rest upon those going forward to the study of theology; but inasmuch as these are derived from the nature of theology itself, he must likewise render an express statement of his general conception of theology. With him theology is of all sciences the noblest and the most excellent. Its idea is that "of eternal knowledge, which exists out of relation to space, time, and motion, and the idea of its contents is that of eternal being, or God, and the divine essence" (p. 2). Theological knowledge is systematic and speculative knowledge (p. 4), and the organ thereof must be reason and revelation. Theology is therefore the theory of religion in its absolute unity, that is, neither in its subjectivity nor in its objectivity, neither as an accident (*Eigenschaft*), nor as a property (*Eigenthum*), but as something existing in itself and eternally, whose manifestation only is partly subjective, partly objective, and partly both in one. The Christian religion is religion in the abstract; it therefore yields nothing else than Christian theology. It does not produce a natural, a practical, rational theology. But Christian theology, as a theory of the Christian religion, is either dogmatics of the Roman Catholic Church, or dogmatics of the Lutheran and Reformed Church. Encyclopædia has to represent theology as a purely scientific organism.

A purely ideal conception inspired by Schelling lies at the foundation of the *Lectures on Theology* by Erhardt.[2] Theology is science: "To comprehend its nature is nothing else than to

[1] Studien. Herausgegeben von C. Daub und Fr. Creuzer. Bd. 1-6. Frankfurt und Heidelberg 1805-1810. Vgl. Bd. 2. S. 1-69. ["Die Theologie und ihre Encyclopædie in Verhältniss zum akademischen Studium beider. Fragment einer Einleitung in die letztere."]

[2] Vorlesungen über die Theologie und das Studium derselben. Herausgegeben von Simon Erhardt. Erlangen 1810. [Lectures on Theology and its Study.]

recognise clearly what place is proper to it in the wide circle of the sciences" (p. 45). Life is at once the principle of the science and the highest idea (p. 30). This life in the highest significance is unity and manifoldness (oneness and allness—*Einheit und Allheit*). God is unity, the spiritual principle in its highest conception. The material principle in its manifoldness is nature. Consequently the one science is history or the representation of the development of things out of the principle of unity and manifoldness, that is, of life. The one aspect of science is natural science; its other part, which views life from its other side of unity, is theology (p. 52). Religion is the relation of mankind to God. All theology is history, and as such, the methodical representation of the development of mankind from the principle of their original relationship with God (p. 54). The highest development of religion is the Indian religion, which at the end of time will be the universal religion (p. 85 f.). Christian theology is also a historical study, and therefore, as a part, falls under that general theology as a whole. The study of the history of religion is important for theologians, for only from a knowledge of that which is opposed to it can the nature of Christianity be rightly understood. In the encyclopædic distribution of theology, Erhardt follows the usual fourfold division: exegetical, systematic, historical, and practical theology. Erhardt's treatise, which was composed under a noble inspiration, contains many striking remarks on the difference between learning and science, on the character of theology as a science, on religion and its historical manifestation; but theology with him passes completely over into religious philosophy, and he has both failed to mark off Christian theology sufficiently from this religious philosophy, and to bring the subject of that theology, the Christian religion, into its proper relation with the other religions.

As Schelling in his lectures represents religion as the objectivating of the absolute divine nature, Hegel, too, in

his *Encyclopædia of the Philosophical Sciences*, has treated revealed religion as the manifestation of the absolute spirit, and assigned it its place between art and philosophy.[1] In the spirit of the Hegelian system, and with all the requisite special knowledge of theology, Rosenkranz has given a full exposition, encyclopædically, of theology, as the science of the religion of the absolute spirit.[2] In the place assigned to it by Hegel, it has, as its systematic starting-point, and consequently as its task, to develop in all directions the idea of revealed religion, in such a way as to admit the historical elements thereof, in so far as "they cause the reason to behold the speculative contents of the idea in the explicit form of manifestation." As science, it must lead to the proof of the truth of its contents, and by means of this, to scientific knowledge. This can be gained only by means of the mediation of thought. The content in the form of thought is the absolute understanding thereof. The doctrine of religion, wherein it gives expression to itself for the general consciousness, and brings itself to the same, is in contents identical with theology, but in form is to be distinguished from it. The theologian is one who "not only believes what he believes, but also knows with clearness and definiteness why he believes that which he believes." In respect of its contents, theology coincides with philosophy, and inasmuch as both should comprise absolutely the same contents, philosophy and theology cannot put themselves in direct and exclusive opposition to one another. From this fact it is to be explained that, historically, both always appear in connection with each other, and the right relation between the one and the other comes into view. Theology is, in relation to philosophy, neither superordinated nor subordinated, but co-ordinated. "In the idea of science

[1] G. W. Hegel's Encyclopædie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse. Dritter Theil. Die Philosophie des Geistes, S. 440 ff.

[2] Encyclopædie der Theologischen Wissenschaften. Von K. Rosenkranz. Halle 1831. Zweite gänzlich umgearbeitete Auflage. Ebd. 1845.

as such philosophy and theology are exactly co-ordinated with one another, because the one must recognise the other as its absolute end." Now, inasmuch as philosophy is the sum-total of all the sciences, theology is included therein, "but as a science fully complete in itself, the specific unity of which lies in this, that it treats of the life of man in God, and of God in man." Theological encyclopædia has to treat theology, not as an aggregate of different sciences, but rather to set forth the harmonious organization of theological science. For this purpose, an arrangement of the particular branches of study, containing a merely formal schematism, is not sufficient, but rather, along with this, there must be a development of the totality of the contents. There is therefore no reason for joining a methodology with the encyclopædia, since, in the completed encyclopædia, in accordance with its idea, the right course is already indicated which is to be taken in the study of theology. (Compare Preliminary Remarks (*Vorerinnerung*), S. vii.–xix.) In the Introduction, pp. 1–6, Rosenkranz explains the idea of theology and its distribution. Christian theology is a positive science, and as such, not an absolute, but a mixed science. Its division rests "on the distinction of the existence of the Christian religion as the true idea of religion in and for itself; its existence as a historical process, and finally, as an actually present fact." Thus theology falls into three parts—speculative, historical, and practical. Without any inconsequence, according to Rosenkranz, theology, as a positive science, may dispense altogether with speculative theology; but if it will adhere to this, then the succession according to the logical order must be adhered to, from the universal to history as the particular, and to everyday practice as the individual. If one departs from this logical basis, scepticism begins, as to what distribution is true; and on an average, then, the particular Church confession to which a theologian belongs will be influential in securing the adoption of this or that distribution. The first division—Christian

speculative theology—is "the development of the idea of the Christian religion as rational." It presupposes the knowledge of the Christian religion in general, but no less the idea of the pure reason. It must therefore (1) derive the idea of the Christian religion itself; (2) develop this idea according to its specific definition; and (3) describe the forming of this practical self-consciousness resulting from this idea. It thus comprises three branches of study—(1) Theogonic Phænomenology, (2) Dogmatics, (3) Ethics, p. 9. Historical theology has for its subject the temporal manifestation of the idea of the Christian religion, and is also to be arranged under a threefold division—(1) biblical theology, (2) the theology of Church history, (3) Ecclesiastical statistics, p. 115. The concrete unity of the speculative and historical theology is the practical, which in general should be a universal theory of Church practice. Since it passes from the individual through the particular to the universal, it describes—(1) the singular, (2) the particular, and (3) the universal organism of the Church,[1] p. 335 ff.

What Rosenkranz says, in his Preliminary Remarks, about the scientific character and the scientific problem of theology, about its relation to philosophy, and about theological encyclopædia, is scientifically unassailable. Also, that theology is a positive science, no one will be inclined to dispute. But, on the other hand, his distribution of theology is fitted to call forth great opposition. It is in general agreement with Schleiermacher's distribution, only Rosenkranz has, in consequence of his standpoint diverging substantially from that of Schleiermacher, placed dogmatics and ethics under speculative theology. What was previously said against the prefixing of a philosophical theology is also valid here in reference to speculative theology as the first division of theology. But when Rosenkranz bases the suggestion of his threefold division

[1] Or, as we would virtually put it—1, the individual member; 2, the particular congregation; 3, the Church as a whole.—Ed.

upon the logical categories of the universal, particular, and individual, it is not in accordance with his view of theology as a positive science. In so far as it has for its contents a positive religion, and its historical development is yet not regarded as something merely accidental, the true logical method will be to go to that development itself for the distribution of theology. Neither a scheme brought to it from without, nor the accident of a particular confession, ought to determine the distribution. But Rosenkranz gets into conflict with his own axioms on theology, when he affirms that it is permissible to leave speculative theology out of theology altogether. In so far as theology has for its subject something positive, and in this positive element a speculative content is embraced, the speculative knowledge thereof must indeed be an integral part of theology, or it ceases, even should it adopt it, to be generally a science. Theology, at all events, as a positive science, is a mixed science, and has, as such, to borrow much from the other sciences—philosophy, philology, history, etc.;—not that this borrowed element, as such, constitutes its scientific character, as Rosenkranz (p. 2) seems to say, but only that this is brought into connection with it for its own purpose; that everything borrowed by it from other sciences is turned into a positive element, contributing to the knowledge of its contents. Its independence, too, of philosophy, on the other hand, theology can maintain only if it resolutely keeps itself within the limits of a positive science. Nevertheless, although criticism may always find in the encyclopædia of Rosenkranz particulars to contest, and may quite fairly brand it with the reproach of having imported Hegelian ideas into the contents of theology, yet the acknowledgment cannot be withheld from him that, in this work, in contrast to previous theological systems, he has vindicated for theology the dignity of a science, and maintained its place in the organic circle of the sciences.

After Rosenkranz, the speculative science of religion was

encyclopædically expounded by Noack from the philosophical standpoint, and his exposition is also set forth as a theological encyclopædia.[1] It were better if Noack had left this alone, since he makes it appear as if he wished to give an encyclopædia of theology, as that term is usually understood, whereas what he offers is something very different from this. On account, however, of the peculiar position which he assumes in regard to this, we cannot pass over his treatise unnoticed. After the example of the Hegelian philosophy of religion, Noack sets for himself the problem of raising the moments of its idea into special encyclopædic branches of study, and setting it forth in its totality (p. 5). Deeply influenced by religious interests, and with a philosophical spirit, Noack has solved his problem. In the first part of his exposition, he sets forth the phænomenology of the religious idea under (1) religious anthropology, (2) the phænomenology of the religious spirit, and (3) the philosophical history of religion. The second part he entitles the ideology of the religious spirit, and divides this into (1) speculative Church history and history of dogmas, (2) speculative dogmatics, and (3) absolute ethics. And the third part he entitles the pragmatology of the religious idea, and divides it into (1) the science of the absolute priesthood of the religious idea, (2) the absolute pædagogic of the religious idea, and (3) absolute liturgics, or the science of the absolute cultus of the religious idea. From the speculative height of religious science, Noack looks down with disdain upon the Church theology. It appears to him in mere "harlequin's guise" (p. 5); its day is over, and now the science of religion has to be introduced in its place. Noack brings it as a reproach against all previous representations of theology, assuming the rank of a positive science, that they should have taken as their subject a single, historical, given religion

[1] Die Theologische Encyclopædie als System. With the special title: Die Speculative Religionswissenschaft im encyclopædischen Organismus ihrer besondern Disciplinen. Von Ludwig Noack. Darmstadt 1847.

the Christian. Over against such positive empiricism, the speculative science of religion directs its attention to religion as such, and has, in so far, a positive character, "as the nature of religion in general is based upon a positive element, that is, is necessarily rooted in the nature of the human spirit, and is there established upon the eternally immanent revelation of God" (p. 9). Although, philosophically considered, the positive character of the speculative science of religion here laid down might be contested, seeing that a positive-speculative science of religion, as well as a positive philosophy of law, is a *contradictio in adjecto*, inasmuch as the former has first, indeed, to prove whether religion be something positive, as Noack affirms, it must be acknowledged from the theological standpoint of philosophy to be thoroughly correct to make religion in general, as the philosophy of religion, its subject, and to develop it, as Noack has attempted to do, into such an encyclopædia of the speculative science of religion, and to retain for it still the name of "theology." But the demand made by him, that the previous forms of theology have to be abandoned or to be merged in the science of religion, cannot be conceded. The neglect of the Church theology on the part of Noack finds its explanation in this, that Noack had altogether overlooked the relation in which theology stands to the Church. So long as a Christian Church exists, theology will continue to assert itself as a positive theology, which has for its subject the one historical religion given it—the Christian religion. Noack may be right in expressing himself in a depreciatory way about previous representations of this theology; but he is wrong in casting it aside as a whole. Christian theology, in its scientific development, approaches the philosophical science of religion in no hostile attitude; it will willingly regard this as its brilliant glorification, as Noack says, and allow itself to be represented as its archetype and its mirror (p. 5); it will employ upon its own development everything that is offered it from the deep investigations

on the nature of religion and the history of religion; yea, it will be seen that it is animated by a sincere and earnest wish that philosophy in its systems should continually grant its own due place to religion, and, with the means at its disposal, operate outside the limits of the Church "for the cultus of the religious idea;" but as Church theology, it has, on its own part, to maintain its right to continued existence, and to justify its scientific independence, on its own positive grounds, against the changing systems of philosophy. When Noack says on p. 9, The speculative science of religion is the science of the rational knowledge of the religious idea, then we say, Positive theology is the science of the rational knowledge of Christianity; and if both, though along different ways, reach the same end, it may be hoped that both, too, when it pleases God, will come to an agreement.

The Dutch theologian Doedes published in 1876 his *Encyclopædia of Christian Theology*, and the second edition of this work, issued in 1883,[1] contains considerable additions, especially critical notices of those works on theological encyclopædia which had most recently appeared. He defines the encyclopædia of Christian theology as a methodological description of the circle of the sciences belonging to Christian theology. It has to arrange the several theological sciences in accordance with their mutual relations, as bound together in no arbitrary or external way, but as strictly related by means of a common middle point. The logical order in which those sciences must be arranged, and their principal subdivisions, as well as the proper method for their study, must be set forth in the encyclopædia. Doedes insists very strongly, in accordance with this definition of the science, that Christian theological encyclopædia is purely formal. In this he is in

[1] Encyclopedie der Christilijke Theologie door Dr. J. I. Doedes, Hoogleeraar in de Godgeleerdheid, Tweede, vermeerde, uitgaaf. Te Utrecht 1883. Eerste uitgaaf in 1876. The above paragraph, which indicates Doedes' standpoint and summarizes his book, is contributed by the editor of the present volume.

agreement with Schleiermacher, Clarisse, and Hagenbach; while he combats the views of Rosenkranz, von Hofmann, and Rübiger, who describe encyclopædia as not merely formal, but material or real. According to Doedes, encyclopædia has to do, not with the content of the various Christian theological sciences, but only with the sciences themselves as sciences. The definition further restricts the subject to be treated, and excludes such speculations as some encyclopædists had indulged in regarding the absolute religion, the probable superseding of the Christian religion, and the relative inferiority of Christianity to other existing religions. For Doedes, the subject of the encyclopædia is distinctly *Christian* theological science. This exact and proper limitation of his subject helps in determining the distribution of the contents of the encyclopædia. "Four groups of sciences in Christian theology are easily distinguishable. They all have reference to Christianity as the way of salvation carried out by Jesus Christ; some have reference more directly to the sources; others, rather to the history; others, again, to the doctrine; and, yet again, others, to the present condition of Christianity" (p. 34). Objections may be raised that there may be other sciences related in other ways to Christianity; but Doedes answers that these are actually the aspects of Christianity that have attracted and won scientific inquiry. This arrangement of four groups is not arbitrarily assumed, but is gained as the result of experience in regard to the contributions made by Christian theology; and as it comprehends the field of Christian theology, it furnishes a scheme of distribution for the encyclopædia of Christian theology. There is thus—*first*, literary theology, dealing with the literary sources of Christian theology; *second*, historical theology; *third*, dogmatic theology; and *fourth*, practical theology. Under (1) literary theology, we have the science of the sources of Christianity, which embrace Holy Scripture and the Church Confessions. Under the Holy Scriptures of the Christian Church there are grouped

three special divisions—1, the history of the Holy Scriptures, or introduction, which has to treat of the origin and of the collection (canon) of Holy Scripture; 2, the text of the Holy Scriptures, embracing the history and the criticism of the text; and 3, the exegesis of the Holy Scripture (interpretation), embracing exegetical propædeutic (linguistic, rhetorical, archæological, hermeneutical) and exegetical praxis (exposition and translation). Under the confessional writings of the Church, or symbolology, are embraced the three branches—1, the origin; 2, the advantages; and 3, the character of the symbolical writings. Under (2) historical theology, we have the science of the history of Christianity treated in three principal sections—1, the history of the non-Christian religions (preparation for Christianity), embracing the history of the pre-Christian religions (non-monotheistic and monotheistic religion, religion of Israel, biblical history and biblical theology of the Old Testament), and the history of the anti-Christian religion, Islam; 2, the history of Christianity, embracing the founding of Christianity, the biblical history of the New Testament (the life of Jesus, and the history of the apostolic circle), and the course of the development of Christianity, the history of the Christian Church; and 3, the present condition of the Christian Church (Christian statistics), embracing the outward condition of the Christian Church, ecclesiastical legislation in the different communions (Church law), and the ecclesiastical religious life in general. Under (3) dogmatic theology, we have the science of the doctrine of Christianity, under which three principal branches of study are introduced —1, the original presentation of the Christian religious doctrine—biblical theology of the New Testament, embracing the doctrine of Jesus and the doctrine of the apostles; 2, the subsequent development of the Christian religious doctrine, embracing the history of the Christian doctrinal articles (history of Christian dogmas) and confessional symbolics; 3, the systematic elaboration of the Christian religious doctrine,

embracing dogmatics (New Testament ecclesiastical and critical dogmatics) and ethics (doctrine of the Christian or evangelical life). Under (4) practical theology, we have the science of the means used for the maintenance of Christianity, and this is divided into two main sections—1, the theory of the Christian activity directed toward those who are within the pale of Christianity—esoteric practical theology, or practical theology in the narrower sense (*catechetics, homiletics*, liturgics, and poemenics or pastoral theology); and 2, the theory of the Christian activity directed toward those who are outside the Christian pale—exoteric practical theology (Christian apologetics, or the theory of the vindication of Christianity, and Christian halieutics, or the theory of the extension of Christianity).—Here we have a very elaborate and carefully-articulated distribution of the leading and subsidiary Christian theological sciences. In regard, however, to the fourfold arrangement, we would be inclined to say that it substantially agrees with that of Clarisse and Hagenbach, which is also adopted in the present treatise. When this was pointed out by Zöckler, in his *Handbook of the Theological Sciences*, Doedes contented himself with pointing out some verbal inaccuracies in the statement. Zöckler says that Doedes' first division of encyclopædia is the same as Hagenbach's, except in this, that besides Holy Scripture, Doedes also treats of symbolics,—and here he should have said symbolology. This, indeed, is all the difference between Hagenbach's exegetical theology and Doedes' literary theology, that in the latter we have a general consideration of the origin, use, and nature of confessional writings. But while the fourfold distribution of Hagenbach, Doedes, and the present treatise is practically the same, there are many curious and interesting variations in the positions assigned to several of the theological branches of study. The place given to symbolology is one of these peculiarities. That the theory of Church symbols should be introduced alongside of the exegetical

treatment of Holy Scripture is evidently improper, for were the two divisions of this first part to harmonize, we should have simply a theory of Holy Scripture dealing with its origin, use, and general character. If the full exegetical treatment of Scripture is proper to this first part, then symbolics, which treats the confessional writings according to a thorough exegetical method, and not merely the theoretical generalities of symbolology, would be in keeping and proportion. But this would be to introduce what evidently can only come later. According to Doedes, symbolics belongs to dogmatic theology. Here, however, we find further defect and confusion. The inclusion of symbolics, history of dogmas, and biblical theology under the head of dogmatic theology, shows that the departments of history and dogmatic have not been accurately differentiated. The first two of the theological studies named can be treated freely only in the department of history; and as to biblical theology, it depends upon our conception of the science whether we prefer, as is done by Hagenbach, to place it under the head of history, as being somewhat on the same lines as the subsequent development of Church doctrine, or, as is done in this treatise, to include it among the branches of exegetical theology, by emphasizing its scriptural character. With Doedes, again, practical theology is conceived of in an unduly restricted manner, so as to exclude the whole departments of Church organization and cultus or worship. These two are in an unnatural way introduced in the historical section under statistics. Then, again, the insertion of special sections under the head of historical theology, for the treatment of non-monotheistic religions and Mohammedanism, can scarcely be reconciled with the emphatic restriction of the encyclopædia to the Christian religion with which the author opened his treatise. Notwithstanding these serious defects, this encyclopædia constitutes a most valuable handbook, full of suggestion, and admirably wrought out in many of its details. It presents

features of great excellence under each of the four divisions, and the careful execution of details calls for the highest praise. The theological standpoint of Doedes is thoroughly evangelical, and in connection with this, we may refer to an important section in the introduction on the independence of Christian theology, pp. 21–23. Christian theology, says Doedes, is not less independent, but at the same time not more free, than the other sciences. It is bound by the laws which are generally valid for all sciences, and are essential to all scientific investigation. Protestantism, in opposition to Romanism, rejects all ecclesiastical despotism, but at the same time refuses to bring the Church under the despotism of science. Theology stands in close and necessary connection with the Church. The Christian Church, or rather the Christian Church communion, is not a scientific institution, but a religious association. It is true that the character of science is lost sight of when the Christian Church prescribes exactly what must, and what must not, be the result of scientific investigation; but it is also true that the character of the Christian Church is lost sight of when unrestricted doctrinal freedom is claimed by and allowed to those who are the leaders of the community. If theology is to light the way of the Church, then the Church must not prescribe to theology what it is to teach. But if the Church is not to be subject to the arbitrary will of theology, then theology must not force itself upon the Church as its lawgiver and ruler. It ought also to be mentioned that the history of the literature is particularly well done, the notices generally short, but the comparison of theological standpoints and principles of distribution adopted by the several writers being very clearly expressed.

An extremely important addition to encyclopædic literature was made by the publication of von Hofmann's lectures.[1]

[1] Encyclopædie der Theologie von J. Ch. K. von Hofmann, nach Vorlesungen und Manuscripten herausgegeben von H. J. Bestmann. Nördlingen 1879. For further and more detailed criticism of this work, see Appendix A.

These had been delivered in the University of Erlangen, first in 1848, and finally in 1863; and the published volume has appeared in the form of a compact treatise of 389 pages, produced by a careful collation of the different manuscripts used in the lecture-room, and the marginal notes found upon these. The editing has been done in a most careful and painstaking manner, which is fully explained in the editor's preface. The work is of peculiar significance as affording a comprehensive view of theology as conceived by such a profound and original thinker as Hofmann. In a volume of miscellaneous essays by Hofmann, edited in 1878 by Professor Heinrich Schmid of Erlangen, there appeared a short treatise, entitled *Gedanken ueber die Theologie.* This paper had originally appeared in the *Zeitschrift fur Protestantismus und Kirche* for October 1863, and thus it may be taken to represent the mind of the writer at the time when he last delivered, and made a final recension of, his lectures on theological encyclopædia. We have in this essay, to begin with, a summary and defence of the characteristic ideas of his Introduction to the Encyclopædia. He shows how it is necessary that we should begin, not with the idea of religion in general, but with that of Christianity. Should we proceed otherwise, the result would not be a theology, but only a philosophy. He then proceeds to defend the independence of theology as a science, and throughout the rest of the essay he is occupied in setting forth the scientific principles upon which the distribution and arrangement of the several departments of theology should proceed. The arrangement of the theological sciences, proposed by Hofmann, is a threefold one: systematic theology, historical theology, and practical theology. The usual fourfold distribution is rejected, because he embraces exegesis and Church history under the historical division. In placing systematic theology first, he may claim a certain affinity with Schleiermacher, Rosenkranz, and Rothe, all of whom begin with philosophical or speculative theology, which

corresponds, as far as their respective conceptions of theology will allow, with systematic theology. Hofmann, however, vindicates his procedure on altogether peculiar grounds. In his Introduction, p. 28, he argues that theology, as a science, cannot make exegesis its starting-point. It is all very well to say, as Harless does, that Holy Scripture, as containing the history of Christ and the apostles, should be the basis of Christianity. But before this can be made the point of departure, there are certain preliminary questions claiming attention. There must be some basis upon which a conviction of the genuineness and inspiration of these documents can rest. And even after this the question still must be raised, whether the foundation of theology is to be sought in the historical Christ, or not rather in the present Christ. Hofmann therefore begins with that knowledge and those doctrinal positions which the Christian has as a personal possession. The first part of theology is a statement of the doctrinal truth of Christianity, that is, systematic theology. Hofmann insists that no special system is to be introduced here, but only the broad lines of essential Christian truth. As a matter of fact, however, it is impossible to give a statement of the doctrinal truths of Christianity without having it determined by the author's special views of Scripture and history. It is not too much to say that the first division of Hofmann's Encyclopædia presupposes all the peculiar exegetical theories and principles of Scripture interpretation which are characteristically associated with his name. Starting with the proposition of the divine personality, he finds conjoined with this the doctrines of the Trinity and Predestination (the inner and outer self-determination of God), and the realization of the divine will in history. From this he proceeds through eight doctrinal sections to evolve all the generally recognised doctrines of the Christian faith. This exhibition of dogma is certainly instructive, the statement clear, and the connection of the several doctrines set forth with great skill

and acuteness: still it remains hanging in the air, waiting the elaboration of fundamental principles under the exegetical and historical divisions. In Hofmann's arrangement the historical follows the systematic; and this he defines as the scientific comprehension of the historical development of the Church, and of the general meaning of Holy Scripture. The Church presupposes the Holy Scripture; and therefore historical theology begins with a consideration of Holy Scripture. Under this first half of historical theology we have four subdivisions—1. Exegesis, which embraces all that is concerned with the form of Scripture. It is treated of under three sections—(*a*) history of the biblical text; (*b*) hermeneutics; (*c*) history of the origin of the biblical books. 2. The science of the contents of Scripture. This embraces two divisions—(*a*) biblical history in three parts; a history of Israel through the various stages of its national development; a sketch of general history of mankind from the creation, fragmentary, and often only genealogical; and finally, a history of the Messiah springing out of Israel, and founding a Church that transcends the limits of Israel. Hofmann occupies thirty-two pages of his work with the outline of this history. (*b*) Biblical theology, which treats biblical doctrine in a historical manner. This embraces what is ordinarily styled Old and New Testament theology; and it is discussed in a summary and suggestive way by Hofmann. 3. The science of the canon. And here we have first: the history of the collection and closing of the canon; secondly, the inner criticism of the canon, wherein the significance of the Old Testament canon, and the importance of Scripture as a whole, as a memorial of the past and a rule for the present, are discussed; and thirdly, the answer to the question, what is Scripture, where the question of inspiration is made prominent. 4. As the final subdivision we have Scripture proof. This last evidently comes in rdly at the close of a treatment of Scripture that d recede but

follows that systematic theology which states the doctrines of which the proofs are given here. This at least necessitates, as Hofmann allows, the merely tentative maintaining of the doctrines of the system. The second half of historical theology is the history of the Church. Here we have, first of all, the history of the Church, which embraces Church history proper, or the growth of the Church in outward dimensions; history of doctrines; the exhibition of the Christian faith in the relations of common life—family, social, civil life, etc.; history of Church constitution; history of the life of the Christian community. Then we have next, ecclesiastical statistics; and finally, proofs resulting from Church history, to correspond with the section with which the treatment of Scripture concludes.—Practical theology has two parts—1. The theory of the practical application of theology by [illegible] the range of official action, under which we have apologetics and polemics. 2. The theory of the practical application of theology by official action, embracing under the ministering to the congregation and to the Church the ordinary contents of pastoral theology in its widest sense.

The Encyclopædia of Richard Rothe[1] also appeared as a posthumous work. It has been edited upon the whole in accordance with the same principles as the Encyclopædia of Hofmann, and the editor is deserving of similar thanks for the extreme care which he has bestowed upon it. The work is also characterized by most commendable brevity. In the Introduction, Rothe discusses the idea of theology in somewhat less than six pages, and this is all that we have for what is usually reserved to constitute a part of the Encyclopædia itself under the name of the General Part. What properly belongs to the Introduction is disposed of in two chapters,

[1] Theologische Encyclopædie von Richard Rothe. Aus seinem Nachlasse herausgegeben von Hermann Rupellius. Wittenberg 1880. See further details in Appendix A.

entitled respectively, the idea of theological encyclopædia, and the history and literature of theological encyclopædia, the matter under each being compressed into the space of two pages. The treatment of the history is thus peculiarly meagre and unsatisfactory. Rothe regards theological encyclopædia as an introduction to theological study, and a guide to the student entering upon a theological course. He looks upon it as a purely formal science, having nothing to do with the contents of the different theological branches. It also embraces in itself a scientific method, and there is no room for a separate methodology. The last four pages of the Introduction are devoted to discussing the question of the distribution of the theological sciences in the Encyclopædia. He concludes by adopting a threefold arrangement: speculative theology, historical theology, and practical theology. I. Speculative theology. This division, according to [illegible], embraces theology in the narrower sense of the term, and ethics,—these being treated from the standpoint of the Christian consciousness. The term speculative is intended to characterize the thought exercised as not empirical-reflective, not *à posteriori* but *à priori*. This first division also embraces apologetics, which sets forth the grounds upon which the speculative system is reared. The conception of apologetics by Rothe is entirely different from that taken by Schleiermacher, and, unlike the latter, Rothe finds no place here for polemics, which he dissociates altogether from apologetics, and relegates to practical theology. II. Historical theology. This term is used in its very widest extent, so as to embrace not only the science of Scripture and the history of the Church, as with Hofmann, but also positive theology, or the present doctrinal position of the Church. 1. Under exegetical theology Rothe includes—(1) history of biblical literature; (2) biblical criticism; (3) biblical archæology; (4) biblical hermeneutics; and (5) biblical theology. 2. Under Church history he includes—(1) general history of the Church; (2)

history of the Church constitution; (3) history of doctrines; and (4) ecclesiastical archæology. These call for no special remark. 3. Under positive theology he includes — (1) dogmatics; (2) symbolics; and (3) statistics. That symbolics and statistics should be reckoned among the historical branches is quite reasonable, and is in accordance with the arrangement adopted in the present treatise; but the inclusion here of dogmatics results from an altogether peculiar conception of that department of theological science, or at least from a peculiar use of the term. With Rothe, much that is usually included under dogmatics, and in general what is intended by Hofmann in his division of systematic theology, is placed under speculative theology. Dogmatics is, according to Rothe, a purely historical branch, being a statement of ecclesiastical dogma, or, as he would express it, the presentation of what is entitled to be called Church doctrine. III. Practical theology. The reference of theology generally to the guidance of the Church is emphasized by Rothe after the example of Schleiermacher. Practical theology falls into two parts: the direction or administration of the Church as a whole, and the direction of the particular congregation or Christian community. The first subdivision—Church government—has again two parts — 1. Church law, that is, the scientific representation of the organization of the Church; 2. Polemic, that is, the scientific exposition of those fundamental principles according to which this organization is to be defended. The second subdivision—the administration of the congregation—embraces liturgics, homiletics, catechetics, and pastoral theology. The editor indicates various alterations in the distribution of certain departments made by Rothe from time to time; these, however, do not affect the general outline of his Encyclopædia as here given.

An important work, begun in 1882, has just been completed in three large volumes: Zöckler's *Handbook of the Theological Sciences*, an Encyclopædic Exposition of the Historical

Development of their several Branches.[1] The work is essentially an encyclopædia of theology of a very comprehensive kind. Its standpoint is distinctly evangelical, and not unfrequently signs of impatience in dealing with those who occupy other standpoints appear. The introductory section, pp. 3–117, deals with the historical development and scientific distribution of the theological branches. The treatment of many of the important questions here raised is disappointingly summary, and the whole section is marked by a want of thoroughness in treatment and by extreme confusion in the arrangement. This criticism applies specially to the chapter on theological encyclopædia, which compares unfavourably with the Introductions of the better Encyclopædias. This unfavourable estimate, however, applies only to the Introduction. The work itself is very ably executed. The separate divisions have for the most part been assigned to specialists, who have ably performed their tasks. It will be sufficient for our present purposes that we indicate the general plan on which the theological branches are arranged in this work. As a handbook of theological science, we naturally find in it a material and not a merely formal treatment of the subject, while the literature of the different subdivisions is given in great detail. In regard to those lists of books, however, the same objection may be made as we advanced against a similar feature of Hagenbach's treatment: they generally contain either too much or too little. Much more serviceable are the attempts made, especially under the sections on historical theology, to group together theologians and theological works according to their tendencies. This certainly requires to be very carefully and skilfully done; but if so done, the result is something

[1] Handbuch der theologischen Wissenschaften in encyclopædischer Darstellung mit besonderer Rücksicht auf die Entwickelungsgeschichte der einzelnen Disciplinen in Verbindung mit Prof. D.D., Cremer, Grau, Härnack, Kübel, Luthardt, von Scheele, F. W. Schultz, L. Schultze, Strack, Volk, von Zeschwitz, u. s. w., herausgegeben von Dr. Otto Zöckler. Nordlingen. 3 Bände, 1882–1884. This paragraph has been contributed by the editor.

very different from that of a mere list of books arranged according to the year of their publication. The untrustworthiness, however, of some of the classifications given in this ... ill appear from this, that in enumerating the adherents Maurice, ... of modern evan...lical Pietism — Chalmers, together (vol. ii. p. ... diffi...d M'Cosh are bracketed ment of the literature has not bee... culty attending the treat... In the general arrangement of the ... surmounted in this work. follows the usual fourfold division.— ...eological sciences, Zöckler Hagenbach, and in the present t... —that employed by Claris...se, historical theology, systematic the... ...heology, Under exegetical theology (vol. i. pp. 121–681) we ha...gy. threefold subdivision, which is at least extremely conve...e a for the purposes of a handbook—1. The doctrine of the ...ient Testament, embracing all the Old Testament branches, nam... Old introduction general and particular, archæology and his...nely, and the theology of the Old Testament; 2. The doctri...tory, the New Testament, embracing all the New Testament branc...e of namely, introduction general and particular, biblical hist...hes and biblical theology of the New Testament; and 3. The doctrine of Scripture as a whole, embracing the science of the canon and biblical hermeneutics. Under historical theology (vol. ii. pp. 3–497) we have first of all an introductory section which treats of the arrangement, literature, and helps in historical theological science. This is followed by the main portion of this division,—general Church history,—the ancient, mediæval (under three periods), and modern (under three periods): the history is brought down to 1833, and though to be received in part with reservation, is rendered in an extremely interesting way. This treatise on Church history is followed by what may be regarded as historical sciences complementary to this general Church history,—Christian archæology, embracing the history of the Church, constitution, of worship, of the Christian life, and of Christian

art; history of Christian doctrines, embracing a consideration of the development of Church doctrine through six [illegible] extending from A.D. 100 to A.D. 1883; and [illegible] instructive chapter on attempts at [illegible] Christian Church symbols, symbolics [illegible] especially among the German Evangelical Church[illegible] Under systematic theology (vol. ii. pp. 501–769, vo[illegible] 3–78) the three sciences are treated in succession — [illegible] apologetics, dogmatics, and ethics. Apologetics is treated ver[illegible] y ably by Kübel, but it is at least open to question whether t[illegible] he subjects discussed here can be properly arranged under one [illegible] head. (For a discussion of this question, see Appendix B.) The apologetical questions which are [illegible] and nature of religion. The inappropriateness of the [illegible] ng with the whole subject of apologetics in a special deal[illegible] on is made evident when we pass to the section on sect[illegible] natics. The first subdivision is entitled, The doctrine of dog[illegible] ciples; and here under presuppositions of Christianity and orin[illegible] origin of Christian certainty, we come upon unavoidable rep[illegible] titions of statements already made under apologetics. The Christian doctrines are treated under the customary heads —th[illegible] eology, anthropology, Christology, soteriology, ecclesiology, and [illegible] eschatology. The place of ethics as a part of systematic theo[illegible] ogy is undisputed. Many insist upon treating it in com[illegible] ination with dogmatics. The separate treatment as here, seem[illegible] s to us justifiable on scientific grounds, and it certainly com[illegible] nends itself to the convenience of students using an Encyc[illegible] lopædia. Under practical theology (vol. iii. pp. 81–612) we hav[illegible] an introductory part treated with great fulness and care. This is followed by a systematic exposition of the different divisions of practical theology — evangelistics, catechetics, homiletics, liturgics, pastoral theology in the narrower sense, diaconics (which generally corresponds to home mission work, as evangelistics deal with foreign missions) and kubernetics (the doctrine of the constitution

and government of the Church). The arrangement of the whole work reflects great credit upon the learned editor, himself a large contributor to the historical and systematic departments. More perhaps than any other single work, it is fitted to be helpful to the theological student as a comprehensive and informing handbook to a full course of theology. This summary of its contents forms a fitting close to the long history of attempts made within the German Protestant Church to give an encyclopædic exposition of the theological sciences.

Outside of Germany several important treatises on theological encyclopædia have recently appeared. The French Protestant Church has given us, *Introduction à l'étude de la théologie protestante* (Paris 1882), by Ernest Martin of Lausanne. This writer gives a threefold distribution of the theological sciences: I. La science (1. Histoire de la révélation; 2. Histoire du Christianisme; 3. Ethique); II. L'éducation (1. L'individu; 2. L'église, and under this—(*a*) la constitution de l'église, embracing Church law, dogmatics, and Church government; (*b*) activité de l'église à l'égard de ses membres, embracing liturgics, catechetics, apologetics, polemics, and irenics, homiletics, and pastoral theology; (*c*) activité de l'église au dehors, embracing evangelistics and the theory of missions); and III. La philosophie. (Compare Zöckler's *Handbuch der theologischen Wissenschaften.* 2 Ausgabe. Th. 1, S. 108.)

Quite recently an English work on theological encyclopædia has been published under the title of an *Introduction to the Study of Theology.*[1] The author, Dr. James Drummond, Professor of Theology in the Manchester New College, London, does not obtrude his own theological standpoint, but for the most part treats his subject in a purely formal manner. As a handbook of this description, the work is a valuable one. Written in a pleasant style, the matter is substantial, and

[1] Introduction to the Study of Theology, by James Drummond, LL.D., Professor of Theology in Manchester New College, London. London 1884.

the arrangement is at least clear and intelligible. The author professes mainly to follow Hagenbach and Rabiger, but he is by no means a slavish follower of any of his predecessors. The book is divided into three parts. The first part (pp. 1–31), in three sections, treats of the nature, the importance, and the principles of theological study. The second part (pp. 32–41) treats of the relation of theology to other studies. The two parts together cover the field of the *General Division* of the theological Encyclopædia. There are specially good and valuable remarks, on pp. 8–11, regarding the importance of the theological faculty to the university. What properly belongs to the introduction to theological encyclopædia is not treated in this work. The third part (pp. 42–256) corresponds to the *Special Division* of theological encyclopædia, and is introduced by a synoptical view of the various branches of theology. He proposes a sixfold distribution of the theological sciences,—1. philosophy; 2. comparative religion; 3. biblical theology; 4. ecclesiastical history; 5. systematic theology; 6. practical theology. The most important departure here from the generally approved arrangement is the inclusion of philosophy as one of the constituent members, and not a mere auxiliary, of theological science. It is here that the theological standpoint of the author seems to reflect itself upon his conception of the range of theology. He labours to show (pp. 51–56) that philosophy is so intimately associated with theology, and is so indispensable to its study, that it must be dealt with, not as a mere preparatory or auxiliary science, but as a constituent part of theology. All that he urges as to the need of philosophy for the theologian may be readily admitted. But we say precisely the same in regard to the comparative philology of the Semitic languages. The theologian must have so far studied philology as to be in a position intelligently to appropriate the true scientific results, in order to apply them to the interpretation of Scripture. Yet this philology is only an auxiliary science, beside of the

range of theology. So is it with philosophy. The theologian must be so much of a student of philosophy as to be able to choose and to maintain those principles of philosophy upon which the scientific construction of that doctrine conveyed to him in Scripture is reared. It is only when, as happens even with the most advanced and spiritually-minded among the Unitarians, like Dr. Martineau and Dr. Drummond, the claims of Scripture are underrated, and the claims of reason in comparison overrated, that such a proposal as this could approve itself. Then, again, no advantage seems to be gained by treating of comparative religion in a separate division, and not rather, as by Rabiger, under biblical theology, as a subdivision of exegetical theology, or, as by Hagenbach, as an auxiliary to the historical sciences. The study is distinctly historical, but it is of the same order of historical investigation as that which is applied to the sources of Christian revelation. We are thus left with the ordinary fourfold arrangement of the subjects of Christian theology. For the first of these four divisions, Dr. Drummond prefers the name biblical theology to that of exegetical theology, commonly used. This is, perhaps, more a matter of taste than of principle, which we are the less careful to dispute, seeing that under it he discusses all the special subjects included under the corresponding division in the "theologic," with the exception of the history of the different religions, to which, as we have seen, a separate division has been assigned.

The *Introduction to Christian Theology*, by Dr. H. B. Smith,[1] is in many respects a disappointing performance. In regard to form, its frequent disjointedness and fragmentariness might be fairly explained by the circumstances of its publication as a posthumous work compiled from notes used by the author in his class lectures. And, indeed, little serious objection can be taken against the book in this respect, for

[1] Introduction to Christian Theology, by Henry B. Smith, D.D., LL.D. Edited by W. S. Karr, D.D. New York 1883.

the outline is generally sufficiently full to render the meaning and aim of the writer quite distinct. It is when we consider the nature of its contents that we are inclined to regard the title of the treatise as misleading. It is not an introduction to theology generally, but simply an introduction to systematic theology; and not even to systematic theology as a science, but to Dr. Smith's system of theology. The book certainly has no claim to rank as an encyclopædia of theology, for there is much that is proper to an encyclopædia that is not in it; yet we have here many of the points belonging to encyclopædia discussed. It is divided into two parts: a General and Special Introduction. The General Introduction (pp. 1–48) treats of the claims of theology, the true spirit of its students, and the characteristics of a theology suited to our times. This in part corresponds to § 5–11 and § 20 of Hagenbach's Encyclopædie, and yet more closely resembles the *Methodologie* of Lange's Encyclopædie. The Special Introduction, or the Prolegomena of Christian Theology, constitutes the body of the work, and is divided into six chapters. In chapter first, the idea of Christian theology is determined by means of the ideas of science, religion, and Christianity. Chapters two, three, four, and five treat of the sources of Christian theology. We have—1. Subsidiary sources (Christian experience, confessions of faith, and systems of theology and philosophy); 2. Nature, the fundamental source of Christian theology,—natural theology, treated in great detail; and 3. Revelation, the comprehensive and authoritative source of Christian theology—(*a*) Evidences of Christianity (the possibility of a revelation, historical proofs, and internal evidences); (*b*) Divine authority of the record of revelation (canon, inspiration, and rule of faith). And finally, chapter sixth gives the divisions of theology or the outlines of the theological system. From the point of view of encyclopædia, we challenge the propriety of treating apologetical questions of a historical and of a philosophical kind under the same general division.

Indeed, the principle of arrangement is found in the subordination of all the departments of theology to that of systematic theology. The above outline of contents will show that exegetical theology, apologetics, symbolics, etc., are all made auxiliary to systematics, and are thus at once bereft of their independence and their due proportions.

Theological Encyclopædia in the Roman Catholic Church.

In Germany, at least, since the middle of the eighteenth century, (Roman) Catholic theology refused to submit itself to the yoke of that formal scholasticism which had been established anew by the Jesuits, and commended even by theologians of other orders, in the spirit of Thomas Aquinas or Scotus.[1] "Scholastic theology, casuistics, and canonics were the three principal elements in the theological education, and in them for the most part the entire contents of ecclesiastical divinity were comprised" (Werner, *l.c.* p. 121). Martin Gerbert, however, belonging to the order of the Benedictines, in the spirit of a Mabillon and Du Pin, insisted, in opposition to a one-sided scholasticism, upon a return to the historical sources of theology.[2] In his *apparatus* he recommends as a foundation for theological study the study of Holy Scripture. Side by side with this he places the study of the *canones* of the Councils, which are to be

[1] Compare Carl Werner, Geschichte der Katholischen Theologie. Seit dem Trienter Concil bis zur Gegenwart. München 1866. § 88 ff. (History of Catholic Theology from the Council of Trent down to the Present Time. This is one of the series of Histories of the Sciences prepared for the Historical Commission of the Royal Academy of Sciences at Munich. It is intended to be a companion work to Dorner's History of Protestant Theology, which belongs to the same series.)

[2] Apparatus ad eruditionem theologicam, institutioni tironum congregationis Sancti Blasii destinatus, auctore Martino Gerbert, eiusdem congregationis monacho. Aug. Vind. 1754.

regarded as *decreta spiritus sancti;* the study of the papal *epistolæ decretales*, which are to be reverenced as *decreta Petri;* and the study of the *patres*, by whose means the *depositum fidei* has been preserved to the Church, and tradition has been carried down, as it were, through a channel, to the Church of later times, whose *unanimis consensus* has constituted the standard, both for the exposition of Scripture, and for the construction of the Church doctrine. Gerbert very expressly insists upon this, that by means of the firm establishment of these studies all the unprofitable and thorny investigations of scholastic theology should be driven from the range of study. He places special value upon the study of Church history. For the ascertaining of tradition, for the understanding of the Acts of the Councils, and of the Papal Decretals, and of the Canon Law, as well as for the study of the Fathers, it is indispensably useful. As theological auxiliary sciences, Gerbert recommends the *literæ humaniores*, philology, especially the Hebrew and Greek, chronology and geography, the natural sciences, philosophy, mathematics, jurisprudence, criticism, and antiquities. Gerbert occupies a very decided (Roman) Catholic standpoint. He does not oppose the scholastic theology as a whole, but only its excesses. Divine revelation is, according to him, deposited in Scripture and tradition, and in both forms is transmitted by means of the Church, which is the infallible interpreter of the divine word of doctrine. Its doctrinal authority is represented by the bishops joined with the Pope. The Councils are the highest tribunal for the doctrinal decisions of the Church. Upon these Catholic principles he has endeavoured to introduce a certain systematic arrangement into the treatment of those studies recommended by him, and, by means of numerous writings on special points, he has further developed and established these studies. Compare Werner, *l.c.* p. 179 ff.

After the suppression of the order of the Jesuits, which

took place in the year 1773, a more liberal tendency manifested itself in German Catholic theology. Besides others, such as Stephan Rautenstrauch, Brandmayer, Gmeiner, and Wiest,[1] Oberthür,[2] still more decidedly than Gerbert, combated the customary doctrinal method which had been rigidly retained in theology by the Jesuits. In his Encyclopædia, Oberthür distinguishes between methodology and encyclopædia. By the former he understands the doctrine of the fundamental principles according to which the several theological sciences are to be treated, and he illustrates this in his methodology, specially in the case of dogmatics. The remark readily suggests itself, that a methodology so conceived is quite superfluous when we have a properly develo t' ne encyclopædia. The encyclopædia should set forth ry entire compass, the arrangement of the parts, the preparat f sciences, and the direction for the practical application o theology, so that the religion of Jesus may be spiritually more and more established and realized. It falls into thre principal sections. The first treats of the preparatory sciences, and, with great fulness of details, occupies the whole of the first volume; for the tendency of Oberthür is chiefly in the direction of giving to the scholastic theology elaborated by the Jesuits a better form by the help of humanist stu ies. As a preparation for theological study philosophy is pre- eminently recommended, but it must complete itse f in theology. In the second section, the idea of theolo is defined, but this is done in such a way that it coincides w h that of dogmatics, and much is ascribed to theology tha t

[1] On those named above, compare Werner, *l.c.*

[2] Encyclopædia et Methodologia Theologica, vol. i. Salisb. 1786. This work was afterwards issued in a greatly enlarged form in German, under the title, Theologische Encyclopædie oder theologischen Wissenschaften Umfang und Zusammenhang. Von Franz Oberthür. Bd. 1, 2. Augsburg 1828. It was followed by Methodologie der theologischen Wissenschaften ueberhaupt und der Dogmatik insbesondere. Von Franz Oberthür. Augsburg 1828. [Hagenbach says of Oberthür that he occupies a similar platform to that occupied by Nösselt, Planck, and Niemeyer in the Protestant Church.]

should rather have been said of Christianity. The foundations of theology are the infallibility of the Church and Holy Scripture, as a divine revelation, according to its divine inspiration. In the third section, the constituent parts of theological science, and their order, are set forth. Theology falls into theory and practice. The academies have to teach the former; the theological seminaries the latter. The constituent parts of theoretical theology are biblical hermeneutics and exegesis, Church history, dogmatics, moral theology, Church law, and history of dogmas, which has been introduced in the place of the earlier polemics. Practical theology embraces (1) Ascetics, that is, directions for candidates, showing how they may apply to themselves what they have received as the theory of religion; and (2) Pastoral theology in its narrower sense, which teaches the candidate how to expound to others the theory of religion. To practical theology belong also catechetics joined with pedagogics, homiletics, liturgics, casuistics, and practice in the curial style. Oberthür is satisfied with indicating the formal connection of the theological branches, and makes a special endeavour to determine the order in which these studies should be prosecuted in the academy and seminary. Unsatisfactory as Oberthür's general execution of the Encyclopædia, and especially his conception of practical theology undoubtedly is, that nevertheless is deserving of notice which he says about the different tasks of the academies and the theological seminaries; and the religious and peace-loving spirit of the author which makes its presence felt throughout the work, appears to great advantage in contrast to the polemical eagerness of the Jesuits.

The period of the Illumination, too, did not pass without leaving a trace upon the Catholic theology. In the period of Josephinism and Febronianism there entered into the treatment of Catholic Church questions a spirit of liberalism

which, from a rigid Catholic point of view, must have appeared extremely hazardous.[1] Nevertheless, since the period of Romanticism, Catholic theology has taken a new flight under the influence of modern philosophy and Protestant theology. The endeavour of the recent tendency to appropriate to itself the homogeneous and beneficial elements in the active spiritual life of Protestantism, and to enter into all departments alongside of their fellow-workers, shows itself very distinctly in the theological encyclopædias that appeared after this time. Dobmayer[2] prefaces his rich comprehensive system of Catholic theology with an encyclopædia and methodology of theology. Theology is the scientific doctrine of the moral kingdom of God, or of religion and the Church. It falls into rational and positive theology. The latter is Christian, and treats of the doctrine and Church of Christ. The perfect and uncorrupted Christian theology is the Catholic, which proves its truth from its agreement with reason and revelation, and thus suffers ever rational theology to be taken up and included in itself. Catholic theology is divided into theoretical and practical theology. The theoretical, again, is divided into the general, which treats of the kingdom of God in general, and the special, which comprises religionistics and ecclesiastics. Religionistics includes theognosy and theonomy, or dogmatics and moral theology; ecclesiastics, which Dobmayer rightly, in contrast to Oberthür, admits into the theological system, includes liturgics and hierarchics. Prac-

[1] Compare Werner, *l.c.* p. 203 ff. [On Josephinism—that is, the system of reform carried out by Joseph II., Emperor of Austria, from about the year 1780—see article under this name by Carl Müller in Herzog, vol. vii. pp. 108–109. On Febronianism—a protest against papal absolutism and a claim for the independence of national Churches—see article "Hontheim," by Mejer in Herzog, vol. vi. pp. 310, 311. A good popular account of these systems may be found in Chambers's Encyclopædia, arts. "Febronianism, Hontheim, and Josephinism."]

[2] M. Dobmayer, Systema Theologiæ Catholicæ. Opus posthumum cura et Studio Th. P. Senestrey. Sulzbach, 1807–1819. 8 Theile. Compare Werner, *l.c.* p. 248 ff.

tical or applied theology divides itself into ascetics and pastoral theology. The biblical, historical, and philosophical sciences are auxiliaries to theological study. The theological method is either scientific or pragmatic. The former consists in a synthesis of the historical and philosophical modes of treatment; the latter pursues practical ends.[1] Quite in the spirit of Schelling's doctrine of Identity, Thanner, at once philosopher and theologian, constructed his methodological introduction to the academical-scientific study of positive theology.[2] The subject of theology is with him the exposition of the Eternal and Divine in time, and of Christianity in particular, with reference to the specific form under which it has developed itself in Catholicism. Theological methodology sets forth the study of theology in the unity of its life and of its development; theological encyclopædia, in the variety and difference of its parts. The former has to treat of the idea of positive theology, to show how this unfolds itself as religion and Church, — temporally and ideally in the divine education of the human race, historically and really in a positive institution and doctrine of redemption and reconciliation, to which the office of priest and teacher corresponds. The latter, the theological encyclopædia, embraces the science of Catholic theology and the idea of office, and ends in Church history, in which science and Church office in general are led back to the idea. These two, science and office, divide themselves into a trinity of moments; science is distributed into speculative doctrine, his-

[1] Werner, *l.c.* p. 257, says of the work of Dobmayer: "A painstaking analysis of all the details of his dogmatic material, a thoroughly elaborated dogmatic judgment, instructive references to the contemporary literature of philosophy and Protestant theology, are the characteristics by which Dobmayer's work continues fitted even still to afford to the reader of to-day manifold stimulation." [This estimate is clearly unduly favourable. It is only by way of contrast to the extreme narrowness and exclusiveness of his predecessors that Dobmayer can be called liberal or advanced.]

[2] Einleitung in das akademisch-wissenschaftliche Studium der positiven Theologie. München 1809. Compare Werner, *l.c.* p. 305 ff.

tetical exposition, and real positive statement: office or administration is arranged according to the threefold point of view, the idea of office, official sphere, and discharge of official duty.

In connection with Schleiermacher and speculative theology, Drey has given an exposition of encyclopædia.[1] Christianity is the most perfect revelation of God, its highest idea is the kingdom of God, and the visible representation of this idea is the Church. Theology is intellectual occupation with the ideas of Christianity; or more definitely, a construction of the religious faith by means of knowledge. Mere historical construction is to be distinguished from philosophical, properly scientific, construction. "Supernaturalism is not a knowledge of something heretofore only believed, but merely a knowledge of and about faith; rationalism, on the other hand, endeavours to reach a knowledge of the very thing believed, and hopes to transform faith into knowledge" (p. 28). The Church, in which not only the means, but also the organization, for the realizing of the Christian ideas are given, is the true basis of all theological knowledge (p. 33). With reference to the different theologies in the different Churches, Drey gives an exposition of Catholic theology, and "this is accordingly the construction of the Christian religious faith by means of knowledge on the basis of the Catholic Church, in its spirit, and with the intention of realizing in that Church, in a befitting manner, the grand end of Christianity by means of first knowledge" (p. 33). Christianity as a whole, according to history and doctrine, is something positive, which absolute of all can be known only empirically and historically. "The historical knowledge of Christianity must necessarily precede the scientific knowledge, to which the former raises itself when the contents of Christianity are reduced to an idea, and from

[1] Kurze Einleitung in das Studium der Theologie mit Rücksicht auf den wissenschaftlichen Standpunkt und das Katholische System. Von J. S. Drey. Tübingen 1819. Compare Werner, l.c. p. 473 ff.

this idea again are developed by necessary deduction from the one principle" (p. 41). The entire historical material —biblical Christianity and Church history—is reckoned to theological propædeutics. "Scientific theology lays hold upon the result of this propædeutics, and by the help of its own construction, through the transmutation of the historical material into ideas, it developes this result into a special system of Christian religious doctrine." The kingdom of God has an ideal side, which represents itself as the pure sum-total of the ideas, or as the doctrinal system of the Christian religion, and a real side, which objectifies itself as the Church. Hence scientific theology embraces the system of Christian doctrine,—dogmatics and moral theology, and the idea of the Christian Church,—the worship and constitution of the Church. A doctrine of principles, however, is to be prefixed to both; which in regard to its essence, as philosophy of religion, has to develope the idea of Christianity, and in regard to its purpose, assumes the form of apologetics and polemics. In the historical propædeutics and the science itself all the theologian's knowledge is included. But we must join therewith a special instruction as to the manner and form in which the theologian has to make use of [illegible] knowledge in the Church. This instruction does not [illegible]self belong to theology, but is only a technical guide necessary to the divine for putting his science into practice, and so may be [illegible]ed applied or practical theology. It has to give instructions regarding Church government and the Church service [illegible] the clergyman, for his help in the discharge of his official du[illegible] [illegible]v's arrangement of the encyclopædia the separ[illegible] of [illegible] historical propædeutics from theological science proper, and the consequent co-ordinating of the biblical writings with the authoritative writings of Church history, are quite unsyst[illegible]tic. For if, indeed, the method, which is to be applied to the historical department, is different from the speculative method that has to be

applied to the doctrinal department, still the former must also be a scientific method, if it is indeed to give a science of history. Consequently Bible study and the study of Church history will have to be conceived, not merely as propædeutics, but as an integral part of theological science, and then, too, the biblical writings can be brought into their proper relationship with the authoritative writings of Church history. When, further, Drey includes the theory of the Church in scientific theology, and yet places outside a special practical theology, he himself pronounces judgment as to the untenableness of the latter from the point of view of encyclopædia, in so far as he is not able to regard practical theology as a constituent part of theological science. ["The Catholic theologian Drey," says Lange, "has placed the idea of the kingdom of God at the foundation of his Encyclopædia. He maintains that it is only when theology rests upon such a foundation that it becomes positive; and, indeed, he describes theology as positive in the sense of its being an absolute laying down of law: for to the Roman Catholic theologian the kingdom of God can only mean the Romish Church. With the idea of the kingdom of God, however, a beginning cannot be made, although this, too, has been attempted recently by a Protestant theologian.[1] A beginning

[1] The reference is made by Lange is to Ritschl of Bonn, who, in his little work, An Instruction in the Christian Religion (Unterricht in der Christlichen Religion. Bonn 1875), treats in his first section of the kingdom of God. It should, however, be remembered that he distinctly disclaims the intention of writing a dogmatic treatise, and further commends his work for the use of higher schools, on the ground that it is not a treatise on dogmatics but on religion. Lange is therefore not entitled to say, as he does on p. 82, that Ritschl begins the science of theology with the idea of the kingdom of God. In the opening paragraph of his treatise, Ritschl declares incisively that a special revelation as the source, and a special community of believers and worshippers as the sphere of the Christian religion, are necessary presuppositions to any treatment of the Christian religion. Besides, it should be remembered that the kingdom of God is with Ritschl, something very different from that which is understood by Protestants and Catholics generally, when they use the phrase, "The kingdom of God," the general aim and purpose of the Church founded by the revelation of God in Christ.—ED.

must rather be made with the Christian ideal-social presupposition of the history of the revelation, which has furnished the foundation of the kingdom. This revelation, therefore, constitutes the sphere of life in which the theologian as theologian breathes, by means of the idea of which he succeeds in setting himself determinately against any conception of a kingdom, in which we have not the living God communicating Himself to the quickened spirit, but an absolute lawgiver ruling over abject (*unfreie*) subjects."—*Encyclopædia*, Introd. § 8, note 9.]

Closely related to Drey is Klee.[1] His theological Encyclopædia bears evidence of a scientific, and at the same time of a decidedly Roman Catholic spirit; and its arrangement is determined by this latter tendency. In the Introduction he intimates his standpoint as that of theological objectivism, and he derives the properly theological branches from the chief moments embraced in religion. In the first division, he places, as studies preparatory to theological science, philosophy, bibliology, pistics, and ecclesiastics. In the second division, he places, as properly theological branches—1. Dogmatics; 2. Ethics, which falls into ethics proper, and ecclesiastics; 3. Historical theology, which again includes (*a*) biblical theology and (*b*) historical theology, strictly so called; and 4. Symbolical or liturgical theology.

In strict connection with the writer just referred to may be mentioned Buchner,[2] who treats of encyclopædia in a purely formal manner. He defines theology as "the science of the Christian religion or the kingdom of God which was established upon earth by Christ, and is visibly represented in the Catholic Church" (p. 9). He distinguishes theology proper or doctrinal theology, pastoral theology, and historical theology. The two latter are regarded by Buchner after the

[1] Encyclopædie der Theologie von Heinrich Klee. Mainz, 1832.

[2] Encyclopædie und Methodologie der Theologischen Wissenschaften. Von Alois Buchner. Sulzbach 1837.

example of Drey, as not belonging to theology strictly so called (p. 19 f.). Theology proper embraces dogmatics and moral theology, including the system of Church law. With dogmatics is also joined polemics, and with moral theology are joined ascetics and casuistics. Between dogmatics and polemics a place is assigned to symbolics. Pastoral theology has to do with the official rank and functions of the Christian teacher, priest, and pastor, and hence embraces—(*a*) Exemplarics, (*b*) Homiletics, (*c*) Catechetics, (*d*) Liturgics, (*e*) Pastoral theology in the narrower sense. Historical theology as the history of the Church forms the conclusion. Under each of these three principal divisions there are also subsidiary sciences; and, indeed, it is only as such that Bible study is introduced, it being regarded simply as one of the sciences auxiliary to the study of theology proper, or doctrinal theology. [What has been said against the attempt of Harless to introduce dogmatic theology before historical theology may be urged against Buchner, whose distribution is still more faulty from the want of a fully developed groundwork of exegetical theology.] The methodology which Buchner joins to his Encyclopædia "as a guide to the study of theology according to a plan, or an aid to the adequate exposition of it" (p. 73), shows the unsystematic character of the arrangement of his Encyclopædia, inasmuch as he is obliged in his methodology to prescribe, as the actual and proper order of study, a succession of the theological branches quite different from that which he had followed in his Encyclopædia.

In profundity of speculative grasp Staudenmaier excels all his predecessors. After very complete, and in some respects very striking, discussions concerning the general and special encyclopædia,—the encyclopædia of the general sciences and the encyclopædia of the theological sciences,—he defines theology in general as "the consciousness of God raised into science," or as "the science of religion" (p. 26). Then he

defines Christian theology as "the science of our religious consciousness as a whole, as it is determined historically, and found by means of the revelation in Christ," or as "the science of the Christian faith." Theology, as the scientific knowledge of God, is system; and this is the form in which science makes its appearance, and which stands in an inward relationship to the contents. "The content is the substance which, by the exercise of dialectics, imports movement to its own self, and by means of this self-movement invests itself with that form which is at once essential and necessary to it" (p. 79). Encyclopædia is "the systematic outline of the whole range of theology, the short sketch of its concrete idea according to all essential and necessary directions and tendencies,"—a science that is self-articulated, which, as an actual organic whole, carries its principle of life in itself. The principle that determines the distribution of theology must be derived from the very conception of theology; and since our consciousness of God is determined by means of the revelation in Christ, it has to be asked whether the purely speculative or the historical ought to have the precedence. Staudenmaier decides in favour of the former. Consequently, according to him, in the arrangement of the Encyclopædia, the whole of theology falls into three parts:—1. Speculative theology, 2. Practical theology, and 3. Historical theology. Speculative theology begins with a theory of religion and revelation, and then advances to the Christian revelation and its sources—Tradition and the Holy Scriptures. Exegetical theology is therefore included under this first division. It is followed by dogmatics and moral theology, as further subdivisions of speculative theology. Moral theology forms a natural transition to practical theology, the second principal division, which is divided into a system of Church government and a system of Church service. The third principal division, historical theology, embraces history of doctrines, symbolics, archæology, and Church history as history of the Christian life. Staudenmaier

maier quite properly insists that encyclopædia[1] and the systematic distribution of theology should exactly coincide. The demand, however, which he makes of encyclopædia, that its treatment of the theological departments should be brief, is certainly not responded to by himself, for his first volume of 946 pages is occupied with speculative theology alone. Theology as treated by him, in accordance with his general definition, passes completely over into a philosophy of religion, and Christian theology passes over into speculative or systematic theology. Thus, in regard to the distribution of the parts of theology, Staudenmaier attaches himself to his predecessors, and in consequence of his over-estimation of the speculative element he is led to subordinate exegetical theology to speculative theology as a mere auxiliary science. [Hagenbach says of Staudenmaier's work, that "notwithstanding considerable prolixity, a decided speculative talent is to be recognised." "With Rosenkranz," he further remarks, "Staudenmaier has this in common, that by him encyclopædia is regarded as a philosophy of theology, and the methodological part is too briefly treated." Owing to the identification of speculative or systematic theology with theology proper, exegetical and historical theology are comparatively neglected, or at least have no place assigned them in which they can receive strictly scientific treatment. Exegesis, when treated as a branch of speculative theology, must necessarily be under the influence of the principles of that speculative system of which it forms a constituent part, and is thus stripped of its independence. Then, instead of the rich contents of historical theology throwing light upon the problems of Church government and the Church service, they are only gathered together at last, as the mere chronicle or recital of all that has been determined,

[1] Encyclopædie der theologischen Wissenschaften als System der gesammten Theologie. Von Fr. A. Staudenmaier. Mainz 1834. 2 Auflage. Bd. 1. Mainz 1840. Compare Werner, Geschichte der katholischen Theologie, p. 487 ff.

from age to age, in the departments of speculative or practical theology.]

By means of modern Catholic theology, the impress of which is borne by those Encyclopædias that have just been referred to, the old scholastic theology has been transfigured into a new scholastic theology, which is penetrated by an idealism which, supported as it is by thorough and comprehensive exegetical and historical studies, thought to have been able to reach the very highest perfection. In this new scholasticism of the Roman Catholic Church, truth and fiction cross and intermingle with one another at all important points. Subtle and penetrating investigations are undertaken in reference to the problems of religion, Christianity, Church, and science; and then, Christianity is identified with the Catholic doctrine, the Catholic doctrine with the truth, the kingdom of God with the Church, the Church with the hierarchical Church, Catholic theology with absolute theology. Set forth by eminently gifted and spiritual men, this idealism has unquestionably contributed, in the widest circles, to the advancement of the Catholic consciousness and the interests of the Catholic Church. Nevertheless, viewed by Romish eyes, the dangers with which its undisturbed development threatened the hierarchical Church were unmistakeable. If it is to be dragged into the spiritual movement of Protestantism, there is much occasion for fear as to the ultimate position of the doctrine of an unchangeable Church. Jesuitism, on its restoration, has approved itself as the true curial watchman, and has shown itself determined to lead back that idealism within its own limits. The fruit, indeed, of this idealism it has utilized for its own purposes; for the tenacity and constancy, the overbearing and blind determination, with which ultramontanism fought for the Papal Church, is in large measure the work of that ideal theology. This, however, has itself given to Jesuitism its death-blow, when it transferred the *donum infallibilitas* from the Church to the

Pope, and caused the Papal Infallibility to be sanctioned as a dogma. While previously a wide space was allowed to Catholic theology within the limits of the hierarchical Church for free movement, it must now, under the authority of an infallible vicegerent of God and Christ, as a *corpus mortuum*, fall a prey to corruption.

§ 7. SURVEY.

If, as stated in our first section, a new exposition of theological encyclopædia ought to find its foundation in the history of encyclopædia which likewise brings into view the principal phases of the history of theology, it must attach itself to the result of that history, and seek to build further upon them. It therefore also sets itself under the protection of history. For it is just in the province of theology that it has come to be almost a habitual practice to make the individual, as such, answerable for his theological work, while the judgment ought rather to have been directed to forming an estimate of the significance which the scientific [illegible] has, as a whole, to which each individual renders alw[illegible] small contribution.

When we review the num[illegible] frequently very dissentient Encyclopædias [illegible]ns of theology that have come forth [illegible] have to be overcome appear formida[illegible] time, from out of those very difficu[illegible]hich theology must undertake are brought to [illegible]ns of every new attempt to handle the subjo[illegible] material which is to be wrought up lies before us [illegible]he greatest profusion. The theological acquirements, which from the earliest times have developed themselves out of the creative activity of the Christian spirit, gradually assumed the form of special theological branches, and, with a growing desire after wider and more comprehensive knowledge, new branches were always being added to those already existing. These newer theological branches of science gradually co-ordinated themselves with the earlier, according to their relationship, so that in the course of time a tolerably general agreement was reached in regard to the principal divisions into which the

theological branches are to be arranged. Whatever has become historical ought so far as possible to be conserved, wherever there are no fundamental reasons standing in the way, on account of which particular branches are to be withdrawn, and new ones introduced in their place. In spite of that general agreement, however, the greatest diversity prevails, both as to the distribution of the particular branches under the principal divisions, and also in regard to the succession in which those principal divisions are themselves to be arranged. These formal divergences in regard to the systematic arrangement of the divisions of theology result from this, that the authors of the Encyclopædias have allowed themselves to be led, not by a simple consideration of the subject-matter, but partly by considerations of persons and office, partly by confessional considerations. More and more, however, in recent times, the conviction has forced its way, that the true principle of distribution can be reached only by making the Encyclopædia take for its task the development of theology itself, and making it then, by means of its contents, determine its formal arrangement. Therefore the execution is essentially made dependent upon the idea of theology, which is laid as a foundation, and a difference is possible only in so far as a difference finds place in the conception of theology. That this is unavoidable so long as different Confessions, and theological contradictions in the particular Confessions themselves, stand in opposition to one another, cannot be denied. The Encyclopædia, however, need not take these contradictions into consideration, but must, especially in any case where the decision is difficult, allow history to lead it by the hand. While in the earliest, and then again in the Reformation times, theology was determined purely by means of an inner impulse of its own, Catholic theology, as early as the fifth century, lost its freedom by surrendering to the authority of the Church, and Protestant theology, since the beginning of the seventeenth century, lost its freedom by submitting to the bondage of the letter of Holy

Scripture. Orthodox Catholic theology since that time found its principle in the infallibility of the Church; orthodox Protestant theology found its principle in the infallibility of Holy Scripture. This opposition between the Confessions, by reason of the severest tension having been applied to the different principles, has led to an extraordinarily rich development of theology. But while in the realm of Catholicism, under the dominion of the hierarchy, this development must ever be one quite on the same lines, seeing that the principle itself is not allowed to be called in question in the realm of Protestantism, which was able to keep itself free from any Church constraint upon its theology. This development could be carried forward even to the extent of engaging in the freest criticism of the principles. It was of the greatest significance that the orthodox Protestant theology pressed on beyond the narrow limits of ecclesiasticism, and allowed itself to be carried down the stream of the general spiritual life, that its theological problems became likewise philosophical problems, and theology and philosophy were bound together in the performance of the one common task. The now widespread conflict about principles, in the glory and honour of which Catholicism can claim no share, has led to conclusions of the greatest consequence for the upbuilding of theology. After the negative criticism had demolished the principles of the orthodox theology, and had demonstrated the untenableness of its principle of Scripture, philosophy, occupying a position above and apart from theological parties, won for itself the credit of delivering theology from that dissolution and decomposition which had wrought so effectually upon its system, and of securing a foundation, after the demolition of external authorities, upon those same authorities on which science in general rests.[1] The distinctively new conception of theology

[1] The editor feels called upon to express his thorough disapproval of the extreme and unguarded statements made in these sentences. To him they do not seem warranted by the historical matter presented in the preceding pages

now prevalent, which found expression in Schleiermacher's theology and in speculative theology, does not introduce an opposition that allows of no reconciliation, but is rather one which, upon the principles established, leads of itself to an inner reconcilement and harmony. While the movement of Catholicism, led by Jesuitism, consists in this, that, in place of the actual abstract authority of the Church, there was set up the concrete personal authority of the supreme head of the Church, and Catholic theology, since that time, has been obliged to ground its demonstration of the truth upon the continued miracle of the incarnation of the Divine Spirit in one individual man; in the domain of Protestantism, under the influence of philosophy, regenerated theology has made its demonstration of the truth, animated generally by the scientific spirit, and has built up its system according to the rule of scientific objectivity.

In that review of work previously done in the department of theological encyclopædia, the careful student will have observed occasionally a certain exhibition of theological bias on the part of our author. What in these instances, as well as in the present case, has apparently led Rübiger to make those strong statements, which seem to us so objectionable, is his failure to see that there can be any position maintained in relation to Scripture that is not either an unreasoning attachment to the letter of Scripture, or such a free treatment of it as subjects it without restriction to the judgment of philosophical principles. The presupposition of this is the principle of pure rationalism. If philosophy, as our author assumes, free from all limitation, be capable of dealing with the principle of revelation and Scripture, it seems scarcely worth while contending for the remnant of truth that may still be allowed to exist in supernaturalism. If the authorities on which theology is made to rest are nothing more than the authorities on which the other sciences rest, we may have a philosophy of religion, but no theology in the proper sense. To see how Scripture can be viewed in a liberal and scientific, yet not rationalistic, but truly evangelical spirit, the student is referred generally to Dr. John Robson's able work, *The Bible: its Revelation, Inspiration, and Evidence* (London 1883). These extreme statements, made in the sentences to which this note is attached, do not invalidate the main positions of this section. The contrast between Catholicism and Protestantism, in regard to their relations respectively to the development of theology, is, upon the whole, admirably and correctly expressed. The functions, in the closing sentences, ascribed to philosophy, as exerting in Protestant theology an important influence, and determining the construction of the theological system in accordance with the rules of science, are such as we can most heartily recognise.—ED.

§ 3. THE SUBJECT OF THE THEOLOGICAL ENCYCLOPÆDIA.

It is in the history of theological encyclopædia that the theological encyclopædist first finds an answer to the question about its subject. This question is for him surrounded with difficulties, which are not present to one preparing an encyclopædia of the other sciences. While the encyclopædist treating, for example, of jurisprudence, or medicine, can assume quite unhesitatingly the subject of his exposition, it is the duty of the theological encyclopædist first of all to determine what theology he is to set forth. For there appear before him, not one theology, but several theologies. Apart altogether from the non-Christian systems, there are, in the Christian Church itself, theologies in no small number. The one Catholic theology of primitive times broke up into several confessional theologies with the breaking up of the Church. According to the number of the separate Churches was the number of the separate theologies; an orthodox Greek, a Roman Catholic, a Lutheran, a Reformed, etc. All these theologies advanced the claim to be regarded as science, and most of the encyclopædias that have yet appeared have made the theology of one or other Confession the subject of their exposition. In consequence, therefore, of the connection in which these theologies stand to their Churches, the encyclopædias are completely bound to certain determined Church presuppositions, and set for themselves no other task than to give a representation of Christianity in accordance with these presuppositions. For the separate Church to which they belong something important may, indeed, be thereby produced, but this confessional theology is not in a position to accomplish the essential and highest tasks. If theology, in order simply to make prominent some

of its principal moments, is to institute a comparison of Christianity with the other religions, then the conception of it must start, not from a confessionally limited, but from a universal standpoint. If theology is to utter a judgment upon the significance or legitimate standing of the various separate Churches, then the judgment itself must be determined not by means of the interests of the separate Churches, but by means of a universal Church point of view. If theology is to be brought into connection with the other sciences, and if admission for it into the circle of the sciences is to be demanded, then it must appear not . a multitudinous and heterogeneous confessional form, but in a single and comprehensive scientific form. It is therefore to be regarded as an important step in advance, when, in recent times, the confessional theological standpoint has been transcended, and theology, in the exact sense of the word, has been conceived as science, which as such has to solve its problems in regard to Christianity according to the same principles as are valid for all the other sciences. In accordance with this, theological encyclopædia has to take as the subject of its exposition, not a confessional theology, but Christian theological science, or the science of the Christian religion.

§ 9. THE TASK OF THE THEOLOGICAL ENCYCLOPÆDIA.

In accordance with its subject, the theological encyclopædia can have no other task than to represent theology as science. It has therefore to keep itself far removed from those practical considerations by which the earlier encyclopædias were for the most part determined. In place of priests, monks, and clerics, for whom in the primitive Christian times the theological requirements were systematically arranged, subsequent to the Reformation, students make their appearance entering upon the study of theology, men who were destined to be themselves theologians, candidates who were to become teachers of the Christian religion in the future, and, in order to introduce these to the course of theological study, theological encyclopædias were drawn up. In this way it did indeed look as though theology existed properly only for the sake of students and such as were to be teachers of religion; whereas the true connection is quite the reverse, and these are there only for the sake of theology. For the encyclopædia, it is not the need of the student, but only the course of theological study, that comes into consideration, and from its exposition there, there also result those demands to which the student of theology has to submit himself. The encyclopædia, too, has to reject the confessional interests, in consequence of which, in not a few encyclopædias, particular divisions, or even particular branches of theology have been favoured, or placed in the foreground, or indeed even distinct branches have been called into being. By means of all such considerations, brought from without into the encyclopædia, the view of the principal matter is obscured, and the essential task of encyclopædia—the representation of theology as science—seriously interfered with.[1]

[1] Lange is inclined to include both the scientific and the practical in the task of encyclopædia: "As encyclopædia, on the one hand, has the task of further

Encyclopædia comes upon theology empirically as a number of separate theological branches, which in various ways have been gathered together in several groups, and it has frequently remained satisfied with placing these together according to some customary schematism, as an aggregate of theological acquirements. In opposition to this external mode of procedure, in order truly to accomplish its task, it has to show that those branches with which it has to do are connected with one another by an inner bond, and that, in accordance with an inner relationship, they are to be joined to one another in homogeneous groups. In order to arrive at this, encyclopædia must go back to the object of theology itself, as its centre or material principle, and must from it derive the particular branches, so that only those acquirements are to be reckoned by it as theological which stand in some relation, mediate or immediate, to that object. If in this way an inwardly [illegible] or principle of arrangement is won, then so, besides, the formal principle must be brought forward, and this must penetrate the whole of the theological material, if that is to be appropriated by science, and must exercise a determining influence upon theology in all its particular branches, if theology is to [illegible]e itself to the rank of a science. The encyclopædia, the [illegible], will take into consideration the empirically develo[illegible]eology viewed continuously according to its whole range, but likewise, by reason of the central and fundamental standpoint which it occupies, it will surmount empiricism, and not only prove the theological branches adopted by it to be necessary constituent parts of the whole, but will also cut off from the organism as useless

developing theological science according to the unity of its principles, so it has, on the other hand, close beside this the task of guiding by suitable directions the studies of those beginning their theological course" (*Grundriss der theol. Encyclop.* § 4). At the close of this same section, Lange gives a more pictorial description of the task of encyclopædia: "One may compare theological encyclopædia to the view obtained from the peak of a lofty mountain, before which the theological domain spreads itself out like a wide and magnificent landscape."—Ed.

any particular member, or introduce into it a new member, or unite together what had on an earlier occasion been separated, or separate what had previously been bound together.

From what has been said, it follows that the so-called formal method, which has often been recommended and employed in the exposition of encyclopædia, cannot lead to the end contemplated. Without entering into any consideration of the contents, the formal encyclopædia proceeds only to determine the task of the principal divisions of theology and of the particular theological branches, and, in connection therewith, the grouping together of these principal divisions, and the relative rank which the separate branches have under these. Among expositions of this class, that of Schleiermacher is without doubt entitled to the highest place. It secures for itself a rank above that of others similar in principle by this, that Schleiermacher adopts the guidance of the Church as the rule according to which he directs the construction of his entire Encyclopædia. And just because Schleiermacher brings all theological acquirements under the point of view of the guidance of the Church, and according to this determines their tasks and their combinations, he has drafted a clear outline of the theological organism. The organization, however, does not proceed from that which is inward in theology itself, but from a motive which has been brought into theology. Now the representation of theology as a scientific whole is attainable only when theology freely supplies its own contents, and when, from the regular development of these contents, the particular branches and principal divisions of theology are derived. Only according to this material method, because it follows the development of the contents of theology itself, will the encyclopædia be able to prove what branches necessarily belong to theological science, and what scientific task is to be assigned to each particular branch, and only thus will it be able to gain an insight into the nature and whole organic arrangement of theology. Accordingly, the task of the theo-

logical encyclopædia determines itself precisely in accordance with the task of the general encyclopædia. As the general encyclopædia has the task of determining generally the nature of science according to its contents and form, and thereafter developing the organic arrangement of the particular sciences, so the theological encyclopædia has the task of determining the nature of theology according to its contents and form, and then, on the ground of its nature, developing the organic arrangement of its principal divisions, and of the branches belonging to them. When the encyclopædia accomplishes this, it has also proved theology to be a science, and there can therefore, in the nature of things, be only one legitimate representation of encyclopædia. The distinction which Hagenbach (*Encyclopædie*, § 2) recommends, between introductory and complete encyclopædia, is to be set aside; for it too springs from a merely practical consideration, and in its practical application would, from one side at least, readily favour superficiality. For both purposes, the introductory as well as the complete, only that encyclopædia will in the proper way be suitable, which, executed in accordance with that task assigned it, represents itself as a true *παιδεία ἐν-κύκλῳ*, that is, as the whole of the theological acquirements, described as a complete scientific circle, just as the general encyclopædia or system of science has to be described as the circle of all the sciences.

By the expression *ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία* or *ἀγωγή* the Greeks indicated the sum-total of the acquirements which belonged to the training of every free-born man. To this among the Romans corresponded the *artes liberales* or *ingenuæ*. [So Aristotle's *Ethics*, l. 5, 6. So Plutarch. Staudenmaier: "There were accomplishments and arts which every free Greek as such must possess. A liberal education, *παιδεία ἐλεύθερα*, it was called, because it had in view the improvement of the nature of the free man, and hereby excluded all merely mechanical arts and dexterities which served only for the maintenance of

life (*τέχναι βάναυσαι*, Aristotle's *Politics*, 8. 1)." The Romans styled the training which aimed at this end *humanitas*: those *artes liberales* which affected this *humanitas* they called *humaniora studia*, or *humaniores artes*. Gellius says, in his *Noctes Atticæ*, 13. 16, *humanitas* does not answer to the Greek *φιλανθρωπία*, but to *παιδεία*. The encyclopædia was therefore, in the first place, general preliminary culture before entering on the higher technical training in one's particular calling. Lange, *Grundriss der theolog. Encyclopædie*, § 2, note 1.] The compound word *ἐγκυκλοπαιδεία* was probably first introduced, in the second century after Christ, by the Greek physician Galen. During the Middle Ages it was understood as embracing the seven *artes liberales* in the *trivium* and *quadrivium* — grammar, rhetoric, dialectic and geometry, astronomy, music, arithmetic; and then, on account of the constant increase in the number of scientific acquirements, it came to embrace the whole domain of science. From this, in modern times, the name was transferred to the particular sciences, jurisprudence, medicine, etc., and then also to theology, first of all probably by the Reformed theologian Mursinna.[1] (Compare § 5.) Compare Pelt, *Encyclopædie*, p. 8, and Hagenbach, *Encyclopædie*, § 1.

[1] The name, as applied to the circle of all the sciences, is first to be found in Martinius (A.D. 1606) in his *Idea methodica et brevis encyclopædiæ sive admbratio universitatis*. So, too, by Alsted in his *Encyclopædia septem tomis distincta*, 1620. The name was finally applied to the summary of the contents of the particular sciences in the eighteenth century: to jurisprudence by Putter, to medicine by Boerhaave (1668–1738), to theology by Mursinna. The seven liberal arts are thus grouped:—the trivium embraces three arts of the word: *Grammatica loquitur; Dialectica vera docet; Rhetorica verba colorat;* the quadrivium embraces four arts of number: *Musica canit; Arithmetica numerat; Geometria ponderat; Astronomica colit astra* (Lange, *Grundriss der theolog. Encyclopædie*, § 2, notes 1, 2).—Ed.

§ 10. THE IDEA OF THE THEOLOGICAL ENCYCLOPÆDIA.

As a result of the task which has been assigned to it, encyclopædia has to view that theology which has been empirically brought before it, with all its parts and branches, not as an outward object over against itself, which it would have to treat in a merely scholarly, or in a merely formal way. It was in accordance with the former—the merely scholarly—style of treatment that those encyclopædias were constructed, which set themselves forth as mere external reports about theology, and endeavoured to supply the want of an actual theological content by means of a substantial fulness of scholarship, inasmuch as, in accordance with a traditional schematism, they furnish the several theological branches with most complete historical and literary apparatus; as was done, for example, during the earlier part of the 18th century, by the writings of Pfaff, Buddeus, Walch, and Mursinna. In accordance with the latter style of treatment, again, the formal encyclopædias were constructed, which set for themselves the task of setting forth only the connection and arrangement of the several branches into which theology is divided. While those scholarly compendiums and libraries (*Compendia and Bibliothecæ*) never by any possibility gain an insight into the systematic arrangement of theology, the formal encyclopædias, again, lead only to an understanding of the relationship in which the several theological branches stand to one another, but not to an understanding of theology itself. The encyclopædia, on the other hand, which is constructed in accordance with its proper task, coincides rather with its own subject, theology, and is the scientific and necessary development thereof. According to its idea, it is therefore theology itself with its essential contents developed and systematically arranged, so to speak, a compendium of theology, theology *in nuce*. With this idea of the theological

encyclopædia there is given at once the right method, and also the right measure of proportion for its exposition. Inasmuch as it goes back to the object of theology itself, and from this derives the separate theological branches, it admits nothing into the theological structure as a whole which does not stand in some real connection with that object; and inasmuch as it expounds the relation of the separate branches to one another, it admits from their contents only so much as is indispensable for the purpose which it has in hand. So complete and comprehensive a treatment of the separate branches as that which Staudenmaier has seen fit to give in his Encyclopædia, is utterly opposed to the character of encyclopædia, and ought rather to be left as the task of experts in the different theological departments. The encyclopædia can take the contents into account only in so far as they are necessary in order to demonstrate the actual connection of one branch with another, and to trace exactly the inner onward movement which is made from one branch to the other. Hence it must also avoid the purely historical form, and especially the treating of the literary material in the style of a librarian's catalogue, which, after the example of the earlier writings, is even still traceable in the latter and more precisely organized Encyclopædias of Berthold, Stäudlin, Clarisse, Hagenbach, Pelt, and Harless. The reception of such material into the encyclopædia does not advance, but rather hinders, an insight into the theological system. This material ought also to be left to theologians dealing with the separate theological departments. As we have prefixed to the encyclopædia a summary of its history and literature, so also, in respect to every separate exposition, and every new rendering of each separate branch, it ought to be insisted upon that the theologian treating that branch monographically should determine its historical place, and prefix to that branch treated by him its own history and literature. The encyclopædia has only to choose from each particular branch what

will be sufficient to serve for the characterizing of it, and if a more complete knowledge of its literature is desired, the means are at hand whereby this can be secured. If, according to its idea, the encyclopædia quite correctly represents itself as the system of theological science, then instead of the name "Encyclopædia," which has been commonly used since it was introduced by Mursinna, the name "Theologic" should recommend itself as a more suitable designation for this branch of science.[1] Just as the names dogmatics, ethics, polemics, apologetics, etc., have been adopted into theological terminology, so would theologic be the appropriate expression to describe the general system of the theological sciences. The name "Theological Encyclopædia" has undoubtedly the advantage, that it directly points to the connection into which theology has to be brought with the other sciences. Nevertheless, it is only a term that has been transferred from the extra-theological domain to the theological, and its use tends to mislead one into a merely formal treatment of this branch of study; whereas the name "Theologic," even apart from the advantage of its brevity, points directly, and more definitely, to the independence and to the scientific task of the branch of science under consideration; and yet theology is conceived of in its scientific independence only that it may be brought into connection with the other sciences.

[1] The expression *θεολογικὴ ἐπιστήμη*, scientia, quæ eorum est, qui de rebus divinis agunt, is to be found as early as in Aristotle's Metaphysics, 10. 6. Compare Henrici Stephani thesaurus græcæ linguæ. Londini 1816 Vol. iii. *sub voce θεός*, p. 4222. [With this choice of a specific term like theologic to designate the science of theological encyclopædia we may compare the attempt of Doedes to distinguish between encyclopædic and encyclopædia. The distinction is the same as that between apologetic and apology, between homiletic and homily, between liturgic and liturgy, etc. Just as liturgic is the science of divine worship, homiletic the science of preaching, and apologetic the science of the method of defence, so is encyclopædic the science of the organization of the encyclopædia. The history of encyclopædic is therefore the history of what has been done in grouping the sciences according to their rank and vocation. Doedes would reckon the history of encyclopædic first in order of the histories of the theological sciences. (Compare Doedes, Encyclopædie der Christelijke Theologie. Inleiding, § 7, Aanm. 1.)—Ed.]

§ 11. THE OBJECT OF THEOLOGIC.

In the strictest sense theologic is its own proper object, that is, it is an end in itself. Its idea contains also the statement of its aim, and this aim coincides with the idea. Hence the highest and most important object of theologic is to set forth theology as a science. But from the purely theoretical tendency, in accordance with which it allows itself to be determined in its whole course, there result likewise various practical aims, to the realization of which theologic will contribute. In its general part, these practical aims are directed to showing forth the significance of theological science for the Church, and its relations to the other sciences. In this place it must suffice simply to indicate this: it can be more fully expounded only later on. In its special part, however, theologic will afford its help, not only to the beginner in theological study, but also to the well advanced and cultured theologian; and not to these only, but also to those who are not theologians. The latter, in so far as they belong to the educated classes, are wont to relate themselves to theology in a great variety of ways. Some of them, guided by a deep interest in religious or even in churchly matters, turn with special preference to employ themselves upon theological and ecclesiastical questions, in order to obtain comfort, enlightenment, or instruction. To all these theologic will afford its help and support, and will introduce them to the theological system, in order that they may be protected from false and erring ways, into which one who is not a professional theologian might readily be drawn by his theological endeavours, and that the true scientific path be pointed out to them, upon which alone a satisfactory end can be reached. Others, indifferent in regard to religious and churchly affairs, applying themselves rather to political and

social pursuits, regard theology for their purposes as quite superfluous, and think probably that the term of its existence will soon expire. Then there are others, occupying the very highest place in the ranks of culture, who look down upon theology, not only with contempt, but even with a hostile irritation, because they charge it with standing in the way of those ideal ends to the realization of which the whole spiritual work of culture is devoted. Even to those opponents of theology among non-theologians, theologic recommends itself, and will prove helpful in removing their prejudices; and if they ascribe to the science its proper value, it will also inspire them with a respect for theology. It is more immediately required of theologic that it should offer its services to theologians. Even among these appears the tendency to depreciate theology, but also, on the other hand, there appears frequently a tendency to the over-estimating of it. Views of theology, such as those made prominent in the circles of the pietists, and among the theologians of the illumination, repeat themselves, modified naturally by a new set of motives, and by other conditions of culture. Among theologians themselves there have risen up some who have assumed a polemical attitude toward their own science of which they made a profession, and have brought this charge as a reproach against theology, that it injures, much more than it furthers, the interests of Christianity and the Church. Yet the more serious and heavy the accusations become, if they proceed from the side of theology itself, so much the greater urgency will the summons assume that is addressed to theologic, to rebut the charges, and at least make the attempt to lead those theologians to a better opinion of theological science. Others, however, going to the opposite extreme, have so high an opinion of the authority and rank of theology that they are led to entertain a contempt for all the other sciences, and to wish to maintain for theology over against these, an altogether exceptional position, and to enter a protest against any com-

munion being allowed between it and those other sciences. In contradiction to this view, in itself perhaps worthy enough of respect, but narrow and destructive, theologic will afford satisfactory evidence that theology as a science stands in the closest connection with the other sciences, and that it is able to accomplish its own task only when it puts itself into constant connection with them, and turns to account their results for its own upbuilding. And further, inasmuch as theologic points out the relations in which theology stands to the practical life, it endeavours also to overcome that one-sidedness which shows itself among theologians, which recognises a value only in scholarship, and leaves out of view the demands which are made of theology not only from the sphere of ecclesiastical life, but also from the spheres of the political and social life. Finally, it will also counteract that formlessness, which not seldom appears in the treatment of the separate theological branches, so that some particular in its relation to the rest may be over-estimated, or something extraneous, something belonging to another science, may be introduced into its system. From the exposition of theology as a scientific organism there should result at once the limits within which the treatment of the separate branches is to be confined, and that measure of proportion which should be applied, so that the particular may always be conceived in its relation to the whole, and the separate branch in its significance for the entire organism.

It is, however, pre-eminently to the student beginning the study of theology that theologic will prove serviceable. To him it presents itself not only as an introduction to his course of study, but as a sketch that will likewise stand in place of a methodology or hodogetics (guide).[1] Theologic is,

[1] The full discussions given in earlier encyclopædias of preparatory studies, of the intellectual, ethical, and physical qualifications which are desirable in the student of theology, must be excluded from theologic, for what was said in these is partly presupposed, partly a matter of course, and, besides, of equal importance to other students. [A good illustration of the kind of general

first of all, of special importance to the student entering on the study of theology as an introduction. It introduces him to the building, at whose portals he appears, and makes him acquainted with the architectural arrangements of the whole wide-spreading structure in which he intends to take up his residence. Inasmuch as it presents to him theology according to its general character as science, it raises him immediately, at the very beginning of his course of study, to the full summit of the scientific life. It will guard him against the widely prevalent prejudice that looks upon theology as distinguished from the whole range of scientific activity by special limitations. It will lead him rather to

remarks to which Rabiger refuses a place, may be found in Lange's work on encyclopædia. In the general part of his treatise, Lange has two divisions in which the development of the idea of objective theology and of subjective theology are discussed. The former corresponds upon the whole to Rabiger's General Part: but the latter is practically a treatise on methodology or hodogetics. With Rabiger, as we see above, the encyclopædia itself must be also a methodology, and so he provides no separate place for methodology. Under this section Lange introduces five separate divisions. (1) The end of the theological course of study: the concrete manifestation of the theological calling, and especially of the pastoral office. (2) The religious foundation of the theological course of study in its development,—corresponding to the development of religion into science,—the religious calling of the theological student: his personal gifts, his home surroundings, training at elementary schools, etc. (3) The scientific course of training preliminary to the theological course of study—the course at the gymnasium and the student's reaching maturity. (4) The university: the synthesis of religion and science in the young theologian's course of study—importance of university theological culture, university life, the objective and subjective side of the theological course of study. (5) The transfer of the theologian to official life, and the confirming of his character as a true pastor. Now clearly the objections of Rabiger apply to the greater part of these sections. There are, no doubt, many useful hints given under each of the heads: but, for the most part, all would be included in a general assertion that, alongside of special technical training, liberal culture is necessary to secure the full equipment of the scientific theologian: It may also be noticed here that Lange has a conception of methodology very different from that of most encyclopedists. It is ordinarily viewed as simply a practical guide, informing the theological student what order he should observe in the study of theology. Lange, on the other hand, considers that it is within its province to act as guide to the theological student while as yet only in the elementary schools, and indeed, even earlier than this, to afford hints to parents of such as may become theological students as to the home influences with which they should surround them. To all this sort of hortatory matter there would be no end: and it is quite rightly excluded from the domain of science.]

acknowledge that he has to approach the study of theology with the same free and unprepossessed mind which is required generally for every scientific exercise; that theology, if it is fully to be appropriated, lays claim not only to his memory, but to his whole spiritual powers and endeavours; that its study brings him also into connection with the other sciences, and that he has not to shut himself out from these, but to participate in their pursuits, in so far as they in any measure may affect the theological domain. Further, theologic makes the student of theology already acquainted with the essential contents and the ideal tasks of theology, and will thereby form within him a conception completely different from the low and common view of study as a means of gaining a livelihood, which will fill him with respect, and love, and enthusiasm for his science, and will afford him also the opportunity of exercising upon himself the self-scrutiny necessary in order to determine whether, according to his individuality, he is suited for the study of theology, and then he may resolve, with full spiritual surrender, to devote himself to its study. Hence it also opens up to him a glimpse into the connection in which theology, which like all true science springs out of the life and leads back to the life, stands to the noblest strivings and aims of the present time, and makes clear to him already at the very beginning of his course of study the character of those pursuits upon which he has entered, if so be that he has resolved to make the sacred calling his calling for life. And yet more important is it for his study, that theologic presents him with a view of the whole system of theology, the arrangement of all its parts and branches. By means of the survey afforded of the whole domain of that science which he is to make his own, he will be saved from that despondency into which the theologian is exceedingly liable to fall when he considers the wide extent of the field. The very fact that much of the material that has to be embraced can be appropriated only when it is made

an affair of his own personal experience, is fitted to intensify that despondency. By the study of theologic, however, the student will be inspired with confidence, and with the assurance that, by the gradual appropriation of details, he will be enabled to attain unto the ultimate possession of the whole. He will also gain the patience and perseverance necessary for the study of the less interesting and apparently barren branches, when he perceives that even those branches are members which, for the life of the whole organism, are indispensable. But as soon as the student of theology begins the study of the particular branches, he will be drawn into the conflict of contradictories, in which the theological scientific activity of the present day presents itself. And even here, in regard to the character and significance of these contrarieties, theologic will help the student to reach the clearest understanding possible. Since it represents theology as a single scientific organism, it must assume to itself a definite position in regard to those contrary statements, and for this purpose must take upon itself the criticism of these statements. Criticism will enable the student beginning his theological course to find his way in his study of the separate branches amid the confusion of opinions and views which have proceeded from those contradictory notions, and will also enable him to form an independent judgment of his own upon those conflicting theories in general, and in this way will lead him to determine his own attitude toward them. The view current in many circles of the laity, that theological controversies are a mere empty quarrel over words, which originates only in the wilfulness, prejudice, and passion of theologians, and are therefore undeserving of the slightest consideration, easily makes an impression upon the young theological student, and may disgust him with his study, or indeed induce him to turn away from it altogether. Hence theologic seeks to make it clear to him that the theological conflict takes its origin from those contradictory notions, that

these again have not arisen by mere chance, that they have not proceeded from the mere self-will of any individual and from mere arbitrariness, but that they are necessarily determined by the essential characteristics of theological science; that in these opposing statements the necessary phases of the development of theology are represented; that through them the life of theology in its pursuit after truth is maintained; and that generally in theology, just as really as in the other sciences, there can be no movement without such opposing views and such conflicts. Theologic also shows that while science as such must necessarily be intolerant only in regard to that which concerns the ascertainment of the truth, it is especially becoming in the theologian that he should conduct his controversies with spiritual weapons, without any mixture of the notorious *rabies theologica*. In this connection it will also be pointed out to the young theologian that the various ecclesiastical tendencies for the most part have been called into existence by those conflicting theological theories, or that they are at least closely connected with them, that therefore these ecclesiastical distinctions, in so far as their existence is justifiable, have also the right of bringing their existence to an end, and consequently, while in the scientific department controversy is unavoidable, in practical life the fullest toleration ought to be given. Finally, theologic has over and above all this a special ideal importance for the student of theology. Like every other science, theology has to be conceived according to its advancing development. Theologic, therefore, which represents theology as a simple unified system, points out also the tasks which theology in the immediate future has to accomplish, and will thus indicate to the young student the direction in which his powers should be most energetically employed.[1]

[1] That theological encyclopædia should not be regarded and treated as a mere introduction to theology for one entering upon a professional course of theological study, has been pointed out by Lange. "Theological encyclopedia, as the organic unity of all the branches of theological study, that is, as the com-

These are in general the influences which theologic, as introduction, exerts upon the student entering on his theological course. But besides this, it stands to him also in the place of a methodology, if it be carried out in accordance with its idea. It was customary in earlier times to lay down outside of the encyclopædia a special methodology or hodogetics, that is, a science of the way in which the beginner must secure an acquaintance with theology. If encyclopædia shows what is to be studied, then this methodology would show how it is to be studied. In consequence of the unscientific form in which the older encyclopædias appeared, it must have seemed desirable, indeed necessary, to supply to the beginner directions and hints regarding the arrangement of his theological course of study, regarding the proper distribution of the several branches over his three, four, or five years' university career, regarding the use to be made of the lectures, the necessary preparation for them and repetition of them, regarding private study, regarding the general demeanour of the student, and especially of the student of theology. Yet, notwithstanding the good intention that was present in all this, the greater part of that included in this scheme is evidently not exactly scientific, inasmuch as the fortuitousness and diversity of different individualities cannot possibly have any general fixed rule prescribed for them; while another part may be left over to the presupposed maturity of

prehensive summary of theological knowledge, is a representation of the theological idea, the study of which is indispensable on the part of every theologian, not merely on the part of those beginning the theological course. The want of the knowledge of encyclopædia makes itself apparent in the manifold errors of theological works, especially in the analytical fragments that pass as vade mecums for the theological student. Seldom is the theologian as such an *omnia mea secum portans*. Many live in theology, like hermits in a great forest, the boundaries of which, the shapes and forms of which it is composed, the ways into it and the way out of it, being only very imperfectly known. This, too, applies very specially to our own time, in which synthetical studies are made to give way so much in favour of detached and separate analytical processes. It is against this destructive tendency, which threatens to develop into anarchy, that the scientific impulse and spirit must contend." Lange's Encyclopædia, Opening Remarks.—Ed.

judgment, and of the moral character which has been already gained by means of the family life and by means of the training at the higher schools; and yet another part, that treats of university life, is to be referred to a general hodogetics.[1] The prejudices which, even among the ranks of German students, are still widely prevalent, arise for the most part from the confounding of academical freedom with student licence, and are connected chiefly with notions of academical conviviality, the nature of students' associations, the attendance upon lectures, with ideas about private study, and about getting through as speedily as possible their preparation for the unavoidable examination. These ideas, however, are more and more abandoned in proportion as the great interests of public life come into the student's view, and render him thoroughly conscious that it is just the members of the German student guild that are called to brace themselves by earnest and unwearied labour for future efficiency in public life, in order that then, in their various spheres in life, they may, by means of their culture, represent the true intellectual aristocracy of the German nation, in the ranks of which the student of theology especially must strive to secure a place.

On the other hand, whatever, in the contents of those methodologies, is really serviceable and indispensable to the

[1] Besides the writings of J. G. Fichte, Ueber die Bestimmung des Gelehrten (1794), and Das Wesen des Gelehrten (1806), the following are to be recommended:—Fr. Ed. Beneke, Einleitung in's akademische Studium. Gött. 1826. K. H. Scheidler, Grundriss der Hodogetik oder Methodik des akademischen Studiums. Jena 1832. 3 Auflage 1847. Mussmann, Vorlesungen ueber das Studium der Wissenschaften und Künste, ein Taschenbuch für angehende Studirende. Halle 1832. Tittmann, Ueber die Bestimmung des Gelehrten und seine Bildung durch Schule und Universität. Berlin 1833. Von Schaden, Ueber akademisches Leben und Studium. Marburg 1845. J. Ed. Erdmann, Vorlesungen ueber akademisches Leben und Studium. Leipzig 1858. The work of Erdmann contains many striking remarks upon the character and task of the student; what it says, however, regarding theological study is extremely defective. [The works of Fichte referred to in this note have been translated into English by Dr. Wm. Smith of Edinburgh: Popular Writings of J. G. Fichte. London 1848-49. 2 vols. The two treatises named are included in the first volume, and bear the titles: The Vocation of the Scholar; The Nature of the Scholar.]

student of theology, for example, directions about the proper order to be observed in the study of the separate theological branches, is already present in the very body of every well-constructed encyclopædia, and also is placed on a better foundation than can be given it in a methodology. If the encyclopædia, in a purely objective way, in accordance with a necessity arising out of the nature of the science itself, assigns their places to the different parts and branches of theology, it has thereby likewise pointed out the best way for the student to take in the prosecution of his studies. He has simply to follow the track which theology makes in the course of its self-development, to study the separate branches according to the order of succession in which they occur in the encyclopædia, and, by means of this regular successive labour, to make himself master of his science in its entire compass. The encyclopædia itself, therefore, answers to this methodological purpose, and renders any separate methodology unnecessary.[1]

[1] This rejection of a special methodology ought to commend itself as a strictly scientific procedure. It should be observed that Rabiger is not objecting to the addressing of practical hints to students of theology in regard to the method of conducting their studies. He simply says that these can have no place assigned them in science co-ordinate with the theological encyclopædia. Hofmann, on the last page of his Encyclopædia, has a section entitled, The preparation of the theologian. Of this he simply says that it must be at once theoretical and practical; and then he excuses himself from saying any more, on the ground that it lies outside of the system of theological science (see Hofmann, p. 589). Doedes says distinctly that the methodology of Christian theology as a statement of the method according to which Christian theology must be studied has no need of separate treatment on the part of the theologian. Various circumstances—the natural endowments and tendencies of the student, the state in which the several sciences are, the requirements of the age—may largely modify the ordering and succession of these studies. What is matter of science in methodology is not to be distinguished from encyclopædia, which is the methodological description of the circle of the sciences belonging to Christian theology. Doedes, however, remarks that this rejection of methodology from a separate place in encyclopædia does not prevent one from giving hints to students as to their methods of theological study. He himself has published a little treatise of this kind. De theologische studiengang geschetst. (A sketch of the theological course of study. Letters on methodology to a student of divinity, offered also for the reading of young preachers. Utrecht 1866.)—Ed.

§ 12. THE DISTRIBUTION OF THEOLOGIC.

The distribution can be indicated in this place only in a quite general way, in so far as this may be done in accordance with principles laid down in the preceding paragraphs. If, according to its idea, theologic is the systematic arrangement of theology, its distribution must be a distribution of theology itself; and if, according to its task, it has to develop the organic connection of all the parts and branches of theology, it must necessarily go back to the central principle and to the ultimate conditions of the organism, and from these determine all the members of that organism. Hence theologic itself has to be divided into a general and a special part. The former has the task of discussing generally the nature of theology. From this investigation there results immediately the necessary distribution of theology under various divisions and branches; and the second part of theologic—the special part—has to deal with these.

Only this sort of general division in theologic is in keeping with its object, and of importance for the scientific exposition of theology. To the serious disadvantage of the science itself, it has been omitted even from some more recent encyclopædias. Rosenkranz prefixes to his Encyclopædia a preliminary discourse, as though it did not properly belong to encyclopædia itself, and then follows with a short Introduction. In that preliminary part he gives expression to his views upon theology in general, and also upon its encyclopædia, and just so again in the Introduction; whereas the statements about encyclopædia, when systematically arranged, belong to the Introduction to encyclopædia; and, on the other hand, the general statements regarding theology belong to the exposition of the encyclopædia itself, and indeed constitute the General

Part of the Encyclopædia. Hagenbach has indeed an Introduction and a General Part, but in both divisions there appears a motley mixing of statements about encyclopædia and about theology; so that indeed the history of encyclopædia, which evidently belongs to an Introduction to encyclopædia, is added as an Appendix to the General Part. Pelt, on the other hand, satisfies himself with a mere Introduction, and treats therein of encyclopædia and theology alike; whereas the adequate determining of the latter evidently demands a separate and distinct division for itself. [Doedes, too, has only an Introduction, and in it he mixes up, like Pelt and Hagenbach, though in a much briefer compass, questions regarding theology and encyclopædia. He treats of the idea, task, aim, history, and distribution of encyclopædia, which all are proper to the Introduction; but he also treats of Christian theology, of the relation of theology to philosophy, of the independence of Christian theology, and of its history, which properly belong to the General Part of encyclopædia. Lange, on the other hand, has both an Introduction and a General Part to his Encyclopædia. In his Introduction he quite properly treats of the idea, task, purpose, and history of encyclopædia. In the General Part he has two divisions. The first of these corresponds generally to that required by Rähiger, — treating of religion, Christianity, and Christian science as theology. The second division, referred to in a previous note, is the methodology, which, according to the closing paragraph of the preceding section, can claim no separate place in a scientific treatise on encyclopædia. In Hofmann's posthumous work on encyclopædia, the preliminary discourse embraces matters proper to Introduction and to the General Division of the encyclopædia. He discusses first of all the nature of Christianity, then he represents Christianity as a science,—both of these sections dealing with matter belonging to the General Part of encyclopædia,—but not introducing a complete view of these matters; and then, in

the final section, he treats of the tasks of theology, dealing mainly with questions about the distribution of the divisions and subdivisions of theology in the encyclopædia, which are proper to a regular Introduction. In Rothe's Encyclopædia, again, we have a very meagre introductory part, in which are discussed the idea of theology,—corresponding to the General Part of encyclopædia, but embraced in six pages,—the idea of theological encyclopædia, and the history and literature of theological encyclopædia, and the distribution of theological science, all proper to Introduction, and given in the briefest possible compass.—ED.]

This unsystematic course of procedure can be obviated only by means of that general distribution of theologic that has been now proposed.

FIRST OR GENERAL DIVISION OF THEOLOGIC.

THE NATURE OF THEOLOGY.

CONTENTS OF THE GENERAL DIVISION OF THEOLOGIC.

Sec.
13. The Subject of Theology.
14. The Church in its Relation to Theology.
15. Theology as a Positive Science.
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22. The Relation of Theology to the other Sciences.

§ 13. THE SUBJECT OF THEOLOGY.

Theology, like any other science, implies a definite intellectual attitude toward a definite subject. Hence, if its own proper nature is to be known, this can be accomplished only by defining these two things—its own subject, and its intellectual attitude toward that subject. For this purpose it is not enough to go back to the etymological signification and the classical use of the word "Theology," according to which it signifies generally the doctrine of God, or of the Gods and their relation to one another.[1] When the word had become a regular ecclesiastical term, it was understood first of all by the Fathers in the special and literal sense as λόγος περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ, either as the doctrine of the Trinity, or of the Son of God as the Logos, and so it passed over into dogmatics as the technical designation of the *locus de Deo*. According to its original meaning, however, the word was also suitable as a general designation, which would embrace all the branches of knowledge belonging to Christian divinity; so that it gradually obtained its comprehensive historical signification, and became the designation for the science of the Christian religion. Understood in this sense, in accordance with its present use, theology has as its subject Christianity or the Christian religion. But with what degree of comprehensiveness theology has to treat this its subject, the most general consideration thereof must likewise show, inasmuch as it belongs to theology to determine the intellectual attitude which it has to assume toward its subject.

[1] Compare Cicero, de Natura Deorum, iii. 21; Stephani Thesaurus Linguæ Græcæ, vol. iii. p. 4222. [First in the Middle Ages was the narrower circle of Christian doctrine comprehended under the term "Theologia Christiana;" although even then the word was employed—as, for example, by Abælard—preferentially for the doctrine of the Trinity. Hagenbach.]

Christianity as the Christian religion is a particular form of religion. Empirically considered, religion represents itself generally as a reciprocal relationship between the divine and the human. As a characteristic product of the human spirit, it has, like everything human, its historical course, and during this course it gives itself an extraordinary variety and multiplicity of expression. Historically, religion appears in the form of a multitude of separate religions, and these are maintained by separate nationalities, which, with their diverse religious consciousness, partly continue to live beside one another, partly become defunct, and leave behind only a historical tradition of their religious life to the races that have followed them. To a long series of religions Christianity attaches itself as a particular historical religion. In so far, then, as theology has Christianity for its subject, it has religion generally for its subject, inasmuch as the particular can be understood only in the light of the general; and further, inasmuch as the single object can be rightly and fully known only by means of comparison with that which is similar to it, Christianity can be truly appreciated only in connection with the other historical religions, and so Christianity itself also has to be treated as a historical religion. Hence theology has to regard as its subject not merely the doctrinal contents of Christianity, or the truths of the Christian religion, but Christianity according to its comprehensive historical reality, and therefore according to its origin, its historical development, and its present condition. Now Christianity, as a historical religion, has much in common with the other historical religions. Of all these it is characteristic, not only that they represent themselves as having a historical commencement, but that they trace back their origin to a divine act. They all alike make their appearance as revealed religions. Each separate race of the human family confidently maintains its own relationship with the divine through an immediate divine manifestation, and on this assurance lies the

binding and uniting power of all religion. The revelation is the common centre, by means of which the individual members of the race are led to engage in one way in the worship of the divine. Each of the historical religions, therefore, sets itself forth empirically as the common worship of the divine. This applies also to Christianity. As soon as it enters into history, it establishes a communion of all those who profess that they are bound in fellowship with God through the revelation made in Christ. This communion is the Church; and theology, which has Christianity for its subject, has the Church for its presupposition.

§ 14. THE CHURCH IN ITS RELATION TO THEOLOGY.

The Church is the organ which Christianity has created for the purpose of securing a witness to itself in history, and in order properly to develop the entire fulness of those living germs that are contained in it. One of the most important forms in which this life obtains expression is theology. Springing out of the innermost interests of the Christian community, it has regarded the Church as the mother which gave it life. On account of this its origin, there is established between Church and theology a constant relationship of reciprocity; for theology, as it is at no time unaffected by the circumstances and condition of the Church, on its part again always reacts upon the life of the Church. If Christianity, historically considered, appears as a religion alongside of other religions, it presents itself in altogether a different manner when regarded from the ecclesiastical point of view. In the revelation which proceeds from Christ as its author, the Church beholds the highest and last revelation. The revealed religion which it has received constitutes for it the religion in which religious truth has attained its most perfect manifestation. The Church regards the Christian religion as the absolute religion, as the ideal religion; and, in the consciousness that it has thus in its possession absolute religious truth, advances on its own behalf the claim that it should have its place not simply alongside of, but superior to, all other religious communions. This is the presupposition which includes in it the ground and ultimate condition of the historical existence of the Church. But it is in the fact of revelation itself that the Church finds the absolute guarantee for the truth of its religious consciousness and life. It knows that it did not give itself the religion which it professes, but

that it has received it by means of a divine communication, and that consequently its confession rests upon a divine authority, to which every other authority must be traced back. The Christian spirit, therefore, freely adopts, without any further reflection, the divine truth contained in that revelation. Between this Christian spirit and the divine truth no difference can be made. Nor is it necessary that there should be any special and direct communication in regard to this. The Christian spirit is immediately certain of divine truth, so that it rises into perfect harmony with this divine truth, and is conscious of being in the most direct way determined by it. Inasmuch as the Christian religious consciousness is the believing consciousness, the Christian religion is the Christian faith, and the Church generally the communion of believers. Faith is the solid and broad substructure upon which the Church rests, the element of life which should penetrate all its members, and bind them into one spiritual whole.

It is, however, altogether impossible that this faith should continue to be expressed in the Church under this form of simple, immediate, believing consciousness. There are various reasons—some of a more external, others of a more spiritual kind—which make it necessary that faith should pass beyond this sphere of immediateness in which it begins,—not that faith may be abandoned, not even that it may be weakened, but that it may be confirmed and established.

Even in the very earliest periods of the Church, reasons of an external kind had commended themselves, and they have maintained their influence throughout the whole course of the Church's history. Seeing that the Church, immediately upon its appearance in history, made the declaration that it was in possession of absolute religious truth, and seeing that it was impelled by the energy of its faith to make application to all mankind of that definite divine truth which had been revealed to it, and in doing so, to attempt to influence ever widening circles, it could not fail to come into conflict with the religions

existing around it, with Judaism and heathenism, and with all that intellectual and spiritual culture which upon this soil had already sprung up so luxuriantly. But if the Christian religion is to obtain recognition, or even toleration, from those powers of the religious and intellectual life with which it comes in contact, and if it is to win these over to itself, as it must endeavour to do, then it is required of it that it should not only vindicate itself, but that, along with this vindication, it should likewise give evidence of that higher power dwelling within it, which may be called upon to secure for it the victory over the old religions, and to set it in their place. Now, for this purpose the simple declaration of faith is not sufficient; but the Christian believing consciousness must make its own contents the subject of its consideration, and by means of reflection upon itself, and upon that which is in opposition to it, give an exposition of its own contents, so as to mark out a distinction between itself and that to which it is opposed. Out of this tendency grew the great *Apologies* for Christianity, as they appear in the Gospel of John, in the Pauline Epistles, and in the Epistle to the Hebrews, and in the apologetical writings of the second and third centuries. This apologetical activity does not absolutely cease at any period in the history of the Church, but rather will have from time to time new occasions for its exercise, although indeed always in a form modified by attendant circumstances. Set down in the very midst of the spiritual life of the human race, the Church comes ever more and more into conflict with extra-Christian religious communions, or antichristian endeavours, and, in opposition to them, has to vindicate and make good that truth of which it makes profession.

But yet more pressing than those influences which impel the Church from without, are the influences which from within the Church itself lead faith away beyond that sphere which originally is proper to it. The declaration which proceeds from the Church is, indeed, constantly wrought up into

the faith; but, outside of the believing consciousness, believers have likewise an intellectual and spiritual life determined in another direction, which, however, they cannot separate from that believing consciousness, but must rather join it therewith by a deep spiritual bond. It belongs to the very nature of the human spirit to make thoroughly its own all the contents which it receives into itself by means of an independent activity in keeping with its own laws, and to bring those contents into harmony with its own spiritual life. In consequence of this instinct and tendency of the human mind, the believer will also be obliged to make the contents of his faith the subject of his reflection, and to compare it with the rest of the contents of his consciousness. It will thus be necessary for him to convert that immediate certainty of religious truth, which he possessed from the first, into a certainty mediated by this comparison of the various contents of his consciousness; and just thereby will he gain that unity in his spiritual life without which the human spirit cannot exist. This spiritual process, moreover, because it rests upon a love of knowledge and truth that will not remain ungratified, makes its appearance also in the very beginnings of the Church's history. The Christian faith must pass through such inward struggles, in order to strengthen itself in them, and in order that it may strike its roots always deeper into the life of the community. *Qui facile credit, facile recedit.* The Apostle Paul in the realm of Judaism, and Augustine in the realm of heathenism, are conspicuous examples of this struggle. Thus even in the earliest times the γνῶσις, the knowledge of the contents of the faith mediated by its own intellectual activity, joined itself with the πίστις, the direct, simple, immediate faith; and this intellectual elaboration of faith is a process that can never wholly cease within the Church. The more manifold and many-sided the intellectual and spiritual life of the community as a whole becomes, the more varied also will become the degrees of culture into

which individual believers will attain. While many believers, doubtless, find full satisfaction in plain and simple faith, there are, on the other hand, a great many (and those, again, individuals brought up in all the varying degrees of culture) who demand for their faith a confirmation and demonstration corresponding to their culture. In the very midst of the Church itself, indeed, a thoroughly independent intellectual life of culture has been developed, which insists that Christian truth be made the subject of a most searching examination if that truth is not merely to continue associated with it, but also is to be accepted as its foundation, and as indicating its ideal direction. This same spiritual result, which the blending of faith with general culture has in view, is also further called forth by means of the doctrinal activity which has its origin within the Church. If the faith is to be more widely spread, and to be made intelligible to individuals of the most diverse intellectual capacities, the contents thereof must be more and more developed, and its principal elements have expression given them. The faith expands into Christian doctrine, in which the truths of faith have been brought near and rendered accessible to the understanding of the Christian community. An official order that would concern itself with this Christian doctrine becomes a necessity for the Church; and the official teachers of doctrine must be furnished with the necessary acquirements in order that they may adequately fulfil this task. In the course of this doctrinal development, however, differences in doctrine also make their appearance, and these necessitate the much more difficult undertaking of setting up, for the settling of these differences, a doctrinal standard for the community as a whole; and the difficulty of this was greatly enhanced when these doctrinal differences rent the unity of the Church, and led to the establishment of separate ecclesiastical communions. Ever since this separation took place, the interests of the faith became associated pre-eminently with the established doctrine of the Church, and

were directed against all those who refused to give to this doctrine their approval, and who rather adopted a type of doctrine in conflict with it. A polemical activity now begins, just in proportion as the assertion of those doctrinal differences which stand opposed to one another in the principal divisions of the Church becomes exact and definite, this polemical element assumes greater dimensions. No doubt the endeavour made by those contradictory doctrinal views to obtain the support of the different ecclesiastical bodies gave illustration to the contents of the faith from the most diverse points of view, and secured for them an ever extending development. Yet even from the earliest times a systematizing activity was seeking to root deeply the conviction regarding the truths of faith by grouping them firmly together into a comprehensive doctrinal system, and to advance toward the construction of such a system by means of a deeper acquaintance with Christian truth. And this is an activity which developed itself all the more successfully, in proportion as the confessions of the separate Churches the more clearly enunciated their characteristic principles in opposition to one another.

All those activites which proceeded from the bosom of the Christian community, and which advanced the Christian life thereof in the most diverse directions, are theological activities, and find their common centre in the science of theology. Consequently theology is not to be regarded as a phenomenon existing by mere chance or called into being by mere caprice, and therefore transient, but it rather shows itself to be a necessary product of the believing consciousness in the Church, a necessary function of life springing out of the Church organism, and continually active in it—the continued existence of which is coincident with the continuance of the Church itself. So long as there is a Christian Church, so long must there be a Christian theology. In so far then as Christianity receives its subject, Christianity, from the Church, it receives

this not merely as a historical religion, but as the religion that realizes the idea, the ideal religion. Hence the [illegible]r has to make the organism of the Church itself the subject of its consideration, by means of which and in which this idea finds its most adequate realization. And thus it happens as a consequence of its very origin, that theology has not for its subject a merely outward object standing over against itself, which it has to treat in a purely historical manner. As theology has grown up out of the faith, which bears in itself the idea of religion, it must have as the very groundworks of its structure the heartiest spiritual sympathy with its subject.[1] Theology in no way excludes faith from it, but is rather itself only a spiritually potentiated faith-consciousness. What is quite properly demanded of the philosopher, that he must bring the ideas of his system into agreement with the facts of his life, may be demanded in like manner of the theologian. Definitions of theology such as often appear in history, according to which theology should be a scholarly cognition of the Christian religion, or of the truths of the Christian religion, or a summary of the scientific acquirements and technical rules which belong to Christianity, make theology an abstract theory of Christianity, a mere exercise of erudition, which under certain circumstances might be developed and produced by one who was not himself a Christian. On the contrary, the heartiest personal conviction of the truth of the

[1] "Theology stands within the pale of Christianity; and only that dogmatic theologian can be esteemed the organ of his science, who is also the organ of his Church—which is not the case with the mere philosopher, whose only aim is to promote the cause of pure science. This desire to attain an intelligent faith of which dogmatics is the product, this intellectual love of Christian truth, which should be found especially in the teachers of the Church, is inseparable from a personal experience of Christian truth. And, as this intellectual apprehension of what faith is grows out of personal faith, modified by a recognition of the experience of other believers, so its ultimate aim is to benefit the community of believers, and bring fruit to the Church. We may say, therefore, that dogmatic theology nears its goal just in proportion as it satisfies equally the demands of science and of the Church." Martensen, Christian Dogmatics, § 2.—ED.

idea which it has for contents must form the living nerve of theology, must constitute the ethical basis on which it rests. This embraces the *habitus practicus* and the *oratio*, which by the older theologians were rightly claimed for theology.[1]

If this ethical attitude of theology results necessarily from the very nature of its source and from the very character of its subject, then is it all the more a nice and difficult point to determine properly the *meditatio*, the intellectual attitude, which it has to assume toward its subject.

[1] Turretine has very clearly expressed himself in regard to this twofold aim of theology:—Inter orthodoxos nonnulli etiam mere practicam, plures mixti generis; sed alii magis speculativam, alii magis practicam statuunt. Ad quos accedimus, censemusque theologiam nec esse simpliciter theoreticam, nec simpliciter practicam; sed partim theoreticam, partim practicam, utpote quæ simul conjungit theoriam veri et praxim boni; magis tamen esse practicam quam theoreticam. Disciplini theoretica dicitur, quæ in sola contemplatione occupatur, et finem alium non habit a cognitione, practica, quæ non subsistit in sola rei notitia, sed natura sua et per se tendit ad praxim, et pro fine habit operationem. . . . Theologia non posteriori tantum sensu, sed priori dicitur practica.—Institutio, Locus Primus, Quæstio vii. 2, 3. The phrases quoted above are commonplaces in the older theology. Luthardt in his Compendium, § 2, 4, quotes from Hollaz the Media studii theologici:—oratio, meditatio, tentatio. Oratio, studium theologiæ inchoat, meditatio, continuat, tentatio consolidat.—ED.

§ 15. THEOLOGY AS A POSITIVE SCIENCE.

In so far as theology has for its subject Christianity, as a historical religion, and especially as a historical revealed religion, it is a positive science. As such, it takes a place alongside of the other positive sciences, but it has a character essentially different from them. Jurisprudence, medicine, natural science, the science of languages, the science of history are also positive sciences, because they do not furnish themselves with their own subject-matter, but come upon this as something historically or naturally given.[1] This positivity of their subject-matter in no way hinders the sciences above named from solving their scientific problem in regard to it.

[1] We use the term "positive" in the sense assigned to it above. Others, such as Schelling, Vorlesungen, p. 159; Schleiermacher, Darstellung, § 1, and after him, Hagenbach, § 22, and Pelt, p. 15 f., wish to apply it to certain practical conditions and relationships, such as State and Church, and call those sciences positive which serve for the solution of a practical problem. [So, too, Rothe, Encyclopædie, p. 2, defines a positive science ein Ganzes von Erkenntnissen, which addresses itself to a practical problem, and then adds that theology is a practical science.] The term positive science is therefore synonymous with that of practical or applied science; and among the positive sciences are reckoned only theology, jurisprudence, and medicine. We regard this use of the word as incorrect. For also natural science, the science of language, and the science of history, and above all, philosophy, if indeed they do not so directly afford service to the State and the Church, as theology, jurisprudence, and medicine, will yet be found to contribute to the civil well-being, and to the culture existing in Church and State, and hence may also lay claim to be regarded as positive sciences. When, therefore, the expression is taken in this sense, as identical with practical or applied, it is too general to be used for indicating a distinction among the sciences, and, seeing that in that case it would apply equally to all the sciences, it would be upon the whole superfluous. The term "positive" should rather serve to distinguish certain sciences from philosophy, as a science not positive; and it serves for this only if it is taken in the sense assigned to it above. If, on the contrary, the other meaning be given to it, the result is that unclearness is introduced in regard to the relation of the different sciences to one another, as indeed is specially observable in Hagenbach, Encyclopædie, § 22. [Compare also Nitzsch, System of Christian Doctrine, English translation, Edinburgh 1849, T. and T. Clark, § 17, Remark 3.]

Since their subject-matter presents itself to them with no other authority than that of a historical fact or given reality, it is allowable for them to relate themselves to it with the most perfect freedom, and, by means of the laws that are proper to spiritual phenomena, to make it intelligible and comprehensible to a spiritual intelligence. Hence those sciences do not come into any real, irreconcilable conflict with philosophy. Philosophy distinguishes itself from the positive or experimental sciences by this, that it comes upon its subject, not as something given, but as something produced by the energy of its own thinking from the life of the spirit, and as receiving into itself anything presented from without only when that proves itself to be in agreement with the laws of thought, so that it embraces, as an organic whole, the entire field of human knowledge, bound into one system by means of the logic of the spirit. Now the positive sciences, instead of being hostile to philosophy, are rather dependent upon it, inasmuch as only from this organized system of knowledg can they unhesitatingly derive the ideas which belong to t departments with which those sciences have to do. In th investigations of detail they must carry with them th philosophical ideas as guiding stars, and it is just by application of these principles that the positive sciences v be able to solve the scientific problem in reference to t subject assigned them. All this is true in regard to ju prudence, the science of language, the science of history, it is not on this account to be asserted that these sciences not to be represented also as purely exact sciences, but on that before the tribunal of philosophy, they must vindica their claim to be regarded as such by means of their results.

With theology, on the other hand, the case is altogeth different, and just at this point the most serious difficulty, i reference to the scientific construction of theology, arises. Theology comes upon its subject, Christianity, not merely as a something historically given, but as something historically

revealed. It has for its subject a divine revelation, and, indeed, a revelation to which the religion of humanity, according to the understanding of the Church, has been communicated in the most perfect manner—the very idea of religion. As a positive science, theology is the science of revelation. Practically, then, revelation lies before theology according to its essential content as a religious system objectively set forth, which was communicated by Christ to its first professors, and in part transmitted by means of tradition from the apostolic age, in part deposited in Holy Scripture by the inspired authors under the influence of the Divine Spirit. From both, that is, from tradition and from Holy Scripture, there were then still further doctrinal propositions derived, which, sanctioned by the divine authority of the Church and of Holy Scripture, advanced likewise a claim to divine authorization. This compound of Scripture and Church doctrine is the divine truth which forms the essential subject of theology, and the demonstration of its truth consists in the fact of divine revelation. On the ground of this its inherent divine positivity, the Christian religion must energetically repudiate any endeavour to apply to it any human measure. That theology, indeed, like the other positive sciences, should be allowed to borrow the idea of its object, the idea of religion, from a philosophical system, and with this philosophical idea of religion to approach the Christian religion, in order to subject it to criticism according to the standard of that idea, would be a course of procedure in thorough contradiction to the character of the Christian religion. As a divine revelation, and, at the same time, the absolute revelation, it must rather claim the unconditioned subordination of the human reason and human thinking, and therefore of philosophy in general, but pre-eminently of that science which specially is concerned with it, that is, theology, and consequently also of the other sciences of experience. Philosophy would acquiesce in this demand, if it were con-

vinced, by its investigations of Christian doctrine, that this doctrine was in agreement with the laws of its own thinking and with its ideas of reason. But if the content of the Scripture and Church doctrine appears to it to be in any part utterly inconceivable, and in direct conflict with reason, then philosophy must make a thoroughgoing protest against that subordination, and must assert over against Christian doctrine the right of reason to apply a spiritual test to everything that has been supplied from without, and adopt as true only that which does not contradict the logic of the Spirit, and which is in harmony with the claims of reason. This protest of philosophy must therefore direct itself also against theology, if theology enters into that relation of subordination, so as to allow itself to be unconditionally determined by revelation, and to set for itself only the problem of vindicating the Scripture and Church doctrine as the absolute divine truth. During the Middle Ages this was in general the character of the Church theology. As the Church was the depository of divine truth, with which it dominated all human relationships, the family, society, the State, theology was placed wholly at the service of the Church. As the scientific representative of the doctrine of revelation which she maintained, the Church dominated all departments of human knowledge, and philosophy among the rest. It would even admit only one truth, the doctrine sanctioned by the Church and promulgated by theology. Philosophy, in so far as it was allowed an entrance into the theological domain, was the handmaid of theology, and had no other task than that of assisting theology to a knowledge of the firmly held truths of faith. As a consequence of the complete dependence of philosophy upon theology, it was impossible that during this period any conflict should arise between the two. Since the times of the Reformation the case has been quite different. In regard to science, the Reformation serves the credit of having emancipated it from the Church, of making scientific investiga-

tion free from those outward ecclesiastical restraints under which it had been previously held. This, however, only applies to secular science. Even Protestant theology entered very soon again into that relation of dependence, inasmuch as it placed itself altogether under the authority of Holy Scripture and under the authority of the Church doctrine, and, in the consciousness of possessing a divinely revealed truth, exalted itself above all the other sciences.[1] Nevertheless the universal supremacy of theology was now broken. Since philosophy was freed by means of the Reformation from the fetters of ecclesiasticism, and did now, in accordance with its own peculiar principles, extend its investigations ever farther and farther without reference to Church and theology, it soon raised itself to the position of an independent power, and set over against the ecclesiastically and theologically sanctioned truth, that truth which had been found out by itself as equally well authenticated. The more the general intellectual and spiritual life in the domain of Protestantism developed itself in a catholic manner, the more clearly did the far-reaching divergence, not only in all the departments of science, but also in all the circles of life, come into consciousness,—the divergence between revelation and reason, between Church and science, between divine and human, between theological and philosophical truth. With this consciousness, however, there was also inseparably joined the conviction that the present opposition could not be one admitting of no arrangement, that it is impossible that there should be a double truth, a revealed and a rational, a theological and a philosophical,—a conviction, in short, that truth can be only one.

[1] What Baur says in his Dogmengeschichte, vol. ii. p. 212, says of the Middle Age scholastic theology: "An exalting of itself over the *credere*, the content of faith given by the Church, deriving the *intelligere* of the same from another principle than the source of the immediately divine revelation, lay altogether outside of the range of vision of scholasticism," may also in all essential respects be applied to the Protestant scholastic theology. Compare the same work of Baur, vol. iii. p. 35 ff.

As this conflict is a product of modern times, so to these times belongs the task of reconciliation. Philosophy, in so far as it does not relate itself in a purely negative manner to Christianity and the Church, has recognised this to be one of its most important tasks; but also theology could not fail to reach this same conviction, and has, indeed, carried on its spiritual development under the influence of it. Since in earlier times theology had itself formed one side of the contradiction, the contradiction is now thrust within its own borders, and above all, it is now required of theology that it should furnish an answer to the question as to the proper relation of reason to revelation, and that it should in this way determine the attitude which it ought to assume towards its subject. If the theology of the present is in perfect consistency to take its place at the standpoint of a belief in revelation, and in this form to assert itself as a positive science, it should relate itself to its subject in a purely passive and receptive manner, and should only busy itself, as Kant insists that it should, with giving expression to certain statutory propositions according to a certain formalism and schematism. As theology, in such a form, could advance no claim to be regarded as scientific, the loss of reputation would soon be followed by the withdrawal of all attention to its study, and so the subject itself, of which it has to treat, would suffer the extremest damage. If theology is to accomplish independently, whether it be in accordance with philosophy or in opposition to it, the most important task of the present, if it is to show Christianity in its universal authorization, and the Church as the organization necessary for its realization, it must allow itself to be led in regard to its subject, not only by a historical, nor even by a merely ecclesiastical or religious interest, but by the interests of the truth; and therefore its intellectual attitude towards its subject must be so determined that, although it is a positive science, and a science of revelation, it will yet obtain acknowledgment and acceptance by means of

its similarity in character to the other sciences. For this purpose it would seem desirable to enter upon a dialectical investigation of the relations between revelation and reason. This, however, belongs to another part of the theological system; while, on the contrary, in this place, where the present has to be linked on to the past, the historical way to be taken has to be pointed out. In the history of theology various tendencies make their appearance, which represent themselves as separate phases of the development of theology. But their separateness, and the conflict which they wage with one another, are essentially conditioned by the different position which they assign to reason in reference to revelation. Hence is it possible, and at the same time most to the purpose, to determine by means of criticism the relation in which theology must stand to revelation, if it is to be at all reckoned in the true sense of the word a science, and if it is to advance the claim to be regarded as such.

§ 16. THE ORTHODOX, SUPERNATURALISTIC, AND RATIONALISTIC THEOLOGY.

The theology of the Church in its precise and positive form of expression, as it has been described in the previous paragraph, is the orthodox theology. Its foundation was laid as far back as the beginning of the third century, and since that period it has succeeded in maintaining its supremacy, pretty generally, through all the centuries down to recent times. The principle upon which it rests is a purely supernatural one: the presupposition of an immediate divine revelation. Objective Christianity, the doctrine of Scripture and of the Church, claims to be the revealed divine truth which, in its whole extent and in its historical definiteness, is to be received and firmly held by Christian faith. Hence it bears the honourable name of the orthodox theology (*rechtglaubige, orthodoxe theologie*), and has pre-eminently assigned it the task of adducing the proof, that it is not a mere individual intellectual activity which theology as well as faith has to exercise the object of faith, in order that the subjective convic- the truth of that object of faith may first be won and lectual appropriation effected, but that rather the of faith are absolutely authenticated by means of the revelation, and that, as thus authenticated, they an unconditional acknowledgment. So Tertullian, that peculiar intellectual and spiritual movement lled forth by Christianity among the men of culture of that age, first of all after Irenæus, with the utmost decision the objectivity of the ian doctrine over against all subjective-gnostic interetations, characterizes in the most exact manner this standpoint of his theology by his well-known saying: *credo, quia*

absurdum est.[1] Not only is there denied to the *credere* every kind of intellectual activity, such as would present the object of faith in a form subjectively acceptable, but it is just the bare contradiction to human reason that is laid down as the very foundation of the faith, inasmuch as thereby, all the more convincingly, a guarantee to the divinity of the object of faith is afforded.

According to the relation in which the orthodox theology stands to a particular theory of the Church, it obtains a peculiar character of its own. By the Roman Catholic Church, Scripture and tradition are claimed as the sources of divine revelation, but the miracle of revelation is carried on within the Church itself. In consequence of this the Church receives the *donum infallibilitatis*, the gift of infallibility, graciously bestowed, whether this be regarded as a quality resting in the fellowship of the bishops of the whole Church gathered together in councils, or in the one person of the Roman Pontiff. By means of the infallible Church the divine revelation contained in Scripture and tradition is, on the one hand, further developed, and, on the other hand, is more surely grounded as to its objectivity, because, while the doctrine of the Church is sanctioned by Scripture and tradition, the Scripture itself is withheld from the lait exposition is determined by the *unanimis ecclesiæ co* and is also confined to a translation sanctioned by the C and to the judgment of the Church.[2] Hence the or

[1] De Carne Christi, cap. 5. [In the 15th chapter of the same Tertullian says: Natus est Dei Filius; non pudet, quia pudendum mortuus est Dei Filius; prorsus credibile est, quia ineptum est. resurrexit; certum est, quia impossibile est. Irenæus, in h the undue speculative curiosity of Gnosticism, maintained limits of religious thought, and insists on the inadequacy of divine things, in order at once to depreciate philosophy and to gi employment in the study of matters of revelation. See Ueberweg, Philosophy, vol. i. 303, 304: and Pressensé, Martyrs and Apologists, chap. 3, § 2.]

[2] Compare Carl Hase, Handbuch der protestantischen Polemik gegen die römische-katholische Kirche. 1st edition, p. 18 ff.

theology of the Roman Catholic Church is subjected to an ecclesiastical authority as much as to a divine, and therefore places its members under a religious obligation to accept unconditionally the doctrine of the Church. With it the incontestable presupposition is the *credere*, that is, the holding fast to the doctrine sanctioned by the Church. All that remains for it to do over and above amounts simply to this, —to rise to an insight into the doctrine, without venturing to work any change whatever upon it. The motto of this theology, as it was indeed expressly laid down by Anselm of Canterbury (d. 1109), is the *credo ut intelligam*. In regard to the faith prevailing in the Church, no attempt is to be made to shake it, no expression of doubt can be allowed; the problem can only be how to make it the subject of intellectual apprehension (*intelligere*). With rare energy the scholastic theology of the Middle Ages prosecuted this end, and employed upon this all the resources of philosophy at its command. But, deeply as it had entangled itself with philosophy, it could never, in consequence of the fundamental standpoint at which it had placed itself, make more than a so-called formal use of philosophy. The doctrine of the Church stood firm before it as the divine truth, and even philosophy could only assist as a serving-maid to secure an insight into it. The formal method of the Aristotelian dialectic was simply the means whereby it constructed its system.

The scholastic theology is regarded by the Romish Church as the model of an orthodox theology. Both the scholastic theology and its continuation, the Jesuitical theology, are the theologies which correspond most perfectly to the principle of Roman Catholicism; and these alone are still possible in the Romish Church of the future after the dogmatic affirmation of Papal Infallibility. The anti-scholastic theology of pre-Reformation times, as well as the anti-Jesuitical and idealistically coloured theology of modern times, not-

withstanding that they held their place within the range of the Romish ecclesiastical domain, are such as must be disavowed in consequence of the ecclesiastical standpoint, as the condemnatory judgments, which in the most recent times have been pronounced by the Romish Curia against Hermes, Günther, and Baltzer, most clearly prove.[1]

The presuppositions which lie at the basis of the orthodox theology of the Romish Church were overturned by means of the Reformation. In place of the authority of the hierarchy that pretended to be divine but was really human, it put forward the divine authority of Holy Scripture. The Protestant theology, inspired by the deep religious spirit out of which the Reformation sprang, had, in its beginnings, no other end in view than that of endeavouring to obtain the word of God from Holy Scripture, and to present this as divine truth in a statement definitely formulated for the faith of the Christian community. The divinity of Holy Scripture is evidenced by the *testimonium spiritus sancti*. For its exposition no ecclesiastical authority is necessary, but rather the Holy Spirit is Himself the true expositor of Scripture. A distinction was made between *verbum Dei* and Holy Scripture, and, within the New Testament itself, up to the beginning of the seventeenth century, a similar distinction was recognised by the orthodox Lutheran theologians, in accordance with the example of Luther, between *libri canonici* and *libri apocryphi*.[2] [Thus, for example, Chemnitz, the great Lutheran and Protestant champion during the latter half of the sixteenth century, sets for himself the question, whether all the

[1] Compare § 3, 4, and 6. of the present work. Also see K. Werner, Geschichte der katholischen Theologie, p. 405 ff. and p. 624.

[2] Fr. Bleek, Einleitung in das Neue Testament, 3 Auflage, p. 772 ff. [English translation, Edin. 1869, 1870, vol. ii. pp. 233–237. Orthodox theology in the British Churches, represented by the Thirty-nine Articles and the Westminster Confession of Faith, recognises all the books of the Old and New Testaments as canonical and of full divine authority. The Formulary of the Church of England, in its sixth article, enumerates all the books of the Bible, and says that of these the authority was never doubted in the Church. The

Biblical books have one and the same authority, and does not hesitate to answer that they have not. Alii enim sunt canonici, alii apocryphi: quorum illi certam atque classicam habent autoritatem: hos vero quamvis ecclesia legit ad ædificationem plebis, tamen ad confirmandam dogmatum ecclesiasticorum autoritatem non adhibentur, uti loquitur Hieronymus.] As soon, however, as the end had been attained, the doctrine established and recognised by the majority in the Church, Protestant theology, after the period of its creative activity, passed over into the Protestant orthodox theology. It now sought to make good its claims to orthodoxy by identifying the doctrine derived from the Holy Scripture with the Holy Scripture, and laying it down as the divine truth, upon the confession of which Christian salvation is made dependent. But at that time, apart from the requirement to develop itself into an independent science, and to demonstrate scientifically the truth of the doctrine, it saw itself obliged to fall back upon the Holy Scripture alone, and from this basis to advance the proof of its truth, as much on behalf of the Church itself as against its Roman Catholic opponents. It is therefore of supreme importance that the authority of Holy Scripture in its divine objectivity should be firmly established. The confirmation of its truth on religious grounds by means of the *testimonium spiritus sancti*, which affords too much room for the play of subjectivity, proves itself to be insufficient. The deficiency must be made up by means of a theological theory, and thus it must be dogmatically fixed. The old Church doctrine of inspiration

Westminster Confession of Faith also enumerates the books, but avoids making any rash historical generalization, like that of the English Articles, and simply says that all these are given by inspiration of God to be the rule of faith and life, chap. 1, 2. This does not imply that all these books viewed separately are of equal importance, but simply that all are equally canonical as being all inspired. Of the New Testament books the greater number are Homologoumena; the few whose claims had been contested in early times are Antilegomena. This distinction, however, has merely a historical, not a dogmatic, significance.]

was reasserted and put forward as a suitable means for supplying this want, if only its application were made with more thorough strictness, and the strictness of this application rendered compulsory.

The distinction between the word of God and the Holy Scripture was laid aside,[1] and the tendency now rather was to identify the two, the word of God and Holy Scripture, and, in order to remove from the latter every trace of human subjectivity, and to establish firmly its purely divine objectivity, not an inspiration of holy writers of the Scriptures, but an inspiration of the Holy Scriptures in regard to their thoughts and words, was maintained. Hence divine revelation and inspiration came to be regarded as exactly co-extensive, and the Old and New Testaments, in regard both to contents and to form, came to be considered as the objective word of God. The attributes which, in accordance with this view, belong to Holy Scripture — *auctoritas, divina veritas, perfectio, perspicuitas, efficacia divina, necessitas, integritas, et perennitas, puritas et sinceritas fontium, authentica dignitas* — are the grounds as well as the consequences of its *fides divina*.[2]

With its principle of Scripture thus formulated, the orthodox theology had won for itself a principle of knowledge,

[1] As to the distinction between the word of God and Holy Scripture, referred to above, it seems capricious and unreal. Martensen, speaking of the two elements, divine and human, in Scripture, says: "The old proposition, *the Scripture is the word of God*, expresses the union; the more modern dictum, *the Scriptures contain the word of God*, expresses the distinction. The first proposition is clearly preferable to the second, which is vague and indistinct, and may be applied to many writings. The first, however, is untrue if it be taken so to affirm the union as to exclude all distinction of the divine and human elements in the Bible." Christian Dogmatics, § 239; compare the whole section.—ED.

[2] Baur, Dogmengeschichte, iii. p. 48 ff. Rothe, Zur Dogmatik, p. 130 ff. [Compare Westminster Confession of Faith, chap. i. 5. Westminster Larger Catechism, qu. 4. Mastricht enumerates these attributes thus: auctoritas, veritas, integritas, sanctitas ac puritas, perspicuitas, perfectio, necessitas, efficacia. Theoretico-Practica Theologia, lib. I. cap. ii. § 14 21. On the whole subject of the above paragraph, the views of Scripture prevalent among orthodox Lutherans of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, see Dorner, History of Protestant Theology, vol. ii. pp. 118–141.]

which corresponded to its purpose in form and contents. If, indeed, it be successfully proved that the ecclesiastical doctrine is derived from Holy Scripture, then also its contents are thereby proved to be divine, and all human uncertainty is excluded from it. While the Roman Catholic doctrine rests on the infallibility of the Church, the Protestant doctrine rests on the infallibility of Holy Scripture; and while the former ground is proved historically to be a merely human one, that only is to be adopted from the Romish Church which agrees with Holy Scripture, and which in this way first receives the guarantee of divine truth.

The characteristic features of this orthodox theology may be produced from its theory of Scripture. Divine revelation, attested by inspiration and rendered credible especially by means of miracles and prophecies, is to be found only in Holy Scripture. This theology, therefore, cannot be prevailed upon to rise to a historical treatment of religion. The religions which stand outside of the limits of the Old and New Testaments, the so-called heathen religions, do not only receive no sort of recognition when brought up to be judged of from the standpoint of revelation, but they are regarded by orthodox theology as mere delusions, in which the human spirit left to itself since the fall of Adam has vainly wandered. The Church alone possesses divine revelation and truth in the Holy Scriptures. Hence Scripture is set down by this school of theology as for the Church at once the only source of doctrine and the absolute rule of its faith: whatever is found in it, and just as it is found in it, must without controversy be believed, even should it be in contradiction to all presently established laws of nature and reason. With peculiar eagerness the orthodox theology engages upon the exercise of the so-called lower criticism, the verbal criticism of the Biblical text, since it is in the interests of this school to possess the precise original form of writing of the sacred inspired penman, and to lose no iota of the inspired divine truth. On the other

hand, a strong prejudice is entertained against the so-called higher criticism, which enters upon investigations regarding the genuineness or ungenuineness of the separate Biblical books. The investigation itself is indeed submitted to, only no result is allowed to follow which would lead to the removing of a writing from the divinely accredited canon as being ungenuine, since thereby, at the same time, a portion of divine revelation and a support of Christian truth would be lost. The exposition of Scripture, too, is used by the orthodox theology purely in the interests of dogma. In this school of theology, exegesis and dogmatics stand in the closest connection with one another. Inasmuch as here the chief theological task is to produce on behalf of the several dogmas of the ecclesiastical doctrinal system their divine foundation, that is, their scriptural authority, the chief business of the exegetes of this school consists in gathering together from Holy Scripture, and elucidating the dogmatic purpose of, the so-called *sedes doctrinæ* or *dicta probantia*, that is, the Biblical passages which may serve as a ground or basis for a doctrine. The system of doctrine thus exegetically and dogmatically established constitutes the Christian truth, and is, as such, the foundation of the Church. Inasmuch, however, as all separate doctrines are not of equal importance, there are certain principal doctrines, certain *articuli fundamentales*, which are indispensable to the obtaining of salvation, and which must be believed in by all members of the Church, if they would not forfeit their salvation. Moreover, in ecclesiastical practice the clergy are unconditionally under obligation to preach to their congregations the pure doctrine, and to avoid every departure from the doctrine of the Church. And just as the exposition of Scripture, so also the history of the Church and the history of doctrines are placed by orthodox theology under its own dogmatic standpoint. Further, this theology takes an interest only in those parties in the history which are in agreement with its own dogmatic

tendencies, whereas those doctrines which diverge from its standard are, simply for this reason, regarded as damnable heresies.

In the Protestant Church, from the beginning of the eighteenth century, the orthodox theology passed over gradually into the supernaturalistic theology. In consequence of the opposition which in the Church itself was raised from the side of pietism against the prevailing orthodoxy, and from the side of philosophy, not only against the doctrine of the Church, but even against Christianity itself, the orthodox theology found itself compelled, instead of insisting upon the old strictness of the ecclesiastical system of doctrine, to fall back rather upon Holy Scripture. It sought also to give, in opposition to the hostile positions of philosophy, a more decided testimony to the divinity of Holy Scripture; and even while making the acknowledgment that Scripture was not altogether free from views that belong only to a particular period in history, it sought to vindicate the essential contents of Scripture as divine revelation. Thus the change of the orthodox theology into the supernaturalistic theology was consummated. Between the two theological systems there exists the closest affinity. Just as in the Romish Church we have the anti-scholastic and anti-Jesuitical theology, so the supernaturalistic theology is simply a modification of the ecclesiastical orthodox theology. Since, then, it does not hesitate to surrender particular doctrines of the ecclesiastical system of doctrine, or at least to attach less significance to them, especially when their foundation in Holy Scripture cannot with certainty be proved; since further, too, it has brought itself to grant the concession of the presence in Holy Scripture of views merely suited to the time at which they were written, and consequently surrenders the extreme dogmatic conception of inspiration: it is no longer in the strict sense of the word orthodox. Nevertheless it is still thoroughly in sympathy with the orthodox theology in maintaining this same principle, belief

in the reality of an immediate divine revelation and in the divinity of Holy Scripture; and it is likewise in thorough agreement with it in accepting the following fundamental proposition, that the human reason must unconditionally subordinate itself to divinely-revealed truth. Just then for this reason, because against its opponents it pre-eminently engaged on the defence of this proposition, that religious truth not only is not derived from reason, but as revealed truth lies beyond the reach of natural knowledge, it has become historically known as a theological system by the name of Supernaturalism.[1]

The orthodox theology, when occupying its strict supernaturalistic standpoint, is in an eminent degree entitled to the name positive theology. In this positivity may be found at once its truth and its untruth. It is quite right in maintaining the full reality and objectivity of revelation; for the Christian faith, like all religion, rests upon an objective divine ground. But, on the other hand, it mistakes the nature of faith when it insists upon unconditional, intellectual subordination to the objective divine revelation. No doubt faith as such is an immediate consent to revelation, but it yields this consent only in so far as it is an acquiescence proceeding from a spontaneous movement and impulse of the spirit. Faith is not a thing of constraint, not even of divine constraint, but of freedom. The orthodox theology of the Romish as well as of the Protestant Church treats revelation as though it were an affair quite external to man, as though it were a fact which came to mankind from without; and so it relates itself to the contents of revelation in a purely empirical, receptive manner. Because it finds in Holy Scripture and the doctrine of the Church the objective expression of revelation, it does not take into consideration the traces of human elements which can least of all be excluded from the doctrine of the Church, seeing that that is itself the result of

[1] Compare §§ 4 and 5.

theological labour, nor even from the revelation that has been transmitted in Holy Scripture, but accepts as the object of faith that whole complex of doctrines which, as revealed, bears in itself the guarantee of divine truth. Its theological activity, therefore, can only consist in this, that it approaches this object of faith with the reflective understanding, in order, by means of a reference to ecclesiastical authority and Holy Scripture, to collect, arrange, establish, and elucidate the separate doctrines, and to bring them into systematic connection with one another, without touching upon the nature of the object of faith itself, and calling in question the value which it has for religious faith and the thinking mind. This theology rather transposes the religious faith into a dogmatic faith, and what of this doctrinal object, upon which it lays the whole stress, cannot gain an entrance into the thinking mind, but shows itself utterly inaccessible to rational knowledge, is to be reckoned among the mysteries which are not indeed comprehensible, but are nevertheless to be firmly held by faith, if salvation is not to be seriously imperilled.

Grand and imposing as the system is which the orthodox theology has built up, and great as the historical significance is which it has acquired by means of the singleness of purpose and rigid objectivity with which it has demanded recognition of the object of faith purely for the sake of its divine positivity, the Christian spirit is nevertheless obliged, in its pious feeling as well as in its thinking, to suffer loss and injury, and so is constrained to enter into other paths, in order to seek the satisfaction which the orthodox theology does not afford.

While the Roman Catholic theology, in consequence of its being strictly bound down to the doctrinal principles of the Church, was not able to overstep the standpoint of the orthodox theology, the principle of faith set up by means of the Reformation was both able and under obligation to pass beyond the orthodox theology. Upon the field of Protestantism

arose as the task of the Christian spirit the raising of the immediate certainty of faith into a certainty scientifically established. A reaction set in against the rigid dogmatism of the orthodox theology, issuing from the believing consciousness itself in the two tendencies which are known historically as mysticism and pietism. Mysticism, an outflow from the mystical element, which is an indwelling principle in all religion, distinguishes itself in the sharpest way from the orthodox theology; because it sets the subjectivity of the believer in opposition to those objective authorities on which orthodoxy rests, and without entering into conflict with the Scripture and the doctrine of the Church, adopts from both only that which answers to the spiritual needs of the believing subject. During the Middle Ages, under the domination of scholasticism, mysticism afforded a witness to the fact that in the Romish Church of that period the inner life of faith had not been utterly destroyed. In spite of that subjectivism which was characteristic of it, the Roman Catholic Church, in consideration of the strict hierarchical organization which it in general maintained, was able to tolerate it, yea, even in certain circumstances to favour it, whereas Protestant orthodoxy was obliged to oppose it as one of the most dangerous enemies of its ecclesiastical system. Notwithstanding the remarkable variety of the forms under which mysticism has historically manifested itself, it has always directed itself, in keeping with its name, especially to the mysteries of the positive faith, to the Trinity, to Christ the Son of God, to the divine sonship of believers, to the last things, etc. It seeks by means of an individual endowment, which falls to the lot only of favoured persons, to appropriate subjectively the objective content of faith, whether this be done by means of contemplation, or by means of an inward word, or of an illumination, or by means of the fantasy which leads into the very depths of the Godhead; so that to disclosed all the secrets of heaven, of mankind, and

of nature, and the mystic is transformed into the theosophist. By reason of this overweening individual tendency, mysticism is constantly in danger of degenerating into extravagance, fanaticism, enthusiasm, and spiritualism; and instead of finding the rest and satisfaction that were sought after, it is apt to fall into the most stupid superstition.[1]

Closely connected with mysticism, and indeed historically influenced by it, is the tendency which, about the end of the seventeenth century, was brought into existence by Spener, called pietism. In it, too, there is a purely subjective interest which turned against the prevailing orthodoxy. By means of the religious feeling, by means of immediate spiritual experience, it opposes the orthodox theory which made the salvation of the Christian dependent upon the positive Church doctrine, and placed Holy Scripture in the position of supplying dogmatic proofs. Not upon the doctrine of the Church, but only upon Holy Scripture is the believer required to maintain his hold; not in the confession of the Church doctrine, but only in the living appropriation of Christ, as the Scripture sets Him forth, has he to seek salvation; from Holy Scripture he has to derive, not dogmatic proofs, but the word of life, which approves itself to faith as the alone saving word of salvation.[2] Deserving as pietism in its beginnings is of all

[1] Compare Herzog's Real-Encyclopædie under the word Mystik [in last edition, under Theologie, Mystische], and the literature there referred to; especially H. Heppe, Geschichte der Quietistischen Mystik in der Katholischen Kirche. Berlin 1875. [R. A. Vaughan, Hours with the Mystics: a Contribution to the History of Religious Opinion. 2 vols. London 1856. Principal Tulloch, Rational Theology and Christian Philosophy in England in the Seventeenth Century. 2 vols. Edinburgh 1872. Compare particularly vol. ii. chap. v., entitled Henry More: Christian Theosophy and Mysticism.]

[2] Compare § 4. [Also compare Ritschl, Geschichte des Pietismus. 1 Band. Geschichte des Pietismus in der Reformirten Kirche. Bonn 1880. An admirable account of Spener, the characteristics of his theology and tendencies of his school, will be found in Dorner's History of Protestant Theology, vol. ii. pp. 203-227. The relations of pietism to the Church are indicated with great clearness by Ritschl in a few sentences in his History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation, English translation. Edinburgh 1872, pp. 330, 331.]

praise, the tendency in it to give an undue prominence to feeling, in consequence of which practical edification is placed in the foreground, and the ethical claims of faith are thrown back out of view, allowed it soon to degenerate into an ascetic formalism, which excluded and repudiated all intercourse with the actual life of the world, and laid all stress upon diligent attendance at church, the diligent use of the sacraments, and diligent singing and praying. Ultimately it even degenerated into the most objectionable form of the religious life, which has been most appropriately styled Sham-holiness or Sanctimoniousness, inasmuch as designedly a nature that is really impious is covered up by means of forms and gestures, which are counted upon to produce the appearance of the highest degree of inward piety.

Both of these tendencies, mysticism and pietism, come into collision with the positive faith by pressing the claims of subjectivity; but the attitude altogether peculiar to it which, in the form of immediate intuition, of the inner word, of spiritual illumination, of the fantasy, of feeling, of immediate experience, it assumes in reference to the positive faith, not only exposes it to the falling into such errors as have historically sprung from it, but also prevents it from arriving at any scientific configuration. Neither to the mystic nor to the pietist has an objective knowledge of the nature of divine revelation and its relation to the human reason, and of the truth or untruth of the ecclesiastical dogmas, any interest; rather both leave revelation and dogma standing uncontested, and quite arbitrarily choose out of the positive object of faith that wherein they find the most spiritual satisfaction for their own individual religious need. And just for this reason, with reference to this subjective interest, which they make prominent over against the object of faith, mysticism and pietism have been regarded in the domain of Protestantism as the precursors of rationalism, which nevertheless in the exercise of the same subjective tendency distinguishes itself from both

in this, that it proceeds not from the believing, but from the thinking, consciousness.

Rationalism is, to speak generally, the endeavour to come to a rational conception of its object. In this general sense it has entered, just as much as supernaturalism, into connection with the object of faith since the earliest times down through the centuries in the Church. We meet with it in Gnosticism, among the Alexandrian Church Fathers, in the heresies of the ancient and mediæval Church, among some of the schoolmen,[1] and, after the Reformation, among the Socinians and Arminians. In this place, however, we can speak only of specific rationalism, as it has shown itself in a more or less systematic form since the middle of the eighteenth century, as rationalistic theology. It received what is now regarded as its peculiar character by means of philosophy, which after the Reformation had become independent, and by means of the supernaturalism which had been dominant in the Church. Through Descartes and Spinoza philosophy had become conscious of its own peculiar principle. The autonomous reason is the power which rules over all objective being, and it acknowledges only that which is in accordance with its laws. Philosophical truth, which is derived from the reason, and which finds a ground of authority only in rational thinking, by reason of its self-confidence and independence of all outward authorities, sets itself in direct opposition to ecclesiastical authority, which makes truth rest upon revelation. Above faith stands knowledge; even the doctrines of revealed religion are subjected to the criticism of rational thinking, and are abandoned when their rationality cannot be demonstrated. The opposition of reason and revelation,

[1] Compare H. Reuter, Geschichte der religiösen Aufklärung im Mittelalter. Bd. 1, 2. Berlin 1875, 1877. [Hampden, The Scholastic Philosophy in its relation to Christian Theology. Oxford 1832. Cunningham, Historical Theology. 2 vols. Edinburgh 1870. Vol. 1, pp. 413–425, for the earlier period. For special subject of above paragraph, Cairns' Unbelief in the Eighteenth Century.]

which had thus already made itself prominent, was brought into still clearer consciousness by means of the English deism. This school contested not only particular doctrines of positive Christianity, and particular dogmas of the Church's creed, but in the place of revealed religion set natural religion, which continued to maintain simply the existence of a Divine Being, and understood the worship of this Being to consist essentially in the fulfilling of His commands. This natural religion, as the emanation of the natural revelation of reason, is the standard by which every positive religion is tried. Even Christianity has a value only in so far as it appears as a restoration of natural religion, and is in agreement with the moral nature of that religion. All other Christian doctrines of faith are, from the standpoint of natural religion, considered to be without real content, and for the confessors of that religion are without significance. Transplanted into France, deism showed itself in the most bitterly hostile struggle against Christianity, and soon passed over into violent hostility against religion itself. When the essence of religion was made to consist only in the moral, it then became an easy step for the rationalizing thinker to rid himself of religion altogether, and in the negation of religion to seek his absolute freedom. In the hands of the French encyclopædists, deism sank down into utter atheism and materialism.

In Germany, philosophy itself wrought against the spread of deistical modes of thought. While deism set the reason over revelation and denied all supernatural religion, Leibnitz endeavoured to reconcile the opposition, and to save the right of revelation over against the reason by means of the distinction of *contra rationem* and *supra rationem*, according to which revelation cannot, indeed, contain truths which are directly in contradiction to the reason, but yet may contain truths which transcend human comprehension. Wolf endeavoured to reach the same end by setting a revealed

theology side by side with natural theology. Of these, natural theology derives its doctrines purely from the idea of God; revealed theology derives its doctrines from the revelation contained in Holy Scripture, which as such is certainly supernatural and super-rational, but is nevertheless not contrary to reason. The general culture of the understanding, however, which had the way prepared for it by means of the popular philosophy which followed on the lines of Wolf, was little able to elucidate this distinction. The reason which had gained confidence in itself must seek to free itself from the authority of Church dogmas which are in contradiction to it, and from the dominion of an orthodox ecclesiasticism in which it found no satisfaction. But the fundamental positions of deism had also been forced upon Germany, and especially by means of the *Wolfenbüttel Fragments*, edited by Lessing, had become known among wide circles. Hence it happened that by means of the criticism employed upon Holy Scripture by Semler, the orthodox theology was deprived of the principle upon which it rested, and that Semler himself recommended, along with the setting aside of the dogmas of the Church, a purely individual attitude in relation to the Christianity of the Scriptures, and in this Christianity recognised as divine and valuable for the individual only that which would serve for his personal moral improvement.[1] It was under these circumstances that a rationalistic theology developed itself in Germany in opposition to the orthodox-supernaturalistic theology. This rationalistic theology maintained firm hold upon Christianity, in opposition to the philosophical negation of Christianity; but upon principle it advanced from the standpoint of the natural, deriving religion from the reason. From Holy Scripture it received only moral truths which were in agreement with natural religion, while everything in it which contained conceptions and representations that were

[1] Compare § 5.

only temporary and local was excluded. As the general direction of the mind at that time was toward the serviceable and the useful, even Christianity was placed under this point of view, and the duties of Christianity, as the fulfilling of the commands of morality, were recommended on the ground that by the keeping of them human happiness would be advanced. As the theology of the Illumination, this theology combated without reserve all the opinions which were still bound up with the prevailing orthodoxy and the hitherto dominant Church system as antiquated, and as ignorant prejudices, which must yield before the light of the religion of the enlightened. Rationalistic theology secured for itself an increase in moral depth and a rational foundation, partly by means of the religion of reason of the Kantian philosophy, partly by means of the critical investigation of Holy Scripture engaged upon since the time of Semler.[1]

Rationalism in this form, as a theological system, constitutes the diametrical opposition to theological supernaturalism. With the utmost decisiveness it denies the principle of supernaturalism, the reality of an immediate, supernatural divine revelation. And even although the abstract possibility of such a revelation may be granted, yet the actual realization of such a thing can never be proved historically. Least of all can this be done by means of miracles and prophecies, on which supernaturalism rests its proofs, since regarding these it must first be proved that they actually happened in history. And further, even although the relative necessity of a supernatural revelation should be granted, it is, in itself considered, superfluous; for the truths regarding which supernaturalism makes affirmation, that they must have been communicated to mankind in a supernatural manner, could have been found by human reason itself. Holy Scripture is indeed to be held by as an original source of revelation, but the revelation which it contains is to be regarded now only as a mediate, so

[1] Compare § 5.

to speak, natural revelation, and to be attributed to the pre-eminent endowment and spiritual power of writers of the Old and New Testament. The religious truth which it communicates cannot therefore stand opposed to the religion of reason or of nature, but the content of Holy Scripture must rather necessarily be rational. In this way rationalism practically places reason over revelation, and measures revelation by the standard of reason. Whatever does not agree with reason, whatever is not derived from it and cannot be known by it, cannot be admitted in the contents of revelation. Although rationalism, in consequence of the position which it assigns to natural religion as a revelation, has also been designated naturalism, care should be taken not to confound this theological naturalism with philosophical naturalism, which practically goes upon the same lines as materialism and atheism.

By virtue of its principle of reason, rationalism treats Holy Scripture not absolutely, but only in its reasonableness, as a rule of faith, and consequently does not recognise it as the alone source of religion. It readily acknowledges as rational even that which it meets with outside the limits of Holy Scripture in the religious and moral sphere, and delights especially in placing the utterances of Greek and Roman wisdom alongside of the doctrinal propositions of Holy Scripture, and in rendering prominent the ethical worth of those virtues of heathen antiquity which on the side of a strict supernaturalism had been branded as brilliant vices. From this view of pagan wisdom and of pagan virtue, rationalism finds grounds for maintaining that, even outside the field of Scripture revelation, the religious moral life has been advanced by means of the mere reason. Nevertheless, rationalism did not give its strength to a historical and comprehensive consideration of the extra-Biblical religions. This, however, was not the result of any supernaturalistic scruples, because these religions did not spring from divine revelation, but because

they contained too much that was irrational to have any interest for the rationalist.

As rationalism does not regard Holy Scripture as a source of a supernatural revelation, it also denies the inspiration of Scripture. Like other writings, the Biblical writings had their origin in a purely human way. Their writers, too, were decidedly influenced by the representations and opinions of their times and their nation, and have written, not under a uniform objective impulse of the Holy Spirit, but rather in accordance with their individual endowment and culture, and according to their individual tendencies, so that they express mere opinions of the race and of the age, as well as erroneous views, and come even into contradiction with one another. In the attention which it paid to Scripture, rationalism showed the same diligence as supernaturalism did, only in another direction, not in order to win from it revealed truth, but in order to secure a conviction of the reasonableness of its contents. And thus it pressed on, with a zeal equally great to that of supernaturalism, the study of Biblical verbal criticism, yet from an altogether different motive, to restore the exact form of the original writing, in order wherever possible to make the meaning of a passage agree with reason. With special preference it devoted itself to the higher criticism, but even here it was led on by a desire to cast out from the canon as ungenuine such writings as were in their contents most opposed to its reason. Even in its exposition of Scripture, rationalism makes it the chief aim to bring forth from the words of Scripture a reasonable meaning. If the exegetical means do not succeed in accomplishing this, it takes refuge in the so-called Accommodation theory, that is, in regard to such passages as those in which Christ or the apostles teach what is apparently unreasonable. Rationalism helps itself by means of the assumption that while they were themselves acquainted with the higher truth, they accommodated themselves [illegible] exoteric discourses to the

narrow and nationally-limited powers of comprehension which belonged to their hearers and readers. The most serious stumbling-block to rationalism was found in the miracles recorded in Holy Scripture. But even here help was to be obtained in an exegetical way. The exegete only requires rightly to explain the Biblical narratives of the miracles, and then it becomes apparent that the miracles were natural occurrences which only through the peculiar representation of the Biblical writer came to have the appearance of miracles. In reference, however, to the contents of Scripture as a whole, rationalism accepts only the three principal doctrines, the doctrine of God, of freedom, and of immortality. These, too, are the doctrines of the religion of reason, and so far as they are contained in Scripture, Christianity and the religion of reason are identical. Every other dogmatic tenet held by the Church, the ecclesiastical system of belief, is, in respect of essential content, set aside as contrary to reason, and especially it is shown that the doctrines of the Church, which are in themselves irrational, are not grounded in the rightly ascertained, that is, rationally comprehended, doctrine of Scripture. Those three principal doctrines are nevertheless not so much objects of metaphysical knowledge, but are held fast in faith, and have their value in this, that they act ethically upon the human will, and elevate man into a rational moral being. And just such a moral power has Christianity proved itself historically to be, and it ought therefore to be cherished through all time in the Christian community. Hence, too, Church history is placed by rationalism principally under this point of view of ethical activity, and consequently many episodes in that history are to it altogether without significance, and are regarded as at best but the subject of a learned curiosity. Especially from the construction of Church dogmas, from the history of doctrines, and from the distinctions of confessional systems of doctrine, rationalism can gain no advantage; for these his-

torical doctrines appear to it to be no better than an emanation of human unreason, an evidence of human weakness and imbecility, an expression of human opinions without either contents or significance.

Rationalism has its justification in the nature and essence of faith itself. What is offered to faith as something purely external and foreign, as something that is for it inaccessible and incomprehensible, as a pure mystery, can for it have no value and no significance. As the believing consciousness in mysticism and in pietism strives after an intellectual appropriation of the object of faith, so must also the reflective consciousness seek to render the object of faith for the believer a matter of spiritual conviction. The reformation spirit comes into conflict with itself, chiefly when it endeavours to place again the inwardness of faith, to which the religious and ecclesiastical life had been led back by means of the Reformation, in the sense of orthodoxy under the sway of the letter. When supernaturalism attributes to rationalism the usual impure motives, and is accustomed to derive it from a mere lust of novelty, from human vanity and self-seeking, it mistakes not only that claim which is advanced in the faith of the Reformation itself, but also closes itself against the view that theology and the Church, since Christianity according to its profoundest conception is still avowedly an affair of the life, cannot shut themselves against the collective life and the intellectual culture thereof,—that rather theology, if it is to be a means of furthering Christianity and affording a service to the Church, must constantly continue its own development in connection with the general course of intellectual culture, as it has been sketched out by the other sciences. But besides, if justice is to be done to rationalism, this above all is to be kept in mind, that it persevered in its mission from the time when it originated and developed itself, not according to mere wilfulness, but according to the temporal circumstances under which it was placed. After there had

occurred a rupture between revelation and reason from the side of philosophy, and even the principles upon which the old theology of the Church had supported itself ha[illegible] been overthrown, theology was compe[illegible]ter ur[illegible] new phase, and to build up upon p[illegible]ions. n- pelled to take up into itself [illegible]he age had become conscious [illegible] it in its own inner being, [illegible] imputation of taking up [illegible]vea. and a rational, an ecclesias[illegible]Toward the solving of this problem [illegible] first, and just on that account, in many i[illegible]ct attempt. The credit at least cannot be [illegible]borating, by means of the rational represe[illegible]'s made, a defence of Christianity against [illegible]stility toward Christianity that had come [illegible]ng the period of the Illumination, fighting [illegible] against the externalism, the formalism, and superstition of the orthodox ecclesiastical system. It is also to the credit of rationalism that during the period after Kant, in opposition to that domineering tendency in orthodoxy which brought even a Kant to silence, it preserved to Protestantism a needful liberty of investigation, and by means of a reference to the ethical significance and ethical ends of Christianity, exercised a wholesome influence upon its contemporaries. The defectiveness from which, as a theological system, rationalism suffers, was implanted in it by that rea[illegible]craze which prevailed during that period. By means of [illegible] popular philosophy, the so-called sound human understa[illegible]g, which estimated the worth of things according to their [illegible]ulness and their serviceableness for this life, had been elevated to the throne.[1] This

[1] This is admirably shown in a short chapter on the German Illumination in Schwegler's History of Philosophy (English translation by Dr. Hutchison Stirling, Edinburgh 1867, pp. 207-259). This Illumination aimed at information; was the counterpart of the French Illumination—the consideration of what is profitable is put in the foreground; utility is made the special criterion

same empirical, reflective understanding makes its influence felt in rationalistic theology in opposition to religion. Without investigating the objective nature of religion, and without for this ... an inquiry into the history of re... n it the three ideas of reason wh... of God, of freedom, and of ...erence to be most profit- ... these as the essential ...igion to a mere means for ... This natural religion, or ... rationalism as a standard of ... positive doctrine derived from ... it contradicts the sound reason ... moral end, is cast out from the ... extremely subjective attitude lies ... in dealing with the contradic- ...cerned, it explains itself in such a way, that it simply removes the one side of that contradiction and sets up the reason in place of revelation. This subjectivity of rationalism makes its appearance most unquestionably in its relations to history generally, and specially in its relations to Holy Scripture. In its treatment of Scripture, however, rationalism involves itself in a contradiction, inasmuch as in principle it places itself above Scripture; but, on the other hand, seeks in Scripture confirmation for its propositions of reason, and therefore always interprets Scripture in the interests of rationalism. It could not be difficult for supernaturalism to show up the subjective arbitrariness of

of truth. So Reimarus wrote of ... advantages of religion, showing that our earthly enjoyments are not abri...d, but added to, by Christianity. In short, Christianity is represented as a system of eudæmonism. Ultimately the religion thus conceived of was identified with natural religion, and the positive dogma was set aside. Such doctrines as those of the Trinity, of the two natures in Christ, saving faith apart from works, original sin, were pronounced unprofitable, and as such were first ignored without being denied, and by and by repudiated altogether, or at least explained away. Compare Dorner, Hist. Prot. Theology, vol. ii. 277–379.—Ed.

this system, in respect of that negative attitude which rationalism assumed, especially in the departments of the history of doctrines and of exegesis. In consequence of offering this resistance, supernaturalism was not only not infected or perverted by rationalism, but was strengthened in its own proper procedure, and in this way compelled, in opposition to rationalistic negation, all the more decidedly to maintain a firm hold upon the objectivity of the positive element. The contradiction is thus distributed over both systems. Supernaturalism places revelation above the reason; rationalism places the reason above revelation. These two stand, the one side by side with the other, as partial statements of the truth; for the former underestimates the right of subjectivity over against the positive element, and the latter underestimates the right of the positive element over against subjectivity. Hence rationalism, just as little as supernaturalism, was able to arrive at a scientific establishment of its standpoint, and to raise itself above the sphere of subjective into that of objective knowledge. But inasmuch as both part between them what essentially constitutes one and the same thing, and consequently serve mutually to supplement one another, they cannot even be viewed apart from each other. Nevertheless, in consequence of the fundamental contradiction which was present in them, their contact with one another must for the most part be a hostile one, and such as would quickly pass over into a violent struggle and strife, which on the one hand mutual recrimination fostered, but on the other hand every scientific explanation reached tended to bring to a close. During the contest, attempts at reconciliation were made chiefly by means of supernatural rationalism and rational supernaturalism, which endeavoured to balance revelation and reason over against one another, in order to discover what was justifiable in each. Such attempts were made by the former conceiving of revelation as an attestation of the religion of reason specially prepared

by God Himself, and by the latter adjudging to the reason the power of estimating the proofs for revelation and for the contents of revelation, this, however, being done with a distinct insistence upon the concession that revelation, while it can contain nothing that is contrary to reason, may yet contain doctrines and statements of fact which are above reason. These mediation-systems are just as much supernaturalistic as rationalistic. Inasmuch, however, as they maintained their position at the same merely reflective standpoint which the supernaturalistic and rationalistic theology adopted, it was impossible that they should succeed in arranging the difference in dispute between the two parties, and in bringing about a peaceable accommodation of the contradiction with which they had to deal.

§ 17. SCHLEIERMACHER'S THEOLOGY OF FEELING.

The problem which rationalism had attempted to solve could not be given up; but rather the putting of it led to a deeper comprehension of the task of theology, and to a change of the position from which the advance was to be made. In the very midst of the conflict which the supernaturalists and rationalists waged with one another, Schleiermacher made his appearance, and became the creator of a theological system, by means of which theology was led into an entirely new course. The period during which his scientific labour began was agitated to its innermost depths by the most disturbing events, by the most daring patriotic endeavours, and the most idealistic flights of the human spirit [illegible] systems that had previously [illegible] penetration, shows that [illegible] tisfaction in such a time [illegible] st truth of human [illegible] he orthodox and supernatural [illegible] come to mankind [illegible] nity as a formulated [illegible] something eternal [illegible] ity with which rationalism itself [illegible] the sphere the Christianity into a mere [illegible] life [illegible] e-domain learned discussions with which [illegible] if without reference to the claims and [illegible] ch these, more than anything else, making the most cultured among the laity [illegible] from the theologians to the philosophers and poets, generally, did much to bring in an indifference in regard to religion, a coldness and estrangement in regard to Christianity, and a contempt for Church and theology. It was then [illegible] at Schleiermacher, personally affected in the very depths of [illegible] anything that concerned his age, created a theology, by virtue of its principle, satisfied the life as well [illegible] mands of science in a higher degree than the preceding [illegible] ns of supernaturalism or rationalism.

With true prophetic insight, Schleiermacher perceived that his age, in spite of all its culture, in spite of all its poetic enthusiasm, in spite of all its romantic idealism, was still wandering from the centre, from which every actualization of the spiritual life first receives its value and has its high consecration bestowed upon it. From a simple necessity of his nature, in consequence of a divine call, as he himself says, he drew up his discourses on religion for the cultured among its despisers (*Reden ueber die Religion. Reden an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern.* Berlin 1799); and thus he accomplished the task laid upon him by his age and its circumstances, expounding to his contemporaries the essential nature of religion, and leading them back into the sanctuary that had been contemned.

Turning away from all the constructions in which religion had made itself known externally, Schleiermacher gives his attention to the n gination. The theologic and, with great psychologic vogue could afford no has its origin in the objectivity w it is not something heology represente us manner from accepted beliefs, nor ing to man's inmos ved the religi its per to it in the huma spiri and its l feeling. Religion is neither knowledge and as such it has for its co the universal or the infinite. It is the feeling consciousness of certainty by means of the infi independence it is distinguished, indeed, but n ered, from the other spiritual powers. It maintains er the closest connection with these, and animates them raises them into a harmonious co-op ince, l a holy music, it accompanies all spiritual a the depart-ments of science, art, and morals. very nature of religion then necessarily spring ie impulse to association. Wherever the feeling Infinite is con-

cerned, whether it be in a stronger or in a weaker degree, there is also present the longing for the communication of it to others, and for the receiving of it from others, so that a community must be formed which has no other end in view than the mutual exchange of pious feeling. The true Church is the association of all the really pious, which, although in different forms, represents religion in its infinity, and elevates the actual Church in its outward manifestation into a sanctuary for the religious life, as this itself has in human feeling a free, independent existence. Historically, religion appears in the greatest multiplicity of separate constructions, according as the infinite determines the feeling in a particular form, and unites together in one association those who have become possessed by the same feeling. The historical positive religions are individual manifestations of religion, which collectively form the sum-total of religion. Each one bears in its original form its own divine impression, and just as little allows itself to set a limit to the fulness of its own religious feelings as to individual doctrinal opinion; while the so-called natural religion, or religion of reason, as a mere product of reflection, cannot be allowed to assume a place among the positive religions. Nowhere else does religion so perfectly reach the ideal as in Christianity. The presupposition, from which it sets out, is the universal reaction of the finite upon the infinite, and the idea upon which it rests is the idea of redemption. The admirable clearness with which this idea perfected itself in the soul of Christ, is the truly divine element in Him. As Redeemer, who needs not redemption again for Himself, Christ must be partaker at once of the finite nature and of the divine essence.

These fundamental thoughts, which Schleiermacher has developed in his discourses on religion, form also the groundwork of his theology. The actual filling up corresponds thoroughly to that formal schema which Schleiermacher, in his *Brief Outline* (*Kurze Darstellung*), drew up for the theo-

logical system.[1] Of all the branches of theological science, dogmatics must have for him the greatest interest, since in it he can realize in the fullest measure his practico-ecclesiastical purpose, by setting forth the Christian consciousness of the present. From ethics he borrows for dogmatics the idea of the Church, and from the philosophy of religion he borrows the idea of religion. In the Christian Church, the consciousness of God is definitely Christian—that is, the mere feeling of dependence becomes the feeling or consciousness of redemption through Christ. The essential nature of Christianity consists in this, that in it everything is referred to the redemption accomplished through Jesus of Nazareth. This is the formula by means of which Christianity is distinguished from all other forms of faith, and the idea of religion is brought into its positive form of expression suited for theology. Faith, therefore, in the redemption accomplished by Christ is the condition for membership in the Christian association. Dogmatic theology is "the science of the connected presentation of the doctrine prevailing in a Christian Church association at a given period." The Christian Church is now actually divided between the great communions of Catholicism and Protestantism, in each of which Christian piety is characteristically determined, so that the dogmatics of a particular Church, the Roman Catholic or the Protestant, is rendered distinct, and Schleiermacher sets for himself the task of treating of the evangelical Christian faith. The title which he gives to his dogmatics, characterizes in the most definite manner his standpoint: "The Christian faith set forth in a connected form according to the principles of the evangelical Church" (*Der Christliche Glaube*). As thus limited, dogmatics has the task of describing the Christian believing consciousness, which has for its contents the redemption accomplished by Christ, and arising out of this, the task of adopting only those propositions of it into the sum-total of the evangelical doctrine

[1] See above, § 6.

which approve themselves upon an appeal to the evangelical confessional writings, or to the New Testament writings, as evangelical. But the doctrines of the Church, which are themselves only expressions of evangelical piety, have, on the other hand, a worth and significance only in so far as they are in agreement with the immediate Christian believing consciousness. Indeed, even the New Testament, in which the idea of the redemption accomplished through Christ has found its original expression through the writings of the apostles, has a normative significance only in so far as the Christian in need of redemption finds in it the most perfect satisfaction for his believing consciousness. Then, again, the Old Testament, generally speaking, does not come into consideration as an authority for the Christian faith. In Christ, however, there must be recognised, not a mere supernatural and superrational, but a supernatural and superrational which evidences itself to the religious feeling as truly human. As in human nature the capacity for receiving a divine revelation in Christ must be present, so also must the possibility be admitted of transmuting the excitations of Christian feeling into thought, and representing these in terms of the reason. The system of faith, therefore, has no other task than to describe the Christian pious self-consciousness, and, by means of reflection upon the Church doctrine and the Scripture of the New Testament, to prove what must be regarded as Christian. "We absolutely renounce every proof of the truth or necessity of Christianity, and assume, on the contrary, that every Christian, before he at all enters upon such discussions as these, has already the certainty in himself that his piety can receive no other form than this." "The dialectic character of language and the systematic arrangement give to dogmatics the scientific form essential to it." Speculation is to be kept quite apart from dogmatics. Hence it is quite possible that a contradiction may arise between the speculative and the pious self-consciousness, between the highest objective and the highest

subjective form of the human spirit, so that the task of the scientific student consists in his becoming conscious to himself of the agreement of these two; but to render him assistance in this is not, according to Schleiermacher, the business of dogmatics. The contradiction can only rest on a misunderstanding, and this may lead on to the abandonment of piety generally, or at least of Christian piety. Not the system of faith, however, but apologetics, has to guard against this.[1]

The æsthetical conception of religion, as set forth by Schleiermacher, may, indeed, always be chargeable with various defects;[2] nevertheless Schleiermacher has rendered an enduring service in this, that he has proved religion to be an original form of life in the human spirit, a thoroughly independent power among the different spiritual functions, and that he first of all secured a free course for a universal history of religion. His definition of the nature of Christianity, indeed, may not be quite exhaustive, and may not be sufficient for specifically distinguishing Christianity from the other historical religions, yet it is a permanent service, that he grasped everything Christian in its relation to the original facts of religious feeling, and to the archetypal person of Christ as the Redeemer, that he consequently sought to commend Christianity, not as a dogmatic statement, but as a life surrendered and attached to the Redeemer, and that he restored the Church again to its own proper rank, as the association in which this life is set forth and is to be nurtured. That Schleiermacher reared his theology on these foundations

[1] Compare Der Christliche Glaube. Einleitung, pp. 1–130. 2 Ausgabe.

[2] Compare W. Bender, Schleiermacher's Lehre vom schlechthinigen Abhängigkeits-gefühl in Zusammenhang seiner Wissenschaft untersucht und beurtheilt. Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie. Bd. xvi. Hft. 1, pp. 79–146. By the same writer: Schleiermacher's Theologie mit ihren philosophischen Grundlage dargestellt. Bd. 1, 2. Nördlingen 1876, 1878. R. A. Lipsius, Schleiermacher's Reden ueber die Religion. Jahrbücher für protestantische Theologie, 1875. Hft. 1, pp. 134 ff. Hft. 2, pp. 269 ff. A. Ritschl, Schleiermacher's Reden ueber die Religion. Bonn 1874.

affords an explanation at once of the influence which it secured over the whole life of the Church, and of the victory which it gained over previously accepted theological systems. Not only was Schleiermacher successful in that which he originally purposed,—restoring to his contemporaries the lost respect for religion and Christianity, for Church and theology, —his theology also became, for both sections of the Protestant Church, the way upon which they raised themselves above their dogmatic differences to a higher evangelical unity, and approved itself, by means of the growing recognition which it met with, to be the most important scientific protection of the union when that had been accomplished. Schleiermacher, moreover, since he proceeded from the immediate believing consciousness, led theology back to that spiritual ground upon which it had originally, and especially in Protestant theology, arisen. By means of the very assertion of that principle Schleiermacher already raised himself for the most part above the intellectualism, both of the supernaturalistic and rationalistic theology, and by means of the particular method according to which he carried out that principle, he likewise overcame the one-sidedness of these theological systems, while at the same time he appropriated what was of advantage in them. To the confirmed believing consciousness the Biblical canon and the doctrine of the Church are not therefore regarded as an authority, because the one contains revelation, and the other a doctrinal system grounded upon that revelation, but both become an authority to the believer in so far as the idea of redemption is set forth in the New Testament as divine truth, and the doctrine of the Church approves itself as a fitting expression of the evangelical Christian consciousness. The outward relation was thus changed into an inner and spiritual relation: bondage was exchanged for freedom. From this results the attitude which the theology of Schleiermacher maintains in reference to supernaturalism and rationalism. Neither a one-sided subordination

to the positive in the sense of the former, nor a one-sided superordination in the sense of the latter, finds any place here. Schleiermacher, on the one hand, agrees with the objectivity of the supernaturalistic theologians in this, that he connects faith with the principle of the divine life revealed in Christ, and with the doctrine of the Church; and, at the same time, he is in accord with the subjectivity of the rationalistic theologians in so far as he makes the recognition of the positive dependent on its agreement with the demands of religious feeling.

The irenical character which is thus impressed upon Schleiermacher's theology, the philosophical basis on which it rests, the religious profoundness, the Christian certainty of faith, conceived of thoroughly in the spirit of the Reformation, the intellectual and spiritual freedom, which with all his esteem for the positive still makes its way over every outward constraint, — all these advantages, by which this theology is distinguished, could not fail to win for it always a numerous band of disciples. All the more important theologians of modern times, and indeed theologians of the most diverse tendencies, not even excluding those who make it their special business to assail his theology from the orthodox standpoint, are influenced in their theological views by Schleiermacher. It is this one fact, which from the peculiarity of the theology of Schleiermacher becomes perfectly intelligible, which, therefore, on the one hand, vouches for the high significance of that theology, but, on the other hand, also indicates its insufficiency and defectiveness. As Schleiermacher sought to restore the harmony between the religious and the philosophical view of the world, he has also sought in his theology to do away with the opposition, which is represented by the supernaturalistic and rationalistic theology, the opposition of revelation and reason.[1] Nevertheless, although in this

[1] The theology of Schleiermacher was an attempt to recognise the importance of both sides of the great Reformation principle—faith and Holy Scripture. The

he succeeded indeed in a higher measure then rationalism, yet, even by him, the problem in its full range was not solved. The philosophical basis which Schleiermacher gives to theology in general, constitutes also the basis of his dogmatics, inasmuch as it proceeds from the philosophical idea of religion and from the Christian believing consciousness that regulates it. But, in accordance with the practico-ecclesiastical purpose to which Schleiermacher makes theology subservient, dogmatics has no other task than to set forth for the guidance of the Church the content of the Christian believing consciousness, and therefore generally to indicate what is meant by Christian. The activity of the dogmatist, therefore, consists only in this, that with the facts of the pious consciousness he should reflect upon the positive element furnished him from without, and by means of this reflection adopt from the doctrine of the Church and from the New Testament all those elements which are in harmony with the Christian pious feeling as it is essentially conceived; while, on the other hand, rejecting all those which either are of no importance, or may perhaps even have a destructive and injurious influence upon that pious feeling. In accordance with this method Schleiermacher has also proved the agreement of

one-sidedness of rationalism and supernaturalism, referred to in the text, may be described as a tendency to give consideration exclusively, in the one case, to the subjective principle of faith, in the other case to the objective principle of Holy Scripture. These two Schleiermacher sought to re-combine. Dorner, after noticing, in terms very similar to those employed by Rübiger, the wide influence of Schleiermacher, points to those as really his followers, who in his spirit carry on independently the regeneration of theology in its various departments. He then gives a list of most of the distinguished German theologians of modern times, in exegetical, historical, and dogmatic theology, as belonging to this class. "All these construct their doctrine of belief, which they distinguish from Biblical theology, no longer upon the formal principle of Holy Scripture, as Biblical supernaturalists, nor upon natural reason, as their opponents insisted on doing, but upon the material principle of the Reformation, viz. faith combined with Holy Scripture." Hist. of Prot. Theology, vol. ii. p. 394. The weakness of Schleiermacher is the same as appears in almost all avowed endeavours at compromise. Having surrendered so much, it seems to many that he is unable to render any convincing reason why he should not surrender more.—Ed.

the believing consciousness with the revealed object of faith, and in so far he has abolished the opposition between reason and revelation; but, even still, this is only done in a limited way, and means only the abolishing of the opposition between pious feeling and revelation. Schleiermacher's critical reflection does not transcend this sphere of feeling, and does not reach an objectively historical and scientific conception, as is made most evident from his attitude toward the Old Testament, from the use which he makes of the New Testament, and from his treatment of the Church doctrine of God and Christology. The scientific character of dogmatics, therefore, reduces itself to this purely formal moment, that the utterances of the pious consciousness are set forth in proper form and in their logical connection, that is to say, it is reduced to "the didactic character of the language and systematic arrangement." The exposition of the nature of Christianity, and the dogmatics grounded thereon, are only intended for Christians. One who does not belong to that fellowship of the faith, a non-Christian or a Catholic, may indeed experience a conviction that the exposition of evangelical Christianity given by Schleiermacher is correct, while still he himself is not convinced of its truth, and does not feel himself constrained to adopt the same.[1] The question which spontaneously arises, whether that which is Christian is also true, whether that wherein the Christian pious feeling finds its satisfaction has also an objective ground, — this question, and with it philosophical speculation, are by Schleiermacher excluded from dogmatics. When Schleiermacher gives expression to the opinion that in this way all scholasticism and the intermixture of philosophizing with dogmatics will be got rid of,[2] he thereby involves himself in a self-contradiction. For whereas at the end of the introduction he declares that he will completely remove philosophy from dogmatics, he has already, in the beginning

[1] Dogmatik, i. p. 84. [2] *Ibid.* p. 171.

of that same introduction, introduced it under the form of propositions borrowed from ethics and from the philosophy of religion. These borrowed propositions, indeed, have for dogmatics such a fundamental significance that their introduction restores not only, as Schleiermacher would have it, a formal, but a thoroughgoing material, connection between philosophy and dogmatics, and even in dogmatics itself at the bottom of the critical reflection, philosophical thought is always a co-operating factor. And certainly it is just from this that Schleiermacher's dogmatics receives its peculiar value. For only when that philosophical conception, which lies at the basis of his dogmatics, and appears at various points throughout the whole system, has been abandoned, would it be possible for dogmatics, by means of an appeal of the mere believing consciousness to Schleiermacher, to be led back again into the free channel of orthodoxy. But what Schleiermacher intended, viz. to dissolve the material connection between philosophy and dogmatics, and to make the latter independent of any intermixture of philosophizing, is not only not reached, but, in consequence of the philosophical ground given to the dogmatic system, is excluded.

Nevertheless at the subjective standpoint of reflection, which Schleiermacher intentionally adopted in dogmatics, he could not conceal from himself, that for the thoughtful members of the Christian community, that is, for those in whom the speculative consciousness had been aroused, a contradiction between their speculative and their pious consciousness might possibly continue in spite of his dogmatics, and would not be overcome by means of it. For himself, who was at once a philosopher and a theologian, this contradiction had so little an existence, that he was inclined to speak of it as only a misunderstanding. When he now excluded from dogmatics the task of removing this contradiction, he did not by any means wish to exclude it

from theology, but would rather relegate it to apologetics.[1] But since apologetics, as the first sub-division of philosophical theology, has, according to the demands of Schleiermacher, to borrow from philosophy the fundamentals with which it is to operate, and since, if it is to render a demonstration of the truth of Christianity, those very ideas must lie at its very foundation as the norm of its procedure, dogmatics, at least according to the intention of Schleiermacher, would certainly be delivered from all intermixture of philosophizing, but this would not also apply to theology. If, however, as a matter of fact, the philosophical conception of religion maintains a normative significance, not only in apologetics, but also in dogmatics, then Schleiermacher, in spite of his struggle against it, reaches simply the standpoint of the religion of reason.[2] So far as any principle is concerned there is no difference, in reference to their normative application to theology, between Kant's conception of religion, which

[1] Dogmatik, i. p. 172.

[2] The representation given by Dr. Hodge of Schleiermacher's philosophical and theological tendencies, and of the inconsistencies in which he involved himself, is remarkably similar to Rübiger's, and as coming from one occupying so pronounced a theological position is possessed of peculiar interest: "Schleiermacher's philosophy is pantheistic. His theology is simply the interpretation of human consciousness in accordance with the fundamental principles of his philosophy. It is called Christian theology because it is the interpretation of the religious consciousness of Christians—that is, of those who know and believe the facts recorded concerning Christ." "He was not and could not be self-consistent, as he attempted the reconciliation of contradictory doctrines. There are three things in his antecedents and circumstances necessary to be considered in order to any just appreciation of the man or of his system. First, he passed the early part of his life among the Moravians, and imbibed something of their spirit, and especially of their reverence for Christ, who to the Moravians is almost the exclusive object of worship. . . . Secondly, his academic culture led him to adopt a philosophical system whose principles and tendencies were decidedly pantheistic. And thirdly, he succumbed to the attacks which rationalistic criticism had made against faith in the Bible. He could not receive it as a supernatural revelation from God. . . . Philosophy being a matter of knowledge, and religion a matter of feeling, the two belonged to distinct spheres, and therefore there need be no collision between them." Systematic Theology, vol. ii. pp. 138, 440, 441. London and Edinburgh 1874. —Ed.

consists in the recognition of moral duties as divine commands, or Schleiermacher's feeling of absolute dependence. In the one case just as in the other, a philosophical conception of religion has a controlling influence upon theology.

§ 18. SPECULATIVE THEOLOGY.

What Schleiermacher recognised as a need, though he did not succeed himself in accomplishing it, the reconciliation of the man of science with faith, is undertaken by speculative philosophy and theology as their task. Founded by Schelling, and built up by Hegel after an exact method into a separate system, speculative philosophy entered into the place of the subjective idealism of Kant and Fichte as the philosophy of objective and absolute idealism, and demonstrated its importance and intellectual power by the far-reaching and comprehensive influence which it exerted over all the positive sciences, especially over theology. And this influence it continues to assert up to the present hour, although it is now often shown only in quiet after-effects.[1] The name *philosophy of identity* (*identitätsphilosophie*), which it gave itself, indicates very precisely its nature, and leads most easily to an understanding of its character. The opposition, which from the first occupied philosophical thought, the opposition of being and thought, of nature and spirit, of

[1] C. L. Michelet, Geschichte der letzten Systeme der Philosophie in Deutschland von Kant bis Hegel. Th. 2. Berlin 1838. E. Zeller, Geschichte der deutschen Philosophie seit Leibniz. München 1873. [Chalybæus, Historical Development of Speculative Philosophy, from Kant to Hegel. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1854. Admirable sketches of this philosophical system of Schelling and its relations to theology will be found in Schwegler, Handbook of the History of Philosophy, Edinburgh 1867, pp. 299–315, and in Ueberweg, History of Philosophy from Thales to the Present Time. London 1874, vol. ii. pp. 213–225. "Schelling transformed Fichte's doctrine of the Ego, which formed his own starting-point, by combination with Spinozism, into the System of Identity. Object and subject, real and ideal, nature and spirit, are identical in the Absolute. We perceive this identity by intellectual intuition. . . . The system of identity needs to be completed by the addition of a positive philosophy —a speculation in regard to the potencies and persons of the Godhead." Ueberweg, p. 213. Compare Dorner, History of Protestant Theology, vol. ii. pp. 357–361.]

object and subject, of realism and idealism, had been in the post-Reformation philosophy gaining a recognition ever advancing in clearness. The primary question about which philosophy in recent times concerned itself was the question as to the nature of that opposition. Speculative philosophy gives the answer, for its whole system is devoted to working out the proof that the opposition does not in truth exist; that rather being is contained in thought and thought in being, that object is contained in subject and subject in object, that the two sides of the opposition are contained in one another, and that this identity is to be realized in the Absolute. But only philosophical thought can attain unto an insight into this identity. Therefore Hegel in his *Phænomenology of Spirit*, which is to be regarded as an introduction to his system, points out the way upon which the spirit, in the several stages of its development, consciousness, self-consciousness, and reason, is led by an inner necessity from the simplest form of sensible certainty through all oppositions of its empirical being to the height of conceptual knowledge, in which all oppositions and contradictions are removed, by means of which the Spirit knows itself as the Absolute, and thus absolute knowledge is reached. Philosophy is the sytematic representation of absolute knowledge. Logic, which is equivalent to metaphysics, represents the Absolute in the form of pure thought. The categories of thought are at the same time the categories of absolute being. The definitions of being and thought are developed in their totality from pure being up to the notion, which becomes the subject-object of the absolute idea, which is the absolute knowledge of itself. This universe of pure thought, just like the material out of which God created the world, has its reality in nature, which represents itself as the objectuation, or being in a state of otherness (self-externalization) of the idea (natural philosophy), and also manifests itself in the life of mankind and their history, because the idea from its

externalization turns back on itself as spirit, and thus in art and religion raises itself to the consciousness of the absolute spirit which completes itself in philosophy as the knowledge or self-consciousness of the Absolute Spirit (philosophy of spirit). The result of philosophy constitutes the contents of religion, and in this is contained the proof of "the truthfulness and necessity of religion." [1] "Philosophy is firstly the logical idea, the idea as it is thought, as the determinations of thought are themselves its contents, then next the absolute shows itself in its activity, in its productions, and this is the way of the absolute in advancing itself to spirit: and God is the result of philosophy, by which it is acknowledged that it is not merely the result, but that it eternally produces itself, that it is the antecedent. The one-sidedness of the result is in the result itself removed." Philosophy is not, as one has called it, a wisdom of the world in opposition to faith; rather "philosophy has God as its subject, and properly speaking as its only subject. . . . It is no wisdom of the world, but a knowledge of the unworldly, no knowledge of outward matter, of empirical being and life, but it is knowledge of that which is eternal, of that which is God and which flows from His nature, and this nature must manifest and develop itself." [2] What philosophy in its highest and last instance knows, its essential contents, the absolute, the divine,—that is also the contents of religion, and is at the same time reduced to practice in religion. "Knowledge of God and the inseparableness of consciousness from this content is that which we, generally speaking, call religion." [3]

Since, then, it is so that philosophy and religion have essentially the same contents, religion must have the greatest significance for speculative philosophy; and this is the reason why Hegel is obliged to make religion, which already in the *Phænomenology* and in the *Philosophy of Spirit* has had a

[1] Religionsphilosophie. Hegel's Werke, Bd. ii. pp. 18, 61.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 15 f. [3] *Ibid.* p. 12.

place assigned it, the subject of a special treatment in the *Philosophy of Religion*. The philosophy of religion has the Absolute for its subject, but not merely in the form of thought, but also in the form of its manifestation. "The general idea, therefore, is to be taken in its mere concrete significance, wherein its specific character lies, as manifesting and revealing itself. This side of the being is nevertheless—since we are dealing with philosophy—to be itself laid hold of in thought."[1] Hegel has here first of all represented religion as a great manifestation of the Spirit determined by means of an inner necessity.[2] The development proceeds from the idea of religion, so that the idea of religion is the substantial, which unfolds itself by means of the several particular religions until the end of the development has been reached. The idea of religion lies at the basis of the whole range of historical religions, and is at the same time the germ from which every determination has its origin, the moving power by which the religious consciousness is led on to every higher stage, until in Christianity it loses itself in the consciousness of the Absolute Spirit, and in this way the idea of religion has found its perfect realization. "The knowledge of spirit for itself, as it is in itself, is the intrinsic and independent being (*an und für sich sein*) of the knowing spirit, the perfectly absolute religion, in which it is evident that the Spirit, God, is: this is the Christian religion."[3] "Revealed religion is called revealed, because in it God is become altogether revealed. Here everything is in accordance with the idea; there is no longer anything in God hidden."[4] Nevertheless, viewed as a religion,

[1] Religionsphilosophie. Hegel's Werke, Bd. ii. p. 17 f. [Compare also Caird, Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion. Glasgow 1880, pp. 254-268.]

[2] *Ibid.* p. 41.

[3] *Ibid.* p. 43. [The error that runs through the whole Hegelian system shows itself here: the confounding together the abstract thought of the human thinker with the pure absolute thought.]

[4] *Ibid.* p. 44. [See also Dods' Mohammed, Buddha, and Christ. London 1877. Lect. iv., The Perfect Religion. Fairbairn, Studies in the Philosophy of Religion and History. London 1876. "It is not pretended by any writers

Christianity also has its share in the general nature of religion; although its contents are in themselves true, and in accordance with the idea, it still has the same only in a religious way, not in the form of the idea. While philosophy and religion have the same contents, and there is thus a point of union between the two, they are distinguished in respect of form, inasmuch as they possess the same contents under a different form. Religion is a knowledge of God which represents itself not only in a subjective reference, that is, in a reference simply to subjective certainty, as feeling, as faith, as immediate knowledge; but also in objective reference, that is, in reference to its contents, as a representation of God, so that God stands out before consciousness as outside of it, objective, distinct.[1] Philosophy, on the other hand, has to deal with the same contents, which in religion only gave a representation of the Absolute, in the form of the idea, and by this means to rise to speculative knowledge. "The way and manner in which spirit refers itself to itself, that is, becomes objective to itself, is generally a mental impression (*Vorstellung*), so the consciousness of this is religion. It is philosophy, in so far as the spirit is conscious of it, not in the way of impression, but of thought." "The form in which God is presented to us is first of all in the way of impression, and lastly, under the form of thought as such."[2] Even in Christianity the consciousness of the Absolute Spirit appears in the form of mere impression; so that even for it philosophy has to accomplish the task of thinking, and has to raise the impression into the form of the

whose thoughts on this subject have been accepted as a distinct development of religious thought in the country, that there is any higher or worthier idea of God to be found in any religion than in Christianity. Nay, it is not pretended that there is any higher or worthier idea of God present to the mind of the most disciplined or spiritual thinker than that which was conveyed by Christ. No such idea has been published. The religion of Christ has actually conveyed to the world its best idea of God. . . . Men felt that it was not an idea about God they were receiving by revelation, but that God was revealing Himself."—Dods, *l.c.*]

[1] Religionsphilosophie. Werke, Bd. xi. p 62 f. [2] *Ibid.* pp. 37, 63.

notion. This conceivableness (notionalness, *Begreiflichkeit*) is not excluded, because Christianity makes its appearance as an immediate divine revelation. Faith in such a revelation is itself nothing more than an impression belonging to the religious sphere, which has been reduced to its notion, and means the manifestation of the religious consciousness by means of the historical religions. Hence the same principle of identity applies here which has been applied by philosophy to all other spheres, namely this, that everything which is actual is from the spirit and for the spirit; that everything objective, as something produced by the spirit and also rooted in the spirit, is nothing wholly external, inscrutable, but conceivable and knowable. "God is to be revealed, or is for the spirit, and this self-revealing is, at the same time, the witness of the spirit. Hence it follows that the God of which we are conscious can be known; for it is in accordance with the nature of God to reveal Himself, to be revealed."[1] But the principle of identity, even in its application to positive Christianity, is not only a formal principle, but has for its contents the philosophical idea, the idea of the Absolute Spirit, as this is the result of philosophy. "This is the position of the philosophy of religion in reference to the other parts of philosophy. God is the result of the other divisions of philosophy; here this end is made the beginning, is made, that is to say, our special subject, as a simple concrete idea with its infinite manifestation."[2] Although Hegel expresses himself very decidedly against a theology of reason which affirms that God is unknowable, or will have to do only historically with a knowledge of God, still Hegel feels himself to be on common ground with the theology of reason, and also assumes to himself the right of demanding that in the philosophy of religion "he should develop religion truly and openly out of reason, without taking his standpoint from a definite word, and that thus he should treat the nature of

[1] Religionsphilosophie. Werke, Bd. xi. p. 58 f. [2] *Ibid.* p. 18.

God and religion."[1] He is therefore to look away from all external authorities, and to seek a discovery of truth only by means of the thinking reason. It follows from this that no contradiction can find place between the philosophy of religion and positive Christianity, between reason and revelation. There is one spirit, one reason, one truth. "In regard to what concerns the relationship of the philosophy of religion to the doctrine of the Church, in so far as it is not unreal, it is sufficient here to observe that there cannot be a twofold reason and a twofold spirit,—not a divine rea[illegible] and a human, not a divine spirit and a human, which can be plainly distinguished. The human reason, the consciousness of his nature, is reason generally; the divine in man, and the spirit, in so far as it is the spirit of God, is not a spirit beyond the skies, beyond the world, but God is present, omnipresent, and, as spirit, is in all spirits."[2] "It is an unfounded assertion to say that faith in the contents of positive religion can survive, if reason has convinced itself that there is such a contradiction. . . . The human spirit in its innermost meaning is not such a partitioned thing, in which two elements could co-exist which were contradictory to one another."[3] The philosophy of religion is very far from rejecting or explaining away the Christian dogmas after the manner of rationalism, rather its special activity is directed to the comprehending of

[1] Religionsphilosophie. Werke, Pd. xi. p. 20. [Compare on the two sides of the question from standpoints both intended to be Christian—Mansel, The Limits of Religious Thought, London 1858 (and closely connected with this his philosophical work, The Philosophy of the Conditioned. 1866); and Maurice, What is Revelation? a letter to Dr. H. L. Mansel. London 1859. Sequel to What is Revelation? By same author. London 1860. Also, Iverach, Is God Knowable? London 1884.]

[2] *Ibid.* p. 24. [We have here an avowed statement of the pantheistic foundation of Hegelian philosophy.]

[3] *Ibid.* p. 26. [The charge brought by Jacobi against Schelling, that he used theistic words and phrases in a pantheistic sense, may fairly be applied to Hegel. His absolute religion, notwithstanding its Christian phraseology, is not Christianity. The Hegelian position is clearly stated by Schwegler: "Positive reconciliation of God and the world is only attained at last in the revealed or Christian religion, which in the Person of Christ contemplates the God-man, the

these dogmas, that is, to the representing their harmony with the thinking reason, and consequently their universality and necessity, so that it leads to the affirmation that in these dogmas absolute truth is contained. In the third division of his philosophy of religion, which treats of the absolute religion, Hegel has carried out this, for he places the doctrine of the Trinity at the foundation, and develops the whole contents of Christian doctrine according to the three kingdoms of Father, Son, and Spirit, which are reduced, quite in the spirit of the system, to the logical categories of the universal, the particular, and the individual. The formal distinction which exists between Christianity as religion and philosophy occasions therefore no contradiction, but between the two there exists the most perfect harmony, because the common content, as well in the form of impression as in the form of the notion, represents itself as the one divine truth. But, indeed, no distinction finds place between philosophy and theology, for the latter has quite the same task as the former, and has to conceive of the absolute under the same form of thought, to emancipate it from the form of the mere impression under which in religion it is firmly held, and to raise it into speculative knowledge. Theology is "acquaintance with and knowledge of God."[1] All external evidences are useless for the verification of the spiritual. Only through itself and in

realized unity of the divine and the human, and apprehends God as the self-externalizing (self-incarnating) idea, that from this externalization eternally returns into itself, that is to say, as the Triune God. The spiritual import, therefore, of the revealed or Christian religion is the same as that of the speculative philosophy, only that it is expressed there in the mode of conception, in the form of a history, here in the mode of the notion." Hist. of Philosophy, p. 343. "The specific contents of the Christian religion, which from this point of view are at the same time recognised to be the highest philosophical knowledge, have been developed by Hegel under the formula of the doctrine of the Trinity, so that the kingdom of the Father represents the eternal idea of God as abstract, the kingdom of the Son the idea of God as differentiated from itself in the universe and the finite consciousness of man, the kingdom of the Spirit, the idea of God in its concrete fulfilment." Ritschl, Hist. of Christ. Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation, p. 595.]

[1] Religionsphilosophie. Werke, Bd. xi. p. 18.

itself can the spiritual be authenticated; only through itself and in itself can it be verified. This may be called the witness of the spirit; and even the Christian may, in quite an immediate way, give witness to the doctrines of the Scripture, because he has been affected by their truth in his inmost soul. Thus it is justified, but yet thus it cannot be allowed to remain. The most perfect form in the development of religion is theology, scientific religion, in which the witness of the Spirit becomes known, along with its contents, in a scientific manner.[1]

In accordance with the position that had been taken up by the speculative philosophy, the problem, which had penetrated the whole history of theology, had been solved. The theological antithesis of revelation and reason passes over into the general antithesis of realism and idealism. If the latter be overcome, then so also is the former. And thus there was at last brought about a treaty of peace between mental tendencies which it had been thought could only exist in antagonism to one another. In consequence of the peculiar position which was occupied by theology at the time when the speculative philosophy came to take a prominent place, in consequence of the utter breakdown of supernaturalism, in consequence of the shallowness of rationalism, and in consequence of the subjective attitude of the theology of Schleiermacher, it was impossible that any other result should follow than this, that the more profound theological thinkers, who failed to find completeness and satisfaction either for themselves or for life as a whole in any of those theological systems, were attracted by the idealism of the speculative philosophy, by the systematic certainty with which it advanced, by the high importance which it attached to religion for the real and historical life of mankind, and the position which it assigned to religion in relation to philosophy, and to philosophy in relation to religion and theology. A speculative theology was

[1] Religionsphilosophie. Werke, Bd. xii. p. 160 ff.

soon constructed in accordance with the principles of the speculative philosophy, which found not a few adherents, and numbers among its most distinguished supporters, Daub, Marheineke, Rosenkranz, Baur, Rothe, Weisse, Biedermann. And although, just as it also happened in the case of some of the adherents of Schleiermacher's theology, there were some who came forward and used the speculative method only as a cloak for the most vulgar dogmatism, yet in general the speculative theology is to be regarded as the result and proper conclusion of that development, unto which theology in the domain of Protestantism must reach. The Reformation faith, which accepted the witness of the divine truth immediately by means of the word of God, could certainly in this witness find its full subjective satisfaction and rest; but so soon as it entered into the great ecclesiastical strife of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and thus came more and more into contact with general intellectual culture, all the authorities on which it had sought to support itself, Scripture, prophecies and miracles, the Church, the traditional doctrine of the Church, showed themselves to be insufficient, and there remained over only the authority, which also is alone worthy of it, the authority of the Spirit, which, out of the innermost life and law of its being, ratified that immediate witness, and adjudged to faith its objective divine right. While Catholicism, in consequence of its fundamental principles, was led to stake the justification of all religious and moral truth upon the miracle of the infallibility of a human individual, Protestantism, by reason of its own peculiar principle of inwardness and spirituality, is obliged to stake that justification on the authority of the thinking spirit of science. As the speculative philosophy recognised and appreciated the ideal and real worth of religion, it was it that first of all, in accordance with the representations of Schelling and Daub, and then of Rosenkranz,[1] received theology into the ideal circle

[1] Compare § 6 of the present work.

of the sciences, and thus recognised it as entitled to the rank of a science, which not only has to serve some sort of practical purpose, but also an immanent purpose, and has to reach this end by the way of rational thinking. While Schleiermacher, in consequence of his pursuing in his theology an end that had only the Church in view, set forth the believing consciousness as the harmony between revelation and reason, it was the scientific task of speculative theology to advance a proof for this agreement on behalf of the thinking consciousness. Inasmuch as it recognised the authorization of immediate faith as complete, it has inquired into positive Christianity, the doctrine of Scripture and the doctrine of the Church, as the expression of this faith, in accordance with its own proper method. It does not in a one-sided manner, as rationalism had done, set the representations of faith aside or admit in them a merely historical value, but it seeks to recognise the true contents which are contained in them, and to put these in a legitimate form as eternally valid ideas before the tribunal of the Spirit itself.

The acknowledgment cannot be withheld from speculative theology, that, with its ideal spiritualization of the contents of faith, it has at many points hit upon the truth, and especially has broken ground in regard to an actually objective treatment of Holy Scripture and of the doctrine of the Church; nevertheless in general its procedure was of such a kind that it was carried out, not in accordance with a purely objective but rather in accordance with an *à priori* point of view. The speculative philosophy has certainly earned credit to itself by its attitude toward the theological parties, for having raised theology to the rank of a science, but to the theology, which proceeded from it, it communicated not only the formal principle of the rational thinking, but at the same time the philosophical idea upon which the whole speculative system rests. Hence it happened, that in speculative theology the interests of the speculative system were preponderating in the

treatment of the object of faith. The tendency, therefore, was not to discern the conceptions of faith, which the doctrine of Scripture and of the Church afforded, from the spirit which produced them, but rather to explain them in accordance with the spirit of the speculative philosophy. With many speculative theologians the interest in exegetical and historical theology fell into the background, or at least, even if it was still maintained, was placed under the dominion of ideas borrowed from the system. The course, therefore, which speculative theology took, was predominantly a metaphysical one. Hegel himself, thoroughly as he appreciated the subjective side of faith, allowed himself in the philosophical development of it to be led essentially in accordance with the objective side, according to which it was to him a representation of the Absolute. In consequence of this, Hegel was led to turn his attention chiefly to the metaphysical doctrines of Christianity, to the doctrine of the Trinity, of Christ, the God-man, the twofold nature of Christ, the incarnation of God in Christ, and in those doctrines to point out the speculative determinations of the Absolute Spirit, because he thought that in this way he was able to show the thorough agreement of philosophy with positive Christianity. Now the importance which belongs to these doctrines for philosophy and theology is not to be called in question; but Hegel overestimates their importance when he identifies the Church dogma with Christianity. Those doctrines, which are themselves indeed only manifestations of the Christian faith, do not so essentially belong to the contents of that faith, that by them proof is to be led of the harmony between philosophy and Christianity, and by means of this proof is also to be gained for the truth of Christianity, just as also inversely, even had disharmony between those doctrines and philosophy been demonstrated, this would not involve in it a proof for the untruth of Christianity. But the speculative theology for the most part attached itself to the procedure of its great master, and felt

itself compelled to reverence in Hegel the genius by whom the problem was finally solved as to the restoration of the true relations between philosophy and Christianity, between theology and philosophy. Thus it turned with a special preference to the metaphysical content of the positive faith, and not unfrequently lost itself in a scholasticism which was widely estranged from actual everyday life, and upon its speculative heights lost sight of the real demands and requirements of the Christian faith,—an estrangement which has in large measure contributed to prevent the speculative theology from finding a general acceptance in so wide a circle as that which received the theology of Schleiermacher with favour.

The conviction, which is shared by the disciples of Hegel and the speculative theologians, that by Hegel the antithesis of revelation and reason has been resolved into a higher speculative unity, maintained its place unshaken so long as the authority of the Master dominated the school, and both, the speculative philosophy and the speculative theology, were presented in the strict form of the system and in its not easily understood phraseology. There were speculative mysteries, the celebration of which filled the initiated with enthusiasm, the understanding of which, however, continued locked up from the general public, not only from believers, but even from the cultured classes, and, as Hegel himself expressed it,[1] must continue locked up. A harmony did indeed seem to have been introduced amongst the highest orders of the intellectual life by Schleiermacher, and still more by Hegel, which accorded admirably with the political restoration which followed upon the storms of the revolution and of the wars of freedom. A rapid change, however, took place immediately after the death of Hegel. The younger spirits, who had received their training from the Hegelian philosophy, looked upon the speculative philosophy as the absolute philosophy, outside of which there was nothing higher. What they had

[1] At the close of his Religionsphilosophie. Werke, Bd. xii. p. 288.

discovered in the system as truth, they thought that they would be under obligation to put into actual practice and to set forth for the public benefit. The philosophical results were now expounded without reserve in clear and generally comprehensible language, the Hegelian principles were developed without regard to consequences, and an unrelenting criticism was entered upon against all existing conditions of life in civil society, in State, and Church. In the Hegelian school itself this brought on a division into the right and the left wings, which are distinguished very much by the position they assume on this question. Instead of the reconciliation between faith and knowledge that had been before proclaimed, an altogether irreconcilable breach made itself apparent between Christianity and this philosophy. The Hegelians of the left wing, the so-called Young-Hegelians, or the *Hegelingen*, as they have been mockingly termed, gave free expression to the opinion that the unity of religion and philosophy insisted upon by Hegel was a mere veiling of the actual matter of fact; but if one wishes to produce a practical effect, he must not create illusions either for himself or for others, but must take things as they are, and call them by their proper names. Now, although Hegel thinks that if religion and philosophy had the same content, and were consequently one, their difference would amount to only a formal difference, because religion has the Absolute in the form of the impression (*Vorstellung*), and philosophy has it in the form of the notion (*Begriff*), there is actually no truth in that unity of religion and philosophy. For the content and form do not place themselves in a relation of equality with one another, but rather where the form is different the content itself also is different. Therefore, if philosophy has the Absolute in a form different from that in which religion has it, the Absolute of philosophy is also something different from the Absolute of religion, and between the two, not unity, but a significant difference finds place. From what has been adduced above,

from the quotations that have been made from the writings of Hegel, it is clear that the Young-Hegelians by means of this application of theirs have hit upon the actual meaning of the system. In his treatment of Christianity Hegel always starts from the position that Christianity, as indeed religion itself, moves in the sphere of the impression (*Vorstellung*), and consequently conceives of the Absolute as something objective and particular, as an existing nature (*ein seiendes Wesen*) outside of the Spirit, and as an existing divine personality outside of and over the world. This attitude of religion Hegel unequivocally designated as the standpoint of transcendence, as the standpoint of abstract theism, which distinguishes God from the world, and thinks of the world as created and governed by God from without. At this standpoint of dualism the ordinary theology also takes its stand, the rationalistic theology just as well as the supernaturalistic, although indeed the former at the same time admits, that of God outside of the world no objective knowledge can be gained, that rather he must be believed in, according to the doctrine of Kant, as a postulate of the practical reason. The philosophy of identity, on the other hand, raised itself to a knowledge of God by freeing the Absolute from the externality and separateness (*Jenseitigkeit*) under which it had been represented at the religious and theological standpoint. The Absolute is the Absolute Spirit, which is not outside of the world, but living in the world, which manifests itself in nature and in history, especially in the historical religions, until in philosophy it reaches an actual knowledge of this Spirit immanent in nature and humanity. Philosophy is the self-consciousness of the Absolute Spirit. In the idea of the spiritual *universum* the religious and theological dualism is for it overcome. Hegel certainly is entitled to repudiate the imputation of pantheism in the ordinary sense of the term,[1] as the doctrine that all is God and that God is all, but yet the

[1] Compare Werke, Bd. vii. p. 453 ff.

expression serves quite correctly to characterize his system, if it be taken to mean, that God is only in the all. But if the matter stands so even with Hegel's own proper utterances, the Young-Hegelians did not hesitate to declare Hegel's affirmation of the unity of Christianity and philosophy a mere fiction, and with full definiteness to set the philosophical view of the world over against the Christian. The two are essentially distinguished from one another, the former maintaining the immanence, the latter the transcendence, of the divine. If at an earlier stage the antithesis of supernaturalism and rationalism was present in the theological field, a much more profound and far-reaching antithesis now presented itself, the antithesis of Christian theism and philosophical pantheism, of theological dualism and philosophical monism, an antithesis which excludes every sort of reconciliation, and can only be removed when one side of it has been surrendered. And as to which side must be surrendered, there could be among the Young-Hegelians, who saw absolute truth in the system of their master, no manner of doubt: the Christian view of the world must give way before the philosophical.

Among the supporters of this tendency David Frederick Strauss is without doubt the most distinguished.[1] The tendency which has shown itself through all his theological writings, is the determined struggle against Christianity. As Hegel employed dogmatic Christianity in order to prove the unity of Christianity and philosophy, Strauss also has always this dogmatic Christianity in view, in order to combat Christianity and to set in its place philosophical truth. Already in his *Life of Jesus*[2] he unmistakeably takes up this position.

[1] Compare Ed. Zeller, David Friedrich Strauss in seinem Leben und seinen Schriften geschildert. Bonn 1874. W. Lang, David Strauss. Ein Charakteristik. Leipzig 1874. Carl Schwarz, David Friedrich Strauss und sein letztes Werk: Der alte und der neue Glaube. Gotha 1876. A. Hausrath, David Friedrich Strauss und die Theologie seiner Zeit. 2 Theile. Heidelberg 1876, 1878. [Zeller's Life of Strauss has been translated into English. London 1874.]

[2] Das Leben Jesu, kritisch bearbeitet von David Friedrich Strauss. Tübingen 1835. 2nd, 3rd, and 4th editions 1837, 1838, 1840. [This work was trans-

When the Hegelians of the right set forth the doctrine that the idea was not a mere Kantian supposed ground of obligation (*Sollen*), but indeed an essence, that therefore the rational is also actual, that therefore the idea of the incarnation as an approved idea of the reason must also have a historical existence, and be realized in accordance with the evangelical views in the Person of Christ, Strauss contested this deduction, apparently upon the ground of historical criticism; but in truth he set that philosophical proposition over against the other, and, in the sense of the system, quite correct proposition, that the idea, that is to say, the Absolute itself, does not realize itself in such a form that it gives forth its whole fulness in one Exemplar, but rather spreads out the wealth of its contents in a variety of exemplars.[1] In the interests of this proposition Strauss takes up the mythical principle of interpretation, and labours with its help to show up the Christology of the Church in its untenableness, and reduces the whole evangelical history down to its smallest details to a product of an unintentional poetic legend. "This is the key to the whole Christology, that as the subject of the predicates which the Church attributes to Christ, instead of an individual, an idea is set forth, but a real idea and not an unreal one like that of Kant." Not an individual, a God-man, but mankind, humanity itself, is the incarnate God.

It cannot be matter of wonder that upon these lines Strauss himself was soon surpassed. In accordance with his treatment of the evangelical history, it was an easy step to the supposition that it was not Christ who had created the Church, but that it was rather the Church that had created Christ. It

lated into English by Miss Marian Evans, afterwards well known as George Eliot, and published under the title: The Life of Jesus critically examined. 3 vols. London 1846.]

[1] Compare Leben Jesu. Bd. 2. Auflage 2, p. 737 ff. And the treatise, The Enduring and Changing Elements in Christianity: Two friendly papers by David Friedrich Strauss. Altona 1839, p. 98.

was to this absurdity that Bruno Bauer lent himself, when he sought to reduce the Christ of the Bible to a mere picture drawn by the idealizing fancy of the primitive Church.[1] In his dogmatics,[2] then, Strauss joined himself with those who had, in regard to the relationship of religion to philosophy, combated the idea that the contents and the form are equivalent (vol. i. p. 12), and sought to show, by a reference to the doctrines as a whole, that their untenableness could be demonstrated by means of their own history. The Christian system of doctrine appeared to him to be simply a witness to the spirit's losing itself in externality, to the estrangement of the spirit from itself; and when, indeed, there remains over to him so little of the historical Christ, as appears from p. 34, he can only surrender Christianity as a standpoint that has been surmounted. The agreement of speculation with Christianity was a mere appearance. The cleft is now deeper than ever. Philosophy, as the [illegible]ence of the Absolute in the world, stands over against [illegible]anity as the religion of transcendence (p. 66 ff.). [illegible] hesitate to answer in the negative the question [illegible]her the new speculative truth is the same as the [illegible]ion of [illegible] the Church: for Christianity is [illegible] him only as a subordinate and incomplete form [illegible] truth, (p. 71 f.). Hence the mere science have to exchange the Church articles of faith for the scientific views attained unto a reconciliation between faith and knowledge is not possible, and such an attempt can only widen the separation between the two sides of the antithesis (p. 332 f. The old theism is overthrown; God is not a particular-personality, but the universal-personality (pp. 520, 524).

[1] Kritik der evangelischen Geschichte der Synoptiker von Bruno Bauer. Bd. 1, 2. Leipzig 1841. Compare my work, Lehrfreiheit und Widerlegung der kritischen Principien Bruno Bauer's. Breslau 1843.

[2] Die Christliche Glaubenslehre in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwickelung und im Kampfe mit der modernen Wissenschaft dargestellt von D. Fr. Strauss. Bd. 1, 2. Tübingen und Stuttgart 1840, 1841.

With that clear insight which was characteristic of Strauss, he would not shut himself up, in consequence of those historical investigations which by his negative criticism had been entered upon, to the view that the dogmatic Christianity which, in his *Life of Jesus* and in his *Dogmatics*, he had made the one object of his criticism, is to be identified with the Christian religion as such, and that behind the dogmatic Christ a historical Christ is not still to be found, whose significance he had not hitherto acknowledged. In reference to this advanced position, Strauss has not hesitated to express his opinion in very plain terms, first of all in his treatise, *The Changing and the Enduring in Christianity*, and then in his new version of his Life of Jesus, entitled *The Life of Jesus for the German People*.[1] In the former work he represents Christ as the Genius "in whom the Father of all spirits has revealed Himself to mankind;" and he represents him as indeed a genius of the highest order, that of the founders of religions, and assigns to Him again among these the first place as the founder of the most perfect religion, "to whom among all geniuses the first-fruits are due of that honour which we offer to genius" (p. 108 f.). Within the sphere of the religious sphere the highest point is reached by Christ beyond which no one in time to come will be able to advance (p. 127). He is a figure who at the same time forms a point of transition, by means of which an idea enters into the world of phenomena. If the unhistorical character of it be left out of view, the idea which Christ first of all introduced among men is in accordance with the description given of Jesus in the Gospels: "the consciousness of the essential union of the truly human with the divine" (p. 130). And just in the same way, in *The Life of Jesus for the German People*, it is said of the Christ of

[1] Das Leben Jesu für das deutsche Volk bearbeitet von D. Fr. Strauss. Leipzig 1864. [English translation entitled, New Life of Jesus. London 1865.]

history that everything finds itself fully developed in Him which has to do with the love of God and of our neighbour, with the purity of heart and life (p. 626). By reason of this hearty acknowledgment of the religious sublimity of Jesus, it might appear as though Strauss had wished to stretch out the hand for reconciliation, and wished to avoid making a thoroughgoing breach with Christianity. But even in the soliloquies on the changing and enduring elements in Christianity, even if they should have been written in an unsound frame of mind,[1] still no utterance is to be found which might stand over against the fundamental philosophical position of the author, and in the *Life of Jesus for the People* the Christ of history is immediately confronted with the ideal Christ, that figure of moral mystery "of which the historical Jesus has, indeed, for the first time brought into light many features, but which as an outlined sketch belongs to the general dowry of our species, just as much as its further cultivation and completion can be the task and work only of mankind as a whole" (p. 627); and further, in the dedication to his brother prefixed to his book, "the emancipation of the spirit from religious delusions" is spoken of, and an expression is given to a view of the world "which with the refusal of all supernatural sources of help leads men to trust to their own resources and to the natural order of things."

The simple devotion to truth, which forms the most conspicuous feature in his truly noble character, compelled Strauss indeed to make acknowledgment of a historical fact, but just as firmly did it hold him down to that philosophical conviction which he had gained from the study of the speculative philosophy. That this conviction, from the time when he first gave public expression to it, constituted the innermost core of his life, we must believe, in dealing with such a character as Strauss, simply upon his own word; for in

[1] Compare Zeller, D. Fr. Strauss in seinem Leben und seinen Schriften, p. 51. [English translation, p. 62 ff. Compare especially p. 66.]

his last work,[1] which, not long before his death in 1874, was left to those entertaining his opinions as a last testimony, he expressly says, that during forty years of literary activity had been steadily directed toward the same end (p. 9). We have to consider this work in short as a confession, in which a life-long conviction is stated with clear consciousness, a conviction which the most painful experience of life had not destroyed, nor even in the slightest measure shaken. There is laid before us here briefly and conclusively, in the most lucid form, a modern view of the world which is to take the place of that of Christianity and the Church: and the Church as guardian of the Christian faith alongside of the State and schools, alongside of science and art, is declared superfluous (p. 7). Even here it is again dogmatic Christianity against which the critic aims his shafts, so that after an easily obtained victory, Christianity generally, with its representations of a personal God and a life after death, is represented as quite untenable, and as utterly incompatible with the modern view of the world, which is assumed to be absolutely incontestable truth. The critic with the "*we*," in whose name he speaks, can therefore do nothing else than make the confession that they are no longer Christians. There is, however, the further question, whether they are on this account without religion! The modern conception of God amounts only to this, that the very highest idea is that of the universe, unity in variety, variety in unity, a universe which embraces everything which we recognise in the natural as well as in the moral world as force and life, as order and law; and it is only when we occupy ourselves with a mere creation of the imagination that we represent to ourselves over and above this an originator of the universe as the Absolute personality (p. 119 ff.). The religion, therefore, which alone remains over to the

[1] Der Alte und der Neue Glaube. Ein Bekenntniss von D. Fr. Strauss. Leipzig 1872. [English translation entitled, The Old Faith and the New. London 1874.]

"we" after their abandonment of Christianity, can consist only in a relationship to this universe, their highest idea; and so Strauss retains to Schleiermacher's philosophical conception of religion, to the determination of feeling by means of the universe. The new faith is feeling of unconditional dependence upon the universe the legitimate All, full of life and reason (Pp. 138, 143), and the ground thought, the actual foundation upon which the new faith rests, is the principle: "The universe is cause and effect, at once the internal and the external" (p. 14)), a dictum regarding the "logical right of existence" of which even natural science, but especially philosophy and theology, will have to decide.[1]

While from the beginning Strauss fought a purely scientific battle, and by all the means of theological learning sought to prove that, in accordance with the right understanding of the Hegelian system, Christianity cannot be reconciled with speculative truth, others started immediately from this point to make an endeavour to secure for this persuasion a recognition and vindication in the actual life. The chief organ among those men whose philosophy had an immediately practical direction, was the Review edited by Arnold Ruge and Echtermeyer, and published from the year 1838 under the title of the *Halle Review of German Science and Art*, (Halle'sche Jahrbücher für deutsche Wissenschaft und Kunst. 3 Bde. Leipzig 1838–1840), and afterwards under the name of the *German Review of Science and Art* (Deutsche Jahrbücher für Wissenschaft und Kunst. 2 Bde. Leipzig 1841, 1842), and finally, in the year 1843, suppressed by an edict of the Saxon government. If the standpoint of religion generally, or Christianity, is to be conceived of as one that is surmounted, then, too, there is no longer any need of Church. In place of the Church the State

[1] Compare Ein Nachwort als Vorwort zu den neuen Auflagen meiner Schrift: Der alte und der neue Glaube, von D. Fr. Strauss. Bonn 1873, p. 45.

alone has to step in a has to make this a special care, that the citizens of t' State, instead of being educated in religion, are rath ucated in philosophy. After the removal of the Church, the et the State must restore a public school system, by means of wh the philosophical consciousness of the rising generation may ltivated.

This was the political w dom which under the greatest variety of forms was advoca by means of this Review. It was Ludwig Feuerbach,[1] however, who carried out the principles of this standpoint their utmost extreme, and sought to supply to the practical directions of the Review their theoretical basis. While Strauss wished to have Christianity set aside as an antiquated view of the world, yet he always looked upon religion, in accordance with the example of Hegel, as an activity of reason, "which, of the ascending series of the religions was leading Leipzig in ever-increasing approximation to the truth."[2] On the other hand, Feuerbach declared that religion was merely a product of the human heart, in which man makes his own nature his object. There is nothing objective, nothing infinite, no Absolute, no real God, to whom man may perchance in religion stand in any relationship, but God and the divine attributes are only determinations of human nature itself, and therefore also the subject of religion is only human nature. In reference to God man always relates himself only to himself, to his own nature. The truth in religion just amounts to this; and that the same is true also in regard to Christianity, Feuerbach shows in the first division of his work in dealing with separate Christian doctrines, and then, in the second division, he seeks to make plain the untrue, that is to say, the theological, nature of religion. Man, therefore, with his religious notions,

[1] Ludwig Feuerbach, Das Wesen des Christenthums. 1841. [An English translation appeared under the title: The Essence of Christianity, by Miss Marian Evans, translator of Strauss' Life of Jesus.]

[2] Strauss, Glaubenslehre, Bd. 1, p. 22.

according to which he sets over against himself the divine as something objective, is found to be under the influence of an unconscious self-delusion. All religion is nothing more than anthropology. After this insight has been gained, the practical task consists in emancipating man from his religious illusions, and bringing into consciousness his once free nature, in order that he may learn in a truly human way to determine his own position in this world, and to convert earth into his heaven. Thus, too, Feuerbach raises himself above religion, as a mere representation of the divine in our own conception; but he distinguishes himself from the Hegelians in this, that instead of pantheism he sets forth a panauthropism. Man is the All, and the religion of the future can only be a cultus of humanity.

These theories were set forth with great confidence and self-assertiveness in popular treatises, and in a style comprehensible by the people generally. While in themselves these writings had much that was captivating, inasmuch as they set man upon the throne, they could not fail to exert a special influence upon an epoch which was deeply agitated in reference to social questions, and which occupied itself with various measures of reform in the social life. To this there may further be added an ecclesiastical pressure, which in many places was put forth by those in authority, so that vigorous spirits might be easily driven into opposition and led to adopt this extreme of negation. It was not therefore long before an endeavour was made to put this emancipation and this cultus of mankind into practice. The so-called *Free Churches* (*freie Gemeinde*), which, by means of Wislicenus from the year 1841, were called into existence in Halle, and which soon spread out to other places, decided for themselves, each society according to its own peculiar bent, what should be regarded as forming the special terms of communion in its congregational life. For Humanism and Socialism, that is to say, generally for the reformation of human society in accord-

ance with the principle of free, self-dependent humanity, it is evident that its heaven must be sought upon earth. Even from among those German-Catholic congregations (the so-called *Deutsch-Katholicismus*) which in general, in accordance with their establishment under Johannes Ronge in the year 1845, have sworn allegiance to the old rationalism, some attached themselves to those Free Churches.[1]

In consequence of all these occurrences the Hegelian school was completely split up and broken. Another philosophical system, which might attain to a general acceptance and authority, did not exist. On the other hand, the natural sciences were ever advancing more and more toward the front, and it was just these sciences which, in part at least, gave to the doctrine of the free man its scientific limitation. If man is set forth and regarded purely in himself, then it was an easy step to give a representation of man free from every trace of idealism, and to consider him as a mere product of nature, which as a product of matter acts, too, only by means of material powers, and is determined by material motives. Thus a system of materialism was scientifically established, which soon became, even for the uneducated, the path to atheism, and lost itself in the pure egoism of communism, a state of matters similar to that which had arisen in France in the end of the previous century, and which led to outbursts of the most brutal bestiality. From lofty and pure sources troubled streams flowed down to the lowest strata of the

[1] Wislicenus, Ob Scrift, ob Geist? Leipzig 1845. Kirchliche Reform. Monatschrift, herausgegeben von Wislicenus. Halle 1846–1852. Kampe, Geschichte der religiösen Bewegungen der Neuern Zeit. Leipzig 1852–1860, 4 Bände. [See an interesting account of this extraordinary episode in the history of the German Evangelical Church, Herzog, Real-Encyclopædie, zweite Auflage, Bd. viii. pp. 656–663, under the section *Lichtfreunde*. Specially remarkable and significant is the following confession of Uhlich, one of the leaders of the party: "At the beginning I could say: We hold fast to the opinion that Jesus is too high to be regarded as a mere man. Ten years later I could say: God, Virtue, and Immortality, these are the three eternal foundations of all religion. And yet other ten years later, I could put forth a formal manifesto, in which Christianity and God are no longer referred to."]

people. The sublime idealism of philosophy had been degraded into absolute naturalism. The unity of religion, of Christianity, theology, and philosophy, proclaimed by Hegel, was changed from a direct antagonism, was changed theoretically into a reckless destruction and demolition of religion and Christianity, practically into the most decided opposition to the Christian life, the Christian Church, and theology.[1]

[1] Compare generally the historical sketch and survey in §§ 16–18. Also: W. Gass, Geschichte der Protestantischen Dogmatik in ihrem Zusammenhange mit der Theologie überhaupt. Bd. 1–4. Berlin 1854–1867. G. Frank, Geschichte der Protestantischen Theologie (von Luther bis 1817). Th. 1–3. Leipzig 1862–1875. J. A. Dorner, Geschichte der Protestantischen Theologie. München 1867. [English translation, published by Messrs T. & T. Clark, History of Protestant Theology, particularly in Germany, edited by Rev. George Robson. Edinburgh 1871, 2 vols.] F. Chr. Baur, Vorlesungen über die Christliche Dogmengeschichte. Bd. 3. Das Dogma der neuern Zeit. Leipzig 1867. Carl Schwarz, Zur Geschichte der neuesten Theologie. Leipzig 1856. 4 Auflage 1869. J. F. Kohr, Briefe über den Rationalismus, Aachen 1813. J. A. H. Tittmann, Ueber Supernaturalismus, Rationalismus und Atheismus. Leipzig 1816. A. Hahn, De rationalismi, qui dicitur vera indole et qua cum naturalismo contineatur ratione. Lipsiæ 1827. A. Schweizer, Kritik des Eigensatzes zwischen Rationalismus und Supranaturalismus. Zürich 1833. J. E. Erdmann, Vorlesungen ueber Glauben und Wissen. Berlin 1837. A. F. L. Pelt, Protestantismus, Supranaturalismus, Rationalismus und Speculative Theologie. Kiel 1839. K. F. E. Trahndorff, Wie kann der Supranaturalismus sein Recht gegen Hegel's Religionsphilosophie behaupten? Berlin 1840. Theluck, Vorgeschichte des Rationalismus. Abth. 1, 2. Halle 1853, 1854. By the same author, Geschichte des Rationalismus. Abth. 1. 1865. Rücker, Der Rationalismus. Leipzig 1859. [Hagenbach, German Rationalism. Engl. transl. Edinburgh 1865. A. S. Farrar, Critical History of Free Thought in reference to the Christian Religion. London 1863. H. J. Rose, State of Protestant Religion in Germany. 1825. E. B. Pusey, Historical Inquiry into the Probable Causes of the Rationalistic Character of Theology in Germany. 1828, 1839. J. F. Hurst, History of Rationalism. New York 1865. W. E. H. Lecky, The Rise and Influence of Rationalism in Europe. 2 vols. London 1873. John Cairns, Unbelief in the Eighteenth Century, Cunningham Lecture for 1880. Edinburgh 1881; especially chap. v.: Unbelief in Germany. Emile Saisset, Manual of Modern Pantheism, an Essay on Religious Philosophy, from the French. Edinburgh 1862. 2 vols. C. E. Plumptre, General Sketch of the History of Pantheism. 2 vols. London 1881.]

§ 19. THE IDEA OF THEOLOGY.

A radicalism which put in question the most sacred interests of humanity and the most essential foundations of the entire life, that owed its form and development to Christianity, and that had the sanction of a long history, which was willing along with religion to set aside Christianity, and along with Christianity to set aside the Church and theology, was such as would of necessity provoke a reaction. Even natural science, as well as philosophy and history, and especially theology, and that, too, in its present conservative direction, entered into the struggle against the destructive tendencies which had come into vogue. After the reawakening of interest in religion, which was the result of the wars of freedom, the old doctrinaire supernaturalism passed gradually over into pietism,[1] which in accordance with the stimulus which it received from Moravianism, and in opposition to philosophical and theological idealism, gave its allegiance to a Biblical realism, and by using the appliances supplied by modern culture, sought to make the word of Scripture and the doctrine of the Church a matter of the inner life. This pietism which was most keenly affected by Strauss' *Life of Jesus*, and may even be said to have transformed itself with amazing rapidity into a polemic against it, in direct opposition to the whole current of the modern view of the world favoured by the Young-Hegelians, made its appearance as the theology of modern positivism and confessionalism, or as the modern orthodox theology, a transformation to which, it must be

[1] Compare Albrecht Ritschl, Die Christliche Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung. Bd. 1-3. Bonn, 1870-1874. Bd. 1, p. 542. [Of this work the first volume has been translated into English by Rev. John S. Black, under the title, A Critical History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation. Edinburgh 1872. For above reference, see pp. 513-577.]

acknowledged, the *Evangelische Kirchenzeitung*, edited by Hengstenberg from the year 1827, most largely contributed.[1] After the separation of the Old Lutherans, caused by the union of the year 1817, it was chiefly within the circles of the New Lutherans in the united Church that the modern Lutheran orthodoxy was brought to maturity. According to this theology, preservation against the anti-religious, anti-Christian, and anti-ecclesiastical tendencies of the time is to be found only in the most thoroughgoing restoration of the positive system of belief of all the Church. The decided objectivity of this belief must be set up in direct opposition to unbridled subjectivity. Hence, above all, the Confession of the Church must be recognised as the legitimate rule and authority, and the Holy Scripture, from which that Confession, was drawn, must be regarded as inspired in the very letter, and as the infallible word of God. The Church must be the must be a defence of this Confession, which lies Lutheran or the Reformed Confession; not so much upon the contents of the Confession as upon its formal validity as law; and besides, the conviction prevailed that the Reformed element would in a short time surrender itself to the influence of the Lutheran. The theological faculties must be formed by teachers who are faithful to the Confession, and they have only the task of training pastors who will be faithful to the Confession. The pastors are to subscribe the Confession, and must not by a single finger's breadth depart from its doctrine in their preaching. The order of worship for the Church is to be revised and reformed in accordance with the Confession. Books of private devotion, liturgical services, and the old Church hymns, are to be restored, in order that the old Church faith may win its place again in the heart and affections of the Church. Church discipline, too, catechetical examination of those desiring to

[1] Compare Carl Schwarz, Zur Geschichte der neuesten Theologie. 4 Auflage, p. 227 ff.

enter into matrimony, and strict ecclesiastical marriage laws, are to be enforced. And especially, education must be again put under the charge of the Church, and not only in the primary schools, but also in gymnasia or high schools, the catechism must be impressed upon the memories of the youths, together with the best selected hymns.

This theology recognises in the union and in science the chief opponents which the restoration has to encounter. Both of these were regarded by it not only as hindrances interfering with its aspirations, but also as the source from which those conditions of the present which are causing alarm proceeded: both must be removed out of the way, or else into an altogether different course. The union, which sprung only from indifference in regard to the Confession, which was in itself the means of fostering this indifference, this opposition with the most persistent energy. And not only employed to induce the ruling to frustrate the union, but even the ...ions were enlisted against it by means of ...itation. Then again to science, which alone had allowed the ...fluence of subjective ...vity to continue, the call was addressed to return from its former ways, and to subordinate itself likewise to the divine truth contained in the Scriptures and in the Church Confession of the sixteenth century. Above all, this demand is made of the modern theology, which, by means of the rationalistic elements, that have overflowed it like a heritage of the curse, is thoroughly corrupted, until it has become a theology of rhetoric, of dialectic and of phrases, until it has become a drunken science, ...ft of every trace of reason. In its place the theology of facts is to make its appearance. The Church with its revealed doctrine, the offices of the guidance of the Church and of the services of the Church, especially the clerical office as "the ministry of the means of grace" (*Gnadenmittelamt*), with its power of the keys, and the

sacraments administered by it, with their inherent gracious efficacy,—these are the objective facts unto which theology has to subordinate itself, in order to be raised again to the rank of queen among the sciences, and to rule over all the other sciences with her sceptre.[1] The Church served by such a theology, even although endowed with the highest legal or constitutional powers, must enter into the closest connection with the State. As the Church has to seek its support in the temporal power of the State, so the State has to seek its support in the spiritual power of the Church. These two powers ordained of God meet together in the system of the State-Church, in which the idea of the Church finds its true expression.

During three decades, extending from the year 1840 to the year 1870, the field was being occupied ever more and more fully by this modern orthodox theology. The philosophical radicalism, the revolutionary events of the year 1848, the political reaction which followed upon this,—all these things worked together to secure the elevation of this theology to a thoroughly dominant position, under the protection and directly under the fostering care of the State. To the [illegible]nse satisfaction of that Jesuitism, which might fairly hope that on a field which it had itself fertilized it should soonest reap the fruits at which it had aimed, this orthodox theology made reckless use of the power granted to it, with all that narrow exclusiveness that corresponded to its principles. It was quite in keeping with its legalistic character that it should have had among its principal adherents the two jurists, Stahl and Gerlach. Among the theologians belonging to this school may be named Hengstenberg, Kliefoth, Löhe, Vilmar, von Hofmann, Thomasius, Delitzsch, Philippi.[2]

[1] Vilmar, Die Theologie der Thatsachen wider der Theologie der Rhetorik. Marburg.1856. C Scheele, Die Trunkene Wissenschaft und ihr Erbe an die Evangelische Kirche. Berlin 1867.

[2] A much more favourable view of Hengstenberg and his Church tendencies is given by Zöckler in his Handbook, vol. ii. pp. 374, 375. Care must be taken

It cannot be denied that it had some justification, or at least apology, in the conflict against the destructive radicalism, inasmuch as it had been driven by means of one extreme into the other. The conflict, however, as conducted by this theology, must be not only without result, but must even turn to the advantage of the enemy against whom it was directed. As generally happens, so also here it was found that extremes meet. They occupy common ground in that subjective arbitrariness with which history is treated by both sides. When orthodoxy advanced against radicalism the reproach of revolution, it is itself no less open to the same reproach. For just as radicalism endeavoured to introduce its new view of the world with the most decided negation of the vital forces in history, so theology, with an equally radical negation of the whole intellectual and spiritual development of Protestantism, sought to restore again an old view of the world. But just because it urged this view without any intellectual attempt at mediation, laying it down simply as an old law, with the outward help of the civil power, it was not only not able, with its rigid and legalistic orthodoxy, to overcome radicalism, which was still at least a product of that development, and had to be fought with spiritual weapons, and to gain a victory again for the Church; but it furthered the very tendencies of radicalism, inasmuch as, just by means of the violent pressure of an antiquated ecclesiasticism, estrangement from, and active opposition to the Church, were called forth in many circles. In its conflict against the

to distinguish the different tendencies which show themselves in different members of this school. For among its adherents there were extreme and moderate confessionalists. To the former class belong Hengstenberg and Philippi; to the latter, Thomasius, Delitzsch, and Hofmann. Then, besides these classes, there was another which deserves the name Sacramentarian, including Kliefoth and Löhe. It is necessary that such a distinction as this should be made in regard to a list of names like that given above. It would clearly be unjust to classify Hofmann and Delitzsch, in regard to their confessionalism, along with Hengstenberg and Philippi; and equally unjust to all these, to charge them with Romanizing tendencies. For a fairer estimate of Hofmann's tendencies, see Dorner, Hist. Prot. Theology, ii. 405.—Ed.

destructive tendencies of the times, this theology made the mistake of entering upon a conflict with Protestantism itself. In accordance with the principles which it adopted, it turned back, not simply to the old orthodox Protestant theology, but to the orthodox theology of Catholicism. To rob theology of every rational element, and to place it purely under the authority of the Church, of ecclesiastical officers, and of tradition, is utterly to efface theology as a science, and to wound at the very seat of its life Protestantism, which as the outflow of the Christian conscience is to be established, not upon external authorities, but upon the authority of the spirit. The Catholicizing tendency made its appearance in the ranks of modern Lutheran orthodoxy so unmistakeably, that even the evangelical Supreme Church Council (*Ober Kirchenrath*) at Berlin in the year 1867 found itself obliged to send forth a warning in regard to it in the form of a special circular. Dorner, too, has very happily described the situation: "This was the stage," he says, "which in Germany corresponded to that of Puseyism in England, which had preceded it by some decades."[1]

The restoration theology of the period from the year 1840 to the year 1870 is, in accordance with its whole character, an eloquent and earnest exhortation addressed to the theology of the present to withdraw itself from principles which it maintained had been proved untenable, partly by means of the Reformation itself, and partly by means of the history of Protestant theology. Instead, however, of breaking with that history, it rather attached itself to its results, and on this ground endeavoured to secure for itself a scientific form. In order to attain this end, it has to hold its own against the two most important theological systems, with which the more recent development had been brought to a close,

[1] Compare Dorner, Geschichte der Protestantischen Theologe, p. 823. [English translation, vol. ii. p. 404. On German Puseyism in general, see vol. ii. pp. 403-406.]

Schleiermacher's theology and the speculative theology. In favour, generally speaking, of such a demand is the fact that the elements of the two systems referred to, separated more or less from one another, and often in their most characteristic blending, form for a large circle the fundamental constituents of the theology of the last decade. For, notwithstanding that the orthodox theology proscribed theological science, and, so far as it was able, endeavoured to remove the very remains of it, there were not wanting theologians who, with a genuinely Protestant and scientific spirit, pursued the study of theology in accordance with impulses received from Schleiermacher or Hegel, and sought to defend the conservative interests of the Church in opposition to the strong current in favour of negation. These theologians have themselves named their theology the Mediation-theology, and it has now become customary to refer to it under this name.[1] Among its most distinguished representatives may be named Neander, Lücke, C. I. Nitzsch, Julius Müller, Dorner, Ullmann, Liebner, J. P. Lange, Martensen, Hagenbach, Hundeshagen, Palmer; and it is sufficient to mention these names in order to call to remembrance the distinguished service which the Mediation-theology has rendered to the advancement of theological science in all its departments, in exegesis, in Church history, in dogmatics, and in practical theology. Nevertheless, looked at in reference to its systematic foundations, it shows so many defects and weaknesses, that the significance of a theological system which has been able to solve the problems set for theology by its history cannot be conceded to it. For while, by reason of the eclecticism with which it draws, partly from the theology of Schleiermacher, partly from speculative philosophy, it proceeds without a distinctive standard, it seeks, particularly in regard to all essential questions, to be, on the one hand, as just as possible to the claims of science,

[1] Compare Schwarz, Zur Geschichte der neuesten Theologie. 4 Auflage, p. 341 ff.

but also with comprehensive intentions, on the other hand, to conserve the fundamental positions of the old orthodox theology; so that, in consequence of this uncertain fluctuation hither and thither, it has not been able to win any firm standpoint for an unfettered historical treatment and for an objective historical criticism. The Theological Encyclopædia of Hagenbach[1] is a proof of what has been said, as also his Apology for the Mediation-theology, which, notwithstanding all the excellencies which are to be admitted in its favour, still does not succeed in removing out of view its weak points.[2]

As a piece of evidence, the *System of Christian Certainty* of Frank does not prove satisfactory.[3] Frank proceeds upon the lines of Schleiermacher from the certainty of faith, and, while he makes the certainty of regeneration and conversion the essential ground of that certainty of faith, and, in reference to this central certainty, distinguishes the objects of Christian truth into immanent, transcendent, and transient, the Christian is to have a self-certainty as to the truth of all those objects of faith, in so far as they are embraced in that central certainty. He is to be led on, in the same way in which he was led to the certainty of regeneration, to the reality of an absolute personal God; and, by means of an analysis of the separate elements that enter into the process of regeneration, he is brought to distinguish in God a tri-personal mode of existence. By such a statement Frank certainly means it to be understood, that from the sources of knowledge at his command he reaches only the idea of an economic Trinity, and that the idea of an immanent or essential Trinity must be relegated to dogmatics.

By means of this method, which proceeds from Christian experience and the certainty of faith, we can never attain a

[1] Compare what is said in criticism of Hagenbach's Encyclopædia under § 6.

[2] Ueber die sogenannte Vermittelungs Theologie. Zur Abwehr und Verständigung, von K. R. Hagenbach. Zürich 1858.

[3] Das System der Christlichen Gewissheit von Fr. H. R. Frank. Hälfte 1, 2. Erlangen 1870, 1873.

higher position than that of a subjective certainty of truth. For, however general that experience and certainty may be, the demonstration of the truth, that is, the necessity and universal validity of the objects of faith, cannot be deduced from such a line of argument. Indeed, it must lead to the most doubtful consequences, if we were to conclude from the certainty of faith to the reality of the objects of faith. Subjective certainty does not determine objective truth, but contrariwise, often the former is determined by the latter. But further, even dogmatics, which Frank introduces in systematic theology after his System of Christian Certainty, cannot advance to a demonstration of this objective truth. For this would be to dominate dogmatics, and to degrade it to a position of complete dependence, if it is not to be in its power either to abandon or to alter anything that has been laid down in the preceding System of Certainty as Christian truth. Thus dogmatics still wears the aspect of a merely theological article of luxury, or must yet sink back into a mere formal intellectualism.[1] By means of a most impressive reflection upon the vital elements of faith, Frank endeavours to make the object of faith the personal possession of the Christian subject, but he has not thereby succeeded in accomplishing the scientific task which has been set for theology. The extraordinary significance which Carlblom[2] has assigned to the work of Frank, as opening up new lines of inquiry, we

[1] Frank has meanwhile begun to publish his dogmatics under the title, System der Christlichen Wahrheit. 1 Hälfte. Erlangen 1878. Specialists will have to determine upon the relation of this to the System of Certainty. [Zöckler, Handbook, vol. ii. p. 635, refers to the system of Frank as a genial work, which is destined to exert a powerful influence on the further development of the evangelical Lutheran system of doctrine. The system is embraced in three divisions. The first is given in the work on Christian Certainty; the second is given in that on Christian Truth, of which the concluding portion was published in 1881; the third division is entitled, System der Christlichen Sittlichkeit, and of this the first portion has appeared, Erlangen 1884.]

[2] Zur Lehre von der Christlichen Gewissheit. Drei Abhandlungen von A. Carlblom. Leipzig 1874. [Three Treatises on the Doctrine of Christian Certainty.]

are not able to recognise. His work may be satisfying to the believing Christian, who stands fast in his faith, although even he, unless he be altogether unreflecting, will be beset by many doubts upon the way along which Frank leads him. But, on the other hand, as for the Christian who has been shaken in his faith, and as for the anti-religious and anti-christian tendencies of the age, from which indeed the most agitating doubts pass over into Christian souls, this work, with its whole reflective deduction, will scarcely assist in reaching Christian certainty.

If, then, the eclecticism which characterises the Mediation-theology does not allow it to attain unto a fundamental and systematic new construction of theology,[1] it follows from what has been said in §§ 17 and 18 regarding Schleiermacher's theology and the speculative theology, that not even the carrying out of either the one or the other of these two systems to its ultimate consequences could lead to this end. Much rather it is urged, should the untenableness of the Mediation-theology be overcome, we ought to hold fast to the truth which is present in each, after the defects belonging to both systems have been eliminated, in order by means of this combination to win a distinctive standard according to which the system of theology is to be constructed. Schleiermacher and Hegel, as the actual creators of speculative theology, are, in the domain of theology, regarded as contrary to one another. In principle, the opposition is conditioned by means of their different conceptions of religion. According to Schleiermacher, religion is the feeling of absolute dependence upon God; according to Hegel, it is the apprehension of the Absolute. Out of this difference there must result a difference in the conception of theology. Because Schleiermacher introduced into theology his æsthetical idea of religion derived from philosophy, and in accordance

[1] Compare, against the Mediation-theology in favour of a liberal theology as a Mediation-theology, O. Bagge, fermenta theologica. Zur freien Theologie. Leipzig 1869.

therewith determined the essence of Christianity to be faith in the redemption through Christ, he makes this psychological ground of faith the immediate believing consciousness, and that, too, in its evangelical definiteness, the standard according to which positive Christianity is to be estimated, and sets before himself no other end than to indicate how far the doctrine of the Scripture and of the Church is in accordance with that faith. This whole theological activity, however, is not elaborated for believers, since these, by reason of their certainty of faith, are not in need of any such theological apparatus; but it is to serve rather for the Church, which, as the communion of believers, has at the same time to realize the ethical end of Christianity. It is intended, therefore, for those who are entrusted with the difficult and highly responsible office of guiding the Church, in order to give them certainty regarding that which is Christian and evangelical, and they are to be furnished with all the accomplishments which are indispensable for the management of the Church. The theology of Schleiermacher confines itself within the limits of this subjective and ecclesiastico-practical sphere. It purposely excludes from it the proof for the truth of Christianity, and satisfies itself with explaining what is Christian according to the evangelical faith. Nevertheless, theology cannot therefore either regard its task as accomplished, or confine it within the limits drawn for it by Schleiermacher. After Christianity, in the department of Protestantism, was drawn into the general historical and philosophical discussion, after a new view of the world was in consequence of this constructed, which entered into antagonism with the scientific attitude of the old Christian view, after all the external authorities, upon which the old theology supported the truth of Christianity, have proved themselves ready to fall and untenable, and after it has been seen that the old view is not to be won back even by the forcible measures of modern orthodoxy, theology must step out from its intra-

ecclesiastical position, and, in a manner universally valid and purely objective, lead the proof of its truth from the essence of Christianity. This is the result to which theology, by means of its development on the field of Protestantism, must be conducted; and this must be made plain from the side of the speculative philosophy, just as well by means of the positive attitude which it assumed toward Christianity and theology, as by means of the negative tendencies which it called forth. According to Hegel's theoretical conception of religion, religion is not only a determination of feeling by means of the Infinite, but, as an apprehension of the Absolute, is at the same time an immediate cognition and thought. And if, now, Christianity is the apprehension of the Absolute Spirit, the believing consciousness may constantly be certain of the idea of the Absolute by virtue of the immediate witness of the spirit, and may, out of its own inner life, create an objective system of faith. But the thought always latent and living in the faith must at the same time seek to conceive of the object of faith in accordance with its own laws, and to reach to an objective knowledge of it. From the very nature of faith, there follows the necessity of its establishing the immediate witness of the spirit by means of the intellectually mediated witness of thought, and proving the content of faith in its reasonable and universally valid truth. Now this task, inasmuch as it is concerned with the knowledge of the Absolute Spirit, falls principally under the head of philosophy, and along with it, also of theology. This, too, is in accordance with its notion, the knowledge of God mediated by rational thought.

These two, Schleiermacher and Hegel, in a similar manner made light of all external authorities in their procedure. But, while the former always treats the matter in a purely subjective way, and seeks by the believing consciousness to restore the harmony between revelation and the believing subject; Hegel, in accordance with the principle laid down

by him, in a purely objective way aims at proving the agreement of revelation with the thinking consciousness. According to the different changes through which theology passed since its separation from the old orthodoxy, during which it maintained a relation to the object of faith more or less subjective, and blended foreign elements with its subject-matter, it first, by means of the speculative philosophy, received its scientific character and the capacity for apprehending its subject as it really is, that is, proving it in the truth of its contents, and accordingly acknowledging or rejecting it. If theology is to affirm its right to rank as a science, and if it is to receive an independent position over against philosophy and the other sciences, then it must also make the formal principle of all philosophy, and of the other exact sciences, the principle of rational thought, its own, and, like every exact science, it must seek to recognise the positive element given it by means of rational thought. And since its activity is consequently directed immediately to its subject, it follows necessarily that it has to pursue, not, like the theology of Schleiermacher, a practical end lying outside of its own subject, but, pre-eminently and first of all, a theoretical end, in order to apprehend the subject of which it treats in its objective truth. And, likewise, there is this further result, that it cannot, like the theology of Schleiermacher, confine itself within the limits of a confession. For it is not Christianity, according to its conception in this or in that particular sect, that it has to expound, but it has rather to subject these particular expressions of Christianity to its criticism, and by this means to ascertain Christian truth as such, free from all sectarian interests.

While this theology distinguishes itself from that of Schleiermacher by this purely theoretical attitude, it is nevertheless necessary that from this side the further development thereof should be constantly carried on. It is in accordance with the theoretical conception of religion, which the speculative

philosophy and the speculative theology followed, that by preference it should turn to the metaphysical contents of the Christian faith, and that while engaged in metaphysical speculations, it should lose sight of the psychological significance which the objects of faith have for the believing consciousness. Against a one-sided objectivism, which thought to be able by means of its own notion to create the entire fulness of the actual life, theology must seek something as a counteractive in the subjectivism of Schleiermacher, and must maintain firm hold of the truth of that deep psychological conception which lies at the foundation of its idea of religion. Guided by this, theology will deal with and estimate the objects of faith, not only as theoretical problems, but at the same time in their relation to the immediate life of faith, and will be in a position to point out the groundlessness of those abstract consequences to which the speculative notion of religion had given rise. As theology, too, may in the future always assume the proof advanced by Schleiermacher, that religion is an independent and indestructible life rooted in the very nature of the human spirit, this may be received as in itself a precious inheritance. Without overlooking a single aspect of its purely scientific task, it will also henceforth always keep in view, after the example of Schleiermacher, the idea of the Church, and place its whole activity in connection with the life and the task of the Church. It will also give its due importance to the ethical character of Christianity, which was also brought into prominence by Schleiermacher, and will attend to the practical ends resulting therefrom which the Church has to serve.

While theology, in accordance with these hints, has to appropriate the elements of truth present in Schleiermacher's theology and in speculative theology, and has to build up its system in accordance with the declared formal principle, it must be mindful of its origin, that it proceeds from the life of faith of the Church, and has for its subject Christianity according

to the understanding of the Church, as the most perfect divine revelation, therefore as the idea of religion. It must as positive science, in opposition to both of those theological systems, avoid dependence upon philosophy, into which it fell since the time when it was obliged to quit the path of orthodoxy, and it must maintain its independence over against philosophy. Inasmuch as Schleiermacher borrows from philosophy for theology the idea of religion, of Christianity, and of the Church, and makes the demand of every theologian, that before entering on his theological studies he should develop independently a philosophy for himself, he brings theology into a relation to philosophy such as completely overturns it as a positive science. As such it has to seek the idea of its subject in that place where it must look for its original expression, in the Holy Scripture. In consequence of the critical investigations in regard to Scripture, the theology of the present is no longer in a position to recognise *à priori* the Holy Scripture as a *normative* authority. As it cannot bind itself within the limits of the doctrine of the Confession, so too it cannot bind itself under the absolute authority of Scripture. It will rather have to come first of all to a scientific decision in regard to this, and will have to determine in how far the Holy Scripture is valid as an authority, as well for the Church as for theology. But the Holy Scripture, just like the doctrine of the Church, is for theology the source of knowledge; and indeed of the two sources Scripture is the highest and the most indispensable. From it, therefore, and not from a philosophical system, the idea of Christianity has to be derived, and as a theology of the Church this idea has to be proved in its absolute religious truth. The speculative theology lost itself in the depths because of its dependence upon philosophy. While, then, we borrow from the speculative philosophy the formal principle of rational thought, we do this, not as though that were a specific principle of this philosophy, but because it first of all, free from all theological considerations, has laid

the foundation for the application of this principle also to theology. The principle itself is the common property of science, the principle of every philosophy and of every science, and must be admitted into theology as well, if it is at all to be reckoned as a science. Speculative theology, however, borrowed not only the principle, but also the specific ideas of the speculative philosophy. While, then, this philosophy resolves the whole content of the Christian faith into the notion, and conceives of the world as the spiritual universe, outside of which there is nothing, it may indeed in this pantheism find the absolute truth, and think that it has settled all the mysteries of faith; but theology, on the other hand, will take its place at the standpoint of the idea of religion that had been given it, without going farther to appropriate that pantheistic view of the world. Led on, not only in the interests of faith, but in the interest of thought itself, it will be obliged to inquire whether, in spite of that view of the world, mysteries would not still remain, not only for faith and theology, but even for philosophy itself. And this inquiry it will not be able in any way to get rid of. In consequence of the essential nature of its object, the application of its principle must assume a multiplicity of forms. Christianity as a historical religion, on the one hand, rests upon historical facts, under which religion is embraced, and has, on the other hand, as religion, not only an anthropological, but also a superhuman and superhistorical metaphysical content. And now over against everything which belongs to the history of Christianity, theological thought will be obliged to take its place simply as empirical thought, which makes its laws applicable in a similar way in all historical departments for the ascertainment of historical truth; whereas over against the metaphysics of Christianity it will exercise its activity as speculative thought, and will have to pursue the same end with philosophy in reference to those contents which they have in common, in order that it may attain unto a know-

ledge of the metaphysical content embraced in the idea of the Christian religion. By following this course, which theology takes quite as independently as philosophy, it will be seen whether the rational thought can deal with problems which form the limits of all human knowledge, and whether the theistic view of the world of Christianity has to surrender to the pantheistic view of the world of speculative philosophy.

Theology therefore, as a positive science, has to avoid the vacillations of philosophical systems. After the popular philosophy had represented Christianity as the religion of absolute happiness, Kant as the religion of absolute morality, Schleiermacher as the religion of the absolute determination of feeling by means of redemption, Hegel as the apprehension of the Absolute Spirit, theology must maintain its independence of such philosophies, so that in a purely historical way it may recognise the idea of Christianity, and, in accordance with an objective scientific method, conceive of it in its truth, and prove it in its truth over against the other sciences. Seeing, then, that theology relates itself to its subject in this historical and objective way, it succeeds in freeing itself from those one-sided notions from which the earlier theological system suffered, the orthodox and supernaturalistic theology, the old rationalistic theology, the reflective theology of faith of Schleiermacher, the theology of the abstract idea of the Hegelian philosophy. As positive science, springing out of faith, resting upon faith, and leading back all its religious cognitions to faith, it is according to its idea the objective knowledge of the Christian religion, mediated by means of rational thought, rather than that of absolute religious truth. In comparison with the older systems, it is neither supernaturalistic nor rationalistic, but rather, according to its deepest grounds, supernatural, and according to its method, rational.

This conception of theology, which results from the blending together of all the component elements of Schleiermacher's theology and speculative theology, and which must find its

ultimate ground in the reconstructed idea of religion, is also the result which the skilful historian of the most recent theology endeavours to attain unto in the conclusion of the investigation pursued in his work.[1] This conclusion, however, receives its confirmation especially by means of the most important systematic works with which in recent times theology has been enriched, by means of the works of Ritschl, Schenkel, Lipsius, and Biedermann. The influence of Schleiermacher shows itself in them conspicuously, inasmuch as the first three, with great independence indeed, yet none the less really, carry on the development of theology in his spirit, while Biedermann alone adheres to the speculative theology. In this place we have to concern ourselves, not with the special contents of these dogmatical works, but only with the formal principles which they adopt in theology. Ritschl, in his work on *Justification and Reconciliation*, assigns to theology the task of proving the truth of Christianity, after the manner of Kant, from the idea of the kingdom of God; and accordingly, in the further development of the positions of Schleiermacher, he conceives of Christianity purely in accordance with its ethical content. He has in this undoubtedly rendered a service by bringing into consciousness, over against the believing quietism of the Reformation and of the orthodox Lutheran theology, the idea moral significance of Christianity in its universally human worth, and by explaining and justifying scientifically from his ethical standpoint the conceptions of Christian faith, as well as the doctrines of the Church. Schenkel, too, in his Dogmatics,[2] and in his most recent theological work,[3] endeavours to prove the truth of the Christian consciousness, and especially of the Protestant believing consciousness, from the facts of the inner Christian experience,

[1] C. Schwarz, Zur Geschichte der neuesten Theologie, p. 582 ff.

[2] Die Christliche Dogmatik vom Standpunkte des Gewissens aus dargestellt. Wiesbaden 1858–59. 2 Bde.

[3] Die Grundlehren des Christenthums aus dem Bewusstsein des Glaubens in Zusammenhange dargestellt. Leipzig 1877.

from the facts of the immediate Christian believing consciousness, that is, of the Christian conscience. In this way the Scripture proof, and the proof from the Christian traditional doctrine, find their legitimation in the proofs of conscience. From this psychological standpoint Schenkel has sought to disencumber the fundamental doctrines of Christianity from their non-essential dogmatic surroundings, and to represent them in their significance for the evangelical faith. Lipsius[1] assumes substantially the same standpoint, but at the same time he passes far beyond it. As theology, according to Lipsius, wins its scientific unity by means of the relation of the whole series of its separate branches to the service of the Church, and is consequently an applied science, so too evangelical dogmatics, as the scientific exposition of the Christian faith, has to serve the purpose of supplying to the adherents of the evangelical faith an exposition of the contents of their faith, and a thoughtful expression of these contents the most suitable possible. It therefore takes its standpoint in, not outside of, or over, the Christian faith, and recognises as a presupposition the correctness of the Christian and religious fundamental conception. To prove this correctness lies outside of its task, for apart from the question as to the possibility of giving a scientific proof of the fundamental conception of Christianity, there is no need of such a proof for believers, but rather for these the reality of the religious fundamental principles of Christianity, and consequently the reality of the religious principles generally, are immediately certain to their pious consciousness as facts of subjective experience. The scientific task of dogmatics may be said upon the whole to

[1] Lehrbuch der evangelisch-protestantischen Dogmatik, von R. A. Lipsius. Braunschweig 1876. 2 Ausgabe, 1878. [See an able review of this work by Professor James S. Candlish in the British and Foreign Evangelical Review for 1878, pp. 177–185. "Lipsius belongs to the critical school of theology, and is nearly equally opposed to confessional orthodoxy, rationalism, the so-called Mediation-theology, and the Hegelian theosophy. His general position is, that while the dogmatic forms of the old Protestant theology cannot stand before modern criticism, they contain a religious kernel that ought to be preserved."]

amount to this: to develop the propositions of faith which form the contents of the common faith of the Church in strict methodical connection with the Christian principle and in relation to one another, in harmony with the facts of Christian experience, and of experience from all other sides that have been scientifically established. In this way the requirements of believers are satisfied. Of all the indirect proofs, this is the one which will have still the highest interest for them, that of all possible theories of life the Christian theory of life is the most satisfactory; and again, that among all possible religious theories of life the most satisfactory is that of Christianity. This proof, however, belongs not to dogmatics, but to the philosophy of religion, with a reference to apologetics. Dogmatics and the philosophy of religion are therefore not to be identified. The former limits itself to the department of the Christian faith, and takes as its presupposition the objective reality of the religious and the religious-Christian point of view. The latter has under its consideration religion generally as a phenomenon peculiar to the spiritual life of man, and consequently has for its task the psychological explanation of the laws of the religious life and its historical development. The philosophy of religion has to confine itself to the performance of this psychological task. It must be satisfied with reducing the religious conceptions to that in them which is ultimately legitimate and necessary, and with thereby proving the correctness of the religious theory of life as one necessarily grounded in the spiritual nature of man. Thus dogmatics, in order to secure its scientific establishment, has not only to make material use of the results of the investigations of the philosophy of religion, but must also avoid coming into conflict with the conclusions of the philosophy of religion, and this, too, without surrendering its standpoint to the presupposition which the dogmatist personally maintains. Since, therefore, dogmatics renounces any attempt at a scientific proof of its religious fundamental position, while philosophy itself con-

tinues limited to that psychological task, it will on its part uphold its scientific character, not merely by describing the facts of the religious consciousness, and by showing that it cannot be itself satisfied with developing them as a united whole from the principle which lies at their foundations, but by placing them at the same time in the coherence of a general conception of the world scientifically confirmed in all its separate parts, in order that thereby indirectly the not merely subjective, but the objective (universally valid) truth of the presupposed fundamental religious view may be proved. Apart from the connections referred to, dogmatics enters into relationship with philosophy inasmuch as philosophy proceeds not merely empirically, but at the same time speculatively, that is, oversteps the bounds of exact science, and, just as religion does, endeavours to reach, by means of the imagination, a harmonious and comprehensive view of the world.[1] In accordance with these fundamental principles, Lipsius has expounded dogmatics; and the fundamental investigation of the nature of religion, of Christianity, and of Protestantism, as well as the subtle and clear exposition of the religious contents of the separate doctrines by which it is characterized, give to it a permanent value.

The three theologians previously named take their starting-point, in common with Schleiermacher, from the Christian faith, but are separated from Schleiermacher, inasmuch as they not only show what is Christian, but seek also to prove the truth of Christianity, whether it be from an ethical, or a psychological, or a critical reflective standpoint. In consequence, moreover, of their attachment to the Kantian theory of knowledge, they all occupy common ground in demanding that metaphysics should be wholly excluded from theology. Whether it be justifiable for the theology which has its point of departure from Schleiermacher, and whether

[1] Lipsius, Lehrbuch der evangelischen-protestantischen Dogmatik. Die Einleitung, pp. 1–18.

it is undeniably the task of theology as science, to conduct the proof for the truth of the Christian faith from those standpoints, theology at least will not accomplish this task, and will not be able to raise itself to that height at which it ought to place itself in accordance with its presupposed historical development. The purely ethical conception of Christianity issues, just as much as the purely believing conception, in mere one-sidedness. Because, in giving undue prominence to its ethical significance, it leaves out of account its religious notions, it comes into danger of falling into an ethical formalism and scholasticism, just as dogmatism fell into an intellectual formalism. The consequence of this is, that instead of giving to Christianity and the Church a firm objective authorization, the religious presuppositions, valued only for their ethical worth, are thrown overboard, and, wanting these, the moral ideal is laid upon a purely anthropological basis, the Church is set aside, and over it, and without it, an ideal kingdom of morality is called into being, precisely in imitation of Kant's, who could make use of Christianity and the Church only as something provisional for his ethical idealism. The psychological proofs, which Schenkel draws mainly from the facts of the Christian conscience, and which Lipsius draws mainly from the facts of religious experience, are assuredly of the utmost importance for theology, but still they do not lead us beyond mere subjective confirmation, and will, if urged on behalf of the evangelical faith, have scarcely any decisive power of conviction, even for believers in evangelical truth, still less for Catholics, for those who are not Christians, for those whose way of thinking is anti-religious and antichristian. If Lipsius is right as a theologian in proceeding from the presupposition of the objective reality of the religious and religious-Christian position, then it follows — even in the case of one who with Lipsius holds fast to the untenable position that theology is an applied science, which has not only to serve

for Church guidance (as Schleiermacher affirms), but has to serve the Church generally—that the obligation rests upon theology, just when it finds itself thus bound up within the limits of the Church, to endeavour to overpass these restrictions, and to prove even to believers the reality of the religious, and consequently the religious-Christian position, in its objectivity, although it is already to faith firmly established subjectively. For really upon this depends the value of all the proofs which are advanced on behalf of the propositions of the Christian faith from their connection with the Christian principle, or with the Christian-religious fundamental position. Certainly Lipsius has put those proofs to the test of philosophy, and demands of theology that it should make material use of the results of the philosophy of religion, and also that it should be in agreement with the conclusions of the philosophy of religion; but, apart even from the dependence upon philosophy to which theology is by these means reduced, even philosophy, according to Lipsius, in relation to religion is to keep itself clear of all metaphysics, and must in this connection limit itself to setting forth religion, which it meets with at first as a phænomenon of experience, in its psychological legitimateness. Even then it is only a subjective confirmation that is reached; and if, to the agreement of the fundamental position of Christianity with the facts of religious experience, Lipsius will still add its agreement with all other forms of scientifically established experience as proof of its truth, then even by this means not an objective, but still only a subjective, validity will be secured. For surely that which is essentially subjective cannot be expected to gain the character of objectivity simply on account of its not standing in opposition to certain scientific experiences. Thus for many who even are prepared to occupy his own standpoint, Lipsius would be able to establish, not a universal objective validity, but only, at the highest, a subjective validity, by means of his proof. Through the whole course of the demon-

stration the view of the modern theory of the world, which will see in religion nothing else than an anthropological illusion, is not excluded. Lipsius himself says in the Preface to his *Dogmatics*, p. 6, that in our day the foundations of theology are called in question. We ask: By whom? And we are pointed immediately to this modern theory, with its fundamental negation of the religious view of life. In opposition to it, neither philosophy nor the Christian personality and theology will be able to find satisfaction at the psychological standpoint, and to renounce with Lipsius what, on p. 8, he calls *das Fundament* (the foundation) and *das schützende Dach* (the sheltering roof); but rather, in order to win these two, all spiritual energy must be expended. By reason of the cardinal question with which it deals, theology is obliged to admit metaphysics into it. Only by means of metaphysical grounding can the foundations of theology, so far as they have been shaken, be again made firm. The vagaries of metaphysics do not warrant on our part such a dread of it as would lead to its abandonment altogether, and would fear that from it we might only expect an evaporation of religion into philosophical speculation. Encouraged by the example of the most distinguished theologians, it is not to be wondered at that Herrmann should have made the attempt, in a special monograph,[1] to justify this separation

[1] W. Herrmann, Die Metaphysik in der Theologie, Halle 1876. [Though Herrmann is at one with Lipsius in demanding the avoidance of metaphysics in the treatment of theology, he does not accept Lipsius' theological system; but, on the contrary, he has subjected it to a vigorous and decidedly hostile criticism. He is a disciple of Ritschl, who is in agreement with Lipsius in discouraging the use of metaphysics in theology. Ritschl has himself published a short but important treatise on the subject. (Theologie und Metaphysik. Zur Verständigung und Abwehr. Bonn 1881.) It may be described generally as a defence of his own theological position against criticisms of Luthardt, Frank, and others. He distinguishes between metaphysical conceptions of God and the religious, or properly theological, doctrine of God; and against Luthardt, and from the Kantian standpoint, he rejects the common philosophical proofs for the being of God. Then, especially against Frank of Erlangen and Professor Hermann Weiss of Tübingen, he illustrates in great detail the tendency that has shown itself in history, and the relation of

of metaphysics from theology. His attempt, however, might rather be used for a contrary purpose. Christianity and theology are not to be interchanged. The ethical problems of Christianity rest upon certain fundamental religious views, and these require a metaphysical grounding. The demand for a complete separation between Christianity on the one hand, and metaphysics and philosophy on the other hand, has its origin in an altogether abstract conception of life.

Over against those who would thus reject metaphysics, Plitt[1] has produced a contribution to the construction of theological science worthy of careful consideration. Because, in order to defend its positive character, he derives theology from the idea of the free Christian personality, he assigns to it the task of proving the rationality and reality of the objects of faith. The Christianity which is given to theology in the doctrine of the Scripture and of the Church has not only an ethical, but also a metaphysical content, and theological knowledge, too, must endeavour to comprehend this metaphysical content according to its truth, and to represent itself

metaphysical speculation and refinement to theological mysticism. The dreams of the mystics sought their support in supposed metaphysical principles. Ritschl shows that this was especially the case in regard to the doctrine of the *unio mystica*. But at this point Ritschl makes the admission that there are metaphysics and metaphysics. Properly conceived, metaphysics is the theory of knowledge. "Every theologian, as a man of science, must proceed according to a definite theory of knowledge." P. 38. Metaphysics with him and with his opponents has a very different meaning. It is after all *their* metaphysics only that he would exclude from theology. In the end Ritschl seems simply to protest against the false use of metaphysics, and the use of a false metaphysics, in theology. This is precisely the position taken above in the text; only Ritschl, prepossessed against metaphysics generally, seems disposed to refuse it a place, where others might regard it as legitimate. In the attitude of Ritschl toward metaphysical conceptions in reference to theology, we may understand the difference of the Kantian and Hegelian standpoints. Hegelians, with their speculative tendencies, pay special attention to doctrines of Christianity, though in their hands they may become scarcely recognisable as the truths whose names they bear, while those occupying the Kantian standpoint regard these doctrines of the Christian mystery as of compartively slight importance, and as largely the result of metaphysical misconception.]

[1] F. Plitt, Die Frage: Ist biblisch-kirkliche Glaubenstheologie auch Wissenschaft? im Lichte der Idee der Persönlichkeit beanwortet. Gotha 1873.

as speculative theology. In relation to the doctrine of Scripture and of the Church, Plitt grants to theology a very free and elastic connection. But, just in his admission of the metaphysical contents of Scripture, Plitt becomes unfaithful to his principles, inasmuch as he proceeds from psychological facts which are grounded, indeed, in the nature of faith, but historically appear in theology first of all as mere presuppositions.

Biedermann[1] has, in his *Dogmatics*, in a comprehensive manner, and by a very careful treatment of principles, maintained the right of metaphysics, and endeavours to dispel the fear awakened regarding it. The *Dogmatics* of Lipsius, as well as his *Preface to the Preface*,[2] gave occasion to Biedermann to enter upon a detailed explanation of the relationship of the psychological to the speculative standpoint.[3] And he causes his criticism of Lipsius to become a criticism of his own position. But just because he finds the difference between himself and Lipsius to consist in this, that Lipsius starts from the domain of faith as a presupposition given and accepted, while he himself, without this ecclesiastical presupposition, makes the historically developed dogma the subject of his investigation according to pure scientific objectivity, he cannot but make the acknowledgment, notwithstanding the fact that they both agree together in their final intention, the purely scientific purification of the positive faith, that each of the different courses of procedure has its own advantages and its own disadvantages. In this acknowledgment we find a support for the demand which we have made above, that the theology of Schleiermacher and the speculative theology should be combined in one scientific whole. These two systems, with the advantages which are

[1] A. E. Biedermann, Christliche Dogmatik. Zürich 1869.

[2] Protestantische Kirchenzeitung. 1876. Nr. 30.

[3] Protestantische Kirchenzeitung 1877. Nr. 2–6. Compare in reply, R. A. Lipsius, Dogmatische Beiträge 1. 11. Jahrbücher für protestantischen Theologie, 1878. H. 1–4.

peculiar to each, when united, will serve as a correction the one to the other. Faith will not be seeking to maintain itself in representations which have no objective content, and speculation will not be losing itself in abstractions which stand in no living connection with faith. As a Church science, theology must take its standpoint within the faith of the Church; but, as science, it must deal with its subject according to the same method which not only philosophy, but every science follows. If, from the universal historical standpoint at which it is placed, it leads with a psychological, ethical, and speculative confirmation to the knowledge of the Christian truth, theology will approve itself as the true, free, and independent master-worker in the kingdom of God.

§ 20. THE DISTRIBUTION OF THEOLOGY.

The systematic distribution of theology is determined in accordance with its subject and its task (§§ 13, 19). The history of theological encyclopædia shows that the theological branches, as they gradually sprang up, were very soon arranged under several leading divisions, but that in the determining of the leading divisions and the order of their succession, as well as in the subdividing of those several branches themselves, a great diversity of opinion prevailed. No other result could have been expected when no objective rule was followed, but only the most varied subjective interests. The uncertainty and arbitrariness to which systematics (the science of arrangement or method) had been exposed, can only be overcome when the distribution of the parts of theology is carried out in accordance with the actual development of its subject. If theology has the task of attaining to a knowledge of Christianity, viewed in its connection with the historical religions, according to its historical reality, as the idea of religion, it must also ground its principle of arrangement upon the historical course of Christianity. The objection, that the distribution, if it simply follows the history, would consequently fall back immediately again into mere fortuitousness, loses all force when it is considered that the very history of Christianity was determined by the essential nature of Christianity, and was not in any way dependent upon chance, as though it might have been something else than what it was. And just because it is thus closely linked on to the history, the distribution of theology rests upon an objective necessity. Considered as a historical religion, Christianity is to be represented as the historical source of the idea of religion. Consequently the existence of Christianity in history

generally, as well as its historical realization, is delivered from mere fortuitousness, and is determined by the general law of intellectual and spiritual development. As a religious idea it could not appear in history otherwise than in a personal life, which bore in itself the entire fulness of the idea, and rose up to a perfect representation of the truth in that idea. The life of Christ is the centre, from which alone the new universally human principle of life could realize itself in a community which recognised Christ as its founder, and which made the truth exhibited in His life and proclaimed by Him a matter of its own life. The Church was the organ, by means of which the spiritual fulness contained in the central life of Christ gave forth to an infinite circle its own historical mode of being, and showed itself to be a new power of life in a manifold discovery of its indwelling divine might, and in the most varied and most magnificent shapes and forms. During this course of history, however, the Christian spirit, by reason of a necessity peculiar to it that will admit of no denial, is constrained, at all times and under the most various modifications, to raise itself above the multiform Church life, and to make the truth, as it proceeded from Christ, and as it lives in the Church, the subject of its consideration. And this it does, not in order that it may hold fast to the point of that consideration and the particular forms of knowledge won thereby, but rather in order that it may carry over again into the life of the Church the more profound appreciation of the truth, and, by means of its mediation, contribute to the common weal of Christendom. There are consequently four stages which are to be distinguished in the historical course of Christianity,—its origin, its historical development, the elevation of the Christian spirit in becoming the subject of ideal treatment, and the repeated turning in upon the life in practical application: a course which partly belongs to the past and to the present, but partly also, at the same time,

refers to the future. Now the theology which is to acknowledge Christianity according to the whole historical circle of its contents, has to make its distribution in accordance with these four stages, so that it embraces four divisions, which usually have been denominated exegetical, historical, systematic, and practical theology. The task, which is assigned to each of the separate parts, follows from what has been said. In exegetical theology, theology has to consider Christianity according to its origin; in historical theology, according to its historical development; in systematic theology, according to its ideal truth; and finally, in practical theology, according to its ideal-ecclesiastical realization.

[Hagenbach has some good remarks on the inter-connections subsisting between the four divisions of theology: "Exegetical theology has its historical departments (introduction, archæology), and also its dogmatic departments (doctrinal criticism and hermeneutics), and it has, finally, practical references (practical exposition). Historical theology embraces also exegetical functions (the study of sources, exposition of ecclesiastical writers), and has also a connection with the dogmatic department in its Biblical and ecclesiastical dogmatics, and has, finally, its excursions into the practical field,—ecclesiastical archæology, for example, bringing us into connection with liturgics, and the history of the Constitution bringing us into connection with Church government. Systematic theology, in the matter of proof passages, goes back again upon exegesis, and relies also upon the history of doctrines and upon symbolics; while it has, besides, to treat the system of doctrine from its practical side, and, in the doctrine of the Church, to give its foundations to practical theology. Finally, practical theology—how should it be able to come into existence at all without exegesis, without history, without doctrine? Just as in nature, the later forms are found to be already prefigured in the earlier stages of development, and the earlier forms of manifesta-

tion are found to be repeated in the later stages, so also is it here. It would not be difficult to find again the same fourfold division in each of the four main divisions recognised by us. The one always reaches forth the hand to the other. The one affords a glimpse into the other; and wherever one branch comes into living development, the others appear there also as mutually involved and claiming the same recognition." Encyclopædia, p. 118, note.]

This fourfold division of theology is alone justifiable, because it rests upon the actual development of the subject of theology, and hence, too, it puts theology in the position of accomplishing the task which has been assigned it as positive science.[1] But not only the arrangement under four divisions, but also the order of succession which those four parts are to follow, is determined from the same principle. Theological knowledge must stretch forward along the same way which was previously marked out for it by means of the historical course of the very subject of theology. Only thus can it form itself into an organic scientific whole, while every

[1] Hagenbach justifies the fourfold distribution in this way: "From the standpoint of pure knowledge we can say that all knowledge rests either on personal observation (physical or spiritual) or on information and tradition. It is therefore either of a theoretical nature (philosophical) or of a historical nature. But historical knowledge is acquired by means of investigation, and this again is conditioned by a knowledge of languages and philological criticism, and, on the other hand, theoretical knowledge passes over into practice. Likewise Christianity in its positive domain is history as well as doctrine; but its history rests on the Bible, which must be exegetically investigated, and the doctrine is not pure knowledge, but doctrine for the life. The truth of the revelation is to be practically applied in the Church, and in the various departments of Church activity in which practical theology is concerned. So the two departments of knowledge are embraced between the two departments of art, the exegetical at the beginning, the practical at the end" (Ency. p. 113). In his Compendium der Dogmatik, § 4. 1, Luthardt defends this fourfold arrangement: "The usual division into Biblical, historical, systematic and practical theology is justified by the nature of the subject, inasmuch as Christianity, of which theology is the science, rests upon revelation, as it was handed down originally in Holy Scripture; has a history in the Church, which is the abode of Christianity; gains expression in a body of doctrine, which forms a system; and by means of the practical life activities of the Church is carried down to the future."—Ed.

departure from this way must bring disturbance and confusion into its scientific activity. If this general distribution be strictly observed, the arrangement of the parts of the several principal divisions will easily follow from it. This arrangement of particulars must be carried out in accordance with the task assigned to each division, so that no doubt may exist as to what particular branches are to be subsumed under each principal part. Only when this is kept steadily in view can theology be represented as, even in regard to the particular branch, rightly articulated in it, and in regard to all its branches a comprehensive scientific organism.

The distribution under four divisions has been adopted in theological systematics by many of the older and more recent encyclopædists: as, for example, by J. Gerhard, A. Calov, A. H. Francke, Alsted, Ellies du Pin, Pfaff, Buddeus, Mosheim, Planck, Nösselt, Thym, [Karg], Kleuker, Stäudlin, [J. E. C. Schmidt], Clarisse, Hagenbach, Harless, Lobegott Lange, S. Erhardt, [Doedes], Oberthür. But, inasmuch as they fail to give this distribution of theirs a historical foundation, or else ground it only in history, they are led in the ordering of their materials, not by historical, but, for the most part, by subjective considerations. And thus they assign the first place to exegetical theology from dogmatic, pietistic, or confessional motives, or even turn aside altogether from the order of succession demanded by history, and make the systematic theology directly follow the exegetical, and place Church history either under the limited point of view of doctrine, or generally in the background along with practical theology (Gerhard, Calov, Francke, Alsted, Pfaff, Kleuker, Stäudlin, Harless, L. Lange, Erhardt), or even seek to start with systematic theology (Buddeus, Mosheim). But even those theologians who altogether set aside the fourfold division, and prefer to follow a threefold arrangement (Schleiermacher, Reuterdahl, Pelt, Kienlen, Rosenkranz, [Rothe, von Hofmann], Klee, Staudenmaier), or those who adopt simply a twofold

distribution (Hyperius, Walch, Tittmann, Bertholdt, Danz, J. P. Lange, Dobmayer, Drey, Buchner), cannot help falling back in their treatment upon the four divisions, although they introduce them to a very different position, and assign to them a very different value.[1] While, then, even by the history of theological encyclopædia the fourfold distribution is recommended, by means of the historical founding of the encyclopædia the threefold and twofold divisions are disallowed. But besides, these forms of distribution are so burdened with evident defects that they are not suitable for a systematic arrangement of theology. The giving the first rank to a philosophical theology (Schleiermacher, Reuterdahl), or to a speculative theology (Rosenkranz, [Rothe], Staudenmaier), originated unmistakeably in a philosophical interest, and is thoroughly dissociated from the primarily historical task of theology. The threefold distribution, however, is possible for those theologians who have been named, only when they have either, as Staudenmaier has done, included exegetical theology under speculative theology, or, as Schleiermacher with his followers, and Rosenkranz, have done [as also Hofmann and

[1] Lange thus defends the twofold arrangement: "The usual distribution of theology into exegetical, historical, systematic, and practical theology, for which with slight deviations Hyperius already laid the first foundation, had in the course of time, after many vacillations, been pretty firmly established by Planck. Its advantages lie in the popular form and methodological arrangement which make it a safe guide for weaker understandings. Its chief defect consists in its beginning with exegesis, in consequence of the admitted one-sidedness in the realm of Protestantism, which has made it customary to identify the Biblical sources of revelation with the facts of revelation. By degrees this fault almost doubled itself by the labyrinthine discussions of critical theology. Biblical exegesis hovers in the air, if it is not treated as exegesis of the sources of an actual saving revelation, existing before and lying at the basis of these. It certainly follows therefrom that one does not launch forth into abstract historical conceptions of theology, and that one cannot understand the facts as the sources of revelation without the intellectual appreciation of their ideal side. The too complete deposing of technical exegesis in favour of historical theology is also erroneous. Not less traceable to an erring tradition is the limitation of systematic theology to dogmatics and morals, since in the present day, practical theology also is constructed scientifically and systematically. Planck, however, could never recognise the scientific rank of practical theology." Encyclopædie, p. 17.—Ed.

Rothe], joined it together with historical theology. The objection readily suggests itself, that in this way exegetical theology in comparison with speculative theology is thrown into the shade, and does not get an opportunity for the accomplishment of its proper task. Certainly the combination of exegetical theology with historical theology has something to say for itself, because attention is thereby called to its historical character. For it must indeed be granted that the source of Christianity is a historical fact. Nevertheless even as such it does not fall under historical theology in the ecclesiastical sense, but belongs rather to the history of religion. As the conclusion of that history, and as the beginning of a new religious life, primitive Christianity is the presupposition of the historical theology of the Church, and exegetical theology, which is directed to the understanding of this primitive Christianity, must maintain its independent position over against historical theology.

It cannot be denied that in a broad sense exegetical theology may be properly included under historical, inasmuch as it is the work of exegesis to determine conditions essentially historical, and even to elucidate the primitive history of Christianity itself. But historical knowledge, considered in itself, is not the only element that engages the attention of exegetical theology. Exegesis in the proper sense is rather a certain readiness in the application of knowledge, as Schleiermacher himself confesses, which is based on scientific principles (hermeneutics) belonging, not to the historical, but to the philological, or in the widest sense of the term, philosophical, department. The historic value of the Scriptures themselves is not, moreover, merely the same as that which attaches to other monuments of Christian and ecclesiastical antiquity. In their character, as documents of institution or revelation, they engross our study in a very different manner from, and to a far greater extent than, other historical sources. "*Nocturna versate manu, versate diurna*," applies to

them with entire propriety. They rise like the primeval mountains above all the later formations of theological culture, and like the eternal granite rocks, they tower far above valley and hill. "

It may therefore be allowed that it is proper for Protestant theology, upon which devolves a special ministry of the word, to establish a separate department of exegetical theology, and to assign to the study of the Bible an independent, unrestricted place within the domain of theological learning. The objection that the distinction made between the original and derived is only relative (Pelt), bears against every classification, for everything, as we shall see, is relative. Or if it be said (Kienlen) that all science is either philosophical or historical, and that every particular science must belong to one of these categories, we acknowledge that the statement is correct in the broad meaning by which exegesis itself becomes a historical science; but if practical theology is entitled to a place beside historical and systematic (thetical), although its very name indicates that it is neither purely historical nor purely philosophical, we may, with equal propriety, assert the right of exegetical theology to a similar privilege. The truth is, that both exegetical and practical theology are mixed sciences, which stand related, not only to learning, but also to practical skill (τέχνη), not only to knowlege, but also to ability; and the fact that these very sciences form the boundary lines of the study, its beginning and end, points to the practical nature of theology as a whole, by which it is distinguished from pure science. If it should become necessary for purposes of observation to disclose the organism of theological science, as science simply, and without reference to practical needs, it would be proper to represent exegesis as merely an historical auxiliary science, as Biblical exegesis is in fact for Biblical theology, or patristic exegesis for the history of the Church and its doctrines. But the Protestant Church justly insists that, as a primary qualification, every

theologian shall be thoroughly familiar with the Bible, and be competent to deal with it, since more than all else he is to be a well-grounded servant of the word (*verbi divini minister*). The combination of exegesis and history is impracticable, confusing in a methodological point of view, and an innovation upon the ordinary usage of the terms in any language. See Hagenbach's *Encyclopædia and Methodology*, translated by Drs. Crooks and Hurst, pp. 141, 142, corresponding to pp. 115, 116 of the original.

Still more defective and unsatisfactory is the twofold division favoured by many theologians. With the exception of J. P. Lange (who distinguishes a historical and a didactic division, but after having set forth a fundamental theology, which is to represent the history of revelation that constitutes the kingdom of God, adopts the fourfold distribution in the proper order of succession), their position amounts to this, that they lay down a theoretical and a practical division, and all of them, Hyperius alone excepted, assign to the theoretical part only systematic theology, and on the other hand exclude exegetical and historical theology from what is properly scientific theology, and relegate them, either to the merely auxiliary sciences or to theological propædeutics. By this course of procedure a supreme importance that is altogether one-sided is given to dogmatics and morals, and the fundamental significance which exegetical and historical theology must directly have in reference to systematic theology is entirely overlooked.

These proposed schemes of distribution, which for the most part have originated in subjective tendencies, are therefore wanting in even a single standard rule in accordance with which any serviceable arrangement and co-ordination of the several branches may be made, and give no opportunity of reaching any organization of theology that can prove scientifically satisfactory. In opposition to the confusion into which these other arrangements lead, the systematic distribution of

theology, as an independent science, can only be won upon the sure basis of the fourfold division.

[The relations which the principal encyclopædists bear to one another in the matter of their arrangement of the theological branches may be readily seen from the following classified table. We present here the names of the more important workers in this department, distinguishing them, first of all, according to the number of principal divisions that they recognise, and then noting the variations in the order of succession given to the separate branches. Only one, König, proposes a five-fold division, and this he makes by prefixing an apologetical division to the ordinary four divisions, which thereafter are given in their usual order.

The first evident attempt at a systematic and orderly arrangement of the leading divisions of theological science was made by Hyperius (Andrew Gerhard of Ypres) in his *Theologus*, published in 1556. The several books of this treatise discuss in succession — exegetical, systematic, and practical theology, historical theology being included under the last. There was no attempt made by Hyperius to arrange the subordinate branches under these principal divisions.

Von der Goltz proposes a peculiar arrangement of the theological sciences. It may be said to agree with the three-fold division of Pelt and Kienlen, with the addition of an apologetical department under the name of philosophical theology. He will not, as König, prefix this division to the other generally recognised parts. As the ground of all the other theological sciences, it presupposes their development, and can only follow them. (*Die Christlichen Grundwahrheiten*, Gotha 1873, pp. 3–5.) If apologetics is to get a place in the encyclopædia alongside of the other principal divisions, it would seem to us that the end rather than the beginning would be its proper place. We shall give reasons in Appendix C. for refusing such a position to apologetics.]

Encyclopædists adopting the Fourfold Division.

Clarisse, 1832, 1835, .	Exegetical Theology.	Historical Theology.	Systematic Theology.	Practical Theology.
Hagenbach, 1833, 1880,	,,	,,	,,	,,
Luthardt, 1865, 1876, .	,,	,,	,,	,,
Doedes, 1876, 1883, .	,,	,,	,,	,,
Räbiger, 1880, . . .	,,	,,	,,	,,
Planck, 1794, ...	Exegetical Theology.	Systematic Theology.	Historical Theology.	Practical Theology.
Nösselt, 1791.				
Niemeyer, 1803.				
Ständlin, 1821.				
Harless, 1837.				
Kleuker, 1800, 1801, .	Exegetical Theology.	Systematic Theology.	Practical Theology.	Historical Theology.
Von der Goltz, 1873, .	Historical Theology	Systematic Theology.	Practical Theology.	Philosophical Theology.
J. E. Ch. Schmidt, 1811,	Historical Theology	Exegetical Theology.	Systematic Theology.	Practical Theology.

Encyclopædists adopting the Threefold Division.

Schleiermacher, 1811,1830,	Philosophical Theology.	Historical Theology.	Practical Theology.
Reuterdahl, 1837, . . .	,,	,,	,,
Rosenkranz, 1831, 1845,	Speculative Theology.	Historical Theology.	Practical Theology.
Rothe, 1880, ...	,,	,,	,,
Von Hofmann, 1879, .	Systematic Theology.	Historical Theology.	Practical Theology.
Pelt, 1843, ...	Historical Theology.	Systematic Theology.	Practical Theology.
Kienlen, 1842, . . .	,,	,,	,,
Noack, 1847, ...	Phenomenology of Religious Spirit.	Ideology of Religious Spirit.	Pragmatology of Religious Idea.

Encyclopædists adopting the Twofold Division.

Danz, 1832, ...	Christian Science of Religion.	Christian Science of the Church.
J. P. Lange, ...	Historical Theology.	Didactic Theology.

§ 21. THE RELATION OF THEOLOGY TO THE CHURCH.

In accordance with its essential character, theology is, upon the ground of its source and its idea (§§ 14, 19), a thoroughly free product of the Christian spirit, and as such is not a confessional, but a Christian, theology. The state of mind and feeling out of which it springs is, and must ever be, the endeavour to attain unto perfect clearness and certainty in regard to the truth of the Christian faith, which is the subject of the Church's Confession, and which is a living power within the Church. As science, therefore, theology is throughout an end to itself. It has no other end to pursue than the knowlege of Christianity according to its religious truth. Whoever is interested in theology, whether it be as one who is beginning its study, or as one who has already taken it for his calling in life, has, as a theologian, to look away from all other ends, which he might perhaps be able to reach by means of his attainments in theological science, or which such attainments might in any way serve. His principal, indeed his only, task is to get wholly absorbed in the subject of theology, and, by means of free spiritual work, to become certain of the truth thereof, so as to give form to the certainty that has been won by communicating it to others. Any conception of theology, therefore, that would on *a priori* grounds place it under the practical end of the Church, must be set aside. Nevertheless, it is a decided service which Schleiermacher rendered theology, when he made clear the connection between theology and the Church. This connection is undeniable, and is firmly established as a principle on account of the source and the whole history of theology. In consequence of this, theology has certainly to perform the most comprehensive service to the Church; this rendering of service, however, cannot be the norm for theology, but must be the result of its scientific activity. Theology is

not a purely theoretical science, but is, at the same time, a practical science; truly practical, however, it can be only when it gives pre-eminence to the pursuit of its immanent scientific end. But the service which it renders to the Church is not limited to a Church of any particular Confession, but, insomuch as it is Christian theology, its results are laid out for the benefit of all included in the wide range of the Christian Church. This universal standpoint which theology takes up, does not prevent it from entering into a special relationship with one particular confessional Church. Theology meets with no confessional Church in which the full realization of the Christian idea is set forth, but it will turn by preference to that one which does not identify itself with the idea of the Church, and thereby not only authorizes theology to raise itself above the limits of the Church Confession, but even demands for its own furtherance and maintenance the nurture of a free theological science. As the evangelical Church and theological science have both originated in the realm of Protestantism, the closest relationship between the two has naturally been the result. While the Romish Church places its theology under the authority of a hierarchical ecclesiasticism, and in accordance with the standard supplied thereby determines the service which theology, as servant of the Church, has to render; the evangelical Church, which rests upon the authority of that truth which is a witness to itself, recognises theology as an independent science, which has for its highest end the attaining unto the knowledge of this truth.

The practical services which theology renders to the Church result from external and internal motives and influences which originally theology called into existence, and which at all times, though under various modifications, work together for its regular realization. First of all, it follows from this that theology not only serves a certain particular end, as, for example, contributing those qualifications which are necessary

for Church guidance, or educating theological students for the office of the ministry, but that its practice in the widest sense must be directed to the collective life of the Church. As positive science, theology starts from the presupposition, which forms the basis of Church fellowship, that the Christian faith is the perfect religious truth. To afford a demonstration of the truth of this presupposition is the highest task of theology, and in the accomplishment of this task lies at once the highest and the most general service which it can afford to the Church. The whole life of the Church shares in the acquisition made by theology, in securing for the truth of Christianity a scientific and well-established foundation. The theoretical purpose, served by all the principal divisions of theology, coincides with the universal practical value which they have for the Church. Exegetical theology represents Christianity as the completed result of the development of the historical religion, and, at the same time, sets forth its origin as a victory of Christianity gained over the powers of the age with which it came in contact. Historical theology points to a life of culture existing here and now, which was brought to maturity by means of Christianity, as could not have been done by any other religion; and this Christianity did by virtue of those religious and moral powers indwelling in it, in spite of all shortcomings on the part of the Church and hindrances in history. Systematic theology makes known the ideal content of Christianity in its purely scientific form. Practical theology presents to view the ecclesiastical organs as the instruments, by means of which the Christian ideas may be brought into operation, and shown to be the most solid groundworks of social and political life. And just because of all this, theology, with its comprehensive scientific work, maintains the position of the Church fellowship always at the highest point of consciousness, so that its faith is that indeed which is of force with it, and yields it confidence and assurance that the right of its existence is not only a historical one, but

rests upon a divine ground, which, as it has proved itself good in the past down into the present, will also prove itself good in the future. Only so much is theology capable of doing. While the Romish Church has underestimated the practical-ecclesiastical value of theology, it has been sometimes over-estimated on the Protestant side. As philosophy is not in a position to create a religion, no more is theology able to create faith, nor should it seek to set itself in the place of faith. But that positive service, which is actually rendered by theology to the inner life of the Church, gains a still higher importance from the consideration that at the same time outwardly it results in an apology for Christianity which reacts on the whole Church, and on the separate Church communities as well, sustaining and furthering each according to its historical worth. By means of its whole scientific activity, theology proves itself to be a vindication against all the attacks which are directed against Christianity and the Church from without, even should they come forth with the utmost eagerness of negation, and should they aim at completely overturning the universal foundation and ground upon which the Church rests, and even religion itself. Although all these attacks against the proper living power of the Church must be ultimately put to silence, they are still fitted to carry temporary confusion and disturbance into the life of the Church, and to remove these far from the Church is the service which theology by means of its apologetical activity effects on behalf of the Church. For the most part, the Church itself bears the blame of those attacks. Church history is not barren in facts, which afford to opponents weapons in abundance for carrying on the assault upon Christianity. Among these the occurrences in the Romish Church are prominent in the present. The papal syllabus, the dogma of infallibility, the exaltation of the pretensions of the Romish Curia over the civil Government, the pretended appearances of Mary, by means of which the Christian popular

faith is perverted into the grossest idolatry and superstition,—all these facts, which might easily give occasion to a pessimist feeling in Protestantism in reference to the Romish Church, should rather enjoin silence upon all confessional sympathies and antipathies. It should rather call forth sorrowful regret from universal Christendom, that such occurrences should cast their dark shadows over Christianity generally, and afford ever anew a handle to objectors for bringing against it the reproach of tendencies hostile to culture, and for recommending its removal as the fundamental condition of the free development of the modern life. But even over against the attacks which borrow an appearance of justice from these or from similar facts, theology will with good conscience discharge its apologetical function, and will show by the record of history that the blame of those facts belongs not to Christianity, but to its human disfigurations and distortions. The extravagances, too, of modern Catholicism are reduced to the consequences of a hierarchical system, which is itself untrue, and to political intrigues of an ecclesiastical party which thinks by a practical denial of Jesus to honour his name.

With reference now to the events of the Church life itself which damage and endanger Christianity and its realization in the Church, the contribution, by means of which theology positively and apologetically serves the Church, will at the same time always take a negative form. Because theology alone develops its whole system in accordance with the standard of the Christian idea, it approaches with this standard the whole range of Churchdom in its state of division into different Churches, as well as the separate ecclesiastical communities, and brings into view all the relations in which they stand to one another. It takes into consideration the doctrines and the forms of life, by means of which they are distinguished from one another, in order to test them by its own proper ideal standard, and to characterize and oppose everything contradictory to it as a deviation from

Christian truth, as a temporary, irregular phenomenon, as a tendency that threatens the life. As apology, then, theology proves itself also to be a polemic against the existing ecclesiastical condition; but this negative bearing even turns out again to be of service to the Church, since it does not proceed from the interests of mere negation, but from the tendency to exert a purifying and healthful influence upon the Church life.

The apologetical and polemical service of theology in its relation to the Church reaches forth, however, even to the individual members of the Church. Theology is not a doctrine limited to a few learned men, but a common property of the Church; so that its scientific conclusions are accessible to all the well-educated members of the community. In modern times especially a conflict between faith and culture is sure to occur; but to all members of the Christian community who seek instruction from theology it affords the means of rising above this conflict. For the individuals who are drawn by means of their culture into opposition to their faith, and who wish to overcome this opposition, theology proves itself to be an apology of [illegible] against doubt, but, at the same time, it proves itself to [illegible] polemic against a cross-grained, wilful unbelief, against [illegible] thinking superstition, and against the anti-christian and [illegible] ristian endeavours which proceed from both, and [illegible] be prevented only by theology either stopping [illegible] else purifying the sources from which they flow.

All these manifold apologetical and polemical performances are the immediate result of a living theology in the Church. But the service which it renders to the Church is more enduring and of greater consequence by far when it is performed through the channels of the offices ordained by the Church, the office of legislation and administration, and that of teaching. A living faith and a living interest in the tasks of the Church are to be presupposed on behalf of the bearers of these offices, as a fundamental condition of their official activity, but with it must also be joined the other condition

of theological insight. The practical value which theology possesses for the Church is also proved in no small measure by this, that it furnishes the bearers of ecclesiastical offices with the theological culture and the theological acquirements, without which they would not be in a position to discharge their official duties with success. In its fullest extent this applies to those who occupy the office of teachers, the clerical office. The clergyman must be a theologian, in order to render those general positive and negative services which theology renders to the Church generally, amid the altogether special local and temporary relations of particular Church communities, and in serving them he renders a service to the Church as a whole. For this end he must survey the whole historical course of Christianity, and must by means of earnest scientific labour have raised himself to the position of perfect certainty of his faith, so that out of his own innermost conviction he may bring forth Christian truth for application to the life of his congregation. He will work among his people not as a simple believer, who preaches the opinions of his own individual faith and the views of his Church, but as a Christian, whose faith is upon a scientifically established conviction, and by reason of his very theological study he will be led to perceive is not the part of his office to promote the theological philosophical learning of his congregation, but to foster, by means of his teaching of the true knowledge of religion, the life of faith of the congregation, and by means of the influence of his whole personality, by means of his own religious and moral example, to elevate and improve his people. The orders and directories which are given him to guide him in the discharge of his official duties will serve him as a rule of action; but by following these he will not have exhaustively fulfilled the duties of his office. He has to administer his office as at once a free and a sacred office, which has to be accounted for according to the highest standard before God and conscience.

§ 22. THE RELATION OF THEOLOGY TO THE OTHER SCIENCES.

The question concerning the relation of theology to the other sciences proceeds from the assumption that theology is itself a science. To establish this was the purpose of the preceding discussion, and trusting to the foundation thus laid, we might without more ado have proceeded to the answering of the question, had not the scientific character of theology, which we believe to have been proved, been disputed in quite recent times. In this onslaught theologians themselves have taken part. Lagarde, doctor of theology, and Overbeck, doctor and professor of theology, have in special monographs[1] subjected their own science to a severe criticism, so that we have felt it quite necessary that we should deal with their views in a place by themselves. Nevertheless, we can still attach to them only an ephemeral significance, and shall satisfy ourselves with taking notice of them in a summary manner; and we do this lest non-theologians should be induced without due reflection to allow themselves to be influenced by the theological judgment.

According to Lagarde, the German nation is in need of a national religion. Christianity, Catholicism and Protestantism, are without religious content. The theology which is in the service of the Catholic and Protestant Church is no science, but a theology of untruth. The State ought therefore to break with Christianity, with the Catholic and Protestant Churches, and their theologies, and make an end of supporting these theologies in the theological faculties. Should the two

[1] Paul de Lagarde, Ueber des Verhältniss des deutschen Staates zu Theologie, Kirche und Religion. Ein Versuch Nicht-Theologen zu orientiren. Göttingen 1873. And P. de Lagarde, Ueber die gegenwärtige Lage des deutschen Reichs. Göttingen 1876. Franz Overbeck, Ueber die Christlichkeit unserer heutigen Theologie. Leipzig 1873.

Churches be repudiated by the State, and be left only to their own resources, to maintain their existence as sects, they might train their clergy in separate seminaries, which would stand outside of all connection with the universities. Lagarde hopes that by this method of treatment the two Churches would soon wear away and give place to a new religion. For without a religion the State certainly cannot exist. The State cannot, however, create a religion, but has simply to prepare a spiritual atmosphere for a new religion. For this purpose it should establish at the universities a few chairs for a new theology, which is essentially only a subdivision of historical science,[1] and which, after twenty years' diligent investigation of the sources, if first a critical edition of the Old and New Testaments has been produced, will show itself in full splendour. But then, indeed, even this new theology is not in a position to make a religion; nevertheless, as science, it is to be the pathfinder of the new religion of the Gospel.

While Lagarde aims his blow against the whole Church theology, Overbeck directs his attack against the hitherto prevailing Protestant theology. He divides it into apologetical and liberal theology, and denies to both the right to be regarded as Christian. Because they feign to be Christian, they are fallen away from Christianity, and are affected with the taint of untruthfulness. In their place, therefore, the critical theology has to make its appearance, which breaks loose from the half and half position of previous theology, and is according to its nature irreligious.

These two, Lagarde and Overbeck, have this in common with Strauss, that they conjure up for their own use a Christianity, a Church system, and an ecclesiastical or Christian theology, in order that they may direct their attack upon the old system and its reconstruction against this image of their own fancy. Lagarde lays claim to high political motives, but with this theology he will not give any national religion to

[1] P. de Lagarde, Die gegenwärtige Lage, p. 78 ff.

the German people. Lagarde knows well that religion is not to be made; but if the new theology is to be a pathfinder, if it is to find out from among the historical religions the religion of the gospel,[1] that which composes it will still only be its own handiwork, its fabric, a religious system, but not a religion. And is the State upon the authority of the new theological professors to raise this their handiwork to the rank of a national religion? But Lagarde ought also to know that a Church can be made, just as little as a religion, and especially a Church that is to be supported by the State. The State and the new theology together would not be in a position to construct a German National Church. The German people will set greater value upon history, and instead of a new gospel will foster rather the gospel of Christ. And Protestant theology will be able to show Lagarde's pathfinder that, even in the Christianity that is according to him most deteriorated, even in Catholicism, this gospel still retained its life, and that the Reformation is not, as Lagarde is pleased to say, a mere continuation of the Roman Catholic disfiguration of Christianity, but a reforming principle which had its origin in the spirit of the gospel of Christ, which, in spite of its temporary obscuration at the hand of orthodox theology, has rendered possible that whole life of culture by which the present age is characterized. It may also be shown that Protestant theology is not an ossified theology, such as only serves to perpetuate untruth, but that, by means of its history, it affords a proof that Protestantism as a principle has continued active in it,

[1] Compare Die gegenwärtige Lage, p. 84 f.: "Still one may come to me with the assertion that a religion, although it no longer passes current, may yet deserve some study. To this we answer, that unless, in spite of our non-Jewish blood, we are still in 1875 to be Jews in the sense in which Jeremiah and the men of the great synagogue were Jews, and indeed not merely to be Jews, but also Zoroastrians, Buddhists, Evangelicals, and whatever else seems good,—and this surely is nothing short of polytheism,—it is of no use for us to turn even for a few minutes to the study of Hebrew, Israelitish, Jewish religion." [The outcome of this seems to be, that we may study the history of Biblical religion, but are no more called to identify ourselves with it than with any other historical religions which may interest us.]

that in connection with the general spiritual life of Germany it has developed itself into a science of Christian theology, which has no intention of serving a tottering ecclesiasticism, but bears in itself the call to defend the eternal truths of Christianity in the Church, and finds in the evangelical Church the communion in which it can presuppose the longing for this truth and a susceptibility for it. Upon this historical ground it will continue working in the closest connection with the State for the support of the Christian national life, and must assume an attitude of opposition to Lagarde's new theology as decidedly as it protests against Overbeck's irreligious theology. An irreligious theology is a *contradictio in adjecto.* A theology which does not spring from religious motives, and does not pursue religious ends, is no theology. And if Overbeck is inclined to bring this theology into a certain connection with the practical system of the Church, the result can be no other than this, that the irreligious theology would lead to practical irreligiousness. Lagarde and Overbeck advance the pretension that they have history as an advocate on behalf of their theories, but just the radical measures, which, with the mixture of a few good tinctures, they recommend, are all the while unhistorical and impracticable phantoms.

[Zöckler has in a very admirable manner shown the leading tendencies of modern scientific thought in reference to theology. Beginning with the extreme of thoroughgoing antagonism which has been described and discussed above, he proceeds to explain the attitude of others not wholly negative. He gives a fourfold classification of these tendencies—antireligious, antichristian, Christian but opposed to the prevailing conceptions of Christianity, and finally what he calls a book-keeping—by double entry—view of Christianity, an attempt to justify an exoteric and esoteric presentation of Christian truth.

"1. The role of Christianity has been played out. Religion generally may be dispensed with by mankind of to-day,

or is only necessary conditionally, as the cultus of ideal humanity or of the universe. Theology therefore is an anachronism. Theological science and its doctrines are to be regarded as 'lying at the point of death.' Thus, Feuerbach's Anthropologism, Comte's Positivism, Strauss' Naturalistic Pantheism (1872), Häckel's Monism, E. von Hartmann's Pessimism; together with the smaller satellites of those Coryphæi of unbelief.

"2. Religion is still needful, but no longer in the form of Christianity. Christian theology is exchanged for a universal science of religion, or appears as a special section, as 'the science of Semitic monotheism modified by Aryan influences,' one of the departments of research regarding religion and culture. Thus, various Orientalists, comparative philologists, and historians of religion: Paul de Lagarde, Maurice Vernes, Renan, Réville, and other French scholars of the radical school.

"3. Religion must remain, and that, too, in the form of Christianity; but Christian theology must become something totally different from that which it has been. It has to rid itself of all inexact statements, as well in the exegetical and historical department, where the most unconditional criticism, admitting of no presuppositions, must rule, as in the department of dogmatics, where all the customary supports from metaphysics and theosophy must be rejected. Thus, on the one side, the most recent representatives of the Tübingen critical school, as Overbeck, Pfleiderer, Biedermann, Holtzmann, etc.; and, on the other hand, the new Kantians, as Lipsius, etc., and the extreme Ritschlians, Herrmann and Haring; and outside of Germany, the liberal theologians of England influenced by the Agnosticism of the Spencerian philosophy, as Dean Stanley, the author of *Supernatural Religion;* and similar to these are the Dutch 'Moderni' of the Leyden school.

"4. Christianity and even the prevalent Christian theology

are to be retained. A thoroughgoing modernizing of Christian theology, a complete revision of its dogmas according to anti-metaphysical principles, is not to be endeavoured. It is enough to introduce a sort of book-keeping by double entry. Theology in its exoteric doctrinal activity has to conform itself more or less to the critically exact methods of investigation adopted in the natural sciences, and, at the same time, it must acquire a phraseology in keeping with the age. Esoterically, however, especially in regard to practical theology, it may adhere as before to the traditional forms of expression and doctrine. Thus, Hermann Schultz on the doctrine of the divinity of Christ; and, in another way, the theosophist Anton Ziegler; so, too, those who vindicate the action of the new organization of the theological faculties in Holland, where the State since 1876 support only the professorships of exegetical and historical theology, leaving to the Churches to provide their own professors of dogmatics and practical theology." *Handbuch*, vol. i. pp. 18–20.]

Meanwhile, if even from the theological side itself such voices should sound aloud against all the theology of to-day, it can be no cause of wonder that non-theologians chime in with this hostile tone and deny to theology the character of an independent science, maintaining that it has no right to be defended in the universities in separate faculties, seeing that its constituent parts, in so far as they are of general value, must have been dealt with in the philosophical faculty.[1] We believe this estimation of theology must be traced back to a confounding of it with the philosophy of religion. What is thereby overlooked is this, that Christian theology as distinguished from the philosophy of religion stands in an actual connection with the department of life, the Church. If religion is undeniably a historical reality, if, as such, it must also necessarily attain

[1] Compare the literature of the discussion in the Neue Evangelische Kirchenzeitung, xviii., 1876, Nr. 19, p. 293 f.; and also the Protestantische Kirchenzeitung, 1875, Nr. 41.

to its ideal realization, and has actually found this in Christianity; and if, further, the Church is the fellowship which, by means of the idea of religion, has been called into being and has the substance of its life in this idea, then there must also necessarily exist a Christian theology, which has for its highest end the knowledge of the idea of religion and the practical development of the ideal Christian life in the Church. In comparison with other peoples, the German people has the pre-eminence of being in the possession of a theological science which nourishes and defends its Christian life, which will protect it against unbelief and superstition, and against any falling back upon a stage of the life of the Church that has been overpassed, which, in constant connection with the other sciences, seeks to maintain entire the harmony between culture and the Christian life, between the State and the Church. We do not yearn after the ecclesiastical institutions of England, which, unprotected by a free theology, part asunder into sectarian divisions; nor would we fall victims to the Jesuitical arts and intrigues. We do not grudge France its civilisation, which, in spite of all its boasting, is still not in a position to improve at its inmost core the life of the people, but, notwithstanding all its irreligious egoism, surrenders the masses of the people into the hands of a dominant clerical order. It will be true political wisdom to preserve to the German people its theology, which has come down as an inheritance after long outward and inward conflicts. This theology proves its right to a separate existence as theological science from its connection with the Church, from its theoretical tasks and its practical aims; and places on the foundation of this right the claim upon the State to support, in its own interests at its universities under special faculties, the theology of the different Churches, which it embraces in its historical development, and to leave it to the particular Churches to show whether they can produce from their midst

a theology which will hold its own among the other sciences, and which will be able to demand from these an acknowledgment that it is a science. Theology, as it has been represented in the preceding pages, approaches the other sciences with this claim.

The circle of human knowledge comprehends the vast fields of nature and spirit. The several sciences, among which the investigation is distributed, are bound together by means of a common purpose, and among them theology has its authorized place as one of the spiritual sciences. It shows its scientific character by this, that it conducts the inquiry regarding its own proper department of religion in accordance with the same principles of knowledge, and in accordance with the same methods, as are employed in the other sciences, that is to say, in accordance with the method of logical and speculative thought. The scientific character of theology is also proved by this, that on the ground of this method it defends and maintains its own department over against the other sciences; whereas, on the other hand, while it lays claim for itself to this acknowledgment, it also without reserve recognises the results of the other sciences won by the application of similar methods, and turns them to account for the theoretical upbuilding of its own system. Because it is contented to work within its own limits, and not to pass over into foreign fields, it must also demand of the other sciences that they confine themselves within their own limits, and that they do not pass over these into the theological domain. When these determinations of boundaries have been completed and acknowledged, there will be a free scientific interchange between theology and the other sciences, and advances in knowledge upon one side or the other will be able to reckon on mutual consent and support. In modern times the axiom has had general currency in wide circles, that natural science and theology must maintain a hostile attitude toward one another. And yet they come into contact with one another,

inasmuch as both, although indeed upon different fields, are purely sciences of experience, natural science being the science of the experience of external things, theology the science of internal, spiritual experience; so that it just comes to this, that each science must confine itself within its own limits in order not only to avoid any conflict, but also to lead on to a relationship of mutual recognition. When natural science in so frank a manner, as one of the most distinguished naturalists in recent times has done,[1] points out the limitations which are placed upon its investigations in consequence of the very field of investigation, it is certainly justified in claiming for itself the most absolute freedom within those limits, and in refusing to admit any limitation which may be applied from without to its purely observational and experimental procedure, especially on the part of religious or theological theories. Not only has theology nothing to fear from this free natural science, but theology should see in it the champion of its own interests most worthy of respect. Theology will estimate the spiritual results which spring from natural science more highly than its great material consequences. The more widely this impresses itself upon the world of phenomena, the more it yields to the department of the natural life, the more firmly it recognises the laws and powers of nature, the more certainly will the religious and theological conceptions, which owe their origin to a defective and false theory of nature, be overturned, but the deeper will be the grounding secured for the ideas which constitute for religion and theology the very elements of life. Natural science, on the other hand, by means of those limits which it applies to itself, points to something beyond itself, and recognises a department unto which, in accordance with the method of its procedure, it does not reach. In so doing it admits a department of the spirit, and an inquiry, which

[1] E. du Bois-Reymond, Ueber die Grenzen des Naturerkennens. Leipzig 1872.

other sciences have to follow out; and inasmuch as theology reckons itself among these, it cannot first of all demand from natural science anything more than this admission. If, then, theology in its own sphere, the sphere of religion, sets about its investigations just as freely as natural science does, and causes to vanish before it the limits of matter, force, and consciousness, under which natural science remains fixed, it will require also to yield to natural science the right of free decision, in so far as it will recognise the results of theological thought, and will find in them the explanation of problems which by its own scientific methods are unexplainable. The relations of natural science and theology must, however, take an altogether different form, if natural science will not agree to make that admission, if, carried away by pride in its own successes, it assumes that the world of phenomena, over which it has command, is the absolute, and treats the spiritual life as a mere expression of matter, which is altogether subject to the same laws as all other natural things. In presence of such a natural science, theology can assume only a polemical and apologetical attitude. Over against a materialism which hopes to succeed in reducing everything under its own sensible experience, and in subjecting everything to its own process of exact investigation, theology has a right to appeal to the inner experience in which religion manifests itself, and to the vast field of history, which as a real record of that experience stands over against the life of nature.

[Zöckler has endeavoured to represent the relationship of theology and philosophy to the other sciences by recognising the two former as universal sciences and the others as particular sciences. Theology, by virtue of its theocentric standpoint, embraces the whole range of natural and spiritual life from above: Philosophy, by virtue of its anthropocentric standpoint, embraces all from below. The former rears its system of a comprehensive theory of God and the world from above, starting from God as the one ground of all faith and

knowledge: the latter builds from below upwards by an analysis of human consciousness, concluding, after passing through all the spheres of real and ideal knowledge, with the idea of God as the highest of all ideas. In illustration of this he gives the following table:—

(God)

Theology.

(The Natural World) The Natural Sciences.		(The Spiritual Life) Spiritual or Historical Sciences.	
A. Theoretical. Mathematics, Astrophysics, Geophysics, Chemistry, Biology.	B. Practical. Medicine, Agriculture, Technology.	A. Theoretical. History, Philology, Ethnology. Linguistics.	B. Practical. Jurisprudence. Political Economy.

(Man)

Philosophy.

Zockler's *Handbuch der theolog. Wissenschaften*, 2 ed. Nordlingen 1884, p. 17.]

While natural science and theology are within these limits intimately related to one another, theology stands in closer connection with the sciences of language and history. Inasmuch as upon its historical side it comes into contact with these two sciences, all the three are thus engaged upon the same field of research, and there can be no question here of a passing over from one department into another. Theology will therefore relate itself to these sciences simply as borrowing from them. It will, however, not only turn to account for itself the essential results which advance it for the time being, but chiefly must appropriate to itself the laws, which both of these sciences place at the foundation of their investigations. The fundamental principles which linguistic and historical researches generally adopt for the ascertaining of the meaning of Scripture from the literary documents given them, as well as for the estimating of their sources and for the ascertaining of their actual contents, must in like manner

be made practical use of by theology in its own special historical department. Indeed, just according to the measure in which it does this will it obtain greater or less results by means of its historical labours, and be able to secure recognition on the part of the sciences of language and history. On the other hand, both sciences will be justified in refusing any consideration and denying any scientific value to a theology which would lay claim, in its linguistic and historical researches, to any other fundamental principles than those which are generally valid. It has just been upon this historical side that its task has been greatly neglected by theology, and this is now being eagerly retrieved. The consequence of this attention now given to the historical side of theological science is that theology has raised itself to a thoroughly free historical standpoint. When this not only is recognised, but is also applied by theology in the widest possible range of circumstances, then first will a decision and an agreement be reached in regard to the most important theoretical and practical questions.

As a practical science, theology is most closely related to jurisprudence. The theoretical department which is common to both, Church government, brings both into contact with each other upon the practical field of civil and ecclesiastical politics. As State and Church are in relation to one another, jurisprudence stands in close connection with the outward rules of the Church, and the departments of law have to determine the limits between State and Church. But theology, on its part, must see to it that by means of the organism of the Church, without interruption on the part of the State, the moral powers are preserved, without which no commonwealth can exist and prosper. At the same time, it will be obliged decidedly to oppose any attempt to encroach upon the inner life of the Church by means of juristic theories, and to set up an ecclesiastical constitution after the manner of the State according to its legalistic standard; while, on the other hand,

jurisprudence has to watch, lest theology should usurp an influence over the civil life that passes beyond the limits of the religious and moral sphere. But this peaceful co-operation will be broken up, if from the standpoint of the science of law on overestimate be placed upon law, and it be set forward as the only foundation upon which the whole civil life must be built up. This, indeed, will happen if the civil State be elevated into an ideal State, in which the whole life of the people is embraced and is exactly contained in the legalistic organism of which there is no authorized place for religion and Church, but at the farthest a toleration is extended to them until they die away. In consequence of a prevalent theory which makes the State absolute, theology is driven into the same polemical and apologetical attitude as it was forced to take up toward a natural science which insisted upon regarding nature as absolute.

Theology again, as speculative science, stands in the most intimate connection with philosophy. The presupposition underlying this is, that philosophy acknowledges religion in its reality as the living element in theology. Between theology and a philosophy which sees in religion a mere human illusion, or represents Christianity as an antiquated theory of the world, there can be no relation at all, or at most only a decidedly negative one.* But philosophy, so far as it has been constructed in any degree independently of Hegel, has raised itself above the superficial conception of religion which sought its protection under the Hegelian system, and inasmuch as it recognises religion as a living power (an inquiry which philosophy cannot refuse), a philosophy of religion is created which does not set for itself the task of comprising religion in the idea and then losing it in the idea, but rather of putting it to proof by means of a historical and speculative inquiry into its reality and ideality. A philosophy of religion so formed will enter into a most intimate and vital connection with theology, and to its dis-

cussions theology will be obliged to devote its constant attention. But if now from many sides a strong desire is expressed that theology as a separate science should be abolished, and that it should be absorbed in the philosophy of religion that is regarded as quite identical with it, and that it should seek its place in the philosophical faculty, then, against all these demands, theology must lodge its protest. As positive science it stands, in accordance with its origin and its practical aims, in a connection with the Church which philosophy has not, and which it cannot have. As philosophy, it has to start either from the speculative idea or from the psychological and historical facts of religion, and has to complete its speculative work upon religion without restricting itself by Christianity and the Church, and unconcerned in regard to any organ whatsoever, by means of which it may have to transfer its theory of religion into the practical life. Should it, in carrying out its researches in the freest manner, reach the result that religion in general must be denied, or that, at least, a new religion must be set in the place of Christianity, it will then be the business of theology from its positive standpoint to engage upon an apology for religion and Christianity, and to remind philosophy of this, that it can create a theory of religion but not a religion, that it may establish a philosophical school but not a religious communion. If, on the other hand, philosophy agrees with theology in the recognition of religion and Christianity, then theology will accept the philosophical testimony as the highest confirmation of its positive platform, and will seek to derive from philosophy the greatest possible advantage. Nevertheless it will not be in a condition to surrender the connection with the real Christian and Church life, which for philosophy does not exist, but in which the practical ends of theology concentrate themselves, and so to abandon generally its positive platform, especially at a time when, from the side of philosophy itself, the divided state of philosophy has been

admitted,[1] and when theology could scarcely find a philosophical system, unto which it might be ready to deliver itself. But, upon its own side, it must be demanded by philosophy that theology should recognise it, not only in regard to its practical calling, but also in regard to its theoretical investigation. For if theology is not merely, as Kant regarded it, the bearer of an ecclesiastical statutory law, but has examined Christianity thoroughly, and the whole department of religion which proceeds from it, by means of the same principle which philosophy employs, then even philosophy will be obliged to seek instruction regarding Christianity and the Church by means of a special theological inquiry.

Since, then, theology stands in so vital and free a connection with all the other sciences, we must give prominence in it to the task of maintaining a strict connection between the Christian Church system and the whole range of the national culture. It has also the task of keeping out of public life the discords which must enter, if a particular Church system were to affirm the infallibility of its doctrinal positions, and, under the pretence that these infallible positions are Christianity, and that a limited Church sect is the Church, were to oppose all historical development in the name of Christianity and the Church. By means of this highest practical task, which theological science has constantly to perform, apart from the purely ecclesiastical end which it pursues, its place among the other practical sciences is already secured to theology, and its claim to be reckoned along with these at its universities by the State as a distinct science is justified. As from the side of natural science a searching review has been made of the whole department of knowledge,[2]

[1] Compare E. Zeller, Geschichte des deutschen Philosophie, p. 917.

[2] Compare H. Helmholtz, Ueber das Verhältniss der Naturwissenschaften zur Gesammtheit der Wissenschaft. (On the Relations of Natural Science to the whole circle of the Sciences.) In seinen populären wissenschaftlichen Vorträgen. (Popular Scientific Lectures.) Heft 1, 2. Braunschweig 1865, 1871. Heft 1, p. 3–29.

so also from the side of theological science the demand must be made that, for the preservation of all the social, civil, and ethical interests of the natural life, the four faculties at the German universities should co-operate in the most intimate fellowship!

APPENDIX A.

The Theological Encyclopædias of Hofmann and Rothe.

The literature relating to theological encyclopædia has been in an unusual measure enriched during recent times. Just about the time when this treatise originally appeared in its German form, the Encyclopædia of J. Ch. K. von Hofmann was issued, edited from lectures and manuscripts by G. J. Bestmann, licentiate and tutor in theology at Erlangen; and soon after, the Encyclopædia of Richard Rothe, edited from his remains by Pastor G. Ruppelius. Undoubtedly those who are sufficiently acquainted with the works of these two theologians, who have gained for themselves, each after his own manner, a very high position in their different theological circles, will already have, from their general familiarity with Hofmann and Rothe's methods, a very good idea as to how both must set forth the theological system, and so will not find anything essentially new in the Encyclopædias now posthumously published. To others, however, not so familiar with those previous writings, they will afford a clear view and a comprehensive scientific conception of the standpoint of the most important theological works of modern times. But beyond all question they are in themselves pre-eminently deserving of attention on account of the help which they afford in carrying forward the construction of the theological system. The two editors, Bestmann and Ruppelius, are therefore entitled to our hearty thanks for the pains which they have taken, out of the lectures of the different academical sessions,

and out of numerous fragments and marginal notes, to make the two Encyclopædias accessible to a wider theological public. But, just because of the circumstances of their publication, it becomes the duty of critics of these treatises to keep in view, not the literary form, upon which the authors, had they themselves published them, would have undoubtedly expended much greater pains, but only their essential contents.

In general, Hofmann and Rothe, individualistic and independent as they have proved themselves to be in the general construction of their theology, are, in the exposition of the theological encyclopædia, more or less influenced by the Encyclopædias of Schleiermacher and Rosenkranz. Hofmann,[1] just like Rosenkranz, prefaces his work with some Preliminary Remarks, pp. 1–36, in which he treats of the foundations of his system, and of its position in relation to different theological tendencies. The Encyclopædia is with him the system of theological knowledge, and is represented as undertaken not simply with the practical aim of affording an introduction to theological study (Hagenbach), but as itself a part of theological science. A merely formal exposition, such as Schleiermacher proposes, is for this purpose not sufficient, but an exposition of the subject-matter itself is required. The Encyclopædia should bring into view the full body of theology, with all its members laid out in order (Rosenkranz). The very essence of theology consists in this, that it is the science of Christianity, and therefore "the knowledge and affirmation of Christianity according to principle, simple, comprehensive, symmetrical." It is not theology that brings forth Christianity; but it is itself a growth from Christianity. Hence the question arises, What is the essence of Christianity? Hofmann reduces the various solutions of this question to the antithesis of doctrine and fact. Christianity as doctrine

[1] Encyclopædie der Theologie, von Johann Chr. K. von Hofmann, nach Vorlesungen und Manuscripten herausgegeben von G. J. Bestmann. Nördlingen 1879.

has grouped together a multiplicity of historical contents. The rationalist, who views the historical element over against the essential doctrinal contents as a merely accidental thing, and the philosopher, who treats the historical element merely as the form from which the essential contents of doctrine are to be distinguished, both deal with their natural reason as though already, in this very exercise of reason, they had gained possession of a doctrinal conception, and in this way they come "into collision with a matter of fact in regard to which there should be no controversy, because it is a thing of experience, namely, that the Christian, as such, is conscious of a newness in his whole relation to God which is at the same time a newness of his whole knowledge," p. 4 f. The mystic and theosophist, however, who, by virtue of an inner enlightenment kindled in him by means of Christianity, thinks to know the essence of Christianity apart from its historical externals, shows by his very procedure that Christianity is not essentially doctrine, seeing that, as such, it is not capable of producing such an effect as the transformation of the cognitive faculty. "It therefore cannot be that Christianity is first of all a doctrine, if this statement be so understood as to imply that the historical element in the contents of Christian doctrine is something incidental and secondary," p. 5 f. Nevertheless, Christianity may be conceived as first of all a doctrine, if only all the while the historical element of its doctrinal contents is regarded as essential. But the historical element will then require a divine guarantee, which it cannot itself contribute; and a Christianity thus outwardly guaranteed will then consist "in mere acquiescence in the assertion that this and that are historical realities." "And supernaturalism has actually reduced Christianity to this degree of indigence; for it makes of Christianity a historical revelation, the contents of which one must believe, just because it has been divinely revealed," p. 6. It is, however, quite another matter when the historical element, in

so far as it is essential, is treated as having its guarantee in itself, and as proving itself to be, not merely something past, but something present, which bears witness of itself to every one who will hear. Christianity, then, is no longer regarded as pre-eminently a doctrine, but this matter of fact is the essential thing. When Hofmann says that Christianity is pre-eminently a matter of fact, he means that in Christianity man's relation to God is witnessed to spiritually by the historical facts concerning a Christ who has appeared, died, risen, and ascended unto God, p. 7. From this conception of Christianity Hofmann next reaches to the idea of a communion such as the Christian Church. Neither rationalists nor theosophists reach to such a notion; while supernaturalism admits only of an outwardly constructed communion. The Church, regarded as a commonwealth having as its constitutive principle this great fact of the relation of man to God, receives individuals into its membership, and makes them sharers in this divine relationship. A distinction, however, must be made between the Church as an outward commonwealth and its spiritual reality. The relationship with God into which the Church introduces her members does not correspond in all respects with the outward commonwealth of the Church; but those who participate in its outward ordinances become much rather, independently of them, a living witness to that relationship of God and man which is to be experienced by means of those ordinances. A supernatural fact must make proof of its reality and presence by means of this spiritual commonwealth, and give testimony to those who belong to it, p. 9 f. "The one great fact of Christianity must be this, that the relationship of God and man, whose communion is the Christian Church, independently of what is to be found visible in the world, is realized in the person of the supernatural Christ; and He, just because He carries His evidence in Himself, gives testimony to, and proof of, the spiritual, by means of the actual and visible

commonwealth, to those who belong to it," p. 10. The ecclesiastical commonwealth of the day is "the Church of Christ always only in the measure in which it is fit to be the means of witnessing to the actual Christ through the ordinances of the Church." In conclusion, Hofmann says: "Christianity, therefore, is the fact of a present relationship between God and man, and this present relationship between God and man is—(1) realized in the Person of Christ Jesus, so that to stand in fellowship with Him, and to stand in a fellowship of love with God, are one and the same thing; but (2) Christianity is also the fact of an outwardly organized and visible commonwealth which exists by means of that relationship between God and man, and in order to the realizing of that relationship; so that, again, membership in this commonwealth of the Church, and participation in that relationship between God and man realized in Christ, are one and the same thing," p. 10 f.

Thus Hofmann answers the question about the nature of Christianity without having previously answered the question about the nature of religion. According to him, the answer to the latter question lies in the answer to the former. For while the Christian is conscious of bearing to God a relation of loving fellowship, which reached its perfection in Christ, he at the same time knows that, even apart from this, he would stand in an analogous relation to God as the first cause of his being. Natural religion is a relationship to God implanted in man's very life, so that he cannot stand otherwise than in a relation to God. But by reason of sin natural religion falls into error concerning God, degenerates into a wilful doctrine of God, a false religion, and forms communions on the basis of such errors for each separate nationality. This is the nature of heathenism, the religions of which have been broken up by the reaction of thought on the part of individuals, and are not to be reckoned as positive religions. In Christianity, on the other hand, "it is God who has established

a new relationship between Himself and mankind, which is not determined by means of the sin of man." This is a positive religion, and the communion established thereby is a Church in the wider sense, independent of the natural and merely national life, so that the history preliminary to that of Christ and of His Church is included in it. Now, inasmuch as in this religion a will of God not previously made known manifests itself, this religion is a revealed, as contrasted with a natural, religion. As a divinely-revealed religion, Christianity is the truth of religion; and theology, as the science thereof, does not need to prove its own right to exist over against the philosophy of religion. "The philosophy of religion ends where the positive religion begins; and just there theology comes in. The philosophy of religion transgresses its limits when it aspires to become a philosophy of revelation; and theology does not need to take over from the philosophy of religion a definition of what constitutes religion, in order then to tell what kind of a religion Christianity is," p. 16. The independence of Christianity has this as a consequence, that there can also be an independent science thereof. Theology is the carrying out of a single and independent thought. In opposition to Rosenkranz, and particularly to Schleiermacher, who deny the simplicity and independence of theology as a positive science, Hofmann maintains that one must distinguish between the essential ground of a science, from which it proceeds by an inward necessity in virtue of the human impulse in the direction of knowledge, and the need that has arisen outwardly, by means of which, even apart from the impulse in the direction of scientific knowledge, it was called forth. Now the position of theology is precisely this, that it owes its historical origin to the need that had arisen in the Church. In so far as theology is regarded as a matter of professional activity in the ecclesiastical commonwealth, it is, first of all, historical theology which embraces in it the science of Scripture as well as the history of the Church. But, on

the other hand, there is "the self-scrutiny of the Christian by virtue of which he is conscious of that which constitutes his Christianity, as the natural basis of a scientific activity, just like that scrutiny that is directed to nature," p. 20. As a product of the scientific impulse, theology is the scientific self-knowledge of the Christian, or the scientific knowledge of Christianity, therefore systematic science. As such theology is an independent knowledge of a subject proper only to it, independent as well of philosophy as of any external motive, be it ecclesiastical need or ecclesiastical authority. In this, however, there is nothing said in favour of a false subjectivity; for it is assumed of the theologian, that, as a member of the Church, the truth of the reality maintained in the Church is with him a living power. "It follows from this that there is, rooted in the very nature of Christianity, a binding obligation resting upon the theologian, but this obligation is an inward, not an outward one. Every other binding of theology than that which results freely from the presupposition of this obligation is useless and at the same time injurious," p. 22. In order to restore systematic theology, that is, a system of the knowledge of Christianity growing up in the way of Christian self-knowledge, there is only needed, "first, a living fellowship with Christ, without which, indeed, the self-knowledge would not meet with an object of knowledge; and secondly, a thorough training of the power of thinking and of expressing oneself, which constitutes the basis of a fundamental, deep, simple, complete, symmetrical knowledge, and of a suitable statement of Christianity as it is immediately known to us," p. 23. But, on the other hand, the theologian belongs to an ecclesiastical commonwealth, which not only has its history, but also its actually existing present, which again forms the transition to a future that is proceeding out therefrom. This ecclesiastical commonwealth also connects itself with a Holy Scripture, in which it is being always reminded of its true nature, and always anew gains assurance

of its wealth of knowledge. Hence the activity of the theologian directs itself necessarily to those historical subjects; and so to the scientific activity of the θεωρεῖν is joined a second activity of the ἱστορεῖν. But for the theologian the history of the Church is quite another thing from that which it is to the historian. The theologian has to consider it from the point of view of the life of regeneration, p. 24. So, too, is it with the science of Scripture. The philologist treats Holy Scripture as a constituent part of the literature of the old world; while the theologian treats it as the authoritative document to which the Church of Christ appeals. But now, if the Church and Holy Scripture are actually that which in systematic theology they are already acknowledged to be, a common product of the Holy Spirit and the word of God, "then the results of the properly conducted historical labours of the theologian must exactly correspond with the results of his systematic activity. It must be self-evident that Christianity, known to the theologian as a fact of his own innermost experience, stands in agreement with that which constitutes the essential contents of the historical development of the Church, as well as with that which lies before us in Holy Scripture witnessed unto for all time," p. 26.

But in all the three departments of his labours[1] the theologian is liable to error. Hofmann denounces a woe against the Church if it should demand of theology immunity from error; but he also denounces a woe against the theologian who, while claiming for his scientific labour its independence, does not, on behalf of his own faith, as well as on behalf of the faith of non-theologians, maintain the right of criticizing and contradicting his theology; "for while faith is the presentation of the Christian life in its unity and manifoldness,

[1] The three theological departments are those included in the first two divisions of the Encyclopædia, namely, systematic theology and the two parts of historical theology, the science of Scripture and Church history. Practical theology is not taken into account till later on.—ED.

the theology of the day is always only the result of a one-sided, because a merely intellectual, elaboration," p. 27.

In so far as concerns the distribution of theology, in accordance with that which has been previously laid down, theology is first of all a scientific personal knowledge and personal declaration of the Christian, and in this way the scientific knowledge of Christianity. 'We must start with that fact surely established in faith, which constitutes the essence of Christianity, and so begin with *Systematic Theology*. This is not to be prefaced by a philosophical theology, as with Schleiermacher, nor by a speculative theology, as with Rosenkranz, nor by an exegetical theology, as with Harless. Hofmann separates himself from supernaturalism, which starts from the Bible, or, when it takes an ecclesiastical form, from the confessional writings of its Church. According to Hofmann, not the Bible, that is, the history of Christ and His apostles, is the basis of Christianity, but the present living Christ, who has the historical Christ for His presupposition. "It is not something in the first instance past and gone, of which the Christian's faith is certain, but something present," p. 28. Next in order after the systematic work of the theologian is to be placed the historical, as occupying the second place. The one is quite independent of the other. "One must not start from the results of systematic theology, and presuppose these when he comes to historical theology, and *vice versa* just as little," p. 30. If they do not agree in their results, then what has to be done is simply to find out the error. In the prosecution of both departments of study the theologian must reduce his Christianity to the simplest and most general form, and must be himself personally assured of this as he has it in common with all who are Christians,—a reduction which is to be regarded as itself a scientific accomplishment, since, in order to reduce the manifold to its unity, there is needed a thoroughly formed capacity of thought, p. 30 f.

If historical theology, which embraces the history of the

Church and the science of Scripture, were to follow the natural course, Hofmann thinks it must give precedence to the history of the development of the Church. Nevertheless, inasmuch as we cannot be led by Church history to any certain result as to what Holy Scripture is, this is to be reached rather through an investigation of Holy Scripture itself; and since generally Scripture must be acknowledged to be more certain as a complete whole than the history of the Church which is to be found still in flux, therefore the science of Scripture must have precedence of Church history. Although, on the one hand, the knowledge of the nature of Holy Scripture won in systematic theology cannot be itself assumed as a presupposition of the treatment of Scripture, yet, on the other hand, the witness won from Scripture concerning the nature of Christianity must be influential for the historical development of the Church. If systematic theology has its warrant in this, that Christianity is a personal matter, then historical theology has its warrant in this, that it is just as undoubtedly a matter for the community. Dealing with Holy Scripture teaches us to estimate aright the social aspect (*Gemeindlichkeit*) of Christianity, and in consequence thereof, to acknowledge the truth that lies in the proper conception of Church history. "The self-certainty of Christianity by means of these three theological pursuits shows itself to be on the lines of scientific knowledge, and this self-certainty becomes a certainty of scientific knowledge in proportion to the agreement in the results of the investigations of systematic theology and of historical theology under its two divisions," p. 33.

The three parts of theology referred to are commonly distinguished from practical theology under the title theoretical. This distinction is, indeed, inconvenient for Hofmann, since he can properly only regard systematic theology as theoretical; but, in the sense that practical theology reduces to practice for the Church the result of the so-called theoretical theology, he admits the distinction, and in accordance therewith defines

practical theology as "the science of the application of theological knowledge in the everyday life of the Church," p. 35. "To gain new decisions or scientific conclusions of a theological kind is not the task of practical theology," p. 35.

These statements of Hofmann I have presented together in a complete and systematic form, because they are of supreme importance in coming to a judgment on his theological system. They have no title to be prefixed to an exposition of encyclopædia. They answer not to the claims which one has to make of encyclopædia. The thoughts treated of here by Hofmann are related to the foundations of the theological system, and, with the exception of what is said about the theological encyclopæd'a, should be incorporated in the encyclopædic system itself. We overlook this question of form, however, and keep rather to the matter. Much of what Hofmann has here laid down agrees with what is said in this treatise, and in my opinion is incontestable. Among those things on which we are agreed I reckon his definition of the theological encyclopædia, according to which it is no mere formal schematism of the theological branches of study, but the theological system according to its essential contents.[1] Further, I also accept his statement regarding the nature of Christianity, that it is not in the first instance doctrine, but a fact, and that the Church is the realizing of this fact, that a distinction is to be made between the outward and the inward in the Church, that theology is to grow out of the fact realized in the Church, that Christianity is the truth of religion, and that theology, as the science thereof, is independent of philosophy, and is the simple drawing out of its own thought, independent of any outward authority, that the theologian as a member of the

[1] Doedes expresses a contrary opinion with equal decidedness: "Rabiger," he says on p. 3 of his Encyclopædie, "declares in his treatise, Zur theologischen Encyclopædie, that the method of handling encyclopædia adopted by him, together with von Hofmann and others, is alone to be regarded as correct; we think that the method followed by ourselves and others is deserving of at least as much recommendation."—Ed.

Church must stand in living fellowship with Christ, that in theology there can be no other binding obligation resting upon the theologian than an inner one rooted in the very essence of Christianity, and that in theological investigation, according to the different subjects to which it is directed, different theological activities, a *θεωρεῖν* and a *ἱστορεῖν*, are to be distinguished.

One thing, however, is less satisfactory, and still another calls for most earnest consideration. While Hofmann rightly distinguishes between Christianity as doctrine and as fact, the style and manner in which he states this distinction, in opposition to the rationalistic and philosophical methods of treating Christianity, are not satisfactory. Against both of those methods he brings the charge, that while by means of Christianity, along with the renewal of the whole man accomplished by it, there is also wrought in the Christian a new power of knowing, they still bring forward the natural reason and employ it in their scientific treatment of Christianity. Here, however, Hofmann is involved in a self-contradiction, since he demands for his own theology the same scientific activity as is directed to the study of nature, in short, a thoroughly trained faculty of thinking, which qualifies for an understanding of Christianity according to its principles, while consistently with his own demands he ought rather to have required for theology that specifically Christian faculty of perception. Again, we are heartily at one with Hofmann in this, that the nature of Christianity can be known without having first answered the question as to the nature of religion. But it is not consistent with the standpoint assumed by Hofmann in regard to the history of religion, to allow the non-Christian religions to be taken cognizance of in contrast to Christianity as the truth of religion. If, as Hofmann maintains, natural religion be a relation between God and mankind ordained by God Himself, then too, even in this must there be included a reference to human sin; and not only

sin, but many other factors as well must have been operative before natural religion assumed among separate nationalities the form of particular heathen religions. Yet even these are not to be regarded as merely arbitrary conceptions, originating in delusion and false religious fancies, in opposition to which Christianity is to be represented as "a new divinely-ordained relation between God and mankind, which is not determined by the sin of man." They are rather to be regarded as having a claim to the designation of positive and revealed religions, and, in consequence, are entitled to the name of true religion. And further, it is scarcely conceivable how Hofmann, with the conception of Christianity which he held, should have included the Jewish religion within the range of positive and revealed religion, and have given it a place in his Church in the wider sense; nor yet does it appear how he should have regarded it as characteristic of the particular tribal religions, that individuals came into opposition with the religion of their race and laboured for its overthrow, since in the Christian communion also a similar phenomenon has been witnessed. By means of the categories, positive and revealed, by which Hofmann distinguishes Christianity from the heathen religions, Christianity cannot be represented as the true religion; but this must be accomplished by means of the historical comparison of religions, and by means of a theoretical investigation of the nature of Christianity. Theology will not be able in the long run to withhold itself from this twofold task if it is to maintain its scientific rank. In my *Theologie* I have made it my special endeavour to call attention to this. But even if one conceive of Christianity in Hofmann's way as a revealed religion, the whole department of revelation would not by any means be reserved for theology alone, so as to exclude from it the philosophy of religion, as Hofmann wishes. For even although it be admitted that theology did not need to derive from it its first idea of religion, in order that it should be able to tell what sort

of religion Christianity is, yet still the philosophy of religion, when treating the question, What is revelation? as Hofmann would put it, is, on its part, neither overstepping its limits nor altogether reserving this investigation to itself.

But above all, the starting-point which Hofmann gives to theology is a cause of offence. With him theology is first of all a purely personal affair, and generally speaking nothing can be said against this. The theologian, however, is to start from Christianity as a matter of his own inmost experience, from that fact which constitutes the essence of Christianity, firmly established in his faith, so that his scientific self-knowledge becomes the scientific knowledge of Christianity. Hofmann is quite right when he says that it is not something past, but something present, of which Christian faith is assured, not the historical, but the present living Christ. But how does this agree with the representation of Christianity as a fact? At all events the fact as such is not the essence of Christianity, for in it there lies only a formal designation of Christanity in opposition to doctrine. Hence the essence of Christianity lies not in the fact, but in that which forms the basis of the fact. That, however, is something historical, which evidences itself to faith as present, and distinguishes the faith as Christian from every other religion. How then does this agree with the historical? Hofmann says: the present living Christ points back to the historical; but he says also, that the risen and exalted Christ gives witness to Himself in the commonwealth of the Church. For the theologian, then, who is a member of the Church, is it only the risen and exalted Christ of whom he can have certainty in his personal faith? Or, if we take as historical the whole Christ witnessed to in Holy Scripture,—the Christ actually manifested, who died, and rose, and was exalted to God's right hand,—shall not the Christ within, as the actually historical as well as the exalted Christ, witness to Himself? And again, are there not various lines of inquiry along which

the theologian may gain assurance for his own faith in regard to that which has been historically manifested in Christ? But even if the theologian has by any means himself reached to an actual assurance of his faith in reference to the historical, he yet can never be certain of this, that among the other members of the Church this assurance has been attained in the same way and exists in the same relation to the historical. Now Hofmann demands, at least of the theologian, that he receive his Christianity in the simplest and most general form, and that he should come to a certainty of it in such a way as is common to all Christians. But if in this the theologian is only referred to his own individual experience, then is the solution of the question very difficult; and if he attempts it, he will never reach but to a very uncertain result, or to a merely tautological expression. It just comes to this, that the theologian with his experience of a present living Christ is restricted to the particular ecclesiastical sect to which he belongs, so that even in the case of his succeeding in giving expression to his personal Christianity in a form satisfactory to all the members of his own denomination, this expression can have, for the members of another denomination, only the significance of a subjective experience of Christianity, be it Catholic, or Lutheran, or Reformed, or that of any other Church sect. We too, with Hofmann, demand of the theologian the heartiest personal interest in Christianity; but when Hofmann makes this demand in the sense that the theologian should make his personal experience of Christianity the ground of his theology, then, by reason of this starting-point, his theology receives a thoroughly individual, personal, and subjective character, which can indeed lead to a scientific self-knowledge, to a knowledge of the Christianity personally peculiar to the theologian, but not to an objective scientific knowledge of Christianity. From this point of view we are also obliged to object to the encyclopædic distribution which Hofmann proposes for theology. He distinguishes, in respect

of their origin, between the common human impulse after knowledge directed to the nature of Christianity, out of which theology as scientific knowledge springs, and the ecclesiastical need by means of which it is called forth as an ecclesiastical professional activity. The distinction is not brought out here by Hofmann with sufficient clearness of expression. Hofmann says regarding it, that the former, the theology which proceeds from the impulse after knowledge directed to the essential nature of Christianity, is systematic theology; while, on the other hand, that which springs from ecclesiastical need is historical theology, embracing the sciences of Scripture and Church history. In the Church, indeed, this historical theology made its appearance earlier than that which is called forth by the natural impulse after knowledge. Systematic theology is thus a purely personal affair; historical theology, on the contrary, is an affair of the community. All this seems to us quite untenable. Various impulses, no doubt, outward and inward, which might lead to the construction of theology, are to be distinguished, some turning upon the essential nature of Christianity, others turning upon the needs of the Church. In history, however, they have operated just in an inverse relation to one another from that which Hofmann lays down. Those yearnings which were directed toward further attainments in the knowledge of Christ came forward earlier than those which were directed simply to the Church's needs. Yet they are not to be sundered from one another as though they were operating in a way mutually exclusive and absolutely independent of each other; as though the knowledge of the essential foundations of Christianity were reached without regard to the needs of the Church, and the Church's needs were expressed without regard to the essential nature of Christianity. Hence it cannot be said in general terms that systematic theology is a personal affair, and that historical theology is an affair of the community. For it is just the Church, as such, that has the

highest and most persistent interest in the knowledge of Christianity.

Hofmann says very strikingly that theology is the carrying out of a single and independent thought, and that it is just in this that its right to be ranked as a science consists. But, owing to the peculiar relation in which he places systematic theology with regard to historical theology, theological science with him shrivels up into systematic theology. For, according to his representation, the sciences of Scripture and of Church history have a subordinate significance, so that they only serve, partly for the confirming of the doctrinal system, and partly for the practice of the Church. In this way of viewing historical theology we see a concession on the part of Hofmann to Schleiermacher's conception of theology; but it is one that completely miscarries. Hofmann, as it were, parts theology into two. Between systematic and historical theology there lies, according to Hofmann, the gulf which separates theory from practice. The two stand over against one another, without being organically bound with one another by one scientific purpose. The precedence which Hofmann grants to systematic theology is determined by his theological starting-point. What the nature of this is, I have already shown. A Christianity of personal experience only will always be a very insecure basis for theology. Instead of this subjective starting-point, theology will have to seek an objective one. Hofmann himself says of Holy Scripture, that by it the Church has to be continually reminding itself of its own essential nature; but then we should remember that to this its essential nature belongs before all its Christian faith according to its contents. Again, Hofmann says, that on principle the science of Scripture ought to be placed before the science of Church history, because the essential nature of Scripture can be rightly known only by dealing directly with itself. Now from these statements the true conclusion is that the theologian should direct his attention first of all to Holy

Scripture, in order to learn from it, in a purely objective way, the essential contents of the Christian faith, and that therefore the science of Scripture, upon the same principle on which it is ranked before Church history, is also to be ranked before systematic theology. It is indeed one of the most important questions in theology that is here discussed. If the state of matters be really such as it is on many sides affirmed to be, that nothing historically certain is to be known from our Gospels, that rather only from the effects of the work of Christ any insight into the essential nature of Christianity can be gained, then it must go ill, not only with Protestant theology, but with theology generally. And yet, were we now obliged unreservedly to admit that from the New Testament Gospels no historically exact biography of Jesus can be drawn up, it were even then a precipitate act to deny to them on that account all historical value. With good right are they regarded as the historical document from which the religious consciousness of Jesus, the one thing with which they are chiefly concerned, and that which forms the very essence of Christianity, can be known. However highly the effects of Christianity may be valued in forming an estimate of it, yet, for a right understanding of these very effects, one must first of all go back to their origin in the spirit of Jesus Himself. Hofmann rejects with disdain, as of a piece with the *supernaturalismus vulgaris*, as we indeed, in the sense in which Hofmann understands it, would also do, the setting of exegetical theology in front of the theological system; for not the Bible, but the living present Christ, which points back to the historical, is the basis of Christianity. Very important is this on the side of the Church life, but not on that of theology. Instead of turning to the present living Christ, it will, if it is to gain on its part a firm objective basis, have to turn back to the historical Christ, and therefore must begin with exegetical theology. Indeed, just because I have adopted this method, beginning my Encyclopædia with

exegetical theology, one critic has brought against me the charge of going over to the side of supernaturalism. How unfounded such a charge is, ought to be readily perceived. As the foundation of its treatment of Scripture, supernaturalism assumes certain dogmatic presuppositions. Proceeding from its dogma of revelation and inspiration, it regards Scripture as the basis alike of the Church institution and of the theological system. I, on my part, start from a purely historical standpoint, and demand that, by means of a historical treatment of Scripture, its significance for the Church may be established, and also the essential nature of Christianity may be ascertained. I do not believe that anything should be rejected simply because it is supernaturalistic. The element of truth in supernaturalism is this, that it maintains hold of Scripture as an objective basis. What is untrue in it is that dogmatic presupposition. On the removal of this false element, the other, as undoubted truth, is to be firmly maintained. When exegetical theology has set forth the essential nature of Christianity, and when thereafter Church history has shown the historical development of Christianity, then from these objective groundworks systematic theology may proceed to an exact and scientific demonstration of the truth of Christianity. All the three principal divisions, then, stand in organic connection with one another, so that they mutually sustain, supplement, and advance each other. But the demand is scientifically untenable, which Hofmann makes of the theologian, that in treating Scripture and Church history a procedure should be adopted specifically different from that of the philologist and historian. We ought rather to require of all the three, if they are to perform their tasks, that they should equally make use of the philological and historical methods. The theologian will distinguish himself from the philologist and historian only in this respect, that he has to treat Scripture and Church history in connection with the theological system.

And besides all this, Hofmann, because he places systematic theology before historical theology, that is, exegetical theology and Church history, brings the two into a very doubtful relation with one another. They are both to be prosecuted quite independently of each other. "One must not," says Hofmann, "proceed from the conclusions of systematic theology, and presuppose these when he comes to the historical division, and just as little *vice versa*," p. 30. Much self-deception, therefore, is demanded, especially of the systematic theologian. Notwithstanding the dominant position which Hofmann assigns to systematic theology, he assumes from the first that, if it has done its work in the right way, "the conclusion of the properly-conducted historical work of the theologian must be at one with the conclusion reached by his systematic labours," p. 26. Evidently Hofmann regards it as possible that the conclusions in the one and the other may not agree,—then, he thinks, it only remains to find out the error which has crept in, p. 30. And who is now to concede the error and acknowledge it? The systematic theologian, who, for his conclusion, appeals to the scientific character of his proof, or the historical theologian, who, for his conclusion, appeals to the facts communicated by him? Truly for Hofmann the thing would be never-ending. He confesses, and no one will contradict it, that theology in all its three departments, the systematic, the exegetical, and the historical, may be in error; and if now in a scientific way the errors are not to be removed, then there is, for Hofmann, faith, to which the last decision belongs. To the theologian's own faith, as well as to that of the non-theologian, will he preserve the right of giving the lie to his theology. This ranking of faith above theology we cannot agree to out and out, and least of all on the grounds which Hofmann adduces for it, that "faith is the presentation of Christianity in its unity and manifoldness, while the theology of the day is always only the result of a one-sided,

because a merely intellectual elaboration," p. 27. On this point Hofmann is found in contradiction with himself. According to him, the theological is likewise a scientific exercise; and also, according to him, the scientific exercise consists in this, that it "brings the manifold to its unity," p. 31. In the all-sidedness of faith lies its manifoldness, and, in opposition to it, the theological activity, according to our conception, as scientific, will have to represent the higher unity. Theology should, and can, do no violence to the faith; but instead of allowing faith to sit in judgment on theology, theology has rather to assume the task of freeing faith from the manifold delusions, superstitions, and errors with which in history it has been alloyed, and to point back to its alone divine living ground. That Hofmann should vindicate for faith that ultimately valid judgment upon theological error, is in keeping with the subjective character of his theology. This subjective tendency is shown in this, that he treats the theological activity always only as the individual act of a believer, and does not rise to the recognition in theology of an objective spiritual work, uninterruptedly continued in the Church, which accomplishes the correction of its errors by means of its own continued scientific activity. Of what use then generally is theology, if it is so with it and with faith as Hofmann puts it? Is it the certainty of faith from which theology starts, and will faith be exposed to danger, bereft of its certainty by theological errors and rendered unquiet? Is it not then better to repress in the Christian the living impulse after knowledge, and to nip it in the bud, in order at least to hinder the rise of a systematic theology, and to allow faith to have peaceful intercourse with its Holy Scripture and the history of its Church?

Hofmann has failed completely to bring practical theology into organic connection with historical and systematic theology, as he had failed to bring these last into connection with one another. In his conception of practical theology Hofmann is

in essential agreement with Schleiermacher. As "the science of the practical application of theological knowledge in the life of the Church community," so Hofmann defines practical theology (p. 35), it has to do only with theological arts in the Church, and is the theory of the practice thereof (*Kunsttheorie*). For one who does not enter upon the ministry of the Church it has no value; for "to gain new perceptions of a theological kind is not the task of practical theology," p. 35. It is consequently shut out from the theological system, and can be attached to it only as an appendix, dealing with matters of importance to the practical theologian. Instead of having this subordinate position assigned it, as is done by Hofmann, I am of opinion that practical theology ought to form a constituent part of the theological system. If Christianity in the abstract and in history represents itself as a religious communion, and therefore a Church, then also the knowledge and exposition of the really existing Church in accordance with its ideal conception will be seen to be an essential and indispensable exercise in theological science. The idea of the Church already won from preceding departments of theological science is indeed assumed in practical theology; but inasmuch as here it is shown how that idea has taken shape in practical Christianity, practical theology also gives expression to a distinct theological thought, and therefore promotes, just as much as the other parts of theology, scientific knowledge such as every one who occupies himself with theology may claim from theology. Consequently it is not to be restricted to theological transactions and to the direction for their performance in the life of the Christian community, as though everything involved in the institution of the Church were exhausted in the theological activity, and as though practical theology were wholly occupied with the defining of its technical form. On the contrary, the theoretical task of practical theology is to be accomplished, just like that of the other divisions, for the sake of the completeness of the theo-

logical system; so that, for example, it has not only to show preachers how to preach, but rather generally to call attention to this, that there is to be preaching, that is, that preaching is a necessary, constituent part of Christian worship. All the parts of theology have first of all a purely scientific task, but in like manner all serve the practical interests of the Church. Theology, with all its four parts, is a positive science, and at the same time it is, as such, a practical science, as I have sought fully to demonstrate in the present treatise on theologic.

With these explanations of principles we have now to pass on to treat of the several principal divisions of theology. Hofmann begins, as we have seen, with systematic theology. This is, according to him, "a scientific knowledge and statement of Christianity, as the theologian practically experiences it in himself." It has to take its start "from the statement of the relation between God and man in the most general form in which it is still entitled to the name of Christianity," and has to make its whole contents grow out of this general statement. It is the method of evolution which Hofmann follows, p. 48. It is noticeable here that Hofmann seeks to set faith at rest should it raise the objection to this statement, that it does not find its own contents faithfully reproduced in it, by saying that faith may be in error from the want of the necessary knowledge, and that it has to suspend its judgment until there has been a complete development of the general statement in the system. But if faith may err at the beginning of the system, it may also err in its judgment upon the completed system; and where then is the right, which Hofmann still persists in claiming for faith, to contradict and overturn the theological system? This, however, is only incidental. Christianity, when thus reduced to its simplest expression, is, according to Hofmann, "the personal fellowship of life between God and sinful mankind, mediated in Christ Jesus, and indeed mediated by Him as a living present power," p. 51. This universal

proposition, which the theologian bears in himself as his own living experience, is to form the starting-point of his systematic activity. It is indeed only required of the theologian that he, in accordance with the method of evolution, should give an exact scientific expression to the entire circle of particular positions contained in that general statement, so that in this way the general statement may be developed into a detailed statement of Christianity, in which the separate particular positions, which, like the circle, are described from the centre, are exactly equivalent to that first statement. When this is done, there can be no longer any place for the distinction between fundamentals and non-fundamentals.

An examination of this general statement of Christianity, which Hofmann wishes to have accepted as a foundation, furnishes confirmation of the objection which we previously advanced against taking personal experience as the starting-point of theology. If this general proposition is intended to afford a definition of the essential nature of Christianity, we find it in no respect satisfactory. Sin directly excludes the personal fellowship of life with God, and consequently mention can be made only of a relation between God and mankind, and the expression of this relation has to be made in terms so general that it might be taken for a statement of religion generally, rather than as defining specifically the Christian religion. There would thus be in this general statement nothing more than the tautological assertion, that Christianity is the relation between God and man mediated by Christ, without any help being afforded us in regard to the essential nature of Christianity.

Yet more deserving of consideration is the method of evolution employed by Hofmann. It presents to the systematic theologian an extremely difficult task. From that one general proposition he is expected to make the whole system of the Christian faith evolve itself. Hofmann, however, facilitates matters for himself by securing the aid of certain

unquestioned facts. From the present, for example, he gets the existence of a Christian Church, its vocation in regard to Scripture, its Confession, its official action in baptism and the Lord's Supper, the relation of the Christian to orders of society outside of the Church,—such as the family, the race, the State, and humanity. From the past, again, he gets the origin of the Christian Church out of the Israelitish race, the connection of Jesus by birth with this race, and the pre-eminence of Israel, which, as a race, makes claim, along with the Christian Church, to be the congregation of the Lord. All these facts, undenied and undeniable as they are, the systematic theologian may without hesitation receive into his system, since the receiving of them only amounts to the estimating and confirming of the worth and significance of these facts by means of the system. On the other hand, it is demanded by "a scientific necessity" that systematic theology keep itself thoroughly independent of everything that has otherwise been arrived at as contents of the Christian faith, whether it be witnessed to by Holy Scripture or form part of the Confession of the Church. Much rather only that which results of necessity from that general proposition has any claim to be regarded as a constituent part of the Christian faith, and should receive, on account of that derivation, the attestation of its truth. "The uniqueness (*Einheitlichkeit*) and symmetry of the system are the scientific guarantee which affords justification to its several constituent parts," pp. 51–55. We acknowledge that it is a particularly good feature in Hofmann's systematic theology that it takes for its subject, not the ecclesiastical dogmas, but a general statement of Christianity. It also sounds very fine, and secures our hearty sympathy, when Hofmann expresses the wish that systematic theology should be made independent of tradition, whether it be that of Scripture or that of the Church Confession. Yet he does not arrive at this general proposition, which is to embrace what is essentially Christian by

means of an objective procedure, and it does not afford him a standard measure to be used in the criticism of tradition; but it is for him at once the result of the casual experience of the theologian, and the fundamental statement of the truth out of which systematic theology is to rear the entire contents of the Christian faith. If we wished to deal strictly with the claim advanced on behalf of systematic theology in regard to its independence of historical theology, and to demand of the systematic theologian that, in that special department assigned him, he should look quite away from the statements of Scripture and of the Church Confession, then we would be forced to admit that the procedure expected of him, notwithstanding the unchallenged truths given him by Hofmann as a help, must always be a very difficult one, and not only so, but also a very dangerous one. For by this means the widest scope is given to mere wilfulness, dreaming, and speculation. This, indeed, has not been the case with Hofmann. He arrives at that proposition by pursuing a particular course of thought, for he gains his general statement by abstracting from the constituent parts of his faith all that has been empirically acquired. But those constituent parts, which form the empirical contents of his individual faith, are determined by Scripture and the Confession of the Church. Even should he now abstract himself from them, in order to gain this general proposition, he still allows himself, in the evolution of this proposition, to be led by Scripture and the Confession, so that his evolutions agree with these two, and for this reason confer upon the whole contents of his Christian faith the guarantee of truth. Thus Hofmann's systematic theology, in accordance with the proposition which forms its starting-point, and in accordance with the evolution of that proposition, bears throughout the impress of subjectivity. In order to remove myself far from such subjectivity, I have endeavoured in this treatise on theologic to prove that the essential nature of

Christianity is to be determined from Holy Scripture, and upon this objective ground, an estimation is to be made of all the rest of the contents of Scripture as well as of the doctrines of the Church, by the exercise of scientific thinking.

Hofmann proceeds, according to that method insisted upon by him, to set forth the contents of the general statement of Christianity as a present fact, (1) according to its eternal, (2) according to its historical, conditions, (3) with reference to the past, (4) with reference to the present, and (5) with reference to the future. He then gives an outline of systematic theology derived, in accordance with this partition of the material, from the general statement itself. Although we cannot approve even this distribution of the material made only according to time, and not according to contents, yet it is to be acknowledged that even here Hofmann emancipates himself from the traditional schematism, and derives the principle of his distribution from the general proposition laid down as a foundation. Thereafter he presents systematic theology in eight doctrinal articles, in which we find throughout a confirmation of that characterization of his theology which we have already made.

From the eternal presuppositions of Christianity he obtains the personality of God, and the divine Trinity, and the predestination of mankind. The triune God not merely established a historical sphere of existence (*eine Geschichtlichkeit*), but Himself went forth into it. The self-transportation of the trinitarian relation from eternity into the historical sphere of existence is the first condition of all the becoming (*Werden*) of that which, outside of Himself, God makes an object to Himself. The personal Spirit of God Himself is to man designed in the divine plan and to man created (*dem werdenden und gewordenen Menschen*) the indwelling ground of his life. The beginning of the human race must be a single individual; as the self-propagating race is sinful mankind.

Hence between the creation of the first man and the determination by which mankind became sinful the distinction of sex had entered; and in order that the singleness of the beginning of the human race might not be obliterated, the woman must be made out of the first created. But the world of men is not conceivable in this connection without the world of spirits, the angels. As for the sin of man, it could only come by means of a delusive operation wrought upon him. This could come only from the world of spirits. Hence there must be assumed in it a will hostile to God, which would frustrate the work in which the eternal will of God has consummated itself. By means of the creation of the woman was such delusion rendered possible. That will hostile to God having gained dominion, the dissolution of the world followed, and man finds himself in a condition of misery. In this, however, there is only carried out a fulfilment of the divine will, without which indeed the enmity against God would be powerless. But by God's ordinance, as His act of grace, there still remained the possibility of man, after having had from the beginning his powers exercised in opposition to God, being again inclined toward God. It finds its realization by means of a historical presentation of the innermost divine characteristics of the Holy Trinity, by means of the man Jesus, the Son of God. The history lying between the beginning of sin and the redemption by Christ is the history of salvation, and through its course in the everyday life of man that was set forth figuratively which finally found its full and essential realization in the relation of Jesus to God. To this degree does human nature correspond to the divine as suffering from sin and as longing after righteousness; while, on the contrary, man's refusal to believe the testimony of God is the immediate operation of Satan. The realization of salvation, in so far as it is in opposition to the constitution of human nature, is miraculous. In keeping with and answering to this miracle is faith, which appropriates to itself the right-

eousness sought by God. The first miracle of grace is the fellowship of married life in the family, with the moral condition of piety or impiety; the second is the application of the family relationship to a nationality, with legality or illegality, humanity or inhumanity. Now Jesus is to spring from a particular people; therefore that people is separated by God, that it may become the stage of the sacred history. The history of this race is, in contrast to that of all others, a miraculous history, that is, it is a sacred history. Everything here must be a wonderful work of God,—the constitution of the family out of which the nation sprang, and the constitution of the national institution into which this people was developed, and as necessary developments in the sacred history, the priestly, the kingly, and the prophetic offices. The glory of the king had been laid in the dust; but when Jesus arose from out of the Hebrew commonwealth, He pointed to its true essential restoration. The typical history was now at an end; but in order that the people might always retain a consciousness of this typical character which belonged to their history, a comprehensive memorial thereof was needed, which could consist only in a Scripture as the work of the Spirit of God. In Jesus who sprang out of Israel, God has, in terms of the economic trinity, become man. For this incarnation of God there was needed upon this human side no other participation than the conception of the woman. Hence the sinlessness of Jesus before God. But inasmuch as He belonged to the sinful race of man, He, too, was placed under the wrath of God and the power of the evil one. The utmost that the power of the evil one could accomplish against Him was His death, which, as an act by which He proved His own holiness, served to effect expiation for the sinful race, and brought to an end the relation of mankind to God as it had been determined by sin. His holiness, thus attested, is the righteousness of the human race, existing for all time in His person. By this means the attitude of God, which first comes into view in the person of

Jesus, is determined. After death, in His glorified human nature, He enters into unlimited friendship with God the Father. In the person of Jesus there is now called into existence a supernatural fellowship of God and mankind. The Spirit of God, who is the ground of the glorified human life of Jesus, is the bond of fellowship between Him and those who are His. The Church of Jesus is therefore first of all a communion of an invisible kind, a communion of saints; but because it is that which is living in human nature, it is also a visible kingdom of the heavenly Jesus, who makes His Spirit to operate in it. The Spirit of God converts the faith of this Church into a faith in that realization of salvation which had already been reached in the glorified Jesus, and, as the Spirit of miracle, He shows Himself in believers and by means of them. The Church of Jesus exists outside of the limits of Israel; yet, alongside of the other races, Israel continues to be the race whose history was the history of salvation. Israel remains reserved in order to form the grand completion of the Church of Jesus. The extra-Israelitish Church of Christ is the form characteristic of His Church between the time of its beginning, when it went forth from Israel, and the time of its consummation. For that intervening period the Church needs, as did Israel before, a written memorial, which has this distinct advantage in its favour, that it is brought forth by the Spirit of Christ, and this, in addition to the memorial of the typical sacred history, the Church has to admit to be indeed the word of God. The Church of the present, therefore, is the kingdom of the Holy Spirit, which is indeed the Spirit of God, but is here regarded as the Spirit of the glorified man Jesus. The Church comes into view as the sphere in which the relationship between God and man, effected in the person of Christ Jesus, is set forth. God deals with mankind as with those reconciled in Christ; and He emphasizes this reconciliation through the visible actions and institutions of the Church, which are

represented first of all by the word which worketh faith, and then by baptism with water as symbolizing reception into the communion of the Holy Spirit, and by the handing round of bread and wine, in which the Church celebrates its possession of the bodily presence of the glorified Jesus, which is still in the other world, yet is actually appropriated here. The order of the Christian community which the Church demands, and which is to be ultimately resolved into an act of Christ, its head, consists in the official action, the compass of which is to be determined in accordance with the powers and constitution of the Church itself. On the other hand, the relation toward God mediated in Christ embraces the whole range of Christian conduct. The essentially ethical content of Christianity is here set forth by Hofmann, and this is evidently the best part of the whole sketch. From the present we are led on by Christian hope to an end which is, indeed, properly an end for the Church, for it is only in the Church's hope that the individual is embraced, inasmuch as his glorification can come to pass only with the termination of the present cycle of the world, when for the Church the time has come that it, as a whole, should be glorified. While the Church is destined to extend over the whole human race, it is yet limited to those who are true members of the communion of the Holy Spirit, and are willing to be such. From this it follows that there must be an intensifying of the world's enmity against the Church; and when the whole inhabited world comes to be in a state of enmity against the Church of Christ, that Church will be able to find a place for its continued existence only in that people with the sacred history, which now again enters into its vocation after it has, as a race, become the communion of Christ. Then is the Church ripe for glorification, which comes to pass in this way: Christ comes forth from His exaltation in the spiritual world, and presents Himself and His Church in glory over against the world that is opposed to it. The glorified communion, to which also all

the members of it who have died must be reckoned, begins now an existence of a new kind, and Christ, too, through it enters into a new form of existence in order to convince the world of this, that here salvation is realized, and to constrain the world to submit to that salvation. A last attempt on the part of the evil one to found an associated dominion becomes now inevitable, and this immediately leads to the last grand decision. The Church as the Church of God is now complete, and every human being outside of it is excluded from the humanity of God. But this cannot happen, unless all those to whom before salvation had been the object of earnest longing have been incorporated with the Church. The world is now in the place of the so perfected Church, while those who have allowed themselves to be determined by the will of the evil one against God and His salvation, lose, together with that evil one, all possibility of personal action, because they no longer possess anything that is of God. Thus God's eternal will of love reaches its final realization.

Such are the characteristic features of Hofmann's systematic theology. I have reported them, as far as possible, in the very words of the author, at such length and with such particularity, not in order to criticize the system in detail, which is indeed far from my purpose here, but only in order to render a formal demonstration of the statement previously made, that Hofmann, when he starts from a general proposition of experience, and demands of the systematic theologian that he should evolve its contents, in his evolution allows himself to be throughout determined by the interest which he has in his already completed subjective faith, and that, while with the utmost decision he maintains, on the part of systematic theology, its independence of the doctrine of Scripture and of the Church, he yet receives into his systematic theology the whole contents of Scripture and of the Church creed, as he has practically done. The proclaimed independence of systematic theology proves itself, therefore, to be a

mere appearance. For, seeing that from the very first the entire specific contents of Scripture and the faith of the Church are pointed out from the *propylæa* of the system, the theologian is simply led round by various circuitous routes to the inner chambers of that same system. Hence the method of evolution, according to which Hofmann wishes to proceed, deserves rather the name of the method of involution. Hofmann's system is a striking testimony to this, that when theology, instead of having a foundation laid beforehand in Scripture, and having this supported by means of a strictly historical and objective demonstration, takes as its starting-point a proposition of believing experience, it falls under the sway of subjective fancies and tendencies. Hofmann, indeed, longs for the application to systematic theology of a *θεωρεῖν*, a scientific treatment, which the theologian should employ upon his subject, just as the investigator of nature does upon his. With Hofmann, however, this scientific treatment consists in an endeavour to comprehend the already complete subjective faith, and appears to be merely a method of combining and reflecting exercised upon firmly-grounded propositions, not unfrequently accompanied with a scholastic and sophistical exercise of the understanding, which, instead of penetrating into the essential contents of the object, goes rather always round about it. Indeed his customary phraseology seems itself to imply this, for we hear too often questions such as these repeated,—What is there about Christianity? What is there about religion? What is there about the Church, etc.? Also in this we cannot agree with Hofmann, that he will not admit of any distribution of systematic theology under separate branches of study, but insists that it should consist simply of an unfolding in detail of the proposition of faith, which had been laid down as its foundation, and regards this exclusively as its business. Hofmann will hear nothing in favour of a separation between dogmatics and ethics in systematic theology, p. 112 f. It is indeed quite undeniable,

as Hofmann maintains, that ethics stand in the closest connection with dogmatics, and that if it is to be represented as Christian ethics, it must start from foundations firmly laid in dogmatics. It may also be admitted that in dogmatics itself at the proper places the ethical contents of the Christian faith should be developed in accordance with their fundamental features, as Hofmann in his seventh doctrinal section has done. But from all this it ought not to be concluded that, upon the principles won in dogmatics, a system of ethics, as a separate theological branch, may not be developed. This separating of the two very evidently commends itself on the purely external ground that thereby we are saved from unduly increasing the boundaries of dogmatics; but it chiefly commends itself on internal grounds, because thereby a due and complete development is secured to the extraordinarily rich ethical material, which is relegated to a distinct branch of science, while dogmatics enters upon this material only to bring into prominence its leading principles. On the other hand, I am thoroughly at one with Hofmann when he excludes, and that indeed on the same grounds on which I do so in my own treatise, apologetics and polemics from systematic theology, and assigns to them their place in practical theology.

Systematic theology, as we have said above, is regarded by Hofmann as pre-eminently the science of theology. Beside it, historical theology, as the science of Scripture and Church history, has scientifically only a subordinate significance. It stands, indeed, in quite a subservient relation to systematic theology. Its task is, according to Hofmann, "to ascertain and vindicate the essentials of Christianity present in the Scripture and in the Church," p. 113. But this Christianity as thus ascertained has not for Hofmann any fundamental and normative significance. It is rather to systematic theology that such a significance is to be attributed, and the propositions of systematic theology should make refer-

ence to the results of this distinct historical branch of science only for corroboration and confirmation. This end cannot possibly be reached in any really scientific way, except by representing historical theology as a thoroughly independent department of science, to which the actual treatment of the ἱστορεῖν, which even by Hofmann is assigned to it, exclusively belongs, without being influenced by systematic theology. Nevertheless under Hofmann's treatment it fares with historical theology just as with systematic theology. As he, in systematic theology, while most emphatically proclaiming its independence of historical theology, not only determines *à priori* what is to be understood by Scripture and the Church, but also allows himself to be led by the contents of Scripture and the doctrine of the Church, even so in regard to historical theology, while he sets for it, as we have seen, a purely historical problem, and reckons it as the grossest infringement upon its independence to admit the influence of the results of systematic theology in historical theology, his procedure throughout is rather calculated to confirm the prepossession which one cannot help having from the first against the mutual relations required of the systematic and historical departments. Just as systematic theology stands to historical theology in a relation of dependence, so also, by Hofmann, is historical theology made dependent upon systematic theology. This comes out in the clearest manner in his treatment of the science of Scripture. What, indeed, would become of the system, if it could be contradicted and overturned by the science of Scripture, as might easily happen if the application of the ἱστορεῖν to the treatment of Scripture were seriously made? If such a contradiction were made, it would necessitate the assumption that an error had entered, either from the system or from the science of Scripture, and then, according to Hofmann, faith must be called to render help by passing its judgment upon the errors, and removing them. In order, therefore, to avoid the constant

recurrence of such a serious and painful judicial scene, the introduction in practice of an actually objective and historical procedure for the treatment of Scripture commends itself, and the placing of this too rather under the control of the propositions of faith evolved in the system.

The science of Scripture is divided by Hofmann into three parts:—(1) exegesis, (2) the science of the contents of Scripture, and (3) the science of the canon. Under exegesis we have only three sub-divisions: (*a*) the history of the Biblical text, (*b*) hermeneutics, and (*c*) the history of the origin of the Biblical books. The other branches, which are usually reckoned among the parts of exegetical theology, are held by Hofmann to be superfluous. As concerns criticism, the theologian needs only the knowledge of the helps for restoring and giving a guarantee to the original text. Criticism, in so far as it is criticism of the text, is to be admitted; whereas the so-called higher criticism is to be rigorously excluded. In reference to hermeneutics, the theologian requires the knowledge of the conditions under which the hermeneutical rules generally valid in the treatment of Holy Scripture in consequence of its distinctive character find application. In the place of introduction, Hofmann puts the history of the origin of the Biblical books, p. 118 f.

In Hofmann's treatment of the whole department of the science of Scripture we do not discover any principle by means of which its several constituent parts can maintain their systematic connection. Passing, however, from this, we observe that the very attitude which he assumes toward the several separate branches of exegetical theology, as shown in particular by his exclusion of the higher criticism, indicates clearly that in his treatment of Scripture he is not under the control of any historical point of view, but of his own previously elaborated system. This is made specially manifest in his treatment of hermeneutics, where he declares that the grammatical historical exposition is insufficient,

and that it is admissible only in so far as it is guided by the expositor's own knowledge of the doctrine of salvation. By this Hofmann does not understand such an explicit conception of saving truth as he has set forth in his system, but only the personal assurance of those facts of Christian experience which warrant the assumption of the name of Christian. Nevertheless, when this subjective experience of salvation, even taken in accordance with its most general conception, is placed by Hofmann in his system as the principle of theology, it is evident that the exposition of Scripture controlled by the experience of salvation comes also therewith under the influence of the system. Hofmann is certainly right when he says that the theologian cannot free himself from his Christianity; and we must add, he cannot free himself therefrom in order to become an exegete; but if he would treat Scripture as a theologian, and would reach to a scientific understanding of Scripture, his Christianity must not prejudice the historical treatment of Scripture, p. 142 f.—The third sub-division—the history of the origin of the Biblical books—is likewise a proof of that dependence of exegesis on the system. If Holy Scripture is fundamentally a product of the Holy Spirit, and is in this sense the word of God, then the exclusion of the higher criticism from the history of the origin of the Biblical books can only be regarded as a consequence of the system. From p. 145 to p. 199, Hofmann gives a sketch of the entire Old and New Testament literature according to its several writings: not, however, a regular history of these writings, but at most an outline of their contents on the lines of tradition.

In the second part — the science of the contents of Scripture — there are undeniable traces of the influence of the system. It is divided into two sections: (*a*) Biblical history, and (*b*) Biblical theology. In his treatment of Biblical history, Hofmann is not indeed disposed to exclude historical criticism, and he even speaks, on p. 193, of a trans-

lation of the Semitic into the Japhetic;[1] but his sketch of Biblical history from p. 194 to p. 233 is placed altogether under the influence of the point of view established in the system. There the Biblical history is required to be essentially a sacred history or history of salvation, and its principal moments are also laid down in essentially the same way, so that now the exegete as historian has to regard the sacred history as also miraculous history, and from this point of view to choose out of the contents of the Biblical narratives what is according to fact. The relationship between God and mankind which Biblical history sets forth has become doctrine. Biblical theology, therefore, has to set forth this doctrine, and is in so far a historical branch, which has the task of pointing out how the fact of the relationship between God and mankind, mediated in Christ, appears in Scripture as doctrine, p. 224 f. While for Biblical theology its historical character is thus so correctly vindicated, yet, on the other hand, Hofmann's detailed treatment of this Biblical theology, as given from p. 226 to p. 242, shows even here again, that, for the historical development of the doctrine, points of view have been adopted, not objectively grounded, but borrowed from the system.

In the third part of the science of Scripture—the science of the canon—Hofmann treats (1) the history of the collecting and closing of the canon, (2) the inner criticism of the canon, and (3) the question, what is Holy Scripture. Encyclopædically this is here unsuitable. The history of the canon belongs to exegetical theology, and more particularly to the introduction to that department; while, on the other hand, the question about the canonical significance of Holy Scripture for the Church is to be answered in dogmatics, after the character of Scripture has been ascertained

[1] On the page referred to the expression used above is not employed, but the idea of the need of rendering Oriental forms of expression into the corresponding phrases of Western literature is clearly recognised. For example, Hofmann says on p. 193, "The historical tradition in the Holy Scriptures requires a translation out of its style of narrative into ours."—Ed.

by means of its historical treatment. At the conclusion of this third part, p. 254 f., Hofmann makes the demand, that the system is to be compared with Scripture, and that in this way the scripturalness of the system is to be proved. If, now, the treatment of Scripture, which as such has a purely historical task, and even by Hofmann is ranked under historical theology, is robbed of its historical independence, and is placed under the control of the previously elaborated system, as is actually done by Hofmann; and if, on the other hand, the systematic theologian allows himself to be governed by the contents of Scripture adopted into his faith, as is likewise done by Hofmann,—then surely it need not be feared that in any way the conclusions of system and Scripture respectively can come into conflict; much rather, both will always agree together in sweetest harmony; and the systematic theologian will find no difficulty in placing in clear light the scripturalness of his system. From the fundamental attitude exhibited, moreover, is to be explained the characteristic of Hofmann's exposition of Scripture, which affords the most striking proof of what has been said. Dogmatic prejudice, and, proceeding therefrom, a reckless arbitrariness in his commentaries, damage, in the most lamentable way, a very conspicuous and prominent exegetical endowment, and an acuteness that might be coveted by any exegete.

The second division of historical theology is the science of the Church. Hofmann recognises only two branches or subdivisions of this: the one, the science of the Church as it comes into being; the other, the science of the Church that has already come into being. Thus we have the science of the past of the Church and the description of the present of the Church (statistics). Hofmann will not hear of a separate treatment of the history of dogmas, patristics, ecclesiastical archæology, and symbolics. Admirable as indeed everything is which Hofmann says in regard to these generally admitted sub-divisions of Church history, especially what is said on

p. 259 and on the following pages about patristics and archæology in their earlier form, yet it must still always be acknowledged, that all these branches, in so far as in them the essentially constituent parts of Church history are separately treated, have just in this separate treatment their special value, and can render the best service in furthering the development of Church history toward a more perfect form. Only this above all else must be required, as Hofmann specially insists in regard to the history of dogmas, that these subordinate branches of study be always conducted under the consciousness that they have to do only with portions marked off from a greater whole. Hofmann arranges the materials of Church history strictly in accordance with its contents, p. 263, under five sections: (*a*) the growth of the Church from without; (*b*) the history of dogmas; (*c*) the proving of the faith in the relationships of the natural life; (*d*) the history of the constitution of the Church; and (*e*) the history of the Christian life of the community (cultus),—only if regard were had to the actual development of the life of the Church, a different order of these five sections would be necessary. In the outline of Church history, begun on p. 262, not a few admirable remarks in reference to particular points are to be found, but upon the whole it fares with Hofmann's Church history as with his science of Scripture: the one, as well as the other, is dominated by the system. We, too, insist that the Church historian should be controlled by the idea of the Church, in order that in the conclusion of the history he may attain unto a definite result; but, according to Hofmann, Church history is a teacher only for him who is already in sympathy with essential truth, this essential truth being that set forth in the system. This is indeed explicitly stated by Hofmann in the transition to Church history, where he says: "We see now, too, how this relationship of God and man mediated in Christ, which we have given expression to in the system, is found also in the

Church," p. 256. All the constituent parts of the faith, therefore, which are asserted in the system, are without more ado acknowledged when they are met with in Church history, and this ends with a demand for a confessional and official Church, in accordance with the Confession, as it has gained expression in the system. Then again, from the consideration of the present condition of the Church, that is, of statistics, there arises the dark picture of the future which we are familiar with from the system. What the future of Christianity offers comes to this, "only to be again a persecuted sect in a world at enmity with it," p. 304. Nevertheless there is nothing in this to cause despondency, for we know further from the system, that the Christian Church will then find a place of refuge in Israel, and will be borne to glory on the arms of this holy nation. Hence the system has to dread the proof advanced by Church history, as Hofmann has set it forth, just as little as it has to dread the Scripture proof; both, indeed, harmoniously correspond, p. 307 ff.

"Systematic theology guarantees the fundamental and comprehensive consciousness of Christianity (in the preceding system this comprehensiveness would much rather have been claimed for faith), and historical theology guarantees the scientific certainty of the scripturalness and churchliness of the Christianity set forth in the system. But now, at this point, theology as the science of Christianity appears to be exhausted," p. 311. In these words Hofmann makes his transition to practical theology. Quite correctly he claims for theoretical theology, as those two branches, systematics and historical theology, in contrast to practical theology, are usually called, that it has also its practical significance; but he does not rise to a conception of practical theology by which, on the other hand, its theoretical significance would be secured to it, and its scientific position alongside of those two principal divisions of theology. Systematic and historical theology are practical as well as theoretical, but practical

theology is not theoretical as well. With the two former the science of Christianity is concluded, and practical theology contributes nothing new to theological knowledge. As distinguished from ethics, which has to do with the practical realization of the Christian faith, practical theology, according to Hofmann, has to do with theological actions, or with the practical exhibition of theological knowledge. In practical theology, not a duty, but an art, is taught. It is the technology of the practical treatment of theology, and it has therefore for its subject the activity of the theologian in the Church, p. 313 ff. Hence its distribution results from the position of the theologian in reference to the Church. The theologian may be viewed (1) as a Church member, or (2) as a Church officer. Accordingly practical theology is: I. The theory of the practical treatment of theology apart from any limitation of office; including (*a*) the theory of the exact and scientific defence of the Church (apologetics and polemics), and (*b*) the theory of the exact and scientific counselling of the Church (buleutics). II. The theory of the practical treatment of theology on the part of those in office; including (1) the theory of the administration of the single congregation—(*a*) of the regularly constituted congregation, (*b*) the congregation in process of formation [baptized children, and adherents not communicants], and (*c*) the congregation as a whole; (2) the theory of the administration of the Church—(*a*) toward those within, (*b*) toward those without; and (3) the preparation of the theologian.

From the definition and distribution of this part of theology given here by Hofmann, it appears that he does not in any essential respect get beyond the old conception of practical theology. For while, by the older theologians, it was regarded as practical counsel addressed to the clergyman for direction in his official duties, so by Hofmann it is regarded as the theologian's guide to his practical work in the Church. It is to be acknowledged that Hofmann, after the example of

Schleiermacher, amplifies the notion of this theological branch, for in place of the clergyman he puts the theologian, and in place of the congregation he puts the Church, as the sphere in which the theologian's activity is exercised. But thereby another boundary line is drawn, which is just as inadmissible —the boundary line between the Christian activity in the congregation and the theological activity in the Church. With Hofmann it is made to look as if the congregational activity were altogether excluded, and that all activity in the Church were contained in theological doings. How far this is from being the case, even Hofmann cannot conceal from himself. He is obliged to confess that activities in the Church are conceivable which have not theolog[illegible] their condition, p. 317. Hence according to his [illegible]n be can receive such activities into practical theolog[illegible] in so far "as the theologically trained office-beare[illegible] regul[illegible]s, takes superintendence of, and arran[illegible]es them." An independent activity in th[illegible] on the part of one who is a *non-theological* mem[illegible] the congregation is therefore not admissible. It is re[illegible]ed by Hofmann only in so far as it places itself under the g[illegible]ment of the theological office. There are other activitie[illegible] which Hofmann, on the basis of his definition, must exc[illegible]. The diaconate, for example, is shut out, because it do[illegible] not require a theological training, p. 319. In like n[illegible]r Church law, because it embraces purely legal determinations upon which the theologian can pass no judgment, and which generally do not originate in the theological province, belongs, therefore, not to theology, but to jurisprudence. But this is an argument so inconclusive that it scarcely needs a [illegible]ntation. We satisfy ourselves with pointing out that radica[illegible] in Hofmann's p[illegible]actical theology which lies in its limitation to the purely t[illegible]ogical ctivity. For from a scientific point of view we must declare ourselves generally against the conception of practical theology as the teaching of an art. So conceived, it affords

no justification for its being reckoned in theology, and, as the teaching of an art, whether it be that of the pastoral office or that of theological teaching, it can at least find no place in the theological system. If it be essential to Christianity that there be a Church, as indeed Hofmann himself says, p. 318, then must practical theology too, as the concluding portion of its system, set forth the Church of the future in its ideal reality in regard to its instruments and functions, on the ground of the idea of the Church won from Scripture and systematic theology, and with respect to its historical department. Here also, it has still to exercise a purely scientific activity, and to advance theological knowledge, and so to furnish, not a practical theology in the ordinary sense, but a system of ecclesiastical doctrine, a doctrine of the Church. This last part of the system, then, has both a theoretical and a practical significance, just like the preceding parts, and receives alongside of them an equally authorized position in the theological system.

In his Encyclopædia, Hofmann, as we have seen, does not give a mere formal outline of theology, but presents a summary of the contents of his whole theological system. We regard this as the only true conception of encyclopædia, and we agree with Hofmann also in this, that theology as pre-eminently the systematic statement of the faith, must have in view not merely an instruction for practical worship, but a scientific knowledge of Christianity; and further, that at the same time it must in this theoretical attitude vindicate itself as a practical science. Nevertheless, the statement given to the faith by Hofmann is a purely personal one, and is a statement of a faith attaching itself to a Church Confession; therefore a dogmatic faith. Hofmann, indeed, does not wish, in accordance with the materialistic and external method of the old orthodox theology, the *supernaturalismus vulgaris*, to hold fast to the dogmas constituting the faith, simply because they appear as constituent parts of revelation, but just as

little is he willing to prove these dogmas only in their religious contents, and to make their validity dependent thereon; his tendency is rather in the direction of showing the dogmas of the Confession to be absolutely necessary as facts of the Christian life of faith, and [illegible] thereby establishing believers in their faith. Hofmann's theology presents itself as an intetnalized and spiritualized supernaturalism, which with great acuteness is developed into a finely laid out system. There has been much said in the most recent times of the certitude of faith, which is to be confirmed by means of theology. We doubt not that the author himself found his own full personal satisfaction in the system, and that in it also those believers who share with him the same dogmatic faith will find the same satisfaction. But the claims which are made upon theology by the Church of the present and those without the Church, are not satisfied by this system, nor yet can they be satisfied, in a truly scientific manner, upon the lines that have been laid down by Hofmann, and by the method which [illegible]ren. A theology in the garb which Hofmann gives [illegible]rcely be admitted into the circle of the other scie[illegible] knowledged by them as a sister on terms of equal[illegible]steem the reverent regard of the scholar for his teacher, but we believe that Bestmann is deceiving himself when he characterizes the theology of his master as a κτῆμα ἐς ἀεί. We can perceive in it only a forced attempt, occasioned by the peculiar circumstances of the age, to animate anew a theological system, old and already become feeble—an attempt which, as a pure product of the age, will also probably very soon pass away.

In the Introduction which Rothe prefixes to his Encyclopædia,[1] pp. 1–14, he starts with the notion of theology, in order that he may afterwards state the notion of theological encyclopædia. To the encyclopædia of theology he assigns

[1] Theologische Encyclopædie von Richard Rothe. Aus seinem Nachlasse herausgegeben von Hermann Ruppelius, Pfarrer. Wittenberg 1880.

the task of setting forth the whole organism of theology in its inner distribution into a multitude of separate theological sciences. According to its essential notion, therefore, it is the scientific presentation of the organism of the theological branches which has to take its own fundamental principles, that is, the general division of theology, from the essential notion of theology. There is nothing to be said against this, only the procedure by means of which he wishes to reach the notion is to be contested. The definition of theological encyclopædia can, indeed, only be a formal one, and for this purpose it is sufficient, proceeding on the hypothesis that theology is a science, and from the general notion of encyclopædia, in order to determine the notion of theological encyclopædia. But the notion of theology itself, which even in our own time is something very uncertain and vacillating, serves as a basis for the most diverse conceptions. Hence the clear enunciation of this very notion is to be regarded as an essential problem of theological encyclopædia, especially if it has to take its principle of division from the notion of theology; and so, going back to the primal science of theology, we must determine its object and assign its place in reference to the Church, and vindicate in this the claim of theology to be a science. From this notion, then, the distribution of theology into separate parts and branches will result of itself in the treatment of encyclopædia. Rothe, however, brings down into encyclopædia an already completely formed notion of theology which he owes to the theology of Schleiermacher. But whether indeed this notion be the right one, such a one as must be influential for encyclopædia, is just the question which theological encyclopædia would first itself require to decide. We, for our part, cannot regard it as such. That Christian piety could find entrance into the world only as a religious community, and therefore as a Church, and that this Church as a community is in need of a government, which is conditioned by means of the right understanding of the nature and

end of the Church, and that this understanding can be sure and exact only when it is scientific,—in all this we are in the most perfect agreement with Rothe. We must, however, raise an objection, when he proceeds to say that the relation of theology is not immediately to religion, but is exclusively to the Church, and, indeed, more exactly to the guidance of the Church; that, consequently, theology is nothing else than that scientific understanding of the nature and end of the Church, that is to say, the outline arranged organically in accordance with that idea of theology, or the system of those scientific pursuits by means of which the guidance of the Church is conditioned; and that, therefore, this reference to the guidance of the Church is the principle which organizes and holds together the different elements in theology; and that thus theology is a positive science, because it embraces a full circle of intellectual operations essentially engaged upon with reference to a practical problem, p. 2. It will scarcely now be contested from any side, that theology has to yield its practical service to the Church. It should always be acknowledged as a great merit on the part of Schleiermacher, that he brought into prominence again that connection between theology and Church. But it is something quite different to place theology wholly under the point of view of a practical end, and to conceive of it only as a means to this end. By this means the scientific rank of theology would itself be rendered open to question. The end, for the sake of which it is elaborated, and which is to constitute the organizing principle of theology, is one that has been borrowed from without. That science, however, which will in truth vindicate its right to the name, must have in its end in itself, must therefore have for its foundation a material principle, and must brace itself for the simple developing of this principle, so that the grouping together of all the separate elements under the science to which they belong must result from the organic relation in which these elements stand to that principle. Scientificness (*Wissen-*

schaftlichkeit) consists not in formal systematics, but in the simple development of the fundamental principle from which a science proceeds. Hence also theology, if it is to be ranked as a science, must have for its object such a principle, and this can be nothing else than religion, especially the Christian religion. In so far, again, as this is given it historically, it is a historical science, and as such, a positive science, which, first of all, can have no other end than that which is immanent in it, namely, to reach, by means of a comprehensive treatment and development of its subject, the objective knowledge thereof. But all elements which it borrows for the sake of its own development from other sciences become theological, so that they are brought into relation to that subject and to the end immanent in theology. Instead of saying, with Rothe, "a scientific theological activity, of which the inspiring principle is not the interests of the practical problem of Church government, would not really be theological at all," p. 4, we must much rather refuse the name theological to that which has not for its inspiring principle the interests of the subject of theology, that is to say, the Christian religion and its scientific elaboration; and we must agree with Hofmann, in so far at least as he assumes as the motive for systematic theology the intellectual impulse that lives in the Christian spirit. Rothe, for support to his view, appeals to history, and is of opinion that theology has been historically called forth in order to meet a practical need in connection with the guiding of the Church. This opinion we can only regard as one that has been imported into the history, and not as a reflection confirmed by it. For have John and Paul, have the Gnostics and the greatest theologians of the primitive Church allowed themselves to be determined, in reference to their spiritual work upon Christianity, by means of a regard to the guiding of the Church? And is not its intellectualism made on every hand the reproach of scholastic and Protestant orthodox theology? And yet, even if it be objectionable on account of its

one-sidedness, it is surely always a proof of the way in which the human spirit presses on to know that Christian truth which is presented it to strive after. And does not the Reformation theology, too, make a special endeavour to obtain a clear knowledge of the true Christian way of salvation? And even of modern theology, since the middle of the eighteenth century, can it be said that it has gone forth from the interests of Church guidance? The motive that has led to the historical development of theology, and which always will and must be actively present in the Church, has been pre-eminently the endeavour of the Christian spirit to ascertain the truths of Christianity. It is therefore in the light of this motive that the essential task of theological science is to be determined. It may not unreasonably be affirmed that the conception of theology as having only to do with a practical problem which, since Schleiermacher, has been widely asserted, [illegible] panied by his spirit, has contributed [illegible] as compared with the other [illegible] down from the rank which it had [illegible]

From that predominant [illegible] guidance which Rothe maintains [illegible] one must accede to the demands of those who will have theology always treated only as a confessional theology. He says on p. 3, that since the Christian Church consists of a number of particular Churches, Christian theology, too, is not one, but manifold, like the Church itself. There is therefore no other Christian theology than that determined by a particular Confession; and so he takes, as the alone subject of his theological encyclopædia, the evangelical-Protestant-Christian theology. The fact alleged as to the multiplicity of Churches and their theologies is indisputable; but if from it the opinion is to be derived that theology must acquiesce in this fact, and can appear only as a confessional theology, we must give it a direct contradiction. By the limitation of theology to one particular

Church, its scientific character at least is endangered. From the actual multiplicity of Churches it does not follow that theology too must fall into a similar multiplicity; but rather, on the contrary, from the very multiplicity of Churches theology ought to take occasion to form a conception of the Church simply as Christian, and to exercise its scientific criticism on the various separate Churches from its own general Christian standpoint, so that it can come into practical connection only with those separate Churches in which it meets with the most suitable historical realization of Christianity. If, then, the encyclopædist prefers to assume a standpoint belonging to a particular Church sect, he will be thereby at once subjected to embarrassment, and will have the free scientific view greatly obscured. And, indeed, it does not appear how the encyclopædia, if simply confessional, should ever succe[illegible] repre-
senting itself (as Rothe on p. 11 quite [illegible]ists that it should) as a particular me[illegible]le of the sciences, and in sec[illegible]as
Will the enc[illegible]nd
[illegible]clo[illegible] the whole circle of
[illegible]ice in this circle to theology
rega[illegible]s th[illegible] or of that sect? And just as little can we agree with Rothe's statement, that theology is only for the clerical order, that is, for those members of a particular Church who have a definite share in the guidance of it, but not for laymen who have no such share. This can only be regarded as a consequence of Rothe's general conception of theology. But there are laymen who officially take part in the guidance of the Church, without being in need of theology for this; and there are also other laymen who have no share in the guidance of the Church, nor wish to have, and yet make use of and occupy themselves with theology, in order to obtain clearness and certainty about their whole life of faith. Theology, as an utterance of the Church's life, is for the Church and all its members. It is self-evident that it is

indispensable to ministers and Church officers, whose special calling has reference to the guidance of the Church. The distinction, however, which Rothe makes between theologians in the wider and theologians in the narrower sense, we cannot admit, p. 6. Theologians are those only who contribute toward the production of the whole circle of those scientific elaborations which are embraced under the name of theology, and so indirectly serve the Church by means of their labour. This, of course, does not exclude them from being at the same time directly serviceable in guiding the Church. Ministers and other Church office-bearers to whom the guidance of the Church is specially committed, must indeed be theologically educated; yet they are not theologians in consequence of their official activity. This, again, does not exclude them from working unofficially as theologians; but rather it makes it appear highly desirable that this should be. The persons in whom both the activities, the theoretical as well as the practical, are present in their proper proportions, deserve to be regarded as Church princes (*Kirchenfürsten*), to use the phrase of Schleiermacher.

The theological encyclopædia, as an exposition of the circle of the theological sciences, has, according to Rothe, no other end in view than to afford to students of theology an introduction to theological study, and ought therefore to be treated as a purely formal science. Both of these positions follow from the notion of theology adopted by Rothe. If theology is to be prosecuted only with a view to the guiding of the Church, then indeed its encyclopædia can be set forth only for the benefit of those who intend to enter into the service of the Church; and also, it can only consist in a formal arrangement of the theological branches, inasmuch as its exposition of the circle of theology does not proceed from any principle inherent in itself, but purely from the interests of Church guidance. According to our conception of theology, on the other hand, the task of its encyclopædia consists

pre-eminently in the solving of its theoretical problem, in representing, that is to say, theology as a science; and from this it follows that its practical purpose consists, not only in introducing professional students of theology to the study of their science, but also in marking out the way in which those who wish to educate themselves theologically may do so. But if the encyclopædia is to reach unto its highest end as thus conceived, it must be set forth, not as a mere formal science, but as a material science. The one argument which Rothe brings against a material treatment of encyclopædia, that if one intends in the encyclopædia to draw up a summary sketch of the principal contents of the theological branches, the result must necessarily be a production that is altogether superficial and empty, is of no importance. No doubt, only the principal contents of the particular branches can, in any case, be set forth in a material treatment of encyclopædia, but it is not necessary that these general outlines, which alone it can give, should, on account of their being thus general, be also superficial or empty. The encyclopædia, as thus materially developed, will rather give expression to the essential contents of the branches, leaving it to each branch to develop its own contents in detail. If this is not done, then it is not the material method of exposition, but only the encyclopædist, that should bear the blame. But, for the sake of the task that has been assigned to encyclopædia, we must insist upon the material method being followed. The encyclopædia can successfully set forth and arrange the whole compass of theological science only when it proceeds from the actual contents of theology, and from these derives all its parts and branches, so that the entire distribution of encyclopædia is at the same time a development of the very contents of theology, and all the departments of knowledge so originating appear ultimately in the form of a systematic whole, closely knit together by means of an inward bond. That a purely formal encyclopædia is possible, Schleiermacher has shown,

and his exposition of the theological course of study will always be regarded as a masterpiece executed after this method. And as we find it with Schleiermacher, but not always with Rothe, it only allows itself to proceed by means of an abstraction firmly restrained within its own proper limits. But an encyclopædia so abstract and strictly limited to the interests of Church guidance, satisfies neither the scientific claims which are made upon encyclopædia, nor even the practical needs of theological students. By means of Schleiermacher's Encyclopædia, even if we should overlook the difficulty which its abstract form presents to the understanding of a beginner, one will scarcely be won over to, and rendered enthusiastic about, the study of theology; and yet this is, as we suppose, just the effect which the encyclopædia ought to have upon the student. This, however, is to be reached only if the contents of the science, to which he wishes to devote himself, is opened up to his view in their general outlines. An encyclopædia so conducted, then, will point out to the student the right way in which to proceed in his study of theology. Rothe also indicates, p. 8 f., that a doctrine of method for theological study, side by side with the encyclopædia, may be quite easily dispensed with, and is merely ballast. We quite agree with him in this. But then, the methodology can be dispensed with only when the encyclopædia has already itself pointed out the way in which the study may be properly prosecuted. But only an encyclopædia treated after the material method will be in a position to furnish this. We must, however, at least acknowledge this to be a merit on the part of Rothe's Encyclopædia, and must likewise allow it to be recognised as suitable to be a guide, in regard to the way upon which the theological beginner has to go in his study. Hofmann and Rothe treat the history of the theological encyclopædia in a thoroughly characteristic way. While Hofmann pays no attention to it at all, Rothe comes to terms with it on one side, yet merely

for the sake of tracing descent, without bringing it into any systematic connection with the whole. And yet just to the originality of these two men, the history might perhaps have rendered good service.

That the distribution of theological encyclopædia must be a distribution of theology itself, and that this must be derived from the idea of theology, as Rothe insists, will be generally admitted. And now since, according to Rothe, his theology is the scientific knowledge of the evangelical Christian piety and of the evangelical Christian Church, for the purpose of the practical guidance of the latter, theology has first of all a historical task. For these two, the evangelical Christian piety and the evangelical Christian Church, and, indeed, Christianity generally, can be rightly understood only from their past history; and only by means of this understanding can the Church guidance treat the present condition of the Church as properly the earnest of a future more in accordance with its idea. A historical theology, therefore, in the widest sense of the word, constitutes a principal division of theological science. On purely historical lines, however, neither Christianity in general, nor evangelical Christianity in particular, allows itself to be perfectly and truly understood. For this there is rather needed speculation, which has to form a conception of Christianity and of the Christian Church out of the more comprehensive circle of the history of the world, and has, by a special insight, to discern the proper position of the Church in relation to the other departments of human life,—an insight which is evidently of supreme importance for the guiding of the Church. Consequently on its own account, and then, also, for the sake of historical theology itself, the Church is in need of a speculative theology side by side with historical theology. "In such a speculative system proper to it, theology is at once in possession of all those speculative positions which are indispensable as doctrinal propositions even in its other branches." But if theology seeks the scientific

understanding of the essential nature of the evangelical Christian piety and the evangelical Christian Church, for the purpose of the guidance of the Church, it is yet further required of it, that, by means of that institution which had been regulated and organized by this speculative and historical theology, it should expressly group together principles for the immediate guidance of the Church. The collective presentation of those principles for clerical practice constitutes a new and final principal division of theological science—practical theology. It has, for its presupposition, the other two principal divisions, and so in succession to them it takes the third place. Of the first two, again, speculative theology has to take the lead, partly because historical theology itself is in need of a speculative system in order to be able to complete itself satisfactorily, partly because it is just by means of speculative theology that theology is able to represent itself as an organism separate and scientifically distinct from the great general organism that embraces the full circle of the sciences. Rothe rejects the distribution of theology into four parts, because exegetical and so-called systematic theology are rather historical branches. With Schleiermacher, Rothe reckons dogmatics among the historical branches, because it concerns itself with dogmas as historical productions, while he does not recognise ethics as a separate branch distinct from dogmatics. Pp. 10–14. It becomes at once evident that this distribution corresponds exactly to Rothe's notion of theology. It does not proceed from the interests of the thing to be known, but from the interests of the guidance of the Church. Scientific knowledge is conceived of only as a means of Church guidance. This is true especially of practical theology, which, without being bound together with the preceding principal divisions by any inner bond, lays down the principles of clerical practice only with a view to Church guidance, and must be reckoned as practical theology only in the narrower sense, since indeed even the other two prin-

cipal parts, speculative and historical theology, are developed for the purpose of Church guidance, and in so far belong also to practical theology in the wider sense. We are in complete agreement in general with what Rothe says about speculative theology. In this, however, he oversteps the limits of his own notion of theology. For while theology, as understood by him, has for its subject evangelical piety and the evangelical Church, a far more general subject is given to speculative theology, and in place of evangelical piety and the evangelical Church are put Christianity and the Church generally. But then, on the other hand, if speculative theology is still to issue from the ground of evangelical piety and is given over to the service of the evangelical Church, theology remains, in spite of its speculative system, a confessional theology, and it is not to be imagined, even should it be justified as such, that it should receive, in the complete organism of the science, the place of a scientifically separate and distinct organism. Especially objectionable is it, when Rothe insists upon placing speculative theology at the head of the theological sciences. When he says that history, considered apart by itself, and therefore also Christianity, and especially evangelical Christianity, can only be understood perfectly and truly by the help of speculation, no objection can be taken to this, if only the statement be applied to the essentially ideal content of the historical element in Christianity; but we must repudiate it entirely, when it is applied to the historical reality, as with Rothe is the case, since he places speculative theology in front of historical theology, and makes the understanding of the historical object of the latter dependent upon the speculative theology which had been treated before it. On the contrary, it has to be maintained that everything historical, therefore also the historical element in theology, Holy Scripture, and the history of the Church, must be understood in its objective actuality according to principles which are applicable to every kind of historical

composition, that is, according to the principles of historical criticism. Only when this has been done will speculative theology be allowed to make its appearance, in order that it may subject to its criticism the historically admitted material, and examine into its ideal contents. Should the inverse order of procedure be taken, and the speculative system be made the presupposition of historical investigation, then will the suspicion be aroused *à priori*, that the apprehension of the historical facts has been influenced by the ideas of the speculative system, and indeed, as with Rothe, by the ideas of a specifically evangelical speculative system. Hence also against Rothe, we must maintain that, generally, historical theology is to be placed at the head, without here entering further upon the grounds on which the separation of exegetical theology from Church history may be justified, and that speculative theology must have a place assigned to it after that of historical theology. In addition to this, even Rothe himself cannot deny that his encyclopædic distribution of the principal parts of theology is unsuitable from the methodological point of view. While encyclopædically speculative theology is placed at the head, yet the beginning of the theological course of study is not to be made with it, but rather speculative and historical theology are to be begun and pursued together. Even this, however, according to the signification which Rothe attaches to speculative theology, has its disadvantages; for if, without the help of speculation, the historical cannot rightly be understood, then, to the student who should pursue the study of speculative and historical theology together, there would, for the first while at least, be wanting an indispensable auxiliary to the study of the latter. But it is most surprising of all to find that the study of speculative theology is left entirely to the inclination of the student, for at p. 13 it is expressly demanded of him that, if no speculative need arises to him, he should in general not trouble himself with speculative theology. Now

surely, if with Rothe speculative theology is to be reckoned a principal division of theological science, if its propositions are indispensable for the other theological branches, and are of the highest importance, especially for the guidance of the Church, a student, who would not concern himself about it at all, would not be able to pursue in a proper manner the study of the other theological departments, and so, in spite of his course of study, would be at once a poor theologian and unqualified for the guiding of the Church. Therefore, according to Rothe's own conception, only the alternative is placed before him, either to study speculative theology, even apart from the other theological branches, or, if he feels in himself no inclination for this, to abandon theological study altogether.

Speculative theology, with which Rothe, as has been shown, begins his theological system, is distinguished by him from the speculative theology of the philosophical system. In the philosophical system, that is called speculative theology which has God for its object; but in the theological system, the name speculative theology is given without reference to its object, only in respect of its scientific form, inasmuch, that is to say, as it is essentially speculative thinking. But speculative thinking, in distinction from empirically reflective thinking, generates its thoughts out of itself without reference to any given actuality, and developes it by means of a dialectical procedure into a system of thought complete in itself. "No other material than that which is self-produced, not even an ideal received from without, from its own thoughts (for that would be largely empirical), is to be given to speculation to work upon," p. 17. It has for its presupposition only the primary fact of the human thinking itself, therefore the thinking consciousness as it is simply the consciousness of itself, of the thinking itself, the thinking consciousness as pure self-consciousness, as the pure Ego. First, when speculative thinking has completed its system from thoughts produced *à priori*, does it turn itself to the empirically given reality in

order, by means of comparison with this reality, to prove the correctness of its system of thought. It is then required that it should in a moment relentlessly dash in pieces that edifice of ideas which it had laboriously constructed, as soon as it has become convinced of an actual contradiction between it and the realities of experience, and that it should then anew, abstracting itself from everything empirical, begin its *à priori* method, until finally the speculative system is brought into harmony with the realities of experience, pp. 15–18. The relation into which speculation is here finally brought with empirical reality is surprising. We have no objection to make against the characterization by Rothe of speculative thinking; but when this empirical reality, all given from without, from which, during the upbuilding of its system, speculation keeps itself quite aloof, is made the touchstone, by means of which the correctness of the system has to be proved, and the speculative thinker is compelled to continue at his systematic building until it is brought into agreement with reality, then will the empiricism, from which during his speculative labour he is to hold himself aloof, be raised into a power that determines and controls his speculative system. In opposition to this we must place ourselves at the standpoint of Koheleth, and ask, For what end is all this speculating? In so far as no error is pointed out to the speculative thinker in respect of objective reality, he will be able to allow the criticism and correction of his system rather only to continued speculative thinking. Theological speculation is therefore so called only on account of the speculative thinking that characterises it. Now says Rothe further at p. 18 f., "For the religious man there is present along with pure self-consciousness likewise a consciousness of God, at least in its immediate form as a feeling of God: for him, therefore, the primary fact, upon which speculation is exercised, has essentially two sides; it is on the one hand pure self-consciousness, on the other hand consciousness of God, so

that there is for him a double speculation, the one beginning from the speculative consciousness, as self-consciousness, the other beginning from the speculative consciousness, as consciousness of God: the former is the philosophical, the latter the theological, speculation. Both of these, each from its own special point of view in reference to the primary fact, construe the entire reality in a manner purely *à priori*; but, while philosophical speculation thinks and conceives of this fact by means of the idea of the Ego, the theological speculation does this by means of the idea of God." That for the pious man his consciousness of God is immediately and absolutely a certainty of God, is an indisputable fact; but it cannot be said that this consciousness of God is only the other side of the speculative self-consciousness. Rather the former is a different consciousness altogether from the latter. Both may be primary facts of consciousness, but, for speculative thinking, the consciousness of God is something lighted upon by it, something given it, if not from without yet from within, something empirical, so that the pious man if he proceeds from the certainty of his consciousness of God as a speculative thinker, is not practising speculative thinking in the exact sense of the word, as it has been defined by Rothe, but is only applying speculative thinking to that consciousness of God which has been empirically lighted upon by him, and thus it can be understood in this sense only of theological speculation. It is not even allowable to say, that while theological speculation proceeds from this consciousness of God, philosophical speculation must proceed from the consciousness of the Ego. Philosophical speculation also can proceed from the consciousness of God; as indeed is shown in the case of the Catholic philosopher Günther, who proceeds from the three factors of consciousness—the consciousness of self, of the world, and of God. And hence philosophical and theological speculation are essentially distinguished the one from the other, not necessarily by means of the difference of their starting-

point, but rather by means of the difference of their relation to this starting-point. For the philosopher the consciousness of God, if he starts from it, can only be something empirically given, and only if he be able to ground it speculatively, that is, *à priori*, will he feel himself obliged to take notice of it, while also he must beforehand claim the liberty of setting in the place of all historically given forms of the consciousness of God some other form of it, or even of repudiating the consciousness of God itself. The theologian, on the contrary, proceeds from the immediate certainty of the consciousness of God which forms part of his own personal experience. The most inward spiritual participation in this consciousness of God is the presupposition of his whole theological system. Since, however, that immediate consciousness of God of the pious man will be always to some extent historically determined, Christian theology, in so far as it has for its presupposition the Christianly determined consciousness of God, although formally it even represents itself as speculative, is nevertheless according to its essence an experimental science, that is, a positive science. As speculative theology it will likewise, as well as philosophical speculation, have to be grounded upon the consciousness of God, and especially upon the Christian speculative consciousness; but if it would proceed further, and set in the place of this another form of the consciousness of God, or deny the consciousness of God altogether, it would overturn itself as theology completely, and pass over into the philosophical domain. Accordingly we are heartily agreed with that which Rothe, at p. 19, says of the relation of theological speculation to piety, that the former is not a condition of personal certainty of the latter, but that piety is in need of speculation "in order truly to understand itself, and in order that piety should be complete too on the side of the understanding, of the apprehensive thinking." And here, too, we call attention to this, that, while Rothe

in the introduction derives theology from the need of Church guidance, here he cannot help acknowledging the true motive of theology, since he derives speculative theology, which we at least cannot separate from the theological system, from the immediate interest of piety itself:—"to know distinctly everything that it possesses, the endlessly rich treasure of which lies shut up in the still undiscovered fulness of the pious feeling, which for immediate needs is superfluous." Further, speculative theology is according to Rothe simply a theology for the individual, inasmuch as its starting-point is the individual pious consciousness of the one engaged in the speculation. Hence also there must be, according to him, within the limits of Christianity, an essentially different speculative theology for every separate Church communion, since it is presupposed "that confessional differences rest upon essentially individualistic modifications of the universal Christian pious consciousness." Rothe, as a member of the communion of the evangelical Church, starts, therefore, in his theological speculation from the evangelical pious consciousness. To develop, with a precision corresponding to that of the theologian, this consciousness, which already is in some measure scientifically developed and formed, by means of dialectical labour, into an actual idea of God, is the task of evangelical theological speculation, p. 23 f. In point of authority, however, evangelical pious feeling occupies a position superior to this speculation, even although that feeling be not accompanied by those religious notions by which, in the communion to which it belongs, it is surrounded; that pious feeling must still be kept uninjured by speculation. Speculation during its speculative activity must not be influenced by any reference to pious feeling; but when the immediate religious consciousness, from which it proceeds, does not find itself again in the speculative system, then simply the system does not stand the test of pious feeling, and so speculative theology should regard this as a proof that

it has failed in its speculative labours, and should just as little hesitate, as philosophical speculation would, in such circumstances of contradiction to reality, to demolish at once its theological system. Then again, over against evangelical theological speculation, with unconditional authority, stands Holy Scripture, with this one limitation, however, that it is not a mere notional or attained theological conception of the Christian pious consciousness in regard to Holy Scripture, but simply the religious contents of that Scripture itself that come into view. An actual contradiction between speculative theology and Scripture in this sense must be a certain proof to the speculative theologian that he has been following a course of false speculation, and should determine him unhesitatingly to condemn his speculative system. During its speculative procedure, however, this theology has to keep itself altogether independent of Holy Scripture, and to acknowledge no other authority than that of logic and dialectic. Only after it has, in such thoroughgoing independence, finished its work, may it place itself before the judgment-seat of Holy Scripture, and submit itself to its judgment. On the other hand, evangelical speculative theology is not bound to the dogmas of its Church, for it knows itself to be of equal birth with these, and sets itself the task of more thoroughly elaborating them. Speculative theology must necessarily be heterodox, but in the good sense of the term, for by means of its conclusions it carries the dogmas of the Church on to completion. And thus, in the speculative conclusions, the particular pious consciousness receives the word in which it finds its own notional representation pure and entire, and now first truly understands itself; from all which, too, it follows as a consequence, that "the characteristic and fundamental pious feeling of a particular Church sect, when it perceives itself in the glass of the pure idea, bursts forth into a characteristic new form, and constructs for itself, in accordance with its reality, a new world in place

of the former, which has now become unsuitable for it," p. 19 ff.

It is quite easy to understand how Rothe arrived at the course of thought now indicated. It rests entirely upon the foundations which he gave to his theological system: but just for this very reason we cannot help putting ourselves for the most part in opposition to it. No doubt the individual consciousness of God of the theologian, in so far as he belongs to a particular Church communion, will always bear upon it the definite characteristics of a particular division of the Church, but it does not follow from this that speculative theology will always be attached to a particular section of the Church, and that there must be as many speculative theologies as there are Christian Churches. If this consequence be admitted, then this is to degrade theology to a mere theology of the Churches. His own definite pious consciousness in agreement with his own particular Church may and should be the subjective motive to the theologian, which prompts him in his theological work, but he ought not to make this the basis and object of his theological system. Should he take for granted that his individual pious consciousness is the perfect reflex of the pious consciousness of that communion of the Church to which he belongs, he would, by this proceeding of his, just bring this about, that while, perhaps, he himself and his fellow-members would find perfect satisfaction for themselves in his theological system, an objectively valid, truly scientific result could not in this way be reached. The theologies of different Churches would stand over against one another equally valid, and each one would be entitled to employ against the other its own subjective Church character. Hence we must rather demand of the theologian, so soon as he begins his speculative activity, that he divest himself of his individuality as a member of a particular Church, and instead of the subjective churchly, make the objectively Christian, consciousness of God the basis and object of his speculation, in

order that he may create a system which may be able to bring under the range of its criticism the pious consciousness of the theologian himself, and of his own Church as well as of other Churches. The subjective evangelical tendency in Rothe shows itself in the authorities—churchly piety and Holy Scripture—which he places over against his speculative theology, as well as in the relationship into which he brings his speculation with the dogmas of the evangelical Church. The speculative theology of another Church would not be bound to acknowledge these authorities; and even the statement that speculative theology must be heterodox, can only be true of the evangelical Church, while the speculative theology of another Church, which relates itself otherwise to its Church dogmas, may be a thoroughly orthodox one. If, with Rothe, we take the evangelical standpoint, then, if a judicial sentence upon speculative theology is to be delivered by evangelical piety, we can only repeat what we had already to say of philosophical speculation in its relation to empirical reality. But besides this, it would be difficult to determine the standard according to which piety would have to measure speculation. Rothe, indeed, brings forward restrictions, but still it must be defined in some way as evangelical piety, and it is a question whether it would acknowledge the restrictions which are proposed by Rothe: and if not, how then should the conflict between the two be settled? But in the event of evangelical piety not finding itself again in speculative theology, there would be always the possibility of speculation bringing itself into harmony with Christian piety, and in view of this, too, the evangelical piety would have to renounce its exclusiveness, so that the relationship between piety and speculation would be the reverse of that required by Rothe. And yet again, we cannot understand that laid down by Rothe as a possibility, that evangelical piety, if its idea were set forth before it by speculation as in a glass, would be thereby, as it were, driven out of

itself, since in this case piety, in consequence of the authority that has been assigned it, would much rather be in a position to drive speculation out of the evangelical Church. Rothe also minimizes the authority of Holy Scripture by manifold restrictions. But how does speculative theology get the right to apply these restrictions? Should so important a question as that about the significance of Holy Scripture for speculative theology be decided *à priori?* We believe rather that speculative theology can reach a well-grounded judgment on this question only by means of a purely historical consideration of Holy Scripture previously given. Only when a historical insight into the contents and form, into the whole essential character of the Holy Scripture, has been gained, will speculative theology be able to decide whether generally, and how far, and how far not, it has to regard Holy Scripture as an authority. The same, too, is made apparent from the attitude of conflict or contradiction assumed by evangelical speculative theology in reference to the dogmas of its own Church, inasmuch as they are not regarded by it as an authority. Then next, it will not be sufficient to define its relations to the dogmas of its own Church; its relations also to the dogmas of other Churches will require to be determined. This important question, too, as to the place which speculative theology may assume toward the Church dogmas, whether generally, or if not, then to what extent, they have a value for speculative theology, is not to be answered *à priori*, but only on the ground of a historical consideration of the entire development of the history of dogmas. What Rothe says of the attitude of evangelical speculative theology toward Holy Scripture and dogmas rests upon mere evangelical Church presuppositions, and ought first to be historically grounded. Finally, I regard as impracticable Rothe's demand that the speculative theologian should allow, neither to evangelical piety nor to Holy Scripture, any influence over his speculative operation. Rothe's speculative theology does not proceed,

according to what has been said, from the consciousness of God in general, but from the evangelical consciousness of God. In the formal disposition of his Encyclopædia, Rothe does not tell us, nor does he require to tell, wherein the evangelical consciousness of God is distinguished from another form of that consciousness; but if it constitutes the starting-point of speculative theology, then this theology must be determined in its entire systematic structure by evangelical piety; but when Rothe himself says, that only the theologian in some degree already cultured can enter upon the investigations of speculative theology, then there must be attributed to him a scarcely attainable resignation, if his pious consciousness and his consciousness formed upon the Scripture are to be kept perfectly silent during his speculative activity, and are to follow only the commands of logic and dialectic.

By means of all the above quoted statements of Rothe we shall be strengthened in the conviction, that theology will have to abandon the standpoint peculiar to a special Church, and, if it is to become a science of equal standing with the other sciences, must place itself at a universally Christian standpoint; that therefore for this reason, and in order to win for its whole scientific activity an objective basis, it must start from Holy Scripture and lean upon the history of the Christian consciousness; and that, therefore, exegetical theology and Church history must precede speculative theology.

Rothe divides his speculative theology into two principal parts: (*a*) THEOLOGY (in the narrow sense), and (*b*) COSMOLOGY, which again falls into two divisions—(1) PHYSICS, (2) ETHICS. Dogmatics he separates from speculative theology, and places it, after the example of Schleiermacher, among the branches of historical theology, p. 26. We regard this separation as altogether erroneous and quite inadmissible. When Rothe himself says, p. 24, that the need of a speculative theology makes its appearance first in a Church, when the thinking

members of the Church no longer find their satisfaction in the dogmas and dogmatics, and that speculative theology has then to secure to them this satisfaction, for what reason then, we must ask, should dogmatics be at all regarded as a branch of historical theology? Has it to proceed at all otherwise than speculative theology? Are the dogmas, to which speculative theology does not regard itself as bound, to be still further conserved, while already the consciousness of the thinking Church member has passed beyond them? And where are the limits between thinking and non-thinking Church members to be fixed? But, according to Rothe, dogmatics should be distinguished from speculative theology as a historical branch of study, because in the dogmas it has a historical object empirically given it, p. 28. Speculative theology itself, however, which indeed, according to Rothe, should always start from the pious consciousness of a particular Church, comes upon this very consciousness as a historical object given to it. Dogmatics, as further distinguished from speculative theology, is to have a thoroughly ecclesiastical character, p. 23 f.; but would not such a description be applicable rather to speculative theology because of its starting-point? These grounds, therefore, are not sufficient in order to justify this separation. And if we go beyond the formal encyclopædia, Rothe, in his *Ethics*, vol. i. § 17, sets this forth as the most elementary thought of the empirical evangelical apprehension of God: "God is the Absolute," and regards this thought as the starting-point of evangelical speculative theology. It fares with this as with many pictures, the subject of which cannot be understood without the inscription. The thought, God is the Absolute, does not once touch what is specific and characteristic in the general Christian apprehension of God; it omits altogether what is peculiar to the evangelical apprehension of God. However, passing from this, speculative theology, which, according to Rothe, ought to elevate the pious consciousness

of a particular Church to the rank of a scientific notion, must in any case take for its starting-point the full contents of the pious consciousness of that particular Church. But the thought of God is only one side of the pious consciousness, and does not of itself make that consciousness pious; but that which is essential to render this consciousness pious is the living connection between the man and his thought of God, or his apprehension of God. Now, speculative theology, if it is to maintain its scientific significance, has to represent itself not only as a theology of a particular Church, but as Christian speculative theology; and so it must take for its object the specifically Christian pious consciousness, that is to say, the essence of Christianity, or the idea of the pious consciousness, as it has been revealed in Christ. How, then, does speculative theology relate itself to the dogmas of the Church? Rothe quite rightly maintains its independence of these dogmas, and that indeed for this reason, that it knows itself to be of equal birth with these. This, however, can be said only because it has not regarded the dogmas as an emanation from a high superhuman authority, but simply as products of the thinking Christian spirit, just as speculative theology is itself such a product. So also Rothe sees in the construction of Church doctrine the elevation of the particular pious consciousness of the Christian communion to the rank of perfectly clear thought, p. 78. But now, if this is so, then we have to trace back the complex of dogmas, be they dogmas of the Church or not, to the same motive and the same tendency, out of which, according to Rothe, speculative theology proceeds, and to regard this body of dogmas as a great historical work of the Christian spirit preparatory to speculative theology. Is this speculative theology now to pass by these dogmas, ignoring them, and beginning the work, so to say, from the first? Rothe indeed assigns to speculative theology the task of developing the contents of the pious consciousness in its entire fulness purely from the thought of

God. If the speculative theologian thinks that he is able to accomplish this, we at least, besides all else that may be said against it, regard it as a pure illusion. Whoever goes through Rothe's speculative theology will easily notice that even Rothe, however much he guards against it, does allow himself to be determined during his speculative operation, both by the interests of the pious consciousness, and by references to Scripture and the doctrine of the Church. We must rather demand that speculative theology shall draw the full round of historical dogmas into the range of its speculative activity, that it shall subject these to its criticism on the ground of the idea of the Christian pious consciousness, by means of logic and dialectic establish the truth which they contain, or in this way contribute to a scientific proof of the truth of Christianity. We regard it, therefore, as wholly inadmissible that, besides speculative theology, a separate dogmatics should be recognised, for in our view the two should be treated as one. Rothe, indeed, although he separates the one from the other, brings them into a certain relation to each other; but just against this we must make objection, since the serious disadvantages thereof can scarcely fail to appear. Only with the help of speculation (see page 28) will dogmatics be able to accomplish its task, in comprehending in their relation to one another the Church dogmas, which were given originally without any interconnection, that is, in grouping them together scientifically in the unity of a dogmatic system complete in itself. Speculative theology, therefore, is only to help dogmatics to a formal systematic, as it is expressly said on page 107, that "Speculation is the fully authorized judge of dogmas on their formal side." While the right of speculative theology in its perfect freedom in regard to the dogmas of the Church to be heterodox is maintained, in dogmatics only a formal application of speculative thinking to the dogmas of the Church can be made, and so its contents cannot be touched by speculation. On account,

however, of this relationship, a conflict between the two can scarcely be avoided; for speculative theology, so long as it will be speculative theology, cannot place itself under the authority of the Church dogma, and Church dogmatics, so long as it will be Church dogmatics, cannot allow itself to be infected by the heterodoxy of speculative theology. But the actual conflict, leaving out of account the scientific rupture in the theological system itself, must be peculiarly fatal to the realization of that practical purpose to which Rothe subordinates theology. For the question simply comes to be this in regard to the guidance of the Church, Is it to allow itself to be guided in its practical tasks by heterodox speculative theology or by orthodox dogmatics? And is the student of theology, who is to be by and by the minister of the Church, to be theologically educated alike heterodoxly and orthodoxly? But now if still, as said on page 112, even dogmatics will admit heterodoxy, that limitation of dogmatics to a mere formal criticism seems to be removed, and even a material criticism to be allowed it, so that it no longer appears why a separation should be insisted upon by Rothe between speculative theology and dogmatics. That dogmatics, as Rothe defines it, is the science of Church dogmas, that without dogmas there can be no dogmatics (see page 28), that the dogmatic treatment of Church doctrine is not possible without a personal conviction of the truth of that doctrine (see page 114), are propositions which we regard as altogether unfounded, and which even by Rothe himself have in part been abandoned. (Compare p. 109 and p. 24.) We therefore put in place of Rothe's speculative theology and his dogmatics the customary systematic theology, with its two principal divisions, dogmatics and ethics, and assign to both together the same task which Rothe assigns to the speculative theology. We, however, require for both, as a foundation, the doctrine laid down in Scripture, and the whole material of the history of dogmas; so that the doctrine which in history

survives the application of the formal and material speculative criticism is placed under dogmatics, and Christian thinking must resolve to abandon doctrines the untenableness of which is proved by criticism. Not the first place in the theological system, but rather the third, can therefore be given to speculative or systematic theology. We cannot make the sciences of Scripture and of Church history dependent upon speculative theology, but we raise these to their position of scientific independence with their purely historical aims, and indeed assign them the task of thoroughly acquainting speculative and systematic theology with the whole province of history. Pre-eminently the purely historical insight into the contents of Holy Scripture is indispensable for the speculative theologian, if he is not to incur the danger of losing sure ground for his feet in his speculating; as even with Rothe it happens here and there, for example, in the parts of his *Ethics* which treat of the angel world, and of eschatological questions, where he drifts into mere phantasy and imagination. Consequently the definition which Rothe proposes of speculative theology (p. 36), but which can be applied by Rothe properly only to evangelical speculation, we adopt in its full extent for systematic theology: it is "a rational explanation of Christian piety according to the totality of its essential aspects and moments." Ethics, which Rothe separates from dogmatics as a historical branch of study, and attaches to speculative theology (see p. 28 f.), we must, in accordance with our conception of dogmatics, regard as co-ordinated with this latter science. We consider dogmatics as the presupposition and foundation of ethics, as indeed Rothe finds himself compelled to do, when he prefaces his ethics with the doctrine of God and the doctrine of man as an introduction to ethics. (Compare *Theological Ethics*, vol. i. § 13.) Rothe, however, has strikingly shown that apologetics cannot come forward as a branch of speculative theology (p. 33 ff.), only we say that it must appear in systematic

theology. The complete circle of theology in all its parts, but especially in systematic theology, should be an apology for Christianity; but apologetics, as a formal direction for apologetical purposes, we assign, with Rothe, to practical theology.

In historical theology, which receives the second place in Rothe's theological system, the unscientific procedure of representing theology as a confessional science appears from the very outset, when the scientific cognition of the evangelical Church is put down as the task of historical theology. That, in consequence of this, the task is conceived of in too limited a fashion, is made clear at the first glance, but the limitation arises only from the confessionality of this theology. Just as the principal parts of theology had been arranged, so now also the divisions of historical theology are arranged by Rothe "according to the constitutive principle of theology," that is, according to the practical churchly end. The guidance of the Church demands, first of all, the historical knowledge of the ecclesiastical present,—hence we have (1) Positive Theology. Next comes the knowledge of the ecclesiastical past,—hence we have (2) Church History. And finally, there is the knowledge of primitive Christianity,—hence we have (3) Biblical or Exegetical Theology. How unsystematically, and especially unmethodologically, one proceeds when he allows himself to be determined in his derivation of the theological branches of study by an end lying outside of theological science, even Rothe himself cannot help admitting, when he finds himself obliged, in the course of study, to transpose the order given to the three branches in the theological system, and to treat (1) exegetical theology, (2) Church history, and (3) positive theology. Rothe therefore comes round to the same distribution which I lay down in this treatise on theologic as a fourfold division of theology in a temporal order of succession: origin, historical development, present and future, only the division is deprived of its proper foundation by Rothe. But that I am entitled to set down exe-

getical theology, as distinct from Church history, as a principal division, is conceded by Rothe himself, inasmuch as he recognises primitive Christianity in its normative significance for the whole range of theology, and the qualitative distinctness of that primitive Christianity from its historical development. (See pp. 41–43.)

I. Biblical or Exegetical Theology. I have felt obliged to avoid using the name "biblical theology" for this division, partly because it is so readily misunderstood, partly because, according to my conception of it, exegetical theology is not limited to the Bible. The task of exegetical theology, according to Rothe, is to lead to a certain and complete understanding of those Scriptures which are recognised by the Church as the original sources of divine revelation, upon which its very being is primarily founded. Here, too, in the very definition of the task, there immediately appears again, and that to the disadvantage of the subject defined, the point of view of a particular Church as evangelical. Accordingly we find represented as the first branch of study (1) the history of biblical literature, which has to show "how and with exactly what right the collection of these writings has won acceptance and come to be regarded as the sum-total of the sources of divine revelation, that is, the canon. This is followed by (2) biblical criticism, as criticism of the text; (3) archæology, which has to bring about for the expositor the knowledge of the peculiar outward conditions of those circumstances and surroundings of life in which the author, as well as the original readers of the biblical writings, moved; (4) biblical hermeneutics, as a technical study for the perfect understanding of Holy Scripture; and (5) biblical theology, which has to work up the religious material contained in the Holy Scripture as the product of exposition, and hence would more properly be called the doctrine of biblical religion. These are followed by remarks upon the biblical languages, pp. 43–47. In this construction of the exegetical branches

of study we do not discover any definite principle. Motives of Church and of history are here mixed up together by Rothe. If, as he himself requires, exegetical theology has to go back to the very origin of Christianity, it would appear that no other task could be assigned it than the unfolding of the historical manifestation of primitive Christianity. From this it will follow as a necessary result, in how far and to what extent a canonical significance for the Church, and therefore for theology, is to be assigned to the biblical writings. The historical problem is seriously disturbed, when any churchly presupposition is put down as the end of exegetical theology. Least of all can this end be reached by the science of introduction, but rather by the doctrine of biblical religion. Hence, the placing of the science of introduction at the head does not commend itself. Since exegetical theology can solve its historical problem only by means of the right understanding of the biblical writings, hermeneutics will have to be placed at the head, as the doctrine of the fundamental propositions and rules according to which Holy Scripture has to be expounded. Out of it there necessarily arise the subsidiary sciences which are useful to the exegete for the interpretation of Scripture. The distinctive characteristics of the biblical languages made prominent by Rothe require a special section in the system of exegetical theology to be devoted to them as biblical linguistics. Biblical criticism, however, is not to be defined as mere criticism of the text, but the so-called higher criticism, which has to occupy itself with the question of the authenticity of the biblical writings, and which Rothe includes in the science of Introduction, p. 49, belongs rather to the theory of biblical criticism, while it is only the application of it that the science of Introduction has to make. Nor is it indeed justifiable to connect, as Rothe does, p. 58, the Jewish history with biblical archæology; but it must be set down as a separate branch. To me it seems questionable whether it be

proper in biblical theology, according to Rothe's requirement, to prefix to the history of the doctrine of biblical religion a history of revelation, since the latter will naturally be considered partly under biblical history, partly under the doctrine of religion itself, and the arrangement of the doctrine of biblical religion, as a historical branch, will have to be made according to the principal periods of the national history. In the treatment of the several exegetical branches, pp. 48–77, Rothe does not always keep within the limits of the formal encyclopædia, as, for example, in the section on criticism and hermeneutics; but it is observable that Rothe, contrary to the churchly points of view, which guide him, still always asserts a free scientific standpoint in dealing with the several branches of study.

II. Church History. Leaving out of view that here, too, its character as a theological science is vindicated for Church history by conceiving it as at the service of the Church, and that by means of this point of view its idea and range will be determined, everything that Rothe says on general questions in the domain of Church history testifies to the thoroughgoing studies which he has conducted in this department. In order perfectly to accomplish its task of representing historically and scientifically the whole earlier course of the existence of the Church from the time of its origin down to the present moment, Church history has to set forth the historical development of the Christian life according to its totality, and then according to its separate principal functions. According to its universal aspect, it is general Church history; according to its separate functions, which are directed to the constitution of the Church, to the formation of a Church doctrine, and the construction of a Church ritual, and of Christian customs, there are added to the general Church history the history of the Church constitution, the history of dogmas, and ecclesiastical archæology, as the leading special branches of the service, p. 77 ff. It is remarkable that

Rothe has not also secured a special department for the essentially inherent tendency in Christianity to extend itself, which has wrought historically in the most conspicuous manner, and demands the highest consideration on the part of the Church historian, and which should appear as a history of the spread of Christianity, or as the history of Christian missions. Nor, again, is it in accordance with the facts, that in archæology the history of worship should be combined with that of Christian customs. Christian customs, upon which Rothe, indeed, in his Church history has bestowed his very special attention, are so evidently a product of the Christian life, that it is absolutely necessary to treat them likewise under a separate division, as the history of Christian culture. According to our conception, this branch of study has quite a similar value for Christian ethics to that of the history of dogmas for dogmatics. In the history of Christian culture it will also be necessary to embrace the effects of Christianity, which, by means of the Church, operate beyond the limits of the Church's domain, and by means of which, for the most part, reactions upon the Church life are called forth, so that it seems scarcely required outside of Church history to set up, as supplementary to it, a history of the Christian culture of mankind. Whatever in this department lies outside of the task of Church history will fall under the general history of culture; but for this, the history of Christian culture will be available as an indispensable subsidiary science, p. 79. It should also be made prominent by a special acknowledgment that Rothe demands, as a first condition for the understanding of the historical development of the Church, the right perception of the idea of the Church; only we are not of the opinion that the Church historian has to borrow this idea from speculative theology, specially from speculative ethics. He will rather have to take it from exegetical theology, since speculative or systematic theology itself can first obtain a proper understanding of the idea of the Church on the ground

of exegetical and historical theology, p. 84. In a rigidly formal encyclopædia, the outline of Church history given on pp. 84–94 is not in place. To the student commencing his theological course it certainly opens up the points of view most important for his studies; but to Rothe's ideal of the future, which results from the predominatingly ethical bearing of his theology, and to the notion of the final absorption of the Church in the universal human fellowship of the State, and so of Church history in the science of universal history, we cannot give our assent. Ecclesiastical archæology, as the history of worship and of ecclesiastical and Christian customs, Rothe *rightly* regards as extending up to the time of the Reformation, p. 99; while he limits patristics to the so-called Church Fathers, although he quite admits the significance of prominent personalities generally in the results of Church history, p. 82. Among the sciences subsidiary to Church history, Rothe mentions, among the rest, the general history of religion. He has not, however, assigned it a separate place in his theological system. This is to be explained from the practical end to which he subordinates theology. But if theology is actually to be developed as a science, and not to fall behind the time, nor to leave the tasks assigned it in the present unperformed, it will be obliged to set down the general history of religion in its programme, and that indeed in immediate connection with exegetical theology, which is itself essentially the history of religion. Hence it is self-evident that exegetical theology has the general history of religion for its presupposition, and has to take from this just as much as is indispensable, in order, by a comparison with the non-biblical religions, to promote the historical understanding of biblical religion. And then, in connection with systematic theology, which is founded upon the essential content of exegetical theology, it has to fall back upon the idea of Christianity; and then again, for the illustration of this, it must fall back upon the essential contents of the non-Christian religions.

III. Positive Theology. That it belongs to the complete exposition of Church history to represent the whole ecclesiastical domain of the present according to its doctrine and according to its condition as a communion, is undeniable. Whatever, then, is present in Church history itself relative thereto, is met with in it only sporadically, and demands a separate comprehensive exposition. For this purpose Rothe sets down under his positive theology three branches, dogmatics, symbolics, and statistics. These have, according to the particular Church standpoint of Rothe proceeding from the evangelical Church, the task of characterizing the present condition of the separate Churches. Dogmatics has therefore to set forth the doctrine of the evangelical Church of the present; symbolics or comparative dogmatics have to represent the doctrinal systems of the other Churches; while for statistics, such a division is not required, but it has rather to extend itself impartially to all the Churches. I have already on a former page, when speaking in reference to speculative theology, sought to show that dogmatics is to be regarded, not as a branch of Church history, but as a branch of speculative or systematic theology. Only symbolics and statistics remain here for our consideration, and these are welcome to keep their place, which is simply that of a supplement to Church history, and both are to be regarded as constituting the indispensable presupposition, the one of dogmatics, the other of practical theology. Thus, while both of these branches are to be excluded from Church history proper, they are to be reckoned in historical theology; and it can in no way be shown that of them a separate subdivision of historical theology should be formed under the name of positive theology. We have only to remark that Rothe even here again, although he asserts the principle of the evangelical dogmatics, and the distribution of dogmas determined thereby, p. 100, pays no attention to the formal method so decidedly demanded by him for the encyclopædia. Comparative sym-

bolics and statistics, in consequence of his system, are made by Rothe to solve their problems from the evangelical standpoint. Symbolics have to judge of the doctrinal systems of other Church communions from the point of view of the evangelical system. In an oral lecture, Rothe expounded symbolics differently; and only this conception, according to which comparative symbolics is the exposition of the Church doctrinal systems, viewed from the point of view of the idea of Christianity, and apart from the Church, p. 130 f., can be accepted by us, while it is not in accordance with Rothe's system.

While the two parts of theology already treated, by means of the scientific knowledge of Christianity and of the Christian Church (Rothe ought to have called them more precisely: evangelical Christianity and the evangelical Church), afford qualification for the guidance of the Church, theology has yet finally to set forth the practical rules for the application of the instruction thus gained to the actual guidance of the Church. Inasmuch as practical theology is to be regarded as the theory of the practical efficiency of the clergyman as such, and inasmuch as it can only be, like theology generally, for a particular Church, it is treated by Rothe in connection with the evangelical Church, p. 133 ff. Consequently, Rothe is, in his conception of practical theology, in thorough agreement with Hofmann; but he borrows his arrangement of its parts from Schleiermacher. It falls into two principal divisions, into the science of Church government and the science of the direction of the congregation. The former embraces Church law and polemics, — according to the oral lecture only Church politics, as the theory of Church constitution and of Church government. The second embraces liturgics, homiletics, catechetics, and pastoral training, as the science of the care of souls, p. 137 ff. I can here only repeat what I have already said about Hofmann's practical theology, and what has now been said as to their general agreement,

that practical theology, as a mere theory of technical rules for the churchly efficiency of the theologian or of the clergyman, can claim no place in theological science; and least of all, if it is set forth with reference to any one particular Church, such as the evangelical. Even apart altogether from endlessly manifold forms and manifestations of Church life among the different evangelical national Churches, a general theory for the Church guidance of the evangelical Church could set up only fundamental principles and rules, which would have for this particular Church, indeed, some practical value, but would have no generally valid significance. To such a position of general validity only science can bring it, and therefore practical theology can be a legitimate part of theological science, only when, from the universal Christian standpoint, it represents the practical Churchdom (*Kirchenthum*) in its ideal configuration. From the positions of this science the separate Churches will have to take their fundamental principles and rules, both for the direction of their particular Church affairs, and also for the sometimes needed corrections of this Church position; so that as so conceived practical theology will take the place even of that evangelical Church guidance which Rothe rightly demands, so as to lead the evangelical Church, whether we regard it as a whole or in reference to its individual members, out of antiquated positions into new and better forms.

I have thus subjected the Encyclopædias of Hofmann and Rothe to such a thorough criticism, just because they offered the opportunity of stating clearly the most important questions regarding encyclopædia, and testing in regard to them my own standpoint. To the advanced student these theoretical discussions will not seem unimportant: for the question is about the restoration and more complete development of an independent theological science. As the evangelical Church alone is the field upon which such a theology can exist, so is it also the field upon which pre-

eminently the results thereof can live and thrive. It is my conviction that this end cannot be reached when theology from the first is set in the service of a confession, or from the first in the service of a practical churchly end. The relationship indicated in the latter proposition is rather to be reversed. Theology is not to be reduced to a mere means of Church service, but the Church service is rather the means by which the truth accepted and acknowledged by theology is to be conveyed to the life. If the former relationship be maintained, and the primacy awarded to the Church, then it cannot but follow, and it actually does follow, that the most hurtful consequences for the practical life of the Church will result.

APPENDIX B.

Remarks on Criticisms by Dr. W. Grimm.

I cannot pass over without a few remarks a treatise by Dr. W. Grimm that has just appeared in Hilgenfeld's *Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie for* 1882, under the title, "Zur theologischen Encyclopædia." In the first section, the classification of the theological sciences is discussed. I have to thank Dr. Grimm for a notice of my Theologic in the *Protestantische Kirchenzeitung of* 1880, and rejoice to find that in general and in essential matters we are agreed. In regard to most of the exceptions which he feels himself obliged to take to my work, and which he repeats in the treatise referred to, I must confess myself still unconvinced. Christian theology is for him, as it is for me, the science of Christianity, but he proceeds to distinguish it as evangelical and Catholic theology, "in so far as it is conducted in accordance with the fundamental principles of Protestantism or Catholicism," p. 4. But why, we may at once ask, only distinguish theology as evangelical and Catholic, and not also as Greek-orthodox, Lutheran, Calvinistic, Arminian, Methodistic, Quakerish, and Moravian, in so far as the theology is prosecuted in accordance with the principles of any one of these denominations? It is with evangelical theology that Grimm is concerned. As the science of Christianity, theology has first of all a historical division, and "seeing that, according to the formal principle of Protestantism, Holy Scripture must constitute the historical foundations of our faith, the

original form of Christianity or primitive Christianity will be a principal subject of study; and consequently, the history of primitive Christianity and its Old Testament premisses, or the so-called exegetical theology, will constitute the first main division of historical theology," while the history of the Christian religion and Church, that is, what is commonly called Church history, will form the second. Grimm therefore declares himself decidedly opposed to the fourfold distribution of theology, according to which exegetical theology is distinguished from historical theology as a separate principal division. He dismisses the arguments by which Hagenbach would vindicate this separation, because he thinks that "the fourfold distribution can be justified only from the point of view of a rigid conception of inspiration." Since he also refers to me along with Hagenbach as one who follows the old fourfold distribution, I might fairly have expected that he would have mentioned, and sought to disprove, the grounds upon which I do this. In the critical notice, too, he simply maintains against me, that the separation of exegetical from historical theology can be justified only by adopting the strictest notion of inspiration, p. 260. Now even in the often unavoidable brevity of a critical notice this silence would be quite excusable; but when it occurs in a special treatise on the subject, it is certainly calculated to leave the impression that I had assigned the first main division to exegetical theology for the very same reasons as Hagenbach, in consequence of, if not a strict and rigid, yet at least a mild, theory of inspiration. Now all this is far from being the case. My procedure has been determined by reasons altogether different. In opposition to Grimm, too, who has not attended to them, I must maintain these grounds, and disapprove of the combining of exegetical and historical theology favoured by him. In the Theologic I have proved by means of the history of encyclopædia, that the entire historical development of theology points to the fourfold distribution of the theological

system, but that from the want of a definite principle it did not reach any agreement in regard to the arrangement of the four divisions, and that, if such a principle is to be gained, all subjective, and therefore all dogmatic, pietistic, confessional, and philosophical interests must be avoided, and that we must proceed only from a historical point of view. Compare *Theologic*, § 20. I, as well as Grimm, have defined the task of exegetical theology as the attainment of a knowledge of primitive Christianity, and I have insisted that theology should begin with exegetical theology. But reasons must be given for making such a beginning. If one places himself at the standpoint of the Church, and, as Grimm does, vindicates his beginning with exegetical theology by a reference to the formal principle of Protestantism, then he is approaching his subject with a churchly presupposition. One occupying another Church point of view may very reasonably demand another starting-point. The beginning referred to can obtain an objectively scientific foundation only from a consideration of the object of theology. In so far as theology is the science of Christianity, it must above all seek to comprehend the object originally given it, that is, primitive Christianity. Now one might probably say, if only the right beginning be made, it matters not whether one place exegetical theology by itself alone, or in connection with historical theology. This, however, is not a matter of indifference. Primitive Christianity as such is, in its historical significance, the basis of the whole range of the affairs of the Christian Church. In the very fact of its strict primitiveness lies the normative significance which it has for the Church generally, and therefore also for theology, so that in this connection it is characteristically distinguished from the development of the Church which proceeds from it; and therefore, also, exegetical theology and Church history are characteristically distinguished from one another, although they both fall under the category of the historical. From the objectively historical stand-

point, therefore, the demand has to be made, that theology should give expression to this distinction in its scheme of distribution.

Grimm is right in placing systematic theology after historical theology, and in declaring himself against those encyclopædists who place it at the head, or assign it a position under historical theology. He is also quite determined as to its task, which is to give to the idea of Christianity its scientific expression. As branches of systematic theology he mentions apologetics, polemics, and irenics. In this I cannot agree with him. If systematic theology, in treating the three branches which I have assigned to it—the theory of religion, dogmatics, and ethics—proceeds in the right way, its procedure will also be essentially apologetical, polemical, and irenical, and so it will embrace in itself the fundamental principles of these three branches. The actual application of these, however, according to present arrangements, belongs to the practice of the Church, and hence its theory is most properly relegated to practical theology. Even the name "systematic theology" I should not care to exchange for that of "didactic scientific theology" (*Lehrwissenschaftliche Theologie*), which is preferred by Grimm. To the former name no objection can be taken; for although the whole range of theology, and so all its three divisions, must be systematic, still theology as exegetical and historical has to treat the idea of Christianity in its historical aspect, while this, on the other hand, has to treat it in and for itself systematically, so that here too the *a potiori fit denominatio* applies.

Practical theology, which Grimm ranks as the third principal division, is defined by him as "the scientific direction as to how, by means of the official activity of the clergy, the idea of Christianity is to be realized in the Church," p. 13. In opposition to this definition we must at once ask, Is it only by means of the official activity of the clergy? In this respect Grimm completely falls back upon the old conception of prac-

tical theology, and does not even rise to the extension of that conception reached by Hofmann and Rothe, who refer to "theologians" and "clergymen." The Churchman, according to Grimm, meets with certain instruments by means of which he is to perform his task, and also especially, we add, certain functions which consequently he is under obligation to discharge. How then does it stand, we must next ask, in regard to these instruments and functions? Is it not pre-eminently the task of practical theology to define those churchly instruments and functions, which must have their place in the Church, in order that the idea of Christianity be realized, and that then from these there may result of itself the activity which theologians, church officers, clergy, and laity have to exercise upon the task assigned them by the Church? According to that definition, and according to the admission, which is made even by those who agree to it, that practical theology adds nothing new to the contents of theological knowledge, we cannot reckon this as a division of theological science, still less, with Grimm and Schleiermacher, as the crown of all theological science.

After making this distribution of theology according to its principal divisions, Grimm proceeds, in the second section of his treatise, to treat specially "of the schematism of the exegetical branches." Grimm acknowledges the difficulty which lies in the way of a right arrangement of the exegetical branches. A division into two principal classes seems to him most serviceable: (1) Heuristic, which are directed to the finding of the object; and (2) Reproductive or expository, whose task it is to reproduce and expound primitive Christianity and its Old Testament premises according to a scientific presentation. Under the first division he includes—(1) knowledge of the biblical languages; (2) biblical archæology; (3) biblical literary criticism; and (4) biblical hermeneutics. Under the second division he places—(1) biblical history, as the history of the Old Testament, or of the people of Israel,

and as the history of the New Testament, the history of the life of Jesus, and the history of the apostolic age or New Testament times; (2) the history of biblical literature; and (3) the history of biblical religion. Exegesis excepted, Grimm has recognised the same branches which I have assigned to exegetical theology, and has also with me admitted that the so-called Introduction to the Holy Scripture is embraced in the history of biblical literature, and the so-called biblical theology in the history of biblical religion. But I fail altogether to find any definite principle in his arrangement of the exegetical branches by means of which they might be brought into a systematic form. The principle which I have followed is also here again the purely historical. In a note to p. 14, Grimm reproaches me for having assigned the first place to hermeneutics. But this is what I regard as absolutely necessary. If exegetical theology has the historical task of reaching unto a knowledge of primitive Christianity, and can gain this only by means of an exposition of the biblical writings, surely it is pre-eminently requisite that the exegete be acquainted with the fundamental principles and rules according to which he has to proceed; and Grimm himself defines hermeneutics as the "scientific guide to the right exposition of the Bible," p. 17. Since, then, it treats of the knowledge of a historical object, the chief and most fundamental principle which hermeneutics has to lay down is this, that the exegete must proceed historically in his exposition. From this there spring spontaneously the several auxiliary sciences requisite for the exegete, in order that he may reach his end, the representation of primitive Christianity,—an end to which he does attain in the history of biblical religion. The history of biblical literature and biblical history fall, therefore, according to this point of view, under the exegetical auxiliary sciences. While, then, hermeneutics is the pure theory of exposition, exegesis is the theory of exegetical practice. Both branches might be bound together as a system, but for encyclopædic treatment it appears

more suitable to assign to exegesis a separate place, because the use which the exegete has to make of his auxiliary sciences can evidently be best indicated in this way. If Grimm should then ask where in my representation of the exegetical branches is the history of the apostolic age or New Testament times to be found, I can only answer that it is just to be found precisely where he himself places it, that is to say, under the Jewish history. Just as little as Grimm can I regard the history of the New Testament times as a separate branch, but only as a section of the Jewish history; whereas the life of Jesus, because of the significance which it has for the whole range of theology, I have set by itself as a separate branch. As to the history of biblical religion, Grimm thinks that I demanded something "unnatural when I expressed myself willing to adopt as the first principal division of the history of biblical religion a history of the extra-biblical pre-Christian religions collectively, in order that by a comparison of them with Christianity that might be proved to be the absolute religion." Grimm himself regards even the general history of religion as only an indispensable auxiliary science to theology. If, however, it is even this, the question arises, At what point is it to be called in to the help of theology? Grimm considers that the proving of the unconditional pre-eminence of Christianity above all the other religions belongs to systematic theology, and especially to apologetics. But if this proof is not to be given in a superficial manner, it must buttress itself upon the history of these religions. Upon this ground I believe the history of the extra-biblical religions must be admitted into the history of biblical religion as a special division thereof, in order that systematic theology may refer back to the history of biblical religion both what corresponds to the idea of Christianity and also what is comparable therewith in the contents of pre-Christian religions. I am quite well aware that thereby a serious task is laid upon the history of biblical religion, but I cannot regard my demand as unnatural, since it essentially coincides

with the nature of the history of biblical religion, and also does not appear impracticable, if it be taken in the sense given it in the corresponding passage in Rothe. That the history of biblical religion can scarcely overlook this demand is shown by the most important expounders of the so-called biblical theology in recent times, who have in ever-increasing measure taken notice of the extra-biblical religions, as, for example, Baumgarten-Crusius, pp. 50–62; Hävernick, 1st edition, pp. 18–28; H. Schultz, 2nd edition, pp. 40–58; Ewald, vol. i. pp. 210–286; Oehler, vol. i. §§ 5–8. In the present condition of the general history of religion, it seems to be agreed to grant this study a prominent place in the theological system. Grimm, however, attributes to me the intention of proving Christianity to be the absolute religion by means of a comparison of the extra-biblical religions with Christianity. Much rather, according to my clearly expressed purpose, the comparison has first of all to aid in setting forth Christianity from the whole development of historical religion as the most perfect religion, and so to afford a historical proof of the truths of Christianity. On the other hand, I am thoroughly at one with Grimm in this, that the absolute pre-eminence of Christianity in relation to the other religions is to be proved by means of systematic theology. This, however, is not to be done, as Grimm requires, by means of apologetics, but by means of all the three branches of systematic theology as set forth by me. Hence may even Islam, according to Grimm's wish, although it be no original religion, be taken into account. Among the pre-Christian religions I could not consistently mention it, but the charge is altogether unfounded which Grimm in his critical notice brings against me, that in my book I have not spent a single thought upon it. The truth is rather this, that I have referred to it at the proper place in the section on Church history, briefly indeed, so that Grimm might easily overlook it, yet, as I believe, characterizing exhaustively its essential nature.

In the third section, Grimm speaks of "theology as a positive science." He divides the sciences into—1. Pure sciences, which bear their end in themselves, and therefore may also be learnt for their own sakes; to these belong—(1) sciences of reason, and (2) sciences of experience; and 2. Positive sciences, or applied sciences of experience, of which the purpose is the accomplishment of a practical task, conditioned and given by means of empirical relations. I regard this division as false in fact, and contrary to the usage of language. For the sciences of experience do not belong to the pure sciences, just because they are concerned with experience, and according to the usage of language one enumerates among positive sciences those which find their subject as something actually given or positive. These sciences of experience can never become pure sciences, sciences which bear their end in themselves; such sciences of experience are sciences which in the object given them possess an idea or a principle, which they are in a position to construct into a united, therefore systematic organism, which does not exclude their serving also a definitely practical end. Other sciences of experience of which the object is not such an idea or such a principle, will be able to attain only to a scholarly instruction or to a mere doctrine in regard to some practical end. To the former sciences also belongs theology, which is in this sense a positive science, and so indeed a science of experience, but a science which bears its end in itself, and because it realizes its own purely scientific end, the knowledge of its subject, it also serves other ends lying outside of it. Now Grimm, in agreement with Schleiermacher, makes the term positive identical with applied or practical, and regards those sciences as positive which are associated by means of their practical task, by which their parts are bound together into one scientific organism. Among these Grimm reckons theology; the Church service, according to Schleiermacher the Church guidance, is the task to be accomplished by it, and to this end theology constitutes itself

with the help of other sciences of experience into the unity of an organic whole. In a note on p. 27, Grimm brings the charge against me, that in my *Theologic*, at § 15, I have failed to recognise this. In this, however, he is wrong, for I have not failed to recognise it, but have actually pointed it out as false. The bond, by means of which theology is made a united organism, is the idea of Christianity given it, but not the Church service; and all the acquirements which theology embraces in itself are to be regarded as theological only on account of their more or less intimate connection with that idea, but not on account of their connection with the Church service. It bears, therefore, in itself the principle which organizes it into a science, and has, as science, no other end than the cognition of Christianity as the absolute religious truth. I therefore agree completely with what Hofmann says in his *Encyclopædia*, p. 20 f., as I have already said. Grimm sees in this "a mere *doctrinaire* way of talking;" but I, for my part, believe that in this way the precise scientific character of theology is maintained. Grimm, on the other hand, appeals to experience, "according to which theological science as a whole is pursued for no other purpose than for qualifying for the clerical calling." According to this, then, the whole of theology would be nothing else than a scientific guide to clerical qualification, and this definition of it would completely coincide with the definition which Grimm gives of practical theology. Seeing, then, that we have been obliged already to exclude the practical theology so conceived from the realm of theological science, the theology so conceived must also be excluded from the range of the sciences. On the other hand, I might refer Grimm to another experience. Do the academical representatives of theology, the exegete, the Church historian, the dogmatist, the ethicist, urge on the work of the separate faculties wrought by them with a reference to Church service? Does not rather every one seek, quite independent of any practical results whatever, to

administer his department in the service of the truth, that is, in a purely scientific way? And this, too, should be true of students of theology. Just by means of a scientific acquaintance with Christian truth should they be qualified for their future calling. In my *Theologie* I think I have proved in a satisfactory way, that, in following this path, theology pursues its purely scientific end, and at the same time serves a churchly end. But even Grimm himself, in his distribution of theology, seems not to have been conscious of his conception of it as a positive science. According to Schleiermacher and Rothe, whom he follows, theology as a system is to be distributed by means of the reference to the practical churchly end. Grimm, on the other hand, gives the first place to exegetical theology on the ground of a Protestant principle, and assigns to the following divisions, Church history and systematic theology, purely scientific tasks, unmindful of his own doctrine, that the Church service is the bond which has to render theology a united organism.

Theology has to administer its office in the service of Christian truth; it has to start from the idea of Christianity (*exegetical theology*); it has then to follow the course of this idea in its real historical development (*historical theology*); it has then to prove this idea in its absolute truth (*systematic theology*); and finally, it has to show this idea in its ideal realization by means of the instrumentality of the Church (*practical theology*). In performing this work it will vindicate its right to a place on equal terms among the other sciences, and will rightly secure its position in the general scientific organism. In my *Theologie* I have made an attempt to contribute to this scientific construction of theology in constant connection with the life of the Church. Individuals, indeed, can only offer slight contributions to the great scientific whole; but even a minor contribution will be helpful in leading science in its continuity on to fuller perfection.

APPENDIX C.

The Place of Apologetics in the Encyclopædia.

BY THE EDITOR.

To some it may seem a disadvantage to have no separate section in the encyclopædia assigned to apologetics. It ought, however, to be remembered that the refusal of a special division in the encyclopædia to apologetics does not by any means imply any failure to appreciate the significance of apologetical studies, and their right to rank among the most important labours of the scientific theologian. The question simply is, which of these possible methods of treatment will best secure the scientific elaboration of apologetical material,—giving apologetics a place co-ordinate with exegetical, historical, systematic, and practical theology, or excluding it from three of these, and placing it under the other, or, without assigning it a separate place, recognising apologetical elements in the exegetical, historical, and systematic departments?

The first of these methods has been, it would seem, formally proposed only by one encyclopædist. König proposes a fivefold distribution of the theological sciences, prefixing apologetical theology to the four divisions ordinarily recognised. It seems hard to conceive of any apologetical matter that does not directly owe its derivation to one or other of the theological departments that follow. A preliminary treatment of apologetics can only be a summary of presuppositions to be made good by the exegete, the historian, and the dogmatist. If,

again, apologetical theology be introduced after these other departments, it can only be regarded as a summary of results gathered from these departments.

In various ways, and by theologians occupying very different standpoints, endeavours have been made to classify apologetics according to the second of the methods above referred to. Schleiermacher, and after him Rothe, regard apologetics as a branch of philosophical and speculative theology. Schleiermacher makes philosophical theology consist in apologetics and polemics, and conceives of these as outworks of theological science, constituting the propædeutics of theology. Hagenbach fairly charges this arrangement with unduly isolating apologetics, and preventing it acquiring the rich material derivable from systematic theology. According to Rothe, apologetics is the science in which the *stamina* of a speculative theology are first found; but he ultimately reaches the conclusion that a properly developed speculative theology is itself the truest and most scientific system of Christian apologetics (Rothe, *Encyclopædie*, p. 33 ff.). This is just a repetition of König's endeavour to prefix an apologetics to the general theological system, and here, too, it suffers from its being unable to take advantage of the discoveries in exegetical, historical, and positive theology.

Hagenbach and Lange associate apologetics most intimately with systematic theology. This is also done by Kübel in Zöckler's *Handbook of Theological Science*. Hagenbach regards apologetics as the science which affords justification for the presumption of the truth of the Christian faith from which dogmatics start. Hence he regards it as essentially an introduction to dogmatics, to which, therefore, a section in systematic theology must be assigned (Hagenbach, *Encyclopædie*, § 81, Eng. trans. p. 403 ff.). Lange, again, distinguishes a philosophical, a positive or ecclesiastical, and an applied dogmatics. In philosophical dogmatics he recognises four *stadia*: 1. Philosophy of religion; 2. Natural theology; 3. Apologetics;

and 4. Prolegomena or introduction to dogmatics (Lange, *Encyclopædie*, pp. 168–173). The whole of Lange's philosophical dogmatics evidently is in the wider sense an introduction to dogmatics, and thus his disposition of apologetics is practically the same as that of Hagenbach. Kübel, on the other hand, although, in accordance with the editorial arrangement of the theological departments of the *Handbook*, he allows his treatise on apologetics to precede those on dogmatics and ethics, which are by other hands, assigns to the science a place between dogmatics and ethics. Apologetics [illegible]ves that Christianity, which is represented in dogmatics, is that which man needs in order that he may attain unto eternal life, and so prepares the way for Christian ethics (Zöckler's *Handbuch*, Bd. ii. p. 506). In the *Handbook*, again, Cremer and Zöckler revert to the position of Hagenbach, and in the introduction to dogmatics treat of the presuppositions of Christianity, grounds of Christian certainty, and sources of Christian knowledge, as the *prinzipienlehre* of dogmatics. As placed by Hagenbach, Lange, and Zöckler, apologetics is deprived of all the rich apologetical material derivable from dogmatics and ethics, and while, according to Kübel's arrangement, it may avail itself of dogmatics, it is unable to use the contents of ethical science. Notwithstanding all such arguments against placing apologetics in advance of dogmatics, Christlieb, in his article on this subject in Herzog's *Real-Encyclopædie*, maintains that immediately before dogmatics and ethics, as a groundwork and preliminary statement of principles, is the proper position of apologetics (Herzog, 2 Aufgabe, Bd. i. p. 547). This he does on the ground that, while it is necessary that exegetical and historical theology should have furnished their rich materials for the construction of an apologetical system, the elaboration of dogmatics and ethics need not be presupposed, inasmuch as it is with principles established in the first two divisions of theological science that apologetics has to do.

Yet another proposal has been made in accordance with

this method of placing apologetics under one or other of the four theological departments. The Dutch theologian Doedes and Hofmann assign it a place under practical theology. In reviewing Hofmann's Encyclopædia, Rabiger expresses himself somewhat favourably in regard to this proposal. Inasmuch as according to Hofmann's definition practical theology has no proper place within the range of the theological sciences, the placing of apologetics there as a sort of appendix to the other theological departments allows it to gather up the apologetical elements from all the properly theological departments. This conception of practical theology, however, is altogether improper. When practical theology is defined and treated as an integral part of theology, the ranking of apologetics under it clearly implies an undue limitation of its scope. According to Doedes, practical theology is the science which sets forth the theory of the present condition and attitude of the Christian Church. He distinguishes an esoteric and an exoteric practical theology. The esoteric embraces the ordinarily recognised branches of practical theology in the narrower sense, and has reference to those who are within the pale of the Church,—born in it and in sympathy with it. The exoteric embraces the different forms of Christian activity in reference to those who are outside of the pale of the Church, —born outside of it, as heathens, or out of sympathy with it more or less, as unbelievers in the truth of Christianity. The sciences which deal with these two subjects are named respectively halieutics and apologetics. Thus apologetics is placed by Doedes under exoteric practical theology, and defined as the vindication or justification of Christianity against opposers. Here the idea of apologetics is unduly limited, and the science is practically identified with polemics. Hofmann, again, who assigns to apologetics the same place in the encyclopædia, fixes yet more rigidly the limits of the science. Instead of an exoteric practical theology, Hofmann has an extra-official development of theological activity which undertakes the

defending and the counselling of the Church. Under the former we have apologetics and polemics; under the latter, buleutics. "Apologetics directs itself to that which is outide of Christianity; polemics, to that which is outside of the Church of a scriptural confession; buleutics addresses itself to the Church of the true confession itself." This is similar to Sack's distinction, according to which apologetics appeals to heathen or infidel thinkers, polemics to heretical Christian thinkers, and dogmatics to Christian thinkers who take their place within the Church and accept the Church doctrine. The view of Kübel, however, which we have quoted above, according to which apologetics proves Christianity to be that which meets man's deepest needs, and so addresses itself persuasively or assuringly to men, be they believers or unbelievers, affords a much truer conception of the scope of the science. As thus conceived, its range is very comprehensive. It is only a part of such a system of apologetics that can be treated in any one section of the encyclopædia, where it is limited to an appeal to those who are out of sympathy with, and in direct opposition to, the revealed truth of Christianity. This, in short, is no more entitled to the exclusive use of the name apologetics than are the prolegomena to dogmatics, or the statement of principles prefixed to Christian ethics.

Rübiger very properly associates apologetical functions, in an altogether special manner, with systematic theology in its several sections; but, inasmuch as no system of apologetics is fixed down at any point in the distribution of the theological sciences, he is able, as he goes along, to utilize all the resources of theology in all its departments for the defence of Christianity.

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